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Summary  
 
This thesis aims to examine the effects of education expansion on labour market outcomes 
in the waged sector in Indonesia between 2000 and 2014 (the conditions before and after 
the education reform) using the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) data.  
Chapter 3 finds the return to education increases with education level based on Mincer 
wage equation with OLS model. However, the return to education tends to decline for 
most education levels during the period of education expansion, consistent with an 
increase in the supply of educated labour. By sector, the return to education is generally 
higher in the public sector than in the private sector, possibly due to the lack of 
competition in the former. The findings are robust to accounting for the endogeneity of 
education and selection into the labour market.  
Chapter 4 analyses both undereducation and overeducation resulting from education 
mismatch. It is found that the mismatch increases with the main driver being the increase 
of undereducation between the periods, based on Realised Match (RM) – mode and mean. 
This study also finds that education mismatch is determined by age, sector and firm size 
based on the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model; consistent with the Assignment Models. 
Yet, the determinants are sensitive to the different methods used, the sector/gender and 
the periods. 
Chapter 5 finds both overeducation and undereducation incidences affect the labour 
wages, based on the Overeducation–Required–Undereducation (ORU) model (Duncan 
and Hoffman, 1981) with several panel methods. The return to one year of surplus 
schooling is the same with the return to an additional year of required schooling, and the 
return to one year of deficit schooling is negative and significant with the absolute value 
lower than the return to an additional year of required schooling. The results are sensitive 
to accounting for unobserved individual heterogeneity (fixed effects).  
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Chapter 1 General Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Background 
The relationship between education and the labour market has been studied extensively 
by economists over recent decades and across a range of countries, including Indonesia. 
These studies have been motivated mainly by a search for the causes of wage disparities 
in the labour market between individuals with different education levels rather than skills. 
Indonesia is one of the largest economies in Southeast Asia with a population of around 
249 million people; this makes the country the world’s fourth most populous. Moreover, 
the country has a rather young population with around half of the total population below 
the age of 30 years. Combined, these two features imply that Indonesia currently has a 
large labour force, around 68 per cent of the total population in 2000 which then increases 
steadily to 69 per cent or around 125.3 million people in 2014. As such, the human capital 
development becomes indispensable if the country wants to achieve a sustainable 
economic growth. Furthermore, one key element of the human capital formations is 
formal education.  
On the supply of labour, the proportion of labour force with higher education 
qualifications increases. According to the labour force survey data from 2007 and 2017, 
the proportion of labour force with senior high school qualifications increases 
significantly from 17.14 per cent in 2007 to 30.84 per cent in 2017. The proportion of 
workers with undergraduate qualifications also increases from 2.53 per cent in 2007 to 
7.48 per cent in 2017. However, the non-schooling population still persists, accounting 
for around 4.5 per cent of the national population (aged 15 years or older) in 2016 (World 
Development Indicators, 2016). The Net Enrolment Rate (NER) data of the senior high 
school and university levels also confirms this increasing trend, from 7.9 per cent in 2000 
to 20.18 per cent in 2014 for university level; and from 39 per cent to 59 per cent for 
senior high school level in the same period.   
On the demand of labour, education becomes the most important factor in career 
progression, particularly in the formal sector; 40 per cent of the job vacancies formally 
registered with employment in public offices requires minimum qualifications of tertiary 
education, a further 40 per cent requires job seekers to have completed high school and 
20 per cent requires junior high school qualification or lower (Allen, 2016). This is 
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consistent with the economic transformation from agriculture and manufacturing to the 
service sectors. Thus, there exists a gap between the labour demand and supply 
characteristics.  
Despite the education expansion, one of the education problems in Indonesia is the 
persistence of low-quality education. Students who take part in the Indonesian 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)1 perform below the 25th 
percentile of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/OECD’s 
average (World Bank, 2018). Compared to the neighbouring countries, Vietnam and 
Malaysia are in the 25th -50th percentile; and Singapore leads in the 75th percentile. This 
low education quality is related to the relationship between the public and private schools 
in the country. Private schools play an important role in complementing the state-provided 
education and in helping to meet the demands that the public-school system has been 
unable to meet, particularly in poor and rural areas, and at the levels of schooling above 
basic education. However, the quality of the education offered in private schools is 
generally lower than in public schools, with an exception to elite private schools catering 
to wealthier families (Tobias et al., 2014). Low education quality and low education level 
of the population could affect workers performance in the labour market, since they face 
more difficulties in accessing quality and highly productive jobs. In fact, Indonesia’s 
value of labour productivity is around USD 24.3 in 2015, which is still lower than 
Thailand (USD 26.5), Malaysia (USD 55.7), and EU15 (USD 81.3)2.  
The government has implemented many policies to improve both school attendance and 
education quality since the 1970s. The first massive education policy is the 61,000 
primary school’s construction programmes during 1973-1978, followed by the six-year 
compulsory education for primary school in 1984. This was then extended by the nine-
year compulsory education in 1994 and supported by an abundant allocation for education 
expenditure from the total government expenditure (20 per cent), which manifests in 
school grants programs, scholarship system for students from poor families, teacher 
certification programmes, and revisions of the curriculums.  
 
1 PISA is the OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment. Every three years it tests 15-year-
old students from all over the world in reading, Mathematics and science. The tests are designed to gauge 
how well the students master key subjects in order to be prepared for real-life situations in the adult world 
(OECD, 2018). 
2 Labour productivity level by individual worker’s GDP at constant basic price per worker, using 2011 PPP 
and reference year of 2015. Data source: APO Productivity Database (2017).  
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Although these policies have good aims and comprehensive concepts, but the challenges 
are in the implementations. The school construction programme is relatively successful 
in increasing the primary education participation at the national level (Duflo, 2001 and 
Suryadarma and Rogers, 2004). In contrast, the nine-year compulsory education has a 
slower progress than the six-year compulsory education and the school construction 
programme (Suryadarma et al., 2006 and Lewis and Nguyen, 2018). Meanwhile, the 
teacher certification programme may have improved the teachers’ living standard as an 
increase in remuneration is an elemental part of it. However, it does not necessarily 
increase the teachers’ skills or the students’ learning performance (Fahmi et al., 2011 and 
the World Bank, 2018).  
These challenges in policy implementations could affect the education sector as well as 
the labour market outcomes. As a result, the return to education decreases between 1993 
and 2007/08 (Purnastuti et al., 2013). Dumauli (2015) argues that one of the possible 
explanations for the decline in the return to education in Indonesia is the low quality of 
the education system which affects the quality of the graduates. This could also result in 
education mismatch in the labour market. In fact, around 3 to 4 out of 10 workers 
experience a mismatch between their attained education and jobs (Antara, 2017). It is 
worth noting that education mismatch could also be led by the job and the worker’s 
characteristics (Battu and Sloane, 2002; McGuinness, 2006; and Filsi et al., 2014), but 
there is still an absence of evidence for this explanation in Indonesia as most studies have 
focused on the education mismatch trend overtime (International Labour Organization, 
2017 and Allen, 2016).    
Education mismatch may lead to an increase in unemployment and cause inefficient 
allocation of the resources invested in education, as well as suboptimal income in 
individual level or even the existence of penalty wage. Such mismatch may manifest in 
overeducation or undereducation, either one will be costly to the economy, the firms and 
the individuals. As a matter of fact, a year increase in the incidence of undereducation 
among young workers is found to decrease productivity (Kampelmann and Rycx, 2012). 
Yet, most studies in Indonesia still focus on the effects of overeducation and 
undereducation on wages for workers with higher education (see e.g. Alisjahbana et al., 
2017). These studies may not be aware that a prominent issue in the labour market in 
Indonesia is undereducation of workers with lower education levels, since around 60 per 
cent of the population has junior high school or lower qualifications. Thus, the present 
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study sets out to analyse the effect of education mismatch on wages from the lowest to 
the highest education levels, to analyse the return to education with the latest data 
available; as well as to analyse the determinants of education mismatch. This study also 
elaborates on the implications of the findings and provides some recommendations to 
minimise the mismatch from individual level as well as related public policies. 
Correspondingly, the President of the Republic Indonesia, Joko Widodo asserts that the 
focus of his second term (2019-2024) will be on the human resource development 
(Kompas, 2019). Hence, the analysis and evidence on the relationship between the labour 
market and education qualifications from this study aim to contribute as considerations 
for policy making in relevant sectors.      
 
1.2 Aims and Research Questions of the Thesis 
Research Aims and Research Questions 
Based on the research background, the objectives and questions asked in this study are 
developed following the recent developments in Indonesia. The present study assumes 
that the education sector expands recently and technology changes rapidly in the country. 
In the supply and demand framework, these factors will decrease the return to education 
and increase overeducation. On the other hand, Indonesia still has problems with the non-
schooling population and the low quality of education. Thus, the relationships among 
return to schooling, mismatch incidence and its return are still worth examining. 
Furthermore, there is still an absence of evidence on the matter in some areas in Indonesia, 
such as the evidence on the determinants of education mismatch. The waged sectors (both 
of the public and private sectors) are chosen for the analysis here since these sectors have 
the same characteristics, namely workers receiving wages regularly. In addition, 
according to ILO (2000), the basis used for distinguishing formal jobs is that they are 
covered by the framework of regulation in terms of the enterprise’s establishment, 
company size (commonly medium and large firms) and official registrations. In terms of 
labour legalisation, the job must subject to the labour law, minimum wage and protected 
in the job contract between employers and employees.     
More specifically, Chapter 2 reviews the education expansion, the education system and 
its development, as well as discusses the education policies and their implementations. 
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The chapter also provides data on the labour market development which support the 
analysis of the next chapters.  
Chapter 3 investigates and further updates the return to education in the waged sectors in 
Indonesia. Specifically, the chapter aims to investigate how the return to education varies 
across education levels and across time (between 2000 and 2014 periods), to provide a 
more systematic model specification of the return to education in Indonesia (including 
religion and ethnicity variables which are rarely observed in previous studies), and to 
provide an extended analysis by separating the sample by gender and sector. The research 
questions of Chapter 3 are: (3.1) What are the estimated returns to education in 2000 and 
2014? (3.2) Do gender and sector affect the return to education? and (3.3) How does the 
return to education change between those periods?  
Chapter 4 examines the determinants of education mismatch (vertical mismatch3) which 
includes overeducation and undereducation in Indonesia. The aims are to investigate and 
to update the existing literature on education mismatch, particularly in the waged sectors 
in Indonesia for the 2000 and 2014 periods; to investigate the variables which affect the 
mismatch in the waged sectors; and to explore the change on the mismatch determinants 
between these periods. The research questions of Chapter 4 are: (4.1) Does education 
mismatch (both undereducation and overeducation) exist in the waged sectors in 
Indonesia? (4.2) What are the estimates of education mismatch in 2000 and 2014? How 
does the aggregate trend of education mismatch change between these periods? Are there 
any distinctions among genders and sectors? (4.3) What are the variables which determine 
undereducation and/or overeducation? And are there any distinctions among genders and 
sectors?  
Chapter 5 examines the effects of education mismatch on wages. The aims of the chapter 
are to investigate the extent to which mismatch incidences affect the wages; to see 
whether overeducated and/or undereducated workers receive lower wages compared to 
matched workers; to see whether mismatch incidences still affect the wages when 
unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account; to investigate the effect of gender and 
sector on returns associated with education mismatch; and to contribute to the existing 
literature on education mismatch and its returns by taking into account the influence of 
 
3 A vertical mismatch occurs when the education level of the employee’s qualification is not the one 
required by the job.  
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unobserved heterogeneity. The research questions of Chapter 5 are: (5.1) Does education 
mismatch (undereducation and/or overeducation) contribute to determine wage in 
Indonesia? (5.2) Considering the unobserved heterogeneity, does education mismatch 
still contribute to determine wage, and (5.3) Do the returns associated with education 
mismatch differ by gender and by sector?  
 
1.3 Summary of Datasets and Methodology 
There are several data sources provided by the government and non-government 
institutions. The Indonesian government, through the official Statistics Bureau, has some 
surveys with large-scale sample, such as The National Socioeconomic Survey 
(SUSENAS) and the National Labour Force Survey (SAKERNAS). There is also a more 
comprehensive database, i.e. The Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS). The IFLS is a 
collaborative effort between RAND Corporations and several institutions in Indonesia. 
The main difference between the data is provided in Section 2.2.1. 
In terms of periods, the survey waves of the 2000 and 2014 are considered when 
examining the effects of the National Education System Law (No. 20 of 2003) and the 
Higher Education Law (No. 12 of 2012) enforcement in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Thus, 
the year 2000 represents the period before the law was enforced and 2014-2015 represents 
the conditions after the law was effective. In Chapter 5, the data from 2007 is added to 
increase the number of individuals and narrow down the gap between periods in the 
analysis, thus allowing the present study to analyse a period of around 7 years of changes 
in wage. Therefore, the conditions before the education expansion period as well as the 
immediate and longer effects of those policies can be addressed. 
In terms of methodologies, Chapter 3 investigates the return to education in the waged 
sectors in Indonesia by using Mincer wage equations with the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) method. Mincer wage equation is commonly used to measure wage, particularly 
in relation with education levels. Mincer equation has been used to estimate wage for 
different countries, specifications, periods and datasets (see e.g. Psacharopoulos and 
Patrinos, 2004). The principle of Mincer equation is derived from the Human Capital 
theory; wage is determined by the worker’s educational attainment and experience, 
excluding training. Meanwhile, the OLS is a simple method to estimate the equations. To 
analyse the trend overtime, the present study tests the equality of coefficients across two 
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models of Mincer wage equation. Thus, the change can be justified. Admittedly, those 
methods have some issues, such as endogeneity and sample selection bias. The 
Instrumental Variable (IV) is used to gauge the role of the omitted variables (particularly 
the ability bias) or the endogeneity problem in the OLS model. Moreover, Two-Step 
Heckman models are used as the corrective measures to avoid the possibility of sample 
selection bias. As such, the results may be considered for the whole target population. 
While ignoring this correction, it means that the result is valid only for the sub-population 
of people who decide to work in the labour market. The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of hourly wages, and the main explanatory variables are education level, 
experience and its squared. The other control variables are relatively more comprehensive 
than previous empirical studies, which comprises of personal characteristics, work 
related, firm size, and regional variable categories.  
Chapter 4 examines the determinants of education mismatch. Unfortunately, there is no 
standard model to be used in this area of interest in the literature. Thus, the present study 
develops a model based on the assignment theory; mismatch is determined by the 
worker’s and job’s characteristics. The dependent variable is match categories (1: 
overeducated, 2: matched; and 3: undereducated). The explanatory variables in the model 
are determined by the explanatory variables mostly used in previous empirical studies 
(see e.g. Battu and Sloane, 2002): personal characteristics, work related and firm size, 
and regional dummy variables. In terms of the mismatch determination, the present study 
applies objective measures, i.e. the Realised Method (RM) by calculating the mode and 
standard deviation. 
The Multinomial Logit Model (MNL) is used as a method to analyse the determinants of 
education mismatch. MNL is also adopted by some studies, such as Kiker et al. (1997). 
The rationale for using MNL is that it allows the analysis of more than two categories of 
the dependent or outcome variables. The model is also used to predict categorical 
placement in or the probability of category membership on a dependent variable based on 
multiple independent variables. Since multinomial logit coefficients can only be 
interpreted in terms of relative probabilities, the present study also provides marginal 
effect (ME) calculation to reach conclusions about the actual probabilities. Sensitivity 
tests of the result are also performed by comparing the mode and mean results, as most 
studies use mean as a base of their analysis. The present study also carries out the 
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multinomial probit (MNP) model and adds casual workers into the dataset and then 
compares those results with the results from MNL (main model). 
In addition, a hybrid occupation category is developed in this thesis to provide a more 
accurate measurement of the overeducated, undereducated and matched categories; and 
to provide a good balance between a strong sample size and reducing the level of 
heterogeneity in roles within occupational grouping. It is worth noting that the definition 
of overeducation or undereducation is relative; an individual defined as overeducated in 
one job may not be so defined in another job. For instance, a worker with 13 years of 
schooling is overeducated if he is an agricultural and animal husbandry worker (the mean 
of the worker’s education is 8.8 years). However, the worker becomes undereducated if 
he works as an engineer (which has an average schooling of 14.55 years).  
Chapter 5 applies the Overeducation-Required-Undereducation (ORU) model proposed 
by Duncan and Hoffman (1981) with a panel analysis. The model is an extension of 
Mincer wage equation with education variables that are decomposed into required years 
of schooling (REQ), undereducated (UE), and overeducated (OE). Thus, the model 
enables exploring the relationship among years of required schooling, years of deficit 
schooling (UE) as well as years of surplus schooling and wage. The model also passes 
statistical testing in several countries for several periods (see e.g. Tsai, 2010 and Dockery 
and Miller, 2012). There are several advantages from using Duncan and Hoffman’s 
model, i.e. the model can provide the estimations necessary to evaluate wage from the 
monetary perspective. The model also allows the analysis of the return to both 
undereducation and overeducation. Moreover, the model offers a better interpretation of 
mismatch and wage relationship; it allows the analysis of economic value to each 
additional deficit or surplus of education, not just higher/lower wages compared to 
matched workers.  
Furthermore, the panel data model provides a main advantage since it can be used to deal 
with unobserved heterogeneity. There are two methods in the panel model, i.e. fixed (FE) 
and random effects (RE). The main distinction between FE and RE is whether or not the 
unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are correlated with the regressors in 
the model, not whether these effects are stochastic or not. The RE model assumes that the 
individual-specific effects are not correlated with the independent variables. Meanwhile, 
the FE model can be used to analyse the impact of the variables that vary over time.  
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The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hourly wages, similar to Chapter 3. 
The main explanatory variables are years of required schooling, years of deficit schooling 
and years of surplus schooling. The other control variables used are job experience and 
its squared, personal characteristics, work related and firm size, and regional dummy 
(similar to previous chapters). And finally, to test the result, the present study employs 
three approaches as the robustness test, i.e. by replacing mode in the main model by mean, 
by using balanced panel data, and by applying an alternative model from Verdugo and 
Verdugo (1989). 
It is worth noting that the control variables across the chapters may different, Chapter 3 
has five religion, six ethnicity, and four firm size dummy variables; Chapter 4 and 5 have 
only two ethnicity (Java or majority and non-majority ethnicity) and three firm size 
variables; these changes is conducted considering the finding and its interpretation in 
previous Chapter; for example: Chapter 4 has some adjustment considering Chapter 3 
result. Similarly, Chapter 5 is conducted considers the results in Chapter 3 and Chapter 
4, the main aim is simplification of analysis.  
 
1.4 Contribution of the Thesis  
This thesis is hoped to contribute to the existing literature by studying the link between 
educational choices and wage in the Indonesian labour market. The main contributions 
are:  
(1) Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the return to education in the waged sector 
includes public-waged sector whereas most empirical research in Indonesia only 
focuses on the return to education in general and on gender disparity. Furthermore, 
the public sector in Indonesia is particularly important, with 4.5 million civil 
servants in 2016. The sector also continues to attract job seekers thanks to their 
appeals, such as: attractive allowances, opportunities to pursue education abroad 
(Masters and PhD levels), flexible working time, clear career paths, and pension 
plans; 
(2) Chapter 3 also contributes empirically in testing Mincer wage equations in 
developing countries with a relatively comprehensive set of control variables, 
consisting of personal and household characteristics, job related and firm size, and 
residence variables. In terms of endogeneity, besides conventional instruments 
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such as parents' education, this chapter provides some alternative instruments to 
deal with ability bias, for instance, policy instruments and health behaviour 
(smoking);    
(3) Chapter 4 provides an analysis of undereducation, both the determinants and their 
relationship with wage. Undereducation becomes an important issue in the 
Indonesian labour market since some studies find that the trend increases (see 
Chapter 4) where more than 60 per cent of the population have junior high school 
or lower educational qualifications. Undereducation incidence indeed affects the 
economy, as an increase of one year in the incidence of undereducation can 
decrease productivity (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981);  
(4) Chapter 4 also provides a model of education mismatch determination based on 
the assignment theory (mismatch is determined by the worker’s and job’s 
characteristics) since there is no standard model in the literature. Moreover, the 
definition of education mismatch is relatively sensitive to occupation digit 
category. Thus, developing a hybrid occupation category that is specifically 
adjusted for the research questions gives a better estimation than the major group 
(1-digit category) or the unit group (4-digit category) of International Standard 
Classification of Occupation (ISOC) in terms of retaining the homogeneity of 
sample with large observation and in maintaining the minimum number of 
observations for the sample with small observation at once. Principally, the hybrid 
category is rearranged by keeping the sub-categories which have relatively large 
number of observations and merging the remaining (particularly sub-categories 
with sample size less than 30 individuals); 
(5) the panel data method used in Chapter 5 can contribute to enrich the methods used 
to analyse wage and education mismatch in Indonesia, since most of the previous 
studies in Indonesia uses a cross-section model (see e.g. Alisjahbana et al., 2017); 
(6) and finally, Chapter 5 also contributes empirically in testing the ORU model in 
developing countries. Considering the sensitive estimation results when using 
panel data methods, a cautious interpretation is needed in this case. Significant 
different results between RE and FE may indicate that the ORU model used in 
this study is relatively sensitive to the panel data methods used. Alternatively, it 
may point that unobserved heterogeneity may affect the wages. 
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis  
The structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 is divided into two parts. The first part 
details the recent developments in Indonesia; the education expansion, the education 
system and relevant policies on education; as well as the labour market developments. 
The second part concerns the data, which provides background of the data selection 
(IFLS), as well as its advantages and disadvantages. Next, Chapter 3 discusses the return 
to education in the waged sectors in Indonesia by using Mincer wage equation. The other 
important aspect of analysis is trend overtime, which is also detailed in the chapter. This 
chapter also provides some robustness test results which address the endogeneity issue 
and the sample selection bias. Turning to Chapter 4, the determinants of education 
mismatch are presented and analysed. The analysis is conducted based on undereducation 
and overeducation. Furthermore, to make the results more reliable, some sensitivity tests 
using other methods (mean and multinomial probit model/MNP) are performed and 
casual workers are added into the dataset. Chapter 5 further elaborates on the effects of 
education mismatch on wage by using panel data. To provide an extended analysis, 
Chapter 3, 4 and 5 perform the models by separating the sample by gender and sector. 
Finally, in the last part of this thesis, Chapter 6 offers the conclusions, implications as 
well as recommendations of this research.  
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Chapter 2 Developing Countries and Indonesia Context 
 
Indonesia is one of the largest countries in Southeast Asia, having the largest archipelago 
in the world which consists of 17,508 islands; five of them are the major islands. The 
country also has a population estimated at 270.63 million in 2019, increases around 5.3 
per cent from the 2015 estimate of 257 million. This also makes Indonesia the 4th most 
populous country in the world, after China, India and the United States (World Bank, 
2019). Currently, the country is considered a middle-income country. With abundant 
human resources, human capital development becomes one of the most important factors 
to develop the country.  
This chapter comprises two parts; the first part is on the country’s context, which 
discusses some issues in the education system, the education expansion, demographics 
and the labour market developments. Those issues set the background and give empirical 
data for the study on the return to education, educational mismatch and its relationship 
with wage. The second part is on the data, which discusses several alternative data that 
are available to be used in analysing the labour market and the education system in 
Indonesia. Moreover, this part also provides some background of the datasets chosen (the 
IFLS) and their advantages as well as disadvantages for the present study.  
 
2.1 Developing Countries and Indonesia’s Context 
2.1.1 The theories of Labour Market in Developing Countries  
The theory that commonly used to analyse in the labour market in developing countries 
is from Wachter (1974) and Cain (1976). The theory stressed that for labour market 
dualism to exist, different wages must be paid in different sector to comparable workers.  
Lewis (1954) in Fields (2005) reveals earnings in the subsistence sector set a floor to 
wages in the capitalist sector, but in practice wages have to be higher than this, and there 
is usually a gap of 30 per cent or more between capitalist wages and subsistence earnings. 
The gap is “illusory” because of the higher cost of living in the capitalist sector, there 
remained a real wage gap due to 1) the “psychological cost of transferring from the easy 
going way of life of the subsistence sector to the more regimented and urbanized 
environment of the capitalist sector,” 2) the payoff to experience in the capitalist sector, 
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and 3) “workers in the capitalist sector acquiring tastes and a social prestige which have 
conventionally to be recognized by higher real wages.” 
Moreover, Kuznets (1955) in Fields (2005) further developed the model of wage dualism 
and intersectoral shifts by exploring how various measures of income inequality would 
change as the high-income sector comes to employ an increasing share of the population. 
All of the inequality measures used by Kuznets exhibited an inverted-U pattern, which 
later came to be known as the “Kuznets Curve.” In additions, Lewis and Kuznets should 
not be faulted for neglecting the human capital issue, because human capital theory had 
not yet been devised when they developed their dualistic development models.  
The more modern labour market dualism literature stressed that for dualism to exist, 
different wages must be paid in different sectors to comparable workers (Schultz (1961, 
1962), Becker (1962, 1964), and Mincer (1962, 1974)). These theories will be elaborated 
in literature review part (Section 3.2). Since the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, a whole 
class of models has arisen in which a wide variety of wages exist in the labour market, 
and workers are presumed to search among employers for the best possible opportunities. 
There are some critics on the dualistic labour market model, such as: lack of a precise 
behavioural interpretation of the results that is the principal shortcoming of the dualistic 
labour market empirical studies (Rosenzweig, 1988); the formal and informal economies 
operated in segmented labour markets and there is limited mobility between the two 
(IADB, 2003). Nevertheless, labour market dualism was a most useful starting point for 
analysing some economies when it was first presented decades ago, and it remains a 
useful characterization of some economies today. 
In the development, the segmented labour market approach divides the markets into three 
components: the formal sector labour market, the informal sector labour market, and the 
links between the two. The first model is the formal sector labour market, Fields (2005) 
presents four alternative models of wages and employment in the formal economy: a) the 
market-clearing labour market model, the standard labour market model; b) models with 
wages set above market-clearing levels for institutional reasons, or model with a 
minimum wage; c) models with wages set above market-clearing levels for efficiency 
wage reasons; and d) models with wages set above market-clearing levels because of 
supply-side considerations. The other models that identified are matching models 
(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999), job creation and destruction models (Davis, 
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Haltiwanger, and Schuh, 1996), ranking models (Blanchard and Diamond, 1994); and 
imperfect information models (Stiglitz, 2002). 
Secondly, informal sector labour market, this is based on the fact that people are working 
informally because they are unable to work formally. Fields (2005) divides the informal 
sector labour market into: the informal economy as a desirable sector and the informal 
economy with its own internal dualism. The previous empirical research reveals that in 
Mexico and other Latin American countries, self-employment in the informal sector may 
be more attractive for a majority of workers compared to work as wage employees in the 
formal sector (Maloney, 2003, 2004; World Bank, 2007). 
And the last component is intersectoral linkages in the labour market. Fields (2011) 
identified some models in this component: (1) a noncompeting groups model in which 
individuals belong to one labour market segment or another, and they cannot or will not 
switch from one to another (as in many human capital models). (2) An integrated labour 
market model which starts with two or more sectors but assumes that all of the 
equilibrating forces that apply to a single labour market with market-clearing also apply 
to a labour market with a multiplicity of sectors, so that wages equalize across sectors; 
nearly all international trade models have such a labour market specification (Krugman 
and Obstfeld, 2003). (3) The crowding model, which assumes that any worker who is not 
employed in the high wage part of the economy takes up employment in the low wage 
part of the economy; the Lewis and Kuznets models mentioned above can be recognized 
as crowding models. (4) One sector maintains higher wages than another, but the two 
sectors are linked via workers’ job search behaviour, such that in equilibrium the expected 
wages associated with the two sectors are equal to one another (Harris and Todaro, 1970). 
(5) Workers choose occupations which maximize their current and future returns, but 
because of imperfect capital markets, occupations that require high levels of investment 
cannot be entered by persons with low initial wealth. 
 
 
2.1.2 Indonesia’s Context: Education Definition and Institutions 
Education Definition 
Based on Law No. 20/2003 on the National Education System, Indonesia’s national 
education system consists of formal, non-formal (e.g. soft skill courses) and informal 
educational systems (e.g. lifelong learning). Formal education includes several types of 
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education such as general, religious, vocational, professional, and special education. It 
comprises several levels, starting from early childhood education, primary school-6 years 
education (with the average age of 7-12 years), junior secondary schools-3 years 
education (with the average age of 13-15 years), senior secondary school-3 years 
education (with the average age of 16-18 years), and higher education.  
 
Education Institutions 
There are two types of junior and senior high schools in the country: general and 
vocational. General senior high schools are aimed at those who intend to go on to 
university, whereas vocational junior/senior high schools are for those who plan to find 
jobs right away. Islamic institutions could also provide those education levels, but the 
difference is those institutions have more Islamic subjects and content in the curriculum, 
as well as provide general subjects such as science and social science modules.  
For vocational high school (SMK), there are 13,710 vocational high schools in 2017/18, 
with 75 per cent of them being managed by the private sector. The tuition fee of SMKs is 
higher than general senior high schools (SMA) since most are managed by private sector 
and they have more laboratories/practice activities (70 per cent of learning activities) 
which require much more cost than SMAs. In terms of location, most SMKs are located 
on Java Island, the most populated island. In terms of their study programmes, most of 
these SMKs specialise in engineering and technology, business and management as well 
as information and communication technology/ICT (SMKs Statistics, Ministry of 
Education, 2017/18).  
For the higher education level, there are five types of institutions, i.e. academy, 
polytechnic, college, institute, and university. The first two specialise in vocational 
education streams, whilst the last three are more comprehensive and allowed to offer all 
education streams. A college (Sekolah Tinggi) is a specialised institution focusing on one 
particular academic discipline. Unlike universities, institutes are specialised in a 
particular group of disciplines such as sciences and technologies, arts, or agriculture.  
Universities always provide education at the level of Sarjana I (Sarjana Stratum Satu, 
S1), equivalent to an undergraduate degree. These programmes have a nominal length of 
4 years. Students are allowed to extend their study duration to a maximum of 14 semesters 
or 7 years). The Sarjana II (Sarjana Stratum Dua, S2) is equivalent to a master degree 
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and requires a minimum of 2 years/39-50 credit points following an undergraduate 
degree, including a research and 8-10 credit points for a final paper. Finally, the PhD 
programme requires 40-52 credits with a nominal duration of 2-2½ years (4-5 semesters) 
for candidates holding a master’s degree. For candidates holding a bachelor’s degree, the 
required amount of credits is 76-88 with a nominal duration of 4-4½ years (8-9 
semesters). Generally, students finish a PhD programme in 3-4 years, following master 
degree (Nuffic, 2017).  
Apart from those three core degrees, universities also offer diploma degrees (higher 
professional education programmes) which require less time than the 4 years programme, 
for instance, diploma 1 requires only one year of higher professional education, diploma 
2 two years, and diploma 3 three years of education. There is also diploma 4 which is 
comparable to the bachelor’s degrees in a similar specialisation. Moreover, most 
Indonesians do not continue straight away from undergraduate to higher-level educations; 
they usually work for several years and return to university for post-graduate programmes 
after possessing working experiences.  
There are several criteria for a public university entry: one must have already graduated 
from a senior high school in the last three years and passed the university entrance exams. 
There are several entrance exams that can be chosen by students such as the public 
university entrance joint selection (usually at the national level), independent selection 
(at the university level) and invitation based (at the university level). The first two 
selections are based on written test. The last selection is based on the grade score, national 
examination score, or other academic achievements. Meanwhile, private university 
entrance process is simpler; only based on their discretion and selection mechanism.  
In additions, based on the Indonesia Report on Standards and Qualifications (2015), there 
is a national qualifications framework under presidential decree in 2012, the Indonesian 
Qualification Framework (IQF), that provides nine qualification levels with each level 
based in four main dimensions: (1) job skills, (2) science or knowledge comprehension, 
(3) capacity to select and apply methods and knowledge and (4) management skills. The 
framework has a strong focus on equivalency and recognizing all pathways to obtaining 
qualifications and promotes recognition of prior learning. 
Indonesian National Certification Agency (BNSP) is established as as a certification 
authority in charge of implementing the certification of personnel and professional 
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competence for labour. Some of their functions are: to give license to LSP by process of 
accreditation to ensure and maintain performance of the certification bodies; to ensure 
implementation of the Qualification Framework certification scheme is in place for 
assessment and certification; to approve the development of the certification scheme, 
especially for clusters and competency units; and to control and monitor certification 
implementation.  
 
2.1.3 Education System and Expansion 
Education System 
In Indonesia, two ministries are jointly in charge of managing the education system, i.e. 
the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) which is responsible for over 80 per cent 
of all students, teachers and schools, and the Ministry of Religion Affair (MoRA) which 
is responsible for the remaining 20 per cent comprising Islamic schools or madrasah 
(Statistics Indonesia, 2019). 
In terms of institutions, the Indonesian education system has diverse providers, with 
private schools estimated to serve 31 per cent of all students and to employ 38 per cent of 
all teachers. Private education also comprises over 30 per cent of upper-secondary 
enrolment and over 80 per cent of tertiary enrolment (Statistics Indonesia, 2019). In 
Indonesia, these schools play an important role in complementing the state-run education 
and help to meet demands that the public-school system has been unable to meet, 
particularly in poor and rural areas and at levels of schooling above basic education. 
However, the quality of education offered in these schools is generally lower than in 
public schools, with the exception of elite private schools catering to wealthier families 
(Tobias et al., 2014).  
Hendajany (2016) compares the effectiveness between public and private schools using 
the national exit exam of Junior Secondary Schools in Indonesia. Using the Indonesian 
Family Live Survey (IFLS) in 1997, 2000 and 2007, this study finds evidence proving 
that graduates of the public school have higher scores on the national exit exam than those 
of the private school, whilst controlling a wide variety of students' characteristics and 
family background. 
Through Ministerial Decree No. 51/2018 regarding the school enrolment zoning system, 
a substantial improvement in school’s quality could be achieves since the regulation 
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ensures a proportional student distribution across schools and thus putting an end to 
parents’ tendency to favour particular schools. The policy is effective for both public and 
private schools, with the exemption of vocational schools due to the limited number of 
schools and majors. 
 
Education Policies and Its Empirical Studies 
Indonesia has had several government policies that may have had a significant effect to 
increase school participation from primary school to university level. The policies for 
primary schools are the school construction program in 1973; the six-year compulsory 
education for primary school in 1984; and the nine-year compulsory education in 1994 
(as an extension of the previous program). A 12-year compulsory education program (the 
Universal Secondary Education) has been planned since 2013, but these plans have not 
yet been implemented due to the associated costs and other reasons (WENR, 2019).  
The first policy that has a significant effect on education development in Indonesia is the 
primary school construction program, known as the Sekolah Dasar INPRES. The 
government launched this program in 1973, based on the Presidential Instruction 10/1973 
with the aim of achieving the equality of primary education across provinces in the 
country. Throughout this program, more than 61,000 primary schools were constructed 
between 1973/74 and 1978/79. This affected the increase of school-per-pupil ratio; an 
average of two schools per 1,000 children aged 5 to 14 in 1971. This program is reported 
as the fastest primary school construction program ever undertaken in the World (Duflo, 
2002).  
Empirically, Duflo (2002) also points out that the school construction program leads to 
an increase in education among individuals who were young enough to attend primary 
school after 1974, but not among the older cohorts. The study uses the number of primary 
schools built between 1974 and 1978 as the instrument and finds an increase of 10 
percentage points in the proportion of primary school graduates in the labour force, which 
increases their formal labour force participation by 4–7 per cent. Suryadarma et al. (2004) 
assert that the government implemented a 6-year Compulsory Education program for the 
first time in 1984, which proved highly successful; by 1988, 99.6 per cent of children 
were either enrolled in primary schools or had finished the six-year compulsory 
education.  
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The other significant policy is the six-year compulsory education for primary-school-aged 
children (the 7-12 years old population), based on the Presidential Instruction Decree No. 
10 of 1973, which was fully implemented in 1984. The term “compulsory” suggests that 
a six-year education should be universal and that every Indonesian child should have the 
right to at least six years of education. As a result, the government was responsible for 
providing adequate educational facilities and went on to build many schools, including in 
remote areas, provided many primary school teachers for these schools. Afterwards, the 
government launched the extension of the six-year compulsory education which became 
the nine-year compulsory education later on. This includes primary and junior high 
schools (the 7-15 years old population).  
Some empirical studies find that this program increases Indonesian children’s basic 
education attainment in terms of primary school and junior high school attendance, given 
primary school completion. Suharti (2013) notes that the gap in education attainment 
between children from poor and rich households becomes non-existent at the primary 
level and continues to narrow down at the secondary level. Thus, those programmes 
successfully increase the school attendance. The program may also affect the decrease in 
the prevalence of child labour in Indonesia. But, the up-to-date data are not available and 
the latest data are from 2009: of the total number of Indonesian children aged 5-17 years, 
namely 58.8 million, it is estimated that 6.9 per cent of them (around 4.05 million) are 
working children and of this figure, 43.3 per cent (around 1.76 million) are child labours 
(Statistics Indonesia and ILO, 2010).  
Compulsory education also improves the quality of education in terms of literacy rates, 
pupil-teacher ratio and international test result (Tobias et al., 2014). The younger 
generation (individuals aged 30 years) also has the highest rates of high school completion 
and more of them have completed tertiary education. Purnastuti et al. (2013) assert that 
the enrolment of each education level has expanded. The participation rate in primary 
schools increased from 79 per cent in 1973 to 92 per cent in 1993. In line with that, 
enrolments at the higher levels of education have also expanded, both as a flow-on effect 
of compulsory basic education and as a result of direct policy initiatives. Meanwhile, 
Suryadarma et al. (2006) argue that the net enrolment rate at the junior secondary level 
in 2004 was 65 per cent, only 10 percentage points higher than a decade earlier; the 
progress is relatively slower than primary schools, in spite of the 9-year Compulsory 
Education program in 1994. This is due to many factors, such as household welfare, sex, 
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religion, and abundant employment opportunities which all lead to low secondary school 
enrolment.  
Lewis and Nguyen (2018) add that the main reasons for the 9-year compulsory 
education’s failure in Indonesia are that the government did not support the initiative with 
sufficient additional funding and that it was lax in enforcing the policy. Despite the 
education expansion, the main problem of low-quality education persists. Akresh et al. 
(2018) analyse the long term and intergenerational effects of school construction 
programme in 1973 and find that parents exposed to the school construction program 
transmit these benefits to the next generation. The effect does not occur during primary 
school, since primary school is almost universal when second-generation individuals 
attend school. Yet, the effects extend throughout the secondary and tertiary education. 
Relative to the baseline levels, the largest impacts are seen in tertiary education with effect 
sizes indicating a 20 per cent to 25 per cent increase in the likelihood of the second-
generation child completing university. 
Besides, regulations related to higher education levels such as the Education Law (No. 20 
of 2003) and the Higher Education Law (No. 12 of 2012) have some significant effects 
on higher education institutions. In particular, it gives greater autonomy over curriculum, 
as well as their management and use of resources. For instance, universities can set their 
own remuneration system based on merit and performance. In addition, the government 
allows foreign entities to invest in the country’s education institutions, albeit in 
conjunction with local institutions. As a result, the autonomous universities started to 
enjoy greater freedom to develop their management systems and to manage their sources 
more efficiently. This law was issued to accommodate the educational demands of tens 
of millions of Indonesians approaching the university age over the coming years, a 
formidable challenge that the government is struggling to tackle on their own. The effects 
of higher education reform are reflected in academic areas such as higher average Grade 
Point Average (GPA) and faster study completion during 2002-2009 periods (Nizam and 
Nurdin, 2014). For instance, an undergraduate degree which normally takes around 8-10 
semesters (4-5 years) to complete has recently been shortened to 6-8 semester (3-4 years).  
Moreover, the Law number 22 of 1999 (later amended by the Law number 32 of 2004, 
and number 23 of 2014) on regional autonomy have implications on the different 
authority levels of schools’ management. The management of public primary and junior 
secondary schools in Indonesia is under the responsibility of the district/city 
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administration. Public general and vocational senior high schools are managed by the 
province administration. The Ministry of National Education only acts as a regulator in 
the field of national education standards.   
 
Teachers 
One of the most important changes is that through the government regulation No. 
74/2008, a teacher is defined as a professional educator whose main duties are to educate, 
teach, guide, train, access, and evaluate students through formal education level, from 
primary education to higher level of education. There are some requirements for teachers: 
(1) they must have teaching certification, adequate physical and mental health, and also 
the capability to achieve the national education goals; (2) they must have academic 
qualification of at least an undergraduate degree (diploma IV or Sarjana) with compatible 
subject study (i.e. primary school education for primary school teachers); and (3) they 
must be competent in pedagogy, personality, social and professional education. Thus, 
primary school teachers who do not have primary school education background must 
pursue another undergraduate degree or a master degree in primary school education. The 
regulation is later revised in 2018, where some requirements such as compatible academic 
qualification and teaching certification are removed (Kompas, 2018).  
Many researchers have explored the relationship between teacher certification and the 
education quality; most of them agree that the certification program may have improved 
teacher’s living standard as a remuneration increase is an elemental part of it. However, 
it does not necessarily improve the teacher’s skills or the student’s learning performance4 
(Fahmi, et al., 2011 and World Bank, 2018). 
There are two types of teachers in Indonesia: in-service5 and pre-service teachers. Pre-
service teachers or temporary teachers work in private and public schools and are paid by 
the foundations. These teachers vary widely in their qualifications. In terms of pay 
structure, Indonesia has two-tier labour market for teacher. The first tier is the in-service 
teachers; those with an undergraduate qualification and already certified earn around IDR 
 
4 Political pressures also watered down the certification process and left only the pay increase in place. 
5 In-service teachers comprise several categories: (1) Public teachers are civil servants who have minimum 
teaching qualifications. (2) Contract teachers are fixed-term teachers who are usually employed through 
(donor-funded) projects and have the same qualifications as public teachers. And, (3) permanent teachers 
are engaged by the foundations to teach in private schools. These teachers’ qualifications vary by the quality 
of the school. 
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7 million per month (GBP 378)6. The second tier is pre-service teachers, the salary is far 
lower than that of the in-service teacher, starting from IDR 300,000 (GBP 16) monthly in 
rural areas. The total budget for teacher’s allowance is more than IDR 60 trillion in 2018 
or around 2.7 per cent of total national spending (Cabinet Secretary, 2018).  
Another issue is the uneven distribution of teachers although nationally there was an 
oversupply of teachers; approximately 55 percent of schools have an oversupply of 
teachers, particularly in most urban areas; 34 per cent of schools are undersupplied in 
remote and rural areas. Moreover, teachers in rural and remote areas tend to have less 
education than their counterparts in urban areas (The World Bank, 2008). 
 
Curriculum and Teaching Style 
With regards to curriculum, the 2013 curriculum has been gradually implemented since 
2014. It interprets a competency-based curriculum which covers attitudes as well as 
thinking, social and cultural skills. The most important aspect is that the curriculum 
advocates student-to-student active learning. The curriculum is sufficient and good, even 
compared to other ASEAN countries; yet, the challenge is in the implementation and the 
pedagogic style.  
In primary to senior high schools, there are many styles of teaching, three of them are (1) 
the conventional way of teaching which has become a culture within schools, teachers 
dominate the class by explaining the subject, with teachers continuing to practice this 
style of teaching from generation to generation; (2) Active, Innovative, Creative, 
Effective and Fun Learning; and (3) Easy, Fun and Enjoyable Learning. By applying the 
active learning method, teaching can be perceived as an activity that involves facilitating 
learning and assisting students to develop their own understandings (Law and Miura, 
2015). However, in the implementation, most teachers apply a curriculum with the 
conventional way of teaching. World Bank (2018) confirms that 60 per cent of the time a 
typical Mathematics class is spent on lecturing, with limited time remaining for practical 
 
6 (Assumed IDR 1 = GBP 18484) Comprises basic salary (the same for all civil servants) which is around 
IDR 2.5 million; professional allowance around IDR 327.000 (GBP 17.7); the certificate allowance of 
around IDR 95 per cent of basic salary; and other allowances (regional performance allowance) which vary 
depending on regions, for example: DKI Jakarta is around IDR 7 million (GBP 378.7), West Java is around 
IDR 2 million (GBP 108.2) in 2018.   
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work or problem-solving exercises. Subsequently, the improvement in education quality 
is not optimal.   
 
Education Quality 
There are several international indicators that are commonly used, such as the human 
capital rank from the World Economic Forum (WEF), PISA and TIMSS scores. 
According to The Human Capital Report 2015 (WEF, 2015), Indonesia ranks 69th out of 
124 countries in terms of human capital development. The report quantifies how countries 
are developing and deploying their human capital and tracks progress over time based on 
education level, skills and employment availability. Compared to its regional peers, 
Indonesia is still left behind Singapore (24th), Malaysia (52nd), and Thailand (57th). 
Meanwhile, PISA, a measurement by OECD which is commonly used for cross country 
comparison, shows that the education quality in Indonesia is relatively low. Its 
performance is in the position below the 25th percentile of the OECD average, as shown 
in Figure 2.1 (World Bank, 2018). Furthermore, based on Trends in International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS)7, Indonesia’s score in international 
mathematics achievement decreases from 411 in 2003 to 397 in 2015. The top achievers 
in 2015 are Singapore (618), Hong Kong (615), South Korea (608), Chinese Taipei (597), 
and Japan (593), while England score is 546 points.  
 
7 TIMSS is an international assessment of mathematics and science at the fourth and eighth grades, 
conducted every four years since 1995. In 2015, 57 countries and 7 benchmarking entities (regional 
jurisdictions of countries such as states or provinces) participated in TIMSS. In total, more than 580,000 
students participated in TIMSS 2015. The majority of TIMSS items assess students’ applying and reasoning 
skills. 
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Figure 2.1: PISA Score for Reading and Mathematics, 2015  
Source: World Bank, 2018.  
 
 
Education Expansion 
Education has been expanding in Indonesia since 1990s, following the success of school 
construction and compulsory education policies, which is reflected by the Gross 
Enrolment Rate (GER)8, as one of education development indicators (Figure 2.2). 
Between 2000 and 2014, the highest increase of GER is at university level (151 per cent), 
from 10.26 per cent in 2000 to 25.76 per cent in 2014. This is followed by senior high 
 
8 GER is defined as the number of students enrolled in a given level of education, regardless of age, 
expressed as a percentage of the official school-age population corresponding to the same level of 
education. For the tertiary level, the population used is the 5-year age group starting from the official 
secondary school graduation age. Alternative measures of GER is NER (Net Enrolment Rate) which 
defined as the total number of students in the theoretical age group for a given level of education enrolled 
in that level, expressed as a percentage of the total population in that age group (UNESCO Institute of 
Statistics, 2019).  
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school, from 50.22 per cent to 73.95 per cent in the same period or around 47.3 per cent 
increase. Correspondingly, the GER of primary school and junior high school in 2014 is 
already relatively high; 109.2 per cent and 89.98 per cent, respectively. Some possible 
reasons for the increase of higher education are the changes in demographic structure with 
decreasing population in the 19-23 years brackets, positively affecting the enrolment rate; 
there is also a recent increase in the number of institutions in higher education 
(Moeliodihardjo, 2013). Even though those programs relatively succeed, non-schooling 
population still persists; around 4.5 per cent of the population (aged 15 years or older) in 
2016 (World Bank, 2016).  
 
Figure 2.2: Education Indicator: Gross Enrolment Rate, 1994-2016 
Source: Statistics Indonesia. 
Notes: Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) is defined as the number of students enrolled in a given level of 
education, regardless of age, for example: GER primary school = number of primary school students divide 
by population aged 7-12-year-old*100.  
The percentage could higher than 100 percent since there is a deviation, primary school student can enrol 
at age 6 (nearly 7) or student age slightly higher than 12-year-old could also still counted in primary school 
for several reason such as resit or delay. 
 
 
Apart from the increase in GER, Gropello and Sakerllariou (2010) confirm that there is a 
dramatic increase of education attainment in Indonesia between 1994 and 2007, in 
particular at senior high school and university levels, as shown in Table 2.1. The 
proportion of workers with university qualifications increases by more than 190 per cent; 
the proportion of workers with lower secondary and upper secondary general also 
increases by 24.6 per cent and 59.3 per cent respectively. In contrast, the proportion of 
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workers with primary school or below decreases by 32.7 per cent. Similar trend also 
occurs in other Asian countries, such as the Philippines.  
Table 2.1: The Change in Education Qualification Over Time in Several Asian Countries 
Education Level 
Indonesia 
The 
Philippines Thailand China 
1994-07 1998-06 1990-04 1999-05 
Below primary school -69.8 -33.7 -32.9 -59.3 
Primary school -32.7 -30.9 31.4 -45.0 
Lower secondary 24.6 5.3 45.2 -16.6 
Upper secondary general 59.3 45.0 100.0 19.3 
Upper secondary vocational -9.6   14.7   
Tertiary 190.3 37.1 98.4 15.2 
Source: Gropello and Sakerllariou (2010).  
The GER of senior high school and university levels steadily increases, possibly due to 
some government interventions and some other possible reasons from the demand side, 
such as the changes in demographic structure with decreasing population in the 15-19 
years brackets, which positively affects the enrolment rate, and the recent increase in the 
number of institutions of higher education (Moeliodihardjo, 2013).  
Moreover, Indonesia has more than half of the population under the age of 30. The middle 
class counts at least 52 million people (20 per cent of the total population) whose 
consumption accounts for 43 per cent of the total household consumption. Expanding 
Indonesia’s middle class can help boost the economic growth and broaden prosperity 
through one of the most important aspects, i.e. education (The World Bank, 2017). 
Moreover, Indonesians have a strong family-oriented culture; that means that 
householders are more likely to invest in education which is seen as a means of boosting 
living standards, so much so that consumer spending on this item is higher than in other 
regional countries. Thus, spending on education increases significantly with income level 
– the richest households spend more than 25 per cent more on education than the poorest 
households, but all households allocate around 4 per cent of per capita spending for 
education (British Council, 2017).  
 
Comparison with other countries   
Compared to similar countries, the trend of expansion in education is relatively similar, 
as shown in Figure 2.3. Primary schools have a very high gross enrolment ratio, around 
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100 per cent in average. The average enrolment in secondary education level is around 
80 per cent in 2015, with Thailand being the highest (120 per cent) and India the lowest 
(73 per cent). For university or tertiary level, Indonesia has a relatively lower enrolment 
ratio (23.3 per cent), similar to India (26.8 per cent), whereas Malaysia and Thailand have 
higher ratio, 42.3 per cent and 45.9 per cent, respectively. It seems that the trend will 
continue increasing in the future.  
 
Figure 2.3: Gross Enrolment Ratio in Selected Countries, 2000-2015 (in per cent) 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2017.  
 
In terms of pupil-teacher ratio, primary school in Indonesia has a ratio of 16.5 in 2014; 
this is far lower than in 2000, which implies that there is an improvement. The ratio for 
lower secondary school is slightly lower than primary school (14.7 in 2014). In contrast, 
the ratio for upper secondary school is higher than the others, 16.6 in 2014; and the trend 
increases. One of the possible explanations is that the number of senior high school is far 
lower than the number of primary schools, and it has not yet been part of the compulsory 
education programme. In general, pupil-teacher ratios in Indonesia for all education levels 
are slightly higher than the ratio of OECD; compared to the UK, those ratios are similar 
in 2014, as shown in Figure 2.4.  
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Figure 2.4: Pupil-Teacher Ratio, Indonesia and OECD, 2000 to 2014 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2019.  
Note: World data is on average.  
 
Despite the education expansion in Indonesia, the population with junior high school or 
lower qualifications is still far higher than the population with senior high school or higher 
qualifications (Figure 2.5). Allen (2016) asserts that the composition of the labour force 
continues to be dominated by workers with lower levels of education. In particular, it is 
more common for the population aged over 40 years to have primary school or below as 
their highest level of education. Those aged below 40 years are more likely to have 
completed junior high school or senior high school. Those aged below 30 years (younger 
generation) have the highest rates of high school completion and many have even 
completed tertiary education. Considering that Indonesia is one of the most populous 
countries and the highest demographic dividend occurrence, human resource plays an 
important role in sustaining the country’s future economic growth and supporting the 
economic transformation. More investment in human resource is required since highly 
educated and well-trained human resources are the engine of the economy. 
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Figure 2.5: Population by Education, 2000-2017 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics Indonesia, 2019 
 
 
Education Spending  
Based on education level, public school’s fee for primary and junior high schools is free, 
due to the nine-year compulsory education. For private schools, the education fees vary 
according to the location, institution type, and ownership (WENR, 2019). Meanwhile, 
public senior high schools and universities have a substantial lower education fees and 
are more affordable than private ones. Spending on senior secondary and higher education 
has increased between 2008 and 2009 by 26 and 53 percent respectively, but households 
seem to have absorbed a large portion of the cost of expansion, and total household 
spending on education in general has increased significantly over the decade (The World 
Bank, 2013). According to Statistics Indonesia data, average spending per capita on 
education by the household was 3.6 per cent of total spending in 2000, and increased to 
3.9 per cent in 2011, or around IDR 24,679 (GBP 1.4). 
In terms of country comparison, HSBC (2017) conducted a survey on the value of 
education, with the aim to provides authoritative insights into parents’ attitudes and 
behaviour towards their children’s education around the world. Over 500 parents 
(including at least 150 with a child at university or college) were surveyed in all countries. 
Compared to other countries, Indonesian parents spend around USD 18,422 in total 
towards their child’s higher education (including school/university tuition fees, 
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educational books, transport, and accommodation). This amount was relatively lower 
compared to parents in the UK, while Hong Kong has the highest spending in education, 
as depicted in Figure 2.6. It is worth noting that the survey conducted to the parents with 
child at university or college, that possibly only represents top quantile income group and 
sample selection bias could occur. While, most of Indonesian education attainment was 
primary and junior high school, as shown in Figure 2.5. Although the figure represents 
the high-income group, Indonesian expenditure on expenditure was still lower.    
 
Figure 2.6: Parents’ Spending on Their Child’s Education, Selected Countries 
Source: HSBC, 2017.  
Notes: Based on question ‘Have you ever paid for private tuition for your child?’, base: 
parents with a child in primary, secondary or tertiary education.  
 
 
2.1.4 Demographics and Labour Market Developments 
Demographics 
From the total population of 257 million people, Indonesia is expected to reap from its 
huge working age group (Figure 2.7), which will reach 70 percent of the total population 
by 2030. Recently, Indonesia is entering the initial stage of the much-vaunted 
demographic dividend, which is expected to peak within 12 years (The Jakarta Post, 
2018).  
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Figure 2.7: Population Pyramid of 2007 and 2017 
Source: PopulationPyramid.net 
 
Labour Force 
ILO (2014) records show that the Indonesian labour force has reached 127.6 million 
(around 50 per cent of the population). 46.4 per cent of those employed were working in 
the formal economy and 53.6 per cent were working in informal employment. Although 
only 46.4 per cent of employment works in the formal sector, its contribution to GDP is 
around 60-70 per cent in 2010. 
 
Employment 
Statistics Indonesia (2019) records the average unemployment rate being 7 per cent 
during the 2000 – 2018 periods with a minimum of 5.13 per cent in 2018 and a maximum 
of 11.2 per cent in 2005. Based on education level, the highest unemployment rate occurs 
to senior high school (8.29 per cent) and vocational high school (11.41 per cent) 
graduates, with the share of 27.6 per cent and 24.7 per cent in 2018, respectively, as shown 
in Figure 2.8. ILO (2014) confirms that unemployment is an issue for the youth, as the 
unemployment rate for people aged between 15 and 24 years estimated at 17.1 per cent 
in February 2014. Indeed, the youth account for over 50 per cent of the unemployed 
population and most unemployed youth have never worked before. 
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Figure 2.8: Unemployment and Education Levels 
Source: Statistics Indonesia, 2019.  
 
Table 2.2: Labour Market Indicators, Indonesia and OECD, 2000-2017 
Country 
Name 
Series Name 2000 2007 2014 2017 
Indonesia 
Employment to population ratio, 15+, total 
(%) (modelled ILO estimate) 63.2 60.8 64.2 64.4 
Indonesia 
Unemployment, total (% of total labour 
force) (modelled ILO estimate) 6.1 8.1 4.0 4.2 
Indonesia 
Unemployment with intermediate 
education (% of total labour force with 
intermediate education) 13.7 17.1 7.6 7.7 
Indonesia 
Unemployment with basic education (% of 
total labour force with basic education) 5.1 6.0 2.9 2.9 
Indonesia 
Unemployment with advanced education 
(% of total labour force with advanced 
education) 10.4 13.2 5.0 4.6 
Indonesia 
Labour force participation rate for ages 15-
24, total (%) (modelled ILO estimate) 52.8 50.4 47.2 47.8 
OECD 
members 
Employment to population ratio, 15+, total 
(%) (modelled ILO estimate) 56.3 56.7 55.3 56.6 
OECD 
members 
Unemployment, total (% of total labour 
force) (modelled ILO estimate) 6.3 5.6 7.4 5.8 
OECD 
members 
Unemployment with intermediate 
education (% of total labour force with 
intermediate education) 9.2 7.0 11.6 9.1 
OECD 
members 
Unemployment with basic education (% of 
total labour force with basic education) 13.0 10.5 15.6 12.4 
OECD 
members 
Unemployment with advanced education 
(% of total labour force with advanced 
education) 4.6 4.0 7.0 5.9 
OECD 
members 
Labour force participation rate for ages 15-
24, total (%) (modelled ILO estimate) 51.2 48.7 46.0 46.5 
Source: World Bank, 2019.  
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Compared to OECD, the employment-to-population ratio in Indonesia is relatively high, 
at 64.4 per cent in 2017. Meanwhile the ratio in OECD is 56.6 per cent for the same 
period. Unemployment rate in Indonesia is slightly lower; 4.2 per cent of total labour 
force in 2017. Meanwhile, the rate in OECD is 5.8 per cent. In terms of the labour force 
participation rate, Indonesia placed slightly higher (of 47.8 per cent) than OECD (46.5 
per cent). For unemployment by education, Indonesia has a substantially lower 
unemployment with basic education qualification (2.9 per cent in 2017), while OECD 
scores 12.4 per cent in that aspect (Table 2.2).  
Turning to the distribution of workers based on years of schooling and age, it seems the 
younger generations had higher education attainment than the older generation in 2000, 
the highest education attainment is 15 years of schooling or undergraduate degree (Figure 
2.9). Based on gender, young male (22-32 years old) tends to have higher education 
attainment than female at the same age (Figure 2.10).     
 
Figure 2.9: The Distribution of Workers Based on Years of Schooling and Age in 2000  
 
Source: The author’s calculation based on IFLS3 of 2000. 
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Figure 2.10: The Distribution of Workers Based on Years of Schooling, Age and 
Gender in 2000 
Source: The author’s calculation based on IFLS3 of 2000. 
 
In 2014/15 (15 years later), the highest education attainment increases to 22 years of 
schooling or PhD level, although the number of PhD is still lower in the population. There 
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is also a slight shift in the distribution, the proportion of workers with 6 and 9 years of 
school decreased, this also may confirm that education expands in Indonesia (Figure 
2.11). Similar trends occur between the gender, the peak of distribution shift to the 
middle, and male tends to have higher education attainment than female (Figure 2.12).     
 
 
Figure 2.11: The Distribution of Workers Based on Years of Schooling and Age in 
2014/15  
Source: The author’s calculation based on IFLS5 of 2014/15. 
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Figure 2.12: The Distribution of Workers Based on Years of Schooling, Age and 
Gender in 2014/15 
Source: The author’s calculation based on IFLS5 of 2014/15. 
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In terms of underemployment, most study in Indonesia focus on work less than normal 
working hours and would willing to accept another job such as: Dhanani (2004). 
Moreover, there is a study review educated (university) underemployment in Indonesia 
(Nagib and Ngadi, 2008). Nagib and Ngadi found the number of educated 
underemployments reached 3.43 million people (around 12.24 per cent of the total 
underemployment rate) in 1997. The quantity and percentage of this unemployment type 
have been rapidly growing from year to year. During 1997- 1999, the number of educated 
underemployments went up from 3.4 million (12.24 per cent) to 4.27 million people 
(13.63 per cent) in 1999. The 1997 economic crisis also brought impact on the increased 
number and percentage of educated underemployment although it was found minor for 
youth workers. Yet during 2002- 2003, the number of educated underemployments 
decreased from 3.7 million people (12.66 per cent) to 3.62 million people (12.72 per cent) 
in 2003; and increased to 3.87 million people (13.85 per cent) in 2004. Thus, it seems the 
timing of labour market entry (e.g. individuals who enter the labour market just after the 
Asian financial crisis) affect educated underemployment in Indonesia. 
 
Economic Transformation 
In terms of sector, job creation changes in line with economic transformation from 
agriculture to the service sector. Jobs in agriculture fell to 34 per cent in 2015 from 56 
per cent of all employment in 1990, while works in the service sector have surged to 53 
per cent from 34 per cent, and manufacturing jobs have also increased from 10 per cent 
to 13 per cent. In the past decade, the service sector grows extraordinarily, creating around 
22.2 million out of 23.8 million (93 per cent of the total job creation) new jobs between 
2001 and 2015. The manufacturing industry also gained 3.2 million jobs (13.4 per cent), 
in contrast to agriculture and mining which lost 1.6 million jobs or -6.7 per cent 
(Wihardja, 2016). 
 
Formal and Waged Sectors 
According to the Indonesian Ministry of Labour and Immigration (2011), the number of 
job seekers who registered with employment offices (in terms of stock) was 1,941,434 
individuals (23 per cent of estimated unemployment) as of 2011, as shown in Figure 2.13. 
This is significantly smaller than the number of individuals who were estimated to be 
 38 
unemployed by Statistics Indonesia in 2011, which comprises 8,319,779 individuals 
(ILO, 2014), meanwhile 1,094,729 vacancies were registered in the ministry. In general, 
the supply of labour outstrips the demand for it. In contrast, the demand for labour 
outstrips the supply of labour for university level. As such, the issue of education 
mismatch is a high possibility in Indonesia.  
In terms of occupations, the majority of employment has junior high school (9 years 
schooling) or lower qualifications, and most of them work in agricultural industries, 
production and related or sales. Meanwhile, most of university graduates work as 
professional, technical and related workers, as well as clerical and related workers (Allen, 
2016). 
 
Figure 2.13: Registered Job Seekers and Number of Vacancies in Indonesia in 2011 
Source: Dit. PKK Ditjen Binapenta, The Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2011.  
Public Sector 
Government or public sector plays an important role in the economic development 
through allocation, distribution and stabilisation, as well as its role in the labour market. 
The government has estimated 4.5 million civil servants in 2016 or 1.7 percent of the total 
population (The Jakarta Post, 2016).  
In terms of wages, Indonesia’s salary structure is similar to an egalitarian system in the 
past, resulting in most of its best graduates from well-known and highly qualified 
universities uninterested in becoming government employees. Moreover, the low salary 
tends to encourage wrongdoings and illegal activities such as accepting bribes and asking 
for compensation for services provided (Tjiptoherijanto, 2014). In 2013, in line with the 
issuance of Law No. 5/2014 on State Civil Apparatus, public organisations such as 
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bureaucracy have undergone reform to be structurally lean and functionally rich. As a 
result, public sector workers are offered the same wages nationwide, and the wages in 
public sector are as competitive as in the private sector. In addition, there are certain 
occupations in Indonesia where being a public sector worker provides a substantial salary 
boost such as teachers and lecturers.  
Furthermore, the public sector continues to attract job seekers due to their appeals, such 
as attractive allowances, opportunities to pursue education abroad (Master and PhD 
levels), clear career paths and flexible working time; consequently, there will be more 
opportunities to be with family or have an additional job and earn more money for a living 
(Tjahjono, 2017). Meanwhile, Saputra (2018) argues that being a public sector worker 
can lift one’s social status to the highest level, bringing more respect from society. Thus, 
the civil service is still regarded by many Indonesians as a far better job than any other 
occupations even though working for a bank, for instance, could be more lucrative. 
Another reason is the associated privileges. In Indonesia, public sector workers enjoy 
easier access to various services such as banking, mortgages, and health care. It has been 
the rule of the game in Indonesia that banks or other financial institutions are much more 
willing to lend money or give credit to those workers because civil servants have a magic 
letter called a “decree.” This letter guarantees financial stability and security, for the 
simple reason that civil servants are paid by the country, not by a corporation.  
Regarding the recruitment process in the public sector, LaForge (2016) asserts that before 
the reformation era in Indonesia (1997/98), entry into the civil service was based on a 
single examination, after which an employee was essentially guaranteed a job until 
retirement. In the past, promotions were based on the close relationship and personal 
loyalty of an employee to their superiors (Sakinah, 2017), or (simply) willingness to pay 
as observed by Blunt (2012) in Sakinah (2017), that positions in the civil service were 
seen as ‘tradable goods’ open to the highest bidder; rather than merit or ability or the 
worker’s performance. Moreover, regulations made it nearly impossible to fire a civil 
servant, except in cases of criminal doings. Even so, an arduous appeals process made it 
difficult to remove employees who broke the law. In 2014, the government stipulates Law 
number 5/2014 on civil servant, several significant changes are related to merit-based 
recruitment and open promotion. However, the main challenge is in the implementation. 
KPPOD (2017) in KSI (2017) added even within the internal bureaucracy, some 
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bureaucrats are not happy with the implementation of this law, especially the meritocracy 
and open promotion system for Senior Executive Services.  
Remuneration was another issue; disparities between the private and public wages drive 
corruption in the public sector. Thus, the civil service law was amended in 1999 to 
stipulate that the remuneration of public employees should be comparable to that of 
private employees. Following bureaucracy reform in Indonesia, the government through 
law number 5/2014 states procurement of civil servants are through planning, vacancy 
announcement, applying, selection, result announcement, probation, and finally the 
appointment. Each government agency openly announces to the public their need to fill 
positions with prospective civil servants. Every Indonesian citizen has an equal 
opportunity to apply for a civil servant position after fulfilling the requirements. The 
selection is processed by the government agencies through an objective assessment based 
on competence, qualification and other requirements as governed by the position’s 
characteristics. The reform also means that the recruitment process should be objective, 
transparent, and accountable. According to the State Civil Service Body’s data, the 
number of applicants in 2017 is around 2.5 million people, while the vacancies available 
are only around 37.000. Thus, the probability of being accepted is around 1:65.  
 
Wages 
Based on GNI per capita (constant 2010 USD) in 2014, Indonesia has USD 3572.6, the 
highest one is Norway with USD 92147.4, world’s GNI per capital is USD 10152.4, 
meanwhile OECD’s GNI per capita is USD 37722.1 (World Development Indicators, 
2019).  
In the private sector, Amiti (2011) affirms that wages in Indonesia are largely determined 
by the market, with the exception of minimum wages set by provincial governments. 
Meanwhile, the determination of public service’s wage is more complicated, since the 
public service’s wage scale is organised according to seniority, position, rank, and 
political approach; consisting of a base wage in addition to several layers of allowances, 
and even personal relationship. Some of these allowances cover family, food and housing 
needs; others relate to the type of position held, and still others serve as rewards to top 
management in exchange for loyalty (World Bank, 2000). In terms of wage comparison 
in public and private sector, it seems public sector has premium wage since 1990s. While, 
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the lowest wages in public sector is slightly lower than the average wage in private sector, 
as shown in Figure 2.14.  
 
Figure 2.14: Wage Comparison in Public and Private Sector, 1993-2015 
Source: CEIC Database and Government Regulation on Public Sector Wages, Various 
Years 
 
Turning to minimum wage, the determination of minimum wage is based on Article 1 (1) 
of the Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Regulation No. 7/2013 which states that 
the minimum wage is the lowest wage consisting of basic wage including fixed allowance 
set by the governor as a safety net. SMERU (2002) reveals that minimum wages are 
binding for the bulk of workers in the formal sector. Minimum wage in Indonesia varies; 
the lowest is in Yogyakarta (Central Java Province), around USD 102.7 per month; and 
the highest is in DKI Jakarta (capital province), around USD 258 per month. Compared 
to other ASEAN countries, the lowest minimum wage in Indonesia is relatively 
competitive, almost similar to Myanmar; but only a few provinces have a low minimum 
wage. Meanwhile, Malaysia has relatively high minimum wage (Figure 2.15).  
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Figure 2.15: Minimum Wages Comparison in Selected ASEAN Countries, 2018 (in USD) 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat, 2018 
 
 
Gender Disparities  
Gender disparities in labour force participation continue to persist. Female participation 
rate in the labour force is still relatively low; 50 per cent in 2000, increasing slightly to 
53.4 per cent in February 2014 (ILO, 2014). According to the AIPEG (2017), the main 
drivers of low female participation are marriage, having children aged below 2 years in 
the household, low education attainment and changing economic structure, particularly 
the decline in the female-friendly sector of agriculture due to the transition from rural to 
urban areas. Meanwhile, Schaner and Das (2016) asserts that many Indonesian women 
exit wage work due to family and childcare constraints. JICA (2011) adds that many 
female Indonesians engaged in the informal sectors due to fewer job vacancies available 
for women in the formal sector and the flexibilities of working style in the informal sector.  
The Indonesian government issued the Presidential Instruction No.9/2000 on Gender 
Mainstreaming in National Development, which regulates that gender mainstreaming is 
implemented in order to improve the role of women and to achieve gender equality in the 
family, the community, the state and the nation. To encourage the increase of women 
participation in employment, particularly in the formal sectors, the government produces 
regulations as a support system for female workers, such as the Labour Act No.13/2003, 
stipulating menstrual leave (two days per month), maternal leave (1.5 months pre- and 
post-childbirth, 3 months maternal leave in total), miscarriage leave (1.5 months), and 
provision of time for breastfeeding. In 2008, with the collaboration between the State 
Ministry for Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection, Ministry of Manpower and 
Transmigration and Ministry of Health, a joint decree was enforced regarding the 
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establishment of breastfeeding facilities in all buildings containing workplaces (JICA, 
2011).     
However, several studies find that females tend to have less working experience and 
working hours. For instance, when estimating the average working week based on 
industry and gender in Indonesia for 2000 and 2008 period, Klaveren et al., (2010) 
conclude that the average hours females made are fewer than males, and that was the case 
in all industries, as presented in Table 2.3. Meanwhile, Taniguchi and Tuwo (2014) assert 
that working experience may also influence the gender wage gap. Women tend to have 
relatively shorter working experience as they enter and exit the labour market due to 
family considerations. Also, women anticipate shorter or more discontinuous work lives. 
In comparison to other countries, the gender wage gap in Indonesia in 2010 is 20.4 per 
cent. The gap is slightly lower than the gap in the US in 2012 (23 per cent), as shown in 
Table 2.5.  
 
Table 2.3: Average Working Weeks by Industry and by Gender in Indonesia, 2000 and 
2008 
 
Source: Klaveren et al., (2010).  
Notes: Average working weeks is in terms of hours per week.  
 
Furthermore, Taniguchi and Tuwo (2014) find that the distribution of hours worked from 
those in the manufacturing sector tend to be longer than in the public sector. Meanwhile, 
the wage gap tends to be greater among public sector workers than those in the private 
sector. In terms of sector, the widest gender wage gap occurs in finance and real estate, 
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followed by public administration. In fact, the public sector categories (i.e. public 
administration, education, and health and public services) tend to have wider gender wage 
gap compared to other industry categories, as shown in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.4: The Gender Wage Differentials Based on Industry 
 
Source: Taniguchi and Tuwo (2014).  
 
Table 2.5: Selected Studies on the Gender Wage Gap 
 
Source: Taniguchi and Tuwo (2014) 
 
Ren and Miller (2012) argue that the gender difference occurs possibly because of the 
differences in the demand for, and supply of, education between males and females, 
greater positive self-selection of females into the labour force relative to males, a more 
limited supply of skilled female workers, different technological requirements between 
the female-dominated and male-dominated jobs, and discrimination against female 
workers that is less intense among the better educated.  
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2.2 Data 
2.2.1 SAKERNAS and IFLS 
There are two datasets related to the Indonesian labour market: (1) SAKERNAS (National 
Labour Force Survey) and (2) the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS). SAKERNAS 
is provided by the government; the survey is conducted twice a year (in February and 
August). The data only cover labour market information and they are not longitudinal. 
The data can be obtained from Statistics Indonesia office or from their website. It is worth 
noting that the data are not freely accessible.  
SAKERNAS has a bigger sample size and the size varies over time (compared to the 
IFLS). However, the consistency is still questionable. Many studies criticise 
SAKERNAS’ quality and consistency, such as Manning (2006) who reviews the quality 
of SAKERNAS and finds that it is a reliable indicator of labour-force structure and long-
term trends, but not of short-term trends. In addition, the questionnaire and variable 
definitions change occasionally. Thus, SAKERNAS has large year-to-year swings in their 
labour market indicators, which cannot be explained by any real events. 
Meanwhile, IFLS data are collected by RAND Corporation in collaboration with some 
Indonesian institutions. RAND Corporation initiated the survey because there were no 
comprehensive and longitudinal data for Indonesia at that time (during 1990s). In general, 
the IFLS complements and extends the existing survey data available for Indonesia in 
some ways: as a longitudinal survey, the data are available for the same individuals from 
multiple points in time; thus, the IFLS data allows the opportunity to analyse the dynamic 
of any behaviours at the individual, household and family and community levels. 
Moreover, extensive research can be carried out regarding the living conditions of 
Indonesian households during this very tumultuous period, because the waves are 
conducted in a relatively long period; before, during, and after the Asian economic crisis 
in 1997/1998. In addition, the database is freely accessible. Specifically, for this study, 
IFLS data offer rich information on education and both public and private sector 
employments, which are the main variables in this study. Moreover, accessing IFLS data 
are simple; only requiring a registration in RAND Corporation’s website, after which all 
IFLS data can then be downloaded freely. Considering those advantages, the IFLS data 
are selected for this study.  
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2.2.2 IFLS Data  
The IFLS has had 5 waves so far; IFLS1 was fielded in 1993, IFLS2 in 1997, IFLS3 in 
2000, IFLS4 in 2007-2008, and IFLS5 in 2014-2015. There is also IFLS2+ which was 
carried out in 1998 with 25 per cent of the sample; mainly aiming to measure the 
immediate impact of the Asian economic crisis in 1998 (the details of the IFLS 
information are shown in Table 2.6). Because the IFLS are a longitudinal survey, the 
earlier IFLS wave drew their sample from the previous waves. For instance, IFLS5 drew 
their sample from IFLS1, IFLS2, IFLS2+, IFLS3, and IFLS4. 
Table 2.6: The IFLS Survey Summary 
Wave Fielding 
Period 
Survey Size Implementers Contact/Re-contact 
Rates 
    Households Individuals     
1 1993 7,224 22,000 RAND and Lembaga 
Demografi (University 
of Indonesia) 
93 per cent of selected 
households contacted 
2 1997 7,619 33,934 RAND, UCLA, and 
Lembaga Demografi 
(University of Indonesia) 
94.4 per cent of 
IFLS1 households re-
contacted 
2+ 1998 2,055   RAND, UCLA, and 
Lembaga Demografi 
(University of Indonesia) 
94 per cent of 
individuals not in 
IFLS2; 96 per cent of 
IFLS2 respondents 
3 2000 10,435 43,649 RAND, and Population 
Research Center 
(University of Gadjah 
Mada) 
95.3 per cent of 
IFLS1 households re-
contacted 
4 2007/08 13,535 44,103 RAND, Centre for 
Population and 
Policy Studies 
(University of Gadjah 
Mada), and Survey 
METRE 
93.6 per cent of 
IFLS1 households 
re-contacted.  
5 2014/15 16,931 58,337 RAND, and Survey 
Meter 
92 per cent of IFLS1 
households 
re-contacted.  
Source: The IFLS User Guide, various editions.   
IFLS1 was conducted based on the sample representing about 83 per cent of the 
Indonesian population living in 13 provinces (out of 27 provinces) in 1993. Those 
provinces were selected to maximise the representation of the population, capture the 
cultural and socioeconomic diversity of Indonesia, and be cost-effective to the survey 
given the size and terrain of the country. Within each of the 13 provinces, enumeration 
 47 
areas (EAs) were randomly chosen from a nationally representative sample frame used in 
the 1993 SUSENAS, a socioeconomic survey of about 60,000 households. The IFLS 
randomly selected 321 enumeration areas in the 13 provinces, over-sampling urban EAs 
and EAs in smaller provinces to facilitate urban-rural and Javanese–non-Javanese 
comparisons (Strauss, et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, there are two different questionnaires for the individual-household and 
community levels. This study will focus on the data of individual-household levels, 
particularly the adult respondents, since all the data required in the present study are 
available in the survey for primary respondent. The re-contact and completion rates of 
IFLS1-IFLS5 are provided in Appendix I.  
In terms of data collection, the IFLS data are collected by the means of face-to-face 
interviews using paper and pencil questionnaires. From 1997 onwards, each interviewing 
team was accompanied by a team of data editors; the team entered the data on laptops and 
performed extensive consistency checks on the same day the interview took place. If there 
were any inconsistencies, it was corrected in the field, and by revisiting respondents when 
necessary. Afterwards, electronic data were sent to the Principal Investigators to facilitate 
monitoring of the data quality during the fieldwork. 
The respondents’ selection follows the rules: if an entire household, or target 
respondent(s) moved then they were tracked as long as they still resided in any one of the 
13 IFLS provinces, irrespective of whether they moved across those provinces. Target 
respondents were individuals who split off into new households, provided they were a 
main respondent in 1993 (which means that they were administered one or more 
individual questionnaires), or they were born before 1968 (i.e. they were 26 years old or 
older in 1993). Not all individuals were tracked in order to control costs.  
There is a significant increase in the number of households as IFLS3 expands the rules 
for following households who moved out, i.e. (1) 1993 main respondents; (2) 1993 
household members born before 1968; (3) individuals born since 1993 in the original 
1993 households; (4) individuals born after 1988 if they were resident in an original 
household in 1993; (5) 1993 household members who were born between 1968 and 1988 
if they were interviewed in 1997; and (6) 20 per cent random sample of 1993 household 
members who were born between 1968 and 1988 if they were not interviewed in 1997.  
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Furthermore, the rules for interviewing individuals were also expanded. In the original 
IFLS1 households, every individual could be interviewed or be given a proxy interview, 
whether or not they had been a household member in IFLS1. In split-off households, all 
IFLS1 household members, their spouses and biological children, were to be interviewed, 
but not others (not just the target respondents for tracking, but also their spouses and 
children, as in IFLS2). 
The re-contract rates are relatively high, more than 90 per cent, for example IFLS5 the 
dynasty recontact rate was 92 per cent. For the individual target households (including 
split-off households as separate) the re-contact rate was a little lower, 90.5 per cent. 
According to Strauss et al. (2016), these re-contact rates are as high as or higher than 
most longitudinal surveys in the United States and Europe. High re-interview rates were 
obtained because Rand was committed to tracking and interviewing individuals who had 
moved or split off from the origin IFLS1 households. High re-interview rates contribute 
significantly to data quality in a longitudinal survey because they lessen the risk of bias 
due to non-random attrition in studies using the data.  
The present study will elaborate the IFLS data in each chapter (Chapter 3 – Chapter 5), 
based on specific questions on labour and education. Each chapter (Chapter 3-5) also 
provides sample restrictions, summary statistics and additional information on robustness 
or sensitivity tests.   
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Chapter 3 The Return to Education in the Waged Sector in Indonesia, 
2000 and 2014 Periods 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Education in Indonesia has continuously experienced rapid expansion, in particular 
university and senior high school, which is reflected by the Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) 
data, as shown in Figure 2.2. This is possibly because higher education is the most 
important factor in career progression, especially in the formal sector; and several 
important factors that influence this expansion are the government policies such as the 
nine-year compulsory education, as explained in Chapter 2.  
Theoretically, the human capital theory suggests that wage increases in line with 
education level. Although wages do not reflect market wages in public sector9, estimating 
private return to education is useful regarding the incentives set by the government to 
invest in education. Thus, the recent development of return to education is always needed 
to provide the latest information both for individuals and for the government.  
Most empirical studies for Indonesia’s case confirm that the (private) return to education 
increases in line with the level of education (such as: Comola and de Mello, 2010; 
Gropello and Sakellariou, 2010; Dumauli, 2015; and Dong, 2016). Regarding the change 
in recent years, a supply and demand framework suggests that the increase in participation 
rate of education increases the labour supply; thus, there is an outward shift in labour 
supply in the long run. In the short run, the opposite effect may occur; it could withdraw 
potential workers for studentship from the labour force. On the demand side, there is also 
an increase number for educated workers due to technical and economic progress. 
For the change over time in the return to education, the empirical studies’ result varies 
according to the method, period, and context of study. Comola and de Mello (2010) find 
most of returns to education level in Indonesia increase in general, between 1996 and 
2004. In contrast, Gropello, E.D. Sakellariou (2010) find a decrease in return to education 
in Indonesia, particularly for general, vocational high schools and universities (relative to 
primary schools) between 1994 and 2007.  Slightly different, Purnastuti et al. (2013) find 
 
9 Before the bureaucratic reform, wage mechanism in public sector in Indonesia is based on cronyism and 
political patronage. After the reform, the queues of potential employees occur, as explained in Section 2.1.   
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the returns to education in 2007/08 generally lower than the returns in 1993, except for 
the return to university, which increases between those periods, for both males and 
females.  
This chapter elaborates on the effect of education expansion on wages, particularly the 
financial return to education in the waged sector (public and private sectors), following 
the full implementation of several important education policies. Thus, this study employs 
the years of 2000 (IFLS3) and 2014 (IFLS5). 2000 represents the situation before the 
Education Reform based on the Law No. 20 of 2003 and Higher Education Law No. 12 
of 2012 was implemented, and 2014 represents the situation after those policies were fully 
implemented. Meanwhile, education level (i.e. primary school or below, junior high 
school, senior high school and university) is chosen to simplify the analysis and 
effectively distinguish the return to education between different education levels (the 
particular interest is in higher education level). Moreover, this allows non-linear effects 
of the level of education (Steiner and Wagner, 1996); this is also in line with the policy 
implementation that is commonly based on education level. Furthermore, waged sector 
(only public and private sectors) is chosen considering the data availability. 
The aims of this study are: to investigate how return to education varies across education 
levels and across time (between 2000 and 2014 period), to provide a more systematic 
model specification of return to education in Indonesia (including religion and ethnicity 
variables that rarely appear in the previous research), and to provide an extended analysis 
by separating the sample by gender and sector. 
This study is motivated to estimate and update the return to education in different levels 
of education and to investigate whether the large increases in education participation 
which have occurred in the last decades affect the return to education in Indonesia.  
Therefore, the research questions of this study are: (3.1) What are the estimated returns 
to education in 2000 and 2014? (3.2) Do gender and sector affect the return to education? 
and (3.3) How does the return to education change between those periods? To answer 
these research questions, IFLS3 (2000) and IFLS5 (2014) will be used, and the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) method will be used to estimate the return to education and the 
change, and the robustness tests related to endogeneity and selection issue will be carried 
out to further corroborate the results.     
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The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 briefly reviews the theoretical 
framework, which consists of:  
• the human capital theory, 
• the signalling theory, 
• Mincer wage equation and its main methodological issues, 
• the supply and demand framework of labour market (to analyse the change in 
education participation); and, 
• previous empirical studies. 
Furthermore, Section 3.3 discusses the method and data. Section 3.4 presents the 
estimation results from IFLS for 2000 and 2014 periods. And finally, Section 3.5 gives 
conclusion of the return to education in waged sector.  
 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
This part addresses some important questions: firstly, why is there a return to education? 
It will be answered by considering the human capital and signalling theory. Secondly, 
how is it usually measured? The standard Mincer wage equation will be used to answer 
the question. Thirdly, what is the estimated rate of return to education? It will be explained 
by some empirical studies in the US, the UK, Indonesia and other similar countries, and 
based on regions as well. Then, what is the likely impact of the expansion? The simple 
supply and demand framework of higher education will address the question. And finally, 
what has happened to the rate of return to education? This question also, similarly, will 
be explained by some empirical studies in the US, the UK, Indonesia and other similar 
countries.      
 
3.2.1 Why is there a Return to Higher Education?  
The accumulation of human capital is perceived as an investment decision in the standard 
economic model (Schultz, 1961; Mincer, 1974; and Becker, 1993). During a period of 
education, an individual gives up some proportions of wage and spends on education costs 
(both direct and opportunity costs) in exchange for higher future wage. Therefore, 
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education must yield a higher rate of return compared to other investments such as 
working, in order to be pursued from an economic perspective.  
Theoretically, the more education individuals acquire, the better they are able to take in 
new information, skills and technologies; consequently, their productivity increases 
(Poteliene and Tamasauskiene 2013). To explain the return to education, there are several 
alternative theories that are commonly used, i.e. the human capital theory and the 
signalling theory. The main difference between those theories is whether education 
endows or acts just as a signal; indeed, this difference could affect education policies. 
However, both theories agree that there is a positive relationship between education 
attainment and return to education (wages). The detailed explanations of both theories are 
as follows.  
 
Human Capital Theory 
The Human capital theory, pioneered by Gary Becker, is fundamentally based on the 
belief that the role of employees in production process is similar to the role of machinery 
and other forces of production. As a result, the aim of investing in higher education level 
is to provide essential knowledge, skills, and abilities for employees and is evaluated in 
the same way as investment in facilities and equipment for the purpose of improving 
productivity10.  
Becker developed the first model to measure the returns to education, i.e. the internal rate 
returns or IRR (symbolised as !!); this concept is based on workers’ point of view. The 
internal rate of return is the rate of discount that equates the net income stream with and 
without an investment. For example, an individual considers higher education as an 
investment, the internal rate of return is the present value (PV) of additional income 
compared to those who had the right to, but did not pursue higher education to the present 
value of cost (opportunity cost through foregone earnings and, under a private financing 
scheme, the direct cost of study). If this rate of return is higher than the market interest 
 
10 Acemoglu (2014) divided sources of human capital into 5 categories: (1) innate ability, (2) schooling or 
education, (3) school quality and non-schooling investments, (4) training, and (5) pre-labour market 
influences. And all of those categories assume that employees have different amounts of skills or human 
capital. 
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rate at which the individual can borrow loans, education represents a worthwhile 
investment for the individual (Potelienė and Tamašauskienė, 2014). 
The model assumes that certain education level is chosen to maximise the expected 
present value of the stream of future wage, until retirement at date T, and education in 
this case is measured by years of schooling. Moreover, individuals spend costs during 
higher education period, in terms of net cost of education ("!). At the optimum level of 
schooling, the PV of the returns to higher education is equal to the cost of higher 
education. Thus, the equilibrium condition is characterised by:  ∑ "!#"!"#(%&'!)$ = %)#% + "!*#!+,%      (3.1), 
where: !!: the internal net return to higher education; X is years of schooling (level of education), 
X-1 is lag of year (level) of schooling;  %!: wage with X years of schooling.  
The optimal level of investment in higher education occurs when the internal net return 
is higher than the market rate of interest (r), or !! > (, assuming no borrowing 
constraints. If T is large enough, the left-hand side of the equilibrium condition can be 
approximated, thus the equilibrium condition is:   "!#"!"#'! = %!#% + "!       (3.2), 
If CX is sufficiently small, then the equilibrium can be arranged as: !! ≈ "!#"!"#"!"#         (3.3), !! ≈*+, 	%! −	*+, 	%!#%	       (3.4), 
where ≈ means ‘approximately equal to’. The equation above implies that the return to 
higher education is approximately the difference in log wage (W) between Xt years of 
schooling and its lag variable (Xt-1), or the variation of log wage (W) with years of 
schooling.  
Becker (1994) also carries out some empirical studies to apply the theory which estimates 
the rates of return of white male with higher education qualifications in the US for 1939 
and 1949, using the national data on the income of persons at different education levels 
from the 1940 and 1950 censuses. The study calculates the monetary returns from 
attending higher education by comparing the returns and costs in absolute value. In 
addition, the rate of return to a cohort can be calculated from the stream of total (cohort) 
absolute differentials or from the mean (per capita data) differentials. The returns and 
costs of the cohort are adjusted by mortality, growth and taxation. The study finds that 
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the best single estimate for the private rate of return for 1939 cohort is 14.5 per cent. On 
the other hand, the private rate of return for 1949 cohort is 12.7 per cent if income 
differential grows at 1 per cent per annum, or about 1 per cent lower or higher if the 
income differential grows at 2 per cent; and the best single estimate is around 13 per cent.   
However, there are some criticisms aimed towards Becker’s theory, particularly some 
empirical challenges. Firstly, the analysis puts aside the difference of education quality 
as one of the important issues. Secondly, the data limitations may lead to overestimation 
of the returns because the analysis would be done with cross-section sample, and it does 
not follow the lifetime returns of the same age cohort. And finally, the return to human 
capital is hard to specify and measure, as one would find oneself dealing with average 
benefit instead of specific returns to each individual investment (Teixeira, 2014). 
Heckman et al. (2016) also note some challenges of the IRR: (1) it requires lifetime 
earning profiles; (2) earnings are observed only at schooling level selected by agents, thus 
observed earning profiles are subject to selection bias; (3) it is difficult to calculate non-
market benefit and non-pecuniary costs. 
Despite such limitations in measurement; the human capital theory is still important and 
will become the basis theory for further analysis. Becker (1964) argues that there are some 
important assumptions in the human capital theory: productivity is an increasing function 
of the human capital level of the worker. Human capital includes not only formal 
education, but also experience and on-the-job training. In human capital model (as under 
perfect competition), labour is paid the value of its MP and assumed wages are determined 
by the workers’ educational attainment, experience and training. Subsequently, the 
human capital model implies that worker’s characteristics, or the supply side, determine 
earnings and it is only through exogenous shocks that the demand side impacts real wages.  
In the development of human capital theories, Blundell et al. (2000) classify the return to 
investments in education into three types, i.e. (1) private financial return to education, 
mainly that acquiring education improves the wages and/or employment prospects of an 
individual; (2) private non-financial returns to education, comprising improvements in an 
individual’s welfare, which is not only wages but also better working environment and  
other non-financial measurements; and (3) social return to education, including benefits 
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to other individuals and society11. The present study focuses on the first category, i.e. 
wage premium.  
Finally, Mincer Wage Equation, a common single-equation model, is used to measure 
wage in relationship with education level. The equation, named after the proposer, Jacob 
Mincer, is very popular because it is based on a formal model of investment in human 
capital (Lemieux, 2006). The principle of Mincer equation is derived from the Human 
Capital theory; wages are determined by the workers’ educational attainment and 
experience (excluding training). 
 
Signalling Theory 
The signalling theory offers a sensible economic explanation for the observed positive 
correlation between wages and education levels. Nobel laureate Michael Spence 
originally identified the theory in 1973. Afterwards, Kenneth Arrow and Joseph Stiglitz 
developed the model. According to the theory, highly educated employees are likely to 
be more productive, not only because they are better trained, but also because they possess 
some natural skills required to get the educational degree. If these individuals’ 
characteristics are to persist when working, educated employees should also be easier to 
train and firms will obtain higher revenue from them. Therefore, employers could 
distinguish high-productive workers just by observing the signal given by the attainment 
of different education levels (Livanos and Núñez, 2012).  
The main assumption of the signalling model is the asymmetrical information between 
the employers and the employees regarding the employees’ true skill level, assuming that 
the employers were risk neutral. In this case, employers expect to hire capable employees 
for better wage positions; and the signalling mechanism can play an important role in 
accurate job-market matching. The model also assumes that signalling costs are 
negatively correlated with the employee’s productive capability, implying that high 
 
11 Such as: lower crime, greater social cohesion, trust and tolerance, political stability, greater social 
mobility, greater social capital, better educational parenting, more likeliness to vote and support democracy 
better life satisfaction better health quality, and longer life expectancy. It could also lead to increasing tax 
revenues, faster economic growth, greater innovation and labour market flexibility, increased productivity 
of co-workers, and reduced burden on public finances from better coordination with other social policy 
areas such as health and crime prevention. 
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ability individuals will have lower cost of signalling, while lower ability individuals will 
have higher costs.  
An individual is assumed to select signals, for instance high productivity employees tend 
to choose to obtain higher education qualifications, and low productivity employees tend 
to choose to obtain lower level of education such as senior high school or lower; thus 
maximising the difference between offered wages and signalling costs. An individual will 
also invest in higher education if there is sufficient return as defined by the wage schedule 
(including other returns to education and signals from consumption goods).  
There is also an informational feedback in the job market to the employers over time, as 
shown in Figure 3.1. As new market information comes into the employers throughout 
hiring and subsequent observation of productive capabilities related to signals, the 
employers’ conditional probabilistic beliefs are adjusted, and the new round starts. 
Meanwhile, the wage schedule facing the new entrants in the market commonly differs 
from that facing the previous group of employees. The system will be stationary if the 
employers start out with conditional probabilistic beliefs that after one round are not 
confirmed by the incoming data that are generated, such beliefs are referred to as self-
confirming (Spence, 1973). 
 
Figure 3.1: Informational Feedback Loop in the Job Market 
Source: Spence (1973).  
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Even though it is a loop, the equilibrium could exist (the equilibrium is defined as a set 
of components in the cycle that regenerate themselves). As a result, the employer’s belief 
would be self-confirming, or offered wage schedules would regenerate itself, or 
applicant’s behaviour would reproduce itself in the next round of the loop. The occurring 
equilibrium is separating equilibrium (Es), which requires the wage schedule to induce 
self-selection, as explained above. To illustrate this equilibrium, Spence divides the 
population into two groups facing one employer, as summarised in Table 3.1. The signal 
under consideration is education12, measured by an index y and is subject to individual 
choice. 
Table 3.1: Spence’s Signalling Model 
Group Marginal Product Proportion of population 
Cost of education 
level (CX) 
I 1 Ω1 X 
II 2 1-Ω1 X/2 
Source: Spence (1973). 
Where: Ω1 is the proportion of group I; if the employer believes that there is a level of 
education X* below which productivity is 1 and above which productivity is 2. The wage 
schedule w(X) offered will be: /(1) 31,				1 < 1 ∗2,				1 > 1 ∗       (3.5), 
members of each group will select optimal levels of education, or as depicted by the green 
line in Figure 3.2. Consider the person who will set X<X*, then their optimal level of 
education is X=0 because education is costly; until he/she reaches X*, there are no 
benefits to increase X, given the employer’s hypothesised beliefs. For a person who sets 
X≥X*, their optimal level is X=X*, because further increase would merely incur costs 
with no corresponding benefits. Thus, workers will set either X=0 or X=X* in 
equilibrium, as depicted in Figure 3.4. Given the employer’s initial beliefs and the fact 
just deducted, if employer’s beliefs are to be confirmed, then workers in group I must set 
X=0, and workers in group II must set X=X*. 
In the case where the employer’s beliefs are confirmed, a signalling equilibrium occurs. 
The model defines the conditions on behaviour by two groups, in order for  the employer’s 
beliefs to be confirmed, in algebraic, as follows: (1) There is no rational reason for 
 
12 Education costs are both monetary and psychic. 
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someone to choose a different level of education from 0 or X*; (2) group I sets X=0 if 
1>2-X*, which implies that the return for not investing in education is higher than 
investing in education; (3) group II sets X=X* if 2-(X*/2)>1, which implies the return for 
investing in education is higher than not investing in education; (4) putting conditions (2) 
and (3) together, if 1<X*<2, then employer’s initial beliefs are confirmed; (5) in interval 
[1,2], there are infinite equilibrium values of X*, but those values are not equivalent from 
a welfare point of view. The higher X* the worse off is Group II, while Group I is 
unaffected; and (6) if there is no signalling, workers will be paid of this unconditional 
expected marginal product Ω1+2(1-Ω1) = 2-Ω1; thus, group I is worse off than it was with 
no signalling at all. If the proportion of group I is 0.5, group II may also be worse off than 
it was with no signalling; in such a situation, everyone would prefer no signalling.  
 
Figure 3.2: Simple Signalling Framework  
Source: Spence (1973). 
 
The signalling model has an implication that even if education has no real contributions 
to the marginal product of the worker, the combination of the beliefs of the employer and 
the presence of signalling transform the education level X* in a prerequisite for the higher 
paying job. In other words, education could increase the marginal product of labour, 
without this necessarily being true.   
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Regarding the empirical research, Tyler et al.’s finding (2000) supports the signalling 
theory. They estimate the signalling value using the General Educational Development 
(GED) equivalency credential and Social Security Administration (SSA) earnings data. 
The study compares the wages of individuals who had the same GED test scores in the 
US with different passing standards and assumed that individuals who had the same GED 
score acquires equal amount of human capital and have the same productivity level.  
The study finds that the GED signal increases the earnings of young white dropouts by 
10 to 19 per cent and there is no statistically significant effect for minority dropouts. 
Although there are many evidences of higher education as signalling, the validity test is 
needed to criticise; as Page (2010) concludes that empirical tests of signalling model were 
most prevalent during the late 1970s and 1980s, but many were of questionable validity. 
Since the late 1980s, there have been fewer studies that have attempted to identify the 
role that signalling plays in the labour market, but the literature has laid more emphasis 
on finding external sources of identification.   
Furthermore, many studies have tried to prove whether education is just as a signalling or 
more than that (human capital). Most empirical studies find that higher education supports 
the human capital theory more, as Harmon et al. (2000) find that there are some 
significant effects of ability on wages, and education plays a largely productivity-
enhancing role. The study uses two databases, i.e. the GB National Child Development 
Survey13 (NCDS) and the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) which record 
wages and ability data for the UK. They apply three approaches to finesse the problem of 
education, either as signalling or as human capital. Firstly, they attempt to control ability 
and examine if education still has a strong influence on wages, any difference could be 
attributed to the signalling value of education. Secondly, they compare estimated returns 
that controls for ability with those that do not. And finally, they distinguish between 
ability and productivity to directly include ability measures. However, there is a problem 
with this method: the ability measures need to be uncontaminated by the effects of 
education; otherwise, they will pick the productivity-enhancing effects of education.      
Similarly, Chevalier et al. (2002) conclude that education in the UK strongly supports the 
human capital explanation. They study the effect of education on wages, whether it is 
 
13 NCDS is a cohort study of all individuals born in the GB in a particular week in 1958 whose early 
development was followed closely and whose subsequent careers have been recorded including their wages. 
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because education increases productivity or because of a signal of ability, using the large 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) data pooled from 1993 to 2001 from England and Wales. The 
approach used to distinguish between the two theories allows for the possibility of 
employer learning. The study finds that the effect of education on wages is relatively large 
– possibly approaching 10 per cent per additional years of education.  
From the explanation of both the theories and empirical evidence of human capital and 
signalling above, the key difference between signalling and human capital models is that 
signalling models allow firms to draw inferences about unobserved characteristics of 
employees. Those inferences can be based on schooling or work experience of employees, 
or on direct measures of some aspects of job performance (Weiss, 1995). On the other 
hand, the human capital theory argues intuitively that education endows an individual 
with productivity-enhancing ability, and this increased productivity results in increased 
wages in the labour market. Human capital theory follows the competitive market theory, 
which requires labour to receive a wage equal to their marginal product. Meanwhile the 
signalling theory offers an oppositional argument, which holds that education only 
reflects inherent abilities. These inherent abilities (not education itself) increase 
productivity and lead to higher wages (Kjelland, 2008). 
Although there is a significant difference between the human capital and the signalling 
theory, and this could have different policies’ implications, both theories agree that wage 
premium is an increasing function of education attainment.  
 
3.2.2 How is the Return to Education Usually Measured? 
 
There are some frameworks of the Mincer wage equation: individuals have identical 
abilities and opportunities, credit markets are perfect, the environment is perfectly certain, 
but occupations differ in the amount of schooling required. Individuals sacrifice wages 
while in school but incur no direct costs. Because individuals are ex ante identical, they 
require a compensating wage differential to work in occupations which require a longer 
schooling period. And finally, the compensating differential is determined by equating 
the present value of earnings streams net of costs associated with different levels of 
investment (Heckman et al., 2006). Furthermore, the Mincer wage equation assumes that 
(1) an individual with X years of schooling has wages which do not depend on age, for 
example a 40 year old new graduate will obtain the same as an 18 year old new graduate, 
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when they are graduated in the same time; (2) present value of lifetime income is the same 
across individual regardless of schooling if no post-schooling investments are made; and 
(3) the number of years spent at work are independent of the number of years schooling 
(Bunzel, 2008).  
In the regression, the standard Mincer wage equation is represented by log of wage (W), 
which only depends on education (years of schooling/X), years of experience (L), and the 
squared of experience (L2), with a linear relationship between education and wages, the 
proof of log linear relationship is shown in Appendix II. In the present research, Mincer 
wage equation for panel data is used to analyse the change of wage for a given sample 
individuals (i) over time, the standard Mincer wage equation is as shown below: ln%-,+ = ;/,+ +∑;%,0,+1-,0,+ +;1,+<-,+ + ;2,+<-,+1 + =-,+   (3.6),         
where: *>	%-,+: wage of individual i at time t (in log), 1-,0,+: education level of individual i at time t, >	is 1 to 4 (primary to university level) or >	=1 if education variable is defined as years of schooling, <-,+: years of experience of individual n at time t; or potential labour market experience, =-,+: a random error term, ;%,0,+: the rate of return to education for > (1…4 level of education) at time t, ;1	and ;2 
are parameters of experience, ;/,+: the intercept, Σ is set (vector) of explanatory variables; 
n is individual (i=1…I) and t refers to time period.   
In an empirical research, actual or potential wage (W) can be used in the estimates. Actual 
wage refers to wages that individuals actually receive. If actual data are not available, an 
alternative variable that can be used is potential wage, i.e. the potential income that might 
be earned if the individual played by the rules and worked for salary as much as other 
individuals do. There are some wage proxies: net or gross, hourly, weekly, monthly or 
yearly wages (Pereira and Martins, 2001). Swaffield (2000) defines wage as the gross 
average hourly wage and is transformed into the real wage by using a nominal wage index 
(constructed from the New Earnings Survey’s average hourly wage). Meanwhile, 
Chevalier et al. (2002) calculate an hourly wage rate from the ratio of usual wage 
including overtime pay to usual hours (from the respondent’s main job including 
overtime) and deflate all wages to 1993 prices using the Retail Price Index. One advantage 
of using hourly wage is that it could eliminate unobserved heterogeneity caused by the 
omitted working hours (Li and Urmanbetova, 2007); moreover, workers sometimes have 
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more overtime in one month, but not that much time in another month. Transforming 
yearly wage into hourly wage is hoped to eliminate this problem.   
Education attainment (X) could be defined as the highest level of education successfully 
completed and is either indicated by the highest educational qualification (vocational or 
academic) achieved, or by the number of years of education or schooling completed or in 
which case each year is regarded as a kind of level (UNESCO, 2010). Most studies 
calculated this variable by attaching the average of years to several standardised education 
levels or the total years of schooling (Asplund and Pereira, 1999). Meanwhile, other 
studies used a set of dummy variables as individual’s educational and vocational 
qualifications, allowing non-linear effects of the level of education. This specification 
also takes into account that, for a given completed educational/vocational degree, fewer 
rather than more years are considered as a positive signal (Steiner and Wagner, 1996).   
In terms of labour market experience (L), the standard Mincer wage equation also 
indicates a linear function between experience and wages, due to homogeneous 
individuals. Meanwhile, the quadratic function of experience variable could capture the 
fact that on-the-job training investments decline over time, as stated in the standard 
lifecycle human capital model, the algebra of this relationship is provided in Appendix 
III. Most empirical studies used actual and potential experience as labour market 
experience variables, indeed potential experience can be used if the data were not 
available. There is a distinction between both variables; actual experience refers to the 
sum of lifetime hours spent working and training while potential experience refers to the 
time elapsed since leaving school (Regan and Oaxaca, 2009). Thus, there is a possibility 
of different data between actual and potential experience.  
The equation postulates that experience in the labour market has a positive impact on 
wages. Furthermore, the effect of the square of experience is negative which implies that 
there are diminishing returns in experience. If the model assumes a linear relation between 
wage and experience, the correlation between both variables shows a concave shape. In 
addition, to reflect labour market experience, some studies also used job tenure which 
represents the individual’s years of experience in their present job; this variable is usually 
viewed as a measure of firm-specific training and knowledge, at the same time. The 
hypotheses are the same as experience variables.  
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Burdett and Coles (2010) argue that wage changes both with experience and with tenure 
because of two reasons: (1) individuals accumulate human capital by working, for 
example: typists become better typists while working as typists and; (2) human capital 
can be dichotomised into general human capital and firm-specific human capital. A 
worker who enjoys an increase in general human capital becomes more productive at all 
jobs (related to experience), and accumulating firm-specific human capital implies a 
worker is only more productive at that firm (tenure effect). As such, workers who change 
jobs, or those who are laid off, lose their firm-specific human capital, but keep their 
general human capital. As experience variable, the quadratic function of experience 
variable could capture the fact that on-the-job training investments decline over time.  
In the development, most research modifies the standard Mincer wage equation with 
control variables, i.e. personal characteristics such as sex (Comola and de Mello, 2009), 
and marital status (Chevalier, et al., 2002; Comola and de Mello, 2009); job and firm 
related variables such as present labour market experience or tenure (Purnastuti et al., 
2013), firm size and firm age (Pereira and Martin, 2001), industries (Comola and de 
Mello, 2013), formal and informal sectors (Dasgupta et al., 2015);  urban and rural area 
residential (Dumauli, 2015); and some interaction terms such as gender-material status 
and gender-dependency ratio (Comola and de Mello, 2009). These modifications are done 
with the aims to capture other factors that may affect the wage equation.  
It is worth noting as well that Mincer (1958) also asserts that the resulting age-wage 
profile was steeper for more educated employees than for those less educated. In other 
words, log wage is not a strictly separable function of education and age. There is no such 
thing as a single rate of return to education but rather a different rate of return for each 
age group. In contrast, Mincer (1958) also points out that in schooling, experience and 
wage, the experience-wage profiles are relatively parallel for different education groups.  
 
Limitations of the Mincer Wage Equation 
The Mincer wage equation has been commonly used to estimate return to education, and 
also offers a good starting point (Humphreys, 2012). Lemieux (2006) asserts that Mincer 
wage equation provides a parsimonious specification that fits the data remarkably well in 
most contexts. However, there are some valid critiques of the model. In terms of 
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assumptions, mainly the same present value of lifetime incomes cannot be fulfilled, only 
for simplification purpose.   
There are some limitations of the Mincer wage equation, i.e. (1) an endogeneity of 
education exists due to an ability bias and other omitted variable bias (this will be 
explained in detail in the next section); (2) measurement error in education variable causes 
the biased and inconsistent OLS estimates. Bias due to measurement error in the 
schooling variable is generally known to produce an attenuation bias in the coefficient of 
schooling; (3) sample selection bias occurs due to non-random selection of the sample 
used for the estimation process, when the sample is only based on a subpopulation; (4) 
the relationship between education and wages could be non-linear, this may be because 
of sheepskin effects, where achieving the final credential (e.g. a high school certificate or 
university degree) is more important than non-credentialed education. For instance, 
completing four out of four years of a higher education degree may well result in a large 
wage premium, but a person who completes only three out of four years of the same 
degree may receive a much smaller wage premium, as Mincer (1997) argues; (5) there 
are differences in experience profile in the labour market or heterogeneous experience, 
for example: high-skilled jobs may include a significant amount of “on the job” training 
and greater opportunities for professional advancement, while low-skilled jobs could only 
have little experience (Humphreys, 2012; Firpo et al., 2005)). The present study will focus 
on two of its limitations, i.e. the endogeneity and sample selection bias, which will be 
discussed in the next part.   
Although there are many limitations of Mincer wage equation, Lemiux (2003) concludes 
that the equation is still a good approximation in many cases, but it may overstate or 
understate the effect of experience and schooling on wages for some groups. Lemiux 
(2003) evaluates the empirical performance of the standard Mincer Wage Equation for 
the US data, using the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the years 1979-2001. The 
research finds that the equation does not appear to fit the data of the US in the 1980s and 
1990s, but it fits the data from the 1960s and 1970s; because there was an increasingly 
convex function of years of schooling and experience-wage profiles are no longer parallel 
for different education groups. However, the Mincer wage equation remains useful and 
accurate in a stable environment where educational achievement grows smoothly over 
successive cohorts of employees. In short, the Mincer wage equation remains a 
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parsimonious and relatively accurate model of the relationship among wage, education 
and experience, particularly in a stable environment.  
 
Endogeneity Issue in Mincer Equation 
Referring to the first assumption of the Mincer wage equation: all individuals are identical 
apart from the difference in education and training, it seems that the assumption cannot 
be fulfilled since different people cannot be identical, as they have different social 
environment, family background etc. Endogeneity problem arises due to unobservable 
variables such as ability. Ability can determine wage in the labour market and at the same 
time it can be correlated with education. This problem leads to biased results in the OLS 
estimations, because the education variable will be correlated with the error term in wage 
equation. The evidence of this endogeneity problem is explained in Appendix IV.  
To address the endogeneity issue, instrumental variable method can be used to solve this 
problem. The first step is estimating the predicted value of schooling variable, i.e. 1? = 	;/ + ∑;%,0,+@-,0,+ +	 ;1,0,+ ∑A-,0,+ + =-,+    (3.7),  
where: 1? is predicted value of education/schooling variable; @-,0,+ is vector of all 
explanatory/control variables; and A-,0,+ is instrument variables.  
After the predicted value of education is obtained, in the second stage, education variable 
is replaced by the predicted one (from the first stage): ln%-,+ =	;/ + ∑;%,0,+@-,0,+ +	 ;1,+1?-,+ + =-,+    (3.8). 
In terms of instrumental variables, some conventional variables can be used, such as:  
1. family background, including the parent’s education, and household wealth 
(Blackburn and Neumark, 1993). The idea is more educated families affect their 
wage by providing education friendly environment or by providing more financial 
help for their children. However, this could become an unfit instrument if family 
factors affect the wage directly by securing better and well-paid jobs for the 
children using their social affiliations and power; 
2. IQ or other academic scores (Harmon et al., 2003), those variables are assumed 
to capture natural ability; students with greater abilities (or some other hidden 
advantages) are likely to receive more schooling and also receive higher incomes, 
which could result in a correlation between schooling and wage that does not 
describe a causal link. If ability is related to both schooling and wage, then the 
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standard Mincer equation would give an upward biased result, and will also cause 
a convex relationship between education and (log of) wages (Humphreys, 2012); 
3. siblings or twin data, such as Butcher and Case (1994) use of “the presence of any 
sisters” within a family as an instrumental variable for schooling of female 
workers on the basis that gender composition of siblings in a family has a 
significant effect on educational attainment but no effect on inherent ability; 
4. availability of educational institutions nearby (Card, 1993), since the availability 
of school in a locality can increase the level of schooling in general, because living 
far from education institutions increases the cost of schooling in different ways 
such as transportation cost, fatigues and homesickness; 
5. bad habits such as smoking since according to the health economics, more 
educated people have better health and better health habits. Furthermore, 
Grossman (2008) asserts that completed years of formal schooling is the most 
important correlation of good health and this is based on some measurements, 
such as: mortality rates, morbidity rates, self-evaluated health status or 
psychological well-being.  
Alternatively, the analysis can use policy or natural instruments such as: compulsory 
schooling law or other related education policies (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Duflo, 
2001; Comola and de Mello, 2010; Purnastuti et al., 2015). The idea is that a child who 
was born earlier or before the policy is implemented, will have a lower level of education 
as compared to the people born later on. 
Even when there are many alternatives of instrumental variables, searching for a valid 
instrument is hard. Weakly correlated instruments with the endogenous variable causes 
IV estimates to be biased in the same direction as the OLS and may not be consistent. 
Using many instrumental variables could also decrease the number of observations that 
has a serious effect for small sample studies particularly.   
To evaluate whether the instruments used are appropriate, the standard quality, validity 
and relevance criteria of the instruments are considered (Purnastuti et al., 2015). The most 
important thing is to use a valid instrument if it affects earnings through schooling only. 
The first test is for the quality of the instruments. This is assessed using an F-test of the 
joint significance of the respective instrument set in their first-stage equation. Moreover, 
the R squared from the first-stage equation for the IV models based on the conventional 
instruments must be at a reasonable level. In addition, test for overidentification 
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restrictions and Hausman test for relevance criterion can be used. Hausman test can 
confirm the necessity to use IV/OLS estimations.  
 
Sample Selection Issue 
 
The problem arises due to non-random selection of the sample used for the estimation 
process, when the sample is only based on a subpopulation. For example: Mincer wage 
equation estimation is based on individuals whose wage is observed or individuals who 
choose to actively participate in the labour market as a wage earner. Thus, the differences 
between characteristics of actives and inactives may cause the sample selection bias. If 
the decision to or not to participate was a random decision, OLS estimates would be an 
appropriate estimating procedure; yet it is not a random decision, instead it is driven by 
some other factors (Bhatti, 2012). Moreover, Comola and de Mello (2010) assert that 
information on earnings is usually available only for salaried workers, thus OLS estimates 
are inconsistent if the earnings distribution is truncated.   
Gronau (1973) firstly raised this issue. Most empirical studies are only based on the 
observed wage distribution. Meanwhile, the observed distribution represents only one 
part of the wage offer distribution, as the other part being rejected by the job seekers as 
unacceptable. As a result, the traditional estimation procedures may involve certain biases 
when applied to the secondary labour group such as married women, teenagers, and the 
aged. The study finds that the US females participating in the labour force were different 
in characteristics from those who decided not to be included in the labour force. Hence, 
simple OLS may produce biased estimates for different factors influencing wage in the 
labour market.  
The corrective measures can be used in order to avoid the possibility of sample selection 
bias; the results may be considered for the whole target population. While ignoring this 
correction, it means that the result is valid only for the subpopulation of people who 
decided to work in the labour market. Heckman proposes maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimator (1976) and then a two-step estimation procedure (1979). The estimation 
procedure eliminates the possible sample selection bias in two steps. The first step uses 
ML probit regression, in which the decision to or not to work in the labour market is used 
as a response variable that depends on different explanatory factors. Then, the Inverse 
Mills Ratio (IMR) is calculated from the coefficient estimated in the first step. ML probit 
regression is estimated by separating the sample into two groups: 
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Then, ACTIVE can be estimated by equation: B"CDEF-,+ = W/ + ∑;%,0@-,0,+ +	=-,+	     (3.9), 
where:  B"CDEF-,+ is probit / dummy variable for active and not active, @-,0,+ is the number of explanatory variables that affect the likelihood of participation of 
individuals into waged work. 
From the equation above, the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) is calculated by: DX!-,+ = (3%4)%#(3%4)        (3.10),  
where: (. ) and (. ) are density and distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution.  
And the second step, estimating Mincer wage equation with the IMR as an additional 
regressor, or  ln%-,+ = ;/,+ +∑;%,0,+1-,0,+ +∑;%,0,+@-,0,+	 + ;2,+DX!-,+ + =-,+  (3.11), 
this will account for the bias due to the non-random nature of the sample of wage earners. 
A significant coefficient for the IMR points at the presence of the sample selectivity. In 
short, a first-stage probit equation estimates the selection process, which is estimated as 
a probit (the dependent variable is binary variable for being selected into the sample or 
dummy variable is one if the woman is participating in the labour force and is thus being 
paid and observed for the wage equation). The results from the first equation are used to 
construct a variable that captures the selection effect in the wage equation. One example 
of instrument variables is the presence of children for women, since the assumption is 
women with kids may be more likely to be stay-at-home mothers; but working women 
with kids would not affect their hourly pay rate. 
Wang (1995) studies the relationship between marital status, presence of children and 
women’s wage rate in the US, using 1985-1992 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth’s 
(NLSY) data. The sampling includes women aged 25 to 35 years old who exhibited no 
health limitations for job participation. Using the OLS and IV to control endogeneity and 
Heckman to control selection bias, the study finds that the marital status does not explain 
women’s labour participation; women who have higher financial responsibilities such as 
having more children are more willing to work. By controlling the endogeneity of marital 
status and the number of children, the study finds that marriage does have a significant 
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effect on wage as married women tend to have a lower market wage than the unmarried 
ones. According to Heckman correction model, the term is significant in the wage rate 
equation; thus, there is a difference for women who make the decision to or not to work; 
this implies that women who work either require higher wages or have higher ability 
level, or both.   
Aslam (2009) combines some methods to estimate the rates of return on education in 
Pakistan and compares OLS with Two-Step Heckman method. The study controls the 
sample selectivity bias with some variables as exclusion restrictions, such as number of 
children aged less than 7 years old, number of adults aged minimum 60 years old in the 
household, marital status and natural logarithm of unlaboured income. The study shows 
that overall OLS overestimated the return to education compared to the other model and 
concludes that the return for females was consistently higher than that for males after 
controlling the bias from sample selection.  
Dumauli (2015) addresses the sample selection issue to estimate the private return to 
education in Indonesia. The study uses IFLS4 data (year of 2007) and employs the Two-
Step Heckman to control for the bias arisen from the non-random sample for female 
workers. In Two-Step Heckman, the first stage is to estimate the female labour force 
participation rate using a probit model to get a sample selectivity correction term. In this 
stage, the study adds some exclusion variables which influence the probability to 
participate in the labour market, but also which indirectly influence salary. The second 
stage is to include the IMR as an additional explanatory variable to estimate wage 
function. If the coefficient of the IMR is statistically significant, it means that the 
estimated results suffer from sample selectivity bias. The study uses four instruments, i.e.: 
natural logarithm of household assets, regional (provincial) unemployment rate, marital 
status and number of household members or household size. The reasons for choosing 
these variables are as follows: (1) higher household assets, which play as proxy for 
unearned (unlaboured) income, can discourage the possibility of females from 
participating in waged work; (2) the high unemployment rate increases the probability of 
females to participate in waged work; (3) number of household members and (4) marital 
status can influence the decision of females to join the labour market since these variables 
can influence females in terms of housework and the time that has to be allocated for their 
families.   
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Dumauli (2015) finds that the coefficients for natural logarithm of household assets, 
marital status and number of household members are negative and statistically significant, 
which means that these variables discourage females from participating in waged work, 
whereas the coefficient of (provincial) unemployment rate is positive, which means that 
this variable increases the probability for females to participate in waged work. The 
coefficient of the IMR is negative and statistically significant for both years of schooling 
and level of education. It suggests that the OLS’ previous estimates suffer from sample 
selectivity bias. Comparing OLS with Two-Step Heckman, the coefficient of educational 
levels of the Two-Step Heckman is larger except for university level. 
 
3.2.3 What is the Estimated Rate of Return? 
There have been many studies which analysed the association between wage premium 
and higher education. As discussed above, the estimated rate of return (proxied by log of 
hourly wage) depends on education level and experience in the labour market, as 
explained in Mincer wage equation (Section 3.2.2). Thus, what will happen to wage is 
obvious; the higher the level of education, the higher the wage; even though the 
qualification is not in accordance with the required one, at least education acts as a signal 
that higher education qualification could imply higher competencies. One of the 
limitations of the present study is that it only considers education level and amount of 
wages, without considering the subject of study, education background and different 
quality of education institutions.    
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) find that the private return to education varied in 
each region based on the latest data available in each country. The method used to 
estimate the return is the standard Mincer wage equation, following Psacharopoulos 
(1994). They define education variable as a dummy of education level, comprising the 
primary, secondary and higher education. By comparing adjacent dummy variable 
coefficient, the study could derive the private return to education. Psacharopoulos and 
Patrinos find that among the continents, the highest average private return to education 
was in the sub-Saharan Africa region, around 37.6 per cent for primary school, 24.6 per 
cent for secondary school and 27.8 per cent for university. Asia (non-OECD countries) 
had 20 per cent return to education for primary school, 15.8 per cent for secondary, and 
18.2 per cent for university. In contrast, OECD countries (most of which are developed 
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countries) have a lower return to education of only 13.4 per cent for primary school, 11.3 
per cent for secondary and 11.6 per cent for higher education. It seems that return to 
education in OECD countries decreases as the level of education increases.  
They also document private return to education in many countries, such as Australia 
which had return to education rate of 14.2 per cent for secondary school and 4.2 per cent 
for higher education in 1981. Returns to education in India in 1995 were 2.6 per cent for 
primary school, 17.6 per cent for secondary school and 18.2 per cent for higher education. 
Returns to education in Malaysia in 1978 were 32.6 per cent for secondary and 34.5 per 
cent for higher education. Unfortunately, the study does not have private return to 
education data for Indonesia, the US and the UK (Psacharopoulos, 1994).  
For Indonesia, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos estimated the return to primary school for 
males was 19 per cent, and for female was 17 per cent in 1982; the return to secondary 
school for males was 23 per cent, and for females was 11 per cent in 1982; those returns 
significantly changed to 11 per cent for males and 16 per cent for females in 1986. And 
the return to university for males was 10 per cent, and for females was 9 per cent in 1982, 
with a slight change in 1986 to 9 per cent for males and 10 per cent for females. Those 
estimations were obtained from Psacharopoulos (1994).  
The limitations of Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) are: the data come from the firm-
based sample in the hope to control the survey cost and the questionnaire is typically filled 
by the payroll department rather than by the individual employees. This approach could 
lead to the use of sample concentrated only in urban areas. Alternatively, if the rate of 
return is relative to no education, a person who has poor primary education would have 
their opportunity for getting worthwhile secondary education diminished, which could 
affect the rates of return.  
In most countries, the majority of university graduates prefers employment in public 
sector. The concentration of graduates in public sector is identified as a problem in growth 
studies. However, public employee’s pay-based rate of return estimation is useful in 
private calculations. This is an incentive set by the state to invest in education and opt for 
employment in the public sector. Thus, the resulting contradiction is possibly due to these 
limitations.  
Montenegro and Patrinos (2012) recalculated the return to education around the world, 
using the standard Mincer wage equation. The data used are from a large database 
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constructed from existing national household surveys. It was prepared for the World 
Bank’s World Development Report Unit over the period 2005-2011 and has been used in 
World Development Report during this period and also in several Human Development 
Reports for the period between 2000 and 2011. The sample is only waged employees, and 
the omitted variables of education is lower than primary school.  
Based on education level, the study finds that the return to tertiary education on average 
in the world was around 16.8 percent, this is the highest one; meanwhile, the return to 
primary and secondary schools were 10.3 per cent and 6.9 per cent, respectively; which 
is in line with the human capital theory: wage increases with education level. Based on 
region, the return to primary school, secondary and tertiary education in East Asia were 
11 per cent, 6.3 per cent, and 15.4 per cent, respectively. The remaining return in other 
regions is presented in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.2: Return to Education by Level and Region (Latest Available Year between 
2000-2011) 
 
Source: Montenegro and Patrinos (2012). 
 
In general, return to secondary education is the lowest one, except in high income 
economies. The result would imply that the high return in tertiary education is because of 
scarce supply; based on continents, the highest returns are in Sub-Saharan African and 
South Asia. This finding supports Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) as well, that the 
returns to education in high income countries tend to be lower than in developing 
countries The possible reason for this is workers with high education attainment is 
relatively more available in developed countries; thus, the returns to human and physical 
capital tend to be equated at the margin. Another issue is measuring different quality level 
of education with the same model of the Mincer wage equation leads to biased results. As 
Glewwe (1996) argues, education quality in developed and less developed countries is 
low and uneven in quality. Thus, the omission of the school quality variable in Mincer 
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wage equation leads to biased results. This could also invoke the errors in variables 
argument; the years of schooling (education) variable measures human capital attainment 
with a large amount of error, biasing the parameter estimates on years of schooling 
towards zero (the tendency of unmeasured ability to cause the opposite bias may have 
been prevented by controlling for sample selectivity). 
Moreover, several India’s studies are also discussed in this part as a comparison, because 
the characteristics of India and Indonesia are similar, for example: both countries are in 
Asia, have abundant population, and transform the economy from agriculture to the 
service sectors. According to the World Development Indicators, India’s share in 
agriculture, manufacturing and services were 17 percent, 30 percent, and 53 percent in 
2015, respectively, whereas Indonesia’s share in agriculture, manufacturing and services 
were 14 percent, 40 percent and 46 percent in the same year, respectively.  
Rani (2014) and Singhari and Madheswaran (2016) study the return to education in India. 
Specifically, Rani (2014) looks into the impact of different levels of education, religion, 
caste as well as the impact of living in urban and rural communities on earnings in India, 
using a large cross-section sample of India Human Development Survey to estimate the 
Mincer and the augmented Mincer equations. The study finds that the return to education 
of primary school (completed years of education between 1 and 8 years) was around 1.3 
percent, return for secondary school was 3.7 percent, and return for graduate or university 
was 15.4 percent. This result confirms that the correlation between education and wages 
are positive.  
Singhari and Madheswaran (2016) estimate the standard Mincer wage equations 
separately for regular and casual workers. The result is slightly different with Rani’s 
(2014): the return for primary school is relatively higher; however, the trend decreases. 
For regular workers, the highest rate of return to education is diploma, followed by 
graduate and post-graduate, and then secondary education, as shown in Table 3.3. On the 
other hand, other studies’ estimations are almost the same with those of Singhari and 
Madheswaran (2016).  
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Table 3.3: The Estimates of Return to Education in India Based on Some Studies 
Source: Rani (2014) in Singhari and Madheswaran (2016).  
 
With regards to the empirical studies of return to education in Indonesia, Comola and de 
Mello (2012) study the wages in Indonesia by considering the selection bias. The study 
uses the 2004 wave data from the Indonesian National Labour Force Survey 
(SAKERNAS). To deal with the endogeneity of educational attainment, the study 
instrumented years of education by exposure to primary school construction program 
(Sekolah Dasar INPRES), measured as the intensity of school construction in an 
individual’s district of birth and his/her age when the programme was launched. Thus, 
this programme affected the improvement of school attainment as well as the increase of 
wages, as explained in Section 3.2.  
The study does not specifically find the amount of the wages or return to education, 
instead it compares the results of several methods, i.e. multinomial selection and binomial 
procedure (Heckman, 1979). The study finds that several parameter estimates differ when 
multinomial selection is allowed in the estimation of the wage equation. Moreover, one 
of the most important findings is that the estimated returns to education do not seem to 
be affected by the selection bias; it is very interesting for future empirical research to 
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identify any strategies that can deal with the endogeneity of education attainment in wages 
equations independently from the complexity of underlying selection process, if any.  
Furthermore, Dumauli (2015) estimates the private return to education in Indonesia by 
taking into account the endogeneity and sample selection issues, thus using methods other 
than OLS for Mincer wage equation; they use parental education as the instrument 
variable in IV method; and household size, marital status, and regional unemployment 
rate as an instrument of selection bias in the Heckman method. The data used are the 
fourth wave of the IFLS (IFLS4) year of 2007. The study finds that the return to education 
was 11.7 per cent in general (OLS), which means each additional year of schooling 
increases wages by 11.7 per cent. In terms of education level, the study finds that the 
return to primary school was 26.6 per cent, return to junior high school was 64.2 per cent, 
return to senior high school is 109.2 per cent, and return to university was 150 per cent 
higher than individuals with no schooling. Meanwhile, Heckman’s result is slightly 
lower: 11 per cent; and 17.3 per cent for IV method. However, parental education does 
not pass the over-identification test, in other words, the instrument is not appropriate.  
Dumauli’s (2015) finding has an implication that the higher the level of education is, the 
higher the rate of return to education becomes, thus agreeing with the human capital 
theory. That being said, compared to previous studies or to other countries within the 
region, the return to education in Indonesia was still relatively low. Dumauli (2015) 
argues there are two potential explanations for the low return to education in Indonesia. 
Firstly, the low rate of return to education in Indonesia may be induced by the low quality 
of the education system. Another possibility is that high skilled jobs are not in demand in 
Indonesia, but rather exist in the supply side. In particular, there is an excess supply of 
college graduates, and this in turn reduces the wages of college graduates. 
In terms of gender difference, Dougherty (2005) documents previous empirical studies 
with male and female schooling coefficients. The study finds that the estimates of the 
return of schooling in the US tend to be higher for females than for males; for example: 
Angle and Wissman (1981) estimate Mincer’s equation with hourly wage as dependent 
variable and years of schooling/level of education, age, family background and ethnicity 
as the independent variables. The data used are the NLS young men and young women 
with 2,831 males and 1,677 females who had at least some college qualifications. The 
study finds that the coefficient of years of schooling for male was 0.040 and for females 
was 0.076. In addition, the coefficients for females with bachelor and master degrees are 
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higher than males’ coefficients, except for the coefficient of females with a PhD. 
However, Abbasa and Foreman-Peck (2008) argue that high measured returns to female 
education is caused by a combination of much lower workforce participation and fewer 
average years in the labour force than males. 
Card (1999) uses CPS March data in the US from 1994-1996 period. The dependent 
variable is hourly wage, the explanatory variables are years of schooling, potential 
working experience, squared of experience, and ethnicity. The study concludes that the 
coefficients of years of schooling were 0.100 for males and 0.109 for females.  
Similar to the US findings, Trostel et al. (2002) estimate the returns to schooling in 28 
countries (mostly European), with data derived from a common survey instrument. They 
find that the return to education of females is higher than males: females’ return is 5.7 per 
cent, while males’ return was 4.8 per cent. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) list 95 
estimates of males and females schooling coefficients from 49 countries at different dates. 
Of these, 63 were greater for females, 3 were equal, and 23 were greater for males.  
Dougherty (2005) asserts that there are some possible causes of this effect (coefficient of 
return to education for females tends to be higher than for males):  
1. sample selection bias, since the common development in literature is to treat the 
wage equation as the second stage of a two-stage model of labour force 
participation and earnings. If labour force participants differ from non-
participants, OLS estimates are likely to be inconsistent. Given that most males 
do participate, while many females do not, the strength of the bias could be 
different between the genders and this might be a factor responsible for part of the 
difference in the OLS coefficients;  
2. schooling and discrimination; a second extension of the standard Mincer equation 
is to allow for the possibility that schooling may have two effects on earnings, at 
least for females: a direct human capital effect, and an indirect, anti-discrimination 
effect. There are two possible reasons for this; firstly, the better educated the 
individual is, the more likely the individual is to have a degree or formal 
qualification that would help to standardise wage offers, regardless of sex. 
Secondly, the better educated a female is, the less likely she is to be tolerant of 
discrimination. Moreover, the better educated a female is and the greater her 
potential earnings are, the more able she is to pay for childcare and other services 
that allow her to seek a wage offer that fully values her characteristics.   
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3. quality of the schooling investment; there may be a difference in the quality of 
male and female education. It is assumed that females tend to be more motivated 
students than males and extract more from their time in school. As such, 
measuring schooling in terms of years of enrolment may mask systematic 
differentials in the quality of the schooling investment, and if the quality of the 
investment correlates with years of enrolment, its omission from the regression 
specification could cause differential biases in the male and female schooling 
coefficients; 
4. occupational choice; females may be under-represented in jobs where schooling 
is a relatively unimportant factor in the determination of earnings. For example, 
they may be under-represented among union workers, where schooling is 
subordinated to seniority as a determinant of earnings, or in self-employment 
where entrepreneurial skills are relatively more highly valued; 
5. the other possibility is the differentials in measurement error and endogeneity of 
schooling and work experience. However, these possibilities are pursued in the 
study.  
6. meanwhile, Ren and Miller (2012) investigate the gender differential in the 
average return to schooling in China, and argue that the difference occurs possibly 
because of the differences in the demand for, and supply of, education between 
males and females, greater positive self-selection of females into the labour force 
relative to males, a more limited supply of skilled female workers, different 
technological requirements between the female-dominated and male-dominated 
jobs, and discrimination against female workers that is less intense among the 
better educated. 
Abbas and Foreman-Peck (2008) also study the implication of education policy in 
Pakistan by the Mincer equation and using Pakistan Social and Living Standards 
Measurement (PSLM) Survey, between 2004 and 2005. In terms of gender, they conclude 
that returns to an additional year of schooling are greater for females than for males in a 
paid employment; the returns to an additional year of schooling were 9.2 percent and 14 
percent for males and females, respectively. The large and significant gender differences 
in Pakistan cannot be attributed to the scarcity of educated women; a possible explanation 
is the low probability or short duration of employment which requires a high apparent 
rate of return compared to males. Unfortunately, Abbasa and Foreman-Peck (2007) did 
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not have ethnicity as well as religion as control variables, they have Punjab, Sinndh, 
NWFP, and Balochistan as provinces variables/dummies. Abbas and Foreman-Peck 
(2008) also conclude that there is some signalling in Pakistani education investment but 
mainly the education is a productivity-enhancing investment in human capital. The 
conclusion is based on the comparison of coefficients of schooling estimated for the paid 
employed with those for the self-employed. The result shows that the coefficients of 
schooling for the self-employed are lower than for the paid employed. Thus, there is 
apparently a small element of signalling. And the bulk of the return to schooling is a 
consequence of enhanced human capital.  
In addition, the great recession may affect the return to education to some extent, in 
particular wage gap by education level. Belfield (2015) estimates the return to education 
in Arkansas over the period before, during and after the great recession. Belfield reveals 
very modest effects of the great recession on the earnings gaps of workers with different 
level of education. During 2001-2012 period, there were large and stable returns to 
postsecondary education relative to high school completion, and these gaps were largely 
unaffected by the Great Recession. The study also found that employment shocks that 
differ by education level: for persons without a college education, employment shocks 
were stronger, and they persisted beyond the end of the recession. Adjusting for these 
employment shocks, earnings gaps by education level increased over the period after 
2007. Moreover, there is an evidence that those who graduated from college during the 
Great Recession gained less than those who graduated before 2007. As with earlier 
recessions, postsecondary education served as an effective buffer against labour market 
shocks. 
  
3.2.4 What is the Likely Impact of the Expansion? 
The Simple Supply-Demand Framework  
Over the last decade, the education sector has been expanding both in developed and 
developing countries including Indonesia and this expansion has clearly affected the 
labour market. One of the alternatives to analyse the effects is the simple supply and 
demand framework in a competitive market. The framework has been widely used in 
academic research on changing labour market inequality (Machin and McNally, 2007). 
The assumption is that competitive market could be too strong for the Indonesian labour 
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market, considering Indonesia is one of the small open economies in the world. 
Nevertheless, International Business Publication (2017) asserts that the Indonesian labour 
market is generally open and flexible, although there are significant restrictions on the 
use of contract workers.   
The present study uses examples of an expansion in university graduates relative to 
primary school (or below) graduates (relative employment) and its effect to relative wages 
in this part. Beginning with a position where the demand and supply are perfectly 
equalised or the initial equilibrium condition; an increase in the supply of university 
graduate leads to a decrease in the wage premium, ceteris paribus. This is because 
employers have a wider range of similarly qualified individuals to choose from (Machin 
and McNally, 2007). The wages of university graduates (Uni) and primary school (or 
below) graduates (Pri) are denoted by %50-6789-+: and %;8-<=8:, and the employment 
rates are *50- and *;8-, respectively. The initial equilibrium (F/) occurs at the intersection 
of the initial relative demand (Z/) and relative supply ([/) curve, with associated relatives 
wages (%50-/%;8-)/ and the relative employment (*50-/*;8-)/, as shown in Figure 3.3.   
 
Figure 3.3: The Initial Condition in the Labour Market  
 
When there is an expansion in university level, it is followed by an increase in the supply 
of employees with university qualifications. Subsequently, the supply curve shifts to the 
right or from [/ to [%.	The relative employment rate increases from (*50-/*;8-)/ to (*50-/*;8-)%, while the relative wage decreases from (%50-/%;8-)/ to (%50-/%;8-)%, and 
 
 80 
the new equilibrium is F%. In short, this model predicts that the supply shock reduces the 
relative wage of university graduates, as shown in Figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4: The Supply Curve Shifts Due to the Higher Education Expansion 
 
Following the shift on the supply side, employers tend to demand more employees with 
higher education qualifications. Then, there is an increase in the relative demand and the 
demand curve shifts to the right from Z/ to Z%, as shown in Figure 3.5; as such, lower 
relative wages will not be the case, assuming that the relative supply curve is fixed ([%). 
If the demand increases faster than the supply, the wage premium will increase, and the 
new equilibrium occurs in F1 with higher relative wages (%50-/%;8-)1 but the same 
employment rates (*50-/*;8-)1. 
It is worth noting that the elasticity of the relative demand and the relative supply of 
higher education graduates would have significant effect on the analysis. The elasticity 
refers to the degree of responsiveness in supply or demand in relation to changes in wage 
premium. If the relative supply or demand curve is more elastic, then small changes in 
the relative wages premium will cause large changes in the number of relative 
employment. Vice versa, if the relative supply or demand curve is less elastic, then it will 
take large changes in the relative wages to cause a change in the number of relative 
employments. Moreover, the elasticity of wage premium with respect to demand and 
supply is not necessarily the same across countries and over different time periods.  
 81 
 
Figure 3.5: The Demand Curve Shifts Following an Increase in the Supply Side 
 
 
3.2.5 What has Happened to the Rate of Return after the Expansion?  
The simple supply and demand framework specifies that if the relative demand increases 
faster than the relative supply, then the return to education (wages) will increase, as 
explained in Section 3.2.4. This part, then, will discuss what has happened to the rate of 
return after the expansion of education by taking into account empirical studies in the US, 
the UK, and OECD countries, followed by empirical studies from Indonesia and other 
similar countries.  
Many studies have analysed this expansion and some of them even prove that wages have 
increased after the education expansion (Katz and Murphy (1992), and Machin and 
McNally (2007)). On the other hand, other studies also find that wages have decreased 
(Walker and Zhu, 2008).  
Firstly, Katz and Murphy (1992) use a simple supply and demand framework to analyse 
the change in wage structure in the US from 1963 to 1987. The data used were a series of 
25 consecutive March Current Population Surveys (CPSs). The education variable used 
was years of schooling which is then divided into 4 groups: (1) 8-11 years for dropout 
group, (2) 12 years for high school graduate, (3) 13-15 years for some college, and (4) 
16+ year for university graduate; while the wage is measured by the average, weekly 
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wage of full-time workers within gender-education-experience. The sample includes all 
individuals who worked at least one week in the preceding year. The study finds the 
college wage premium increased moderately in the 1960s, decreased in the 1970s and 
increased significantly in the 1980s. The driving force behind the observed change in 
wage structure is the rapid secular growth in the demand for more-educated workers as 
well as female and more skilled workers. In addition, they estimate that the elasticity of 
substitution between skilled and unskilled labour was significant, around 1.4 – 1.6, which 
implies that the increased supply reduces relative wages (ceteris paribus). Thus, the 
differences in the growth rate of the supply of university graduates have an important role 
to play in explaining the changes in college premium in the US during that period. The 
demand has outstripped supply; hence, the wage premium increased significantly over 
this time period despite the large increase in supply.     
Machin and McNally (2007) have addressed some issues related to the expansion in 
tertiary level education: over-supply, over-qualification and skill mismatch. Machin and 
McNally also estimate the change of returns to education in OECD countries in their 
study, using the simple relative supply and demand framework. Moreover, they provide 
empirical evidence for each country. In general, they find that the wage premium has 
increased in most OECD countries, except for Spain, New Zealand, and South Korea. In 
South Korea, the decline of wage premium occurred during rapid industrialisation period 
(1974-1990). Yet, there is still a positive return to tertiary education, even in countries 
with a decline in return. The strong, positive and increasing returns to higher education 
suggest that ‘under-supply’ is more of an issue and that continued expansion is justified.  
For the UK, Machin and McNally (2007) document previous research and assert that the 
proportion of employees with higher education qualifications in the UK increased from 5 
per cent to 21 per cent over the period of 1980-2004. The relative weekly wages also 
increased from 1.48 in 1980 to 1.64 in 2004 in the UK. This concludes that the pattern of 
change in the wage structure differs; however, the pattern of change in university wage 
differentials is fairly clear. There was a significant increase in the 1980s, in terms of the 
average wage return, which continued to increase at a lower rate in the 1990s; and became 
relatively stagnant in the 2000s.  
Some more debates have emerged in more recent works about certain subgroups and 
whether there is any evidence of falling returns to education. A number of studies 
documents rising returns over time from the 1970s to the early 1990s such as: Harkness 
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and Machin (1999). A number of other studies also find slightly rising or constant returns 
from the early 1990s to the early 2000s, such as: Chevalier et al. (2004) and Walker and 
Zhu (2003). In contrast, there is little evidence of declines in return to education such as: 
O’Leary and Sloane (2005) and Walker and Zhu (2005), even Dickerson (2005) reports 
no change in return to education using the same data sources. Moreover, reports of falling 
returns need to be kept in perspective as the size of returns are still substantial in 
comparison to those with only an upper secondary education. Overall, the UK pattern of 
change in relative wage and employment was similar to the US in that the relative demand 
for higher education has outstripped the relative supply. 
Particularly for South Korea, Kim and Topel (1995) study the development of wage 
premium during Korea’s rapid industrialisation, from 1970 to 1990. The analysis is based 
on the simple supply and demand framework, whilst ignoring capital and assuming the 
production in industry is homothetic in its labour input. The study find that there were; a 
very substantial upgrading of skills in the workforce, an increase in the number of 
university graduates, a positive wage premium, and an increase in the wage premium at 
the end of that period. Kim and Topel argued that the change in wage inequality can be 
driven by (at least) three factors, i.e. changes in relative supplies of different skill groups 
can change their relative wages; expanding industries may be intense users of some 
employee types which in turn raises the relative demand for those employees; and finally, 
the pace of technical change may favour certain employee types. As such, there is a shift 
in relative labour demands over time.  
With regards to Indonesia and other East Asian countries, Gropello and Sakellariou 
(2010) estimate skill and wage premium at the national and sectoral levels in seven East 
Asian countries: Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, China and 
Mongolia. For Indonesia, the study used a 2-digit industry classification, and the data 
used are from SAKERNAS surveys from 1994 to 2007. Slightly differently, the method 
used is the linear regression with employees’ characteristics (including age and gender), 
type of labour (skilled or unskilled), industry indicators (dummies) and the social return 
to education (skill premium) as the independent variables; and wage premium as the 
dependent variable. The study confirms that there is a decrease of workers with primary 
and below primary school qualifications. In contrast, there is an increase (expansion) in 
workers with high school and university qualifications.  
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Gropello and Sakellariou (2010) findings are summarised in Tables 3.4, the base 
(reference) education level is completed primary or lower education level; except that the 
presented return estimates for education levels higher than primary are given in 
comparison to primary. Returns to education decreased in most education levels, with the 
largest decline during 1994-2007 period being the junior and senior high schools (relative 
to primary school). Meanwhile, the lowest decline was the university level. In addition, 
the study separates the sample within senior education and finds that most declines in 
premiums were associated with the vocational-technical education. One possible reason 
for this is that the demand for higher education workers is on the rise but only moderately, 
or that the supply of labour outstripped the demand for labour.   
For other Asian countries, the Philippines had an increasing trend for senior and tertiary 
education in basic regression but turning negative when the study adds a control variable 
and industry dummies. It also seems that Thailand had similar trend to Indonesia, as 
explained previously, a negative growth in return to education for most of education 
levels. In contrast, Vietnam and Cambodia had a positive trend or an increase return to 
education in all education levels. Finally, China had a positive return as well, except for 
the primary school qualifications, as shown in Table 3.5. Gropello and Sakellariou (2010) 
argue that those evidence combined with stable or increasing education/skill wage 
premiums (in regressions with only basic controls) indicate a generally increasing 
demand for skills in the region (and that education also leads to increasing inequalities in 
several countries).  
Table 3.4: Return to Education by Education Level (Relative to Primary Education) in 
1994, 2001 and 2007 
  1994 2007 Change (%) 
   1994-2007 
Basic controls only    
Primary 0.213 0.242 13.6 
Junior/Primary 0.234 0.128 -45.3 
Senior/Primary 0.596 0.508 -14.8 
University/Primary 1.125 1.084 -3.6 
Basic controls + Industry dummies   
Primary 0.195 0.243 25.1 
Junior/Primary 0.235 0.126 -46.4 
Senior/Primary 0.61 0.498 -18.4 
University/Primary 1.137 1.07 -5.9 
Basic controls only    
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High school 
general/primary 0.527 0.486 -7.8 
High school 
vocational/primary 0.663 0.547 -17.5 
University/Primary 1.123 1.084 -3.5 
Basic controls + Industry dummies   
High school 
general/primary 0.545 0.479 -12.1 
High school 
vocational/primary 0.678 0.526 -22.4 
University/Primary 1.139 1.056 -7.3 
Source: Gropello and Sakellariou, 2010. 
Note: Return to primary school relative to below primary school graduates.  
 
Table 3.5: The Change of Return to Education by Education Level in Several Asian 
Countries 
Education Level 
Indonesia 
The 
Philippines Thailand Vietnam Cambodia China 
Change 
1994-2007 1998-2006 1990-2004 1999-2006 1997-2007 1999-2005 
Basic control only 
Primary 0.029   0.093 0.113 0.154 0.036 
Junior/Primary -0.106   -0.058 0.227 0.135 0.105 
Senior/Primary -0.088 0.185 -0.033 0.385 0.277 0.274 
University/Primary -0.041 0.101 0.196 0.648 0.722 0.351 
Basic control + industry dummies 
Primary 0.049   0.032 0.098 0.038 -0.019 
Junior/Primary -0.109   -0.092 0.206 0.056 0.111 
Senior/Primary -0.112 -0.209 -0.141 0.318 0.061 0.290 
University/Primary -0.067 -0.141 -0.017 0.487 0.411 0.392 
Source: Gropello and Sakellariou, 2010.  
Similar to Gropello and Sakellariou’s (2010) conclusion, Purnastuti et al. (2013) confirm 
that there was a decline in the return to education in Indonesia. The estimation uses the 
standard Mincer equation with log of monthly earnings as dependent variables; education 
variable is in dummy of education level from primary to master level (relative to below 
primary school) and the control variables are: experience, marital status, gender and 
residential, by comparing IFLS1 (year of 1993) and IFLS4 (year of 2007) data. In 
addition, the study also uses the cohort effect since changes in the pay-off to education 
over time can reflect both cohort and age effects. The study finds that the returns to 
education tend to increase as the level of education increases. Also, gender affects the 
difference in return to education. Returns to education appear to be a less profitable 
investment in 2007 than returns in 1993, except for university degrees, but the 
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profitability of this education level increased between 1993 and 2007, for both males and 
females. The study argues that the decreasing trend could be attributable to the large-scale 
expansion of education in Indonesia, or to a rate of expansion in the number of jobs 
requiring higher educational attainment which lagged behind the expansion of education 
and the increase of average education attainment.  
 
 
3.3 Method and Data 
3.3.1 Method  
The present study applies two specifications of the Mincer wage equation, the first model 
is the standard Mincer equation (Equation 3.6), as explained in Section 3.2.2 and the 
second one is with control variables, including personal characteristics (]), work related 
and firm size (^), and regional dummy variables (B), that is formulated by: ln(&,( = %),( +∑%*,+,(!&,+,( +%,,(,&,( + %-,(,&,(, +∑%.,+,(P&,+,( +∑%/,+,(F&,+,( + ∑b0,+,( A&,+,( + $&,(   
(3.12), 
where: *>%-,+ is log of real hourly wages; _ represents set (vector) of explanatory 
variables;	1-,0,+: education level of individual i at time t, >	 is 1...4 (primary to university 
level) or years of schooling (> = 1), <-,+ is potential labour market experience in terms of 
year. Furthermore, other control variables are divided into three groups: personal 
characteristics (∑P-,0,+), work related and firm size (∑F-,0,+); and area/regional dummies 
(∑A-,0,+), i is individual (1…I); and t is at time t (2000 and 2014). The explanation for 
each variable as follows:  
 
Dependent Variable (*>/-,+) 
The dependent variable in this study is the natural logarithm of hourly wages in the real 
term (2010=100). In the estimation tables, this variable is notated by log of real hourly 
wage, for easier reading and interpretation. Respondents of both IFLS waves are 
explicitly asked about their last year wages (includes all benefits), total number working 
 87 
week per year, and working hours in a week. Hourly wages14 are defined based on the 
formula: 
c+Q(*d	/N,J = >=9+	:7=8	9=@=8:*A+=@	05<B78		CA58	;78	D77E	∗*A+=@	05<B78	D77E	;78	:7=8	   
 (3.13), 
!JN*	ℎ+Q(*d	/N,J = %//-0G@=+-A0 ∗ c+Q(*d	/N,J,  
inflation is in terms of index (2010=100), and wage is measured in Indonesian Rupiah 
(IDR).  
The present study does not consider using monthly or yearly wages like most existing 
studies in Indonesia since hourly wage is a better measure of the return to education, as 
elaborated in Section 3.2.2. As wages are influenced by both wage rate and hours worked, 
hourly wage could eliminate unobserved heterogeneity caused by the omitted work hours 
(Li and Urmanbetova, 2007).  
 
Main Independent Variables 
Education Attainment (∑1-,0,+) 
Education attainment is defined based on question dl16 and is divided into four main 
groups:  
1. primary school and below, consisting of primary school, no schooling, adult 
education A, Islamic elementary school, and kindergarten, 
2. junior high school, consisting of general junior high school, vocational junior high 
school, adult education B, and Islamic junior high school, 
3. senior high school, comprising general senior high school, vocational senior high 
school, adult education C, Islamic senior high school, and Islamic school 
(pesantren), 
4. university, consisting of college (diploma1, diploma2, diploma3), university 
(undergraduate degree), university (master’s degree), university (PhD), and open 
university. 
 
14 Last year salary is defined by question TK25A; total number of hours per week is defined by question 
TK22A; and total number of weeks per year is defined by question TK23A.  
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Furthermore, other education levels and schools for the disabled are defined as missing 
value, since the disabled and general schools have different characteristics and the return 
to education will differ. Education level is used in the main analysis for simplification as 
explained in the introduction; this allows non-linear effects of the level of education 
(Steiner and Wagner, 1996) and is also in line with the policy implementation which is 
commonly based on the education levels. For simplification purpose, the present study 
also adds the analysis of years of schooling especially for robustness test. In the estimation 
tables, these variables are notated as: primary school, junior high school, senior high 
school, and university; or years of schooling.  
 
Experience and Experience Squared (!!,# and !!,#$ ) 
The standard approach to control Mincer equation is experience and experience squared. 
However, it is impossible to get complete labour market experience from both the 2000 
and 2014 surveys. As such, potential experience is used in the regression (as explained in 
the literature review). The present study also follows Dong’s (2016) definition, i.e. 
experience of workers with primary school degree or below is age (in year) – 12 years; 
experience of workers with junior high school degree is age – 15 years; experience of 
workers with senior high school degree is age – 18 years; and experience of university 
qualification is age – 22 years. Then, the square term is employed to construct experience 
squared, notated as L and L2 in the estimation tables as experience and experience square.  
 
Other Control Variables 
Control variables are defined based on the literature and previous empirical studies. The 
present study also considers that those variables must be present in both IFLS surveys for 
comparative purpose. The study then categorises the control variables into three groups: 
1. personal characteristics, consisting of dummy variables for: sex (1=female), and 
marital status (1=single, 2=married and cohabitate, 3=other status) as per Comola 
and de Mello (2009), Purnastuti et al. (2013), and Dumauli (2015); religion 
dummies (1=Islam, 2=Christian/Protestant, 3=Catholic, 4=Hindu/the omitted, 
5=Buddhist, and 6=Konghucu), and Ethnicity dummies (1=Jawa, 2=Sunda, 
3=Batak, 4=Betawi, 5=Minang, 7=Tiong Hoa, and 8=other/the omitted dummy) 
following Suryadarma et al. (2006) and Patrinos (2016). Ethnicity dummies are 
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defined based on majority ethnicities, except for Tiong Hoa or Chinese-
Indonesian ethnicity which is only less than 1 per cent of the population, though 
the ethnicity has a special characteristic due to the argument that 70 per cent of 
the Indonesian economy is in the hands of the Chinese and that negative views 
towards the ethnicity proliferate again recently (Herlijanto, 2016).  
2. work related and firm size variable consists of full-time/part-time dummy (1=full 
time15 and 0=part time) as per Muffels and Fouarge (2001), tenure or current 
experience in the labour market (Purnastuti et al., 2013), sector dummy (1=private 
and 0=public), industry dummies (agriculture; mining and quarrying; 
manufacturing; electricity gas and water; construction; wholesale retail restaurant 
and hotels; transportation storage and communications; finance insurance real 
estate and business services; and social services; with agriculture and other sectors 
as omitted variable), following Gropello et al. (2011); and firm size refers to the 
number of workers in the firm16 (Ekberg and Salabasis, 2001);  
3. regional dummy variable consists of urban/rural dummy or notated as Urban (as 
per Purnastuti et al. (2013) and Dumauli (2015)) and province dummies (Patrinos 
(2016) and Harmon et al. (2000)). However, the present study has a slightly 
different group of provinces between 2000 (IFLS3) and 2014 (IFLS5), though it 
consistently uses Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB) as the omitted variable.   
Furthermore, the present study employs several different estimation specifications, with 
only the main variable and personal characteristic controls; and both of them are in 
addition to work related and firm size. The result will not be discussed in this paper, but 
is attached instead in the appendix for further information (Appendix VI). Full regression 
is chosen with region dummies, since the result is better, considering consistency for the 
interpretations; and the study can analyse different effects of those variables on the wages. 
Moreover, this study also separates the estimations into gender and sector to elaborate the 
gender difference, to get more information on private and public sectors in Indonesia, and 
to see whether those sectors follow market mechanism in wage determination.  
  
 
15 Full-time workers are defined as working equal to or more than 30 hours per week; this is based on ILO 
which use 30 hours per week as the cut-off point for its definition of a part-time worker (Felipe and Hasan, 
2006). 
16 The present study classifies into four groups: firm with 1-4 workers is an omitted variable, firms with 5-
19 workers (small enterprise), 20-99 workers (medium) and more than 100 workers (big enterprise). 
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3.3.2 Data and Sample Restriction 
 
IFLS3 (2000) and IFLS5 (2014) are the main data of the present study. Both surveys were 
fielded in 2000 and in late 2014 to early 2015, respectively. These waves are used to 
examine the effect of the National Education System Law (No. 20 of 2003) and Higher 
Education Law (No. 12 of 2012) enforcement. Thus, the year 2000 represents the period 
before the law was enforced and 2014 represents the years after the law was enforced, as 
explained in Section 3.1.  
The main variables of the present study are wage, education attainment, and experience; 
this is based on the Mincer wage equation as explained in Section 3.2.2. The study also 
puts some restrictions on the data, and determines certain definition of employment in the 
research, since it focuses on the return to education from employment in private and 
public sectors in Indonesia. The full sample data (individuals who provided their 
education attainment) are provided in Appendix V.  
Firstly: age restriction, this study restricts the sample to workers aged 16 - 55 or adult 
respondents. 16 years old is the minimum age of the sample, considering that people 
finish junior high school (as compulsory education) in 16 years of age, and 55 years old 
is the maximum age limit; this is based on Law no. 3 of 1992 on Social Security and Law 
no. 11 of 1992 on Pension Fund17. Workers whose age under 16 or older than 55 are 
exclude in the first restriction; thus, the sample is only workers in the labour market.  
Secondly, the sample is restricted only for employment, following Dong (2015) who uses 
question TK01-TK0418 in each IFLS wave. The restrictions ensure the sample is in the 
labour market or employed during the period. The third restriction is based on sector 
(question TK24A): “Which category best describes the work that you do?”19 The present 
 
17 Those regulations are amended by Government Regulation no. 45 of 2015 article 15 on Pension Security. 
The regulation stipulates: “pension age is 56 years old in 2015; however, starting on 1 January 2019, the 
retirement age will be 57 years. This retirement age will gradually increase by one more year every three 
years until the retirement age finally becomes 65.” 
18 Question TK01: “What was your primary activity during the past week?”; TK02: “Did you work for at 
least 1 hour during the past week?”; TK03: “Do you have a job/business, but were temporarily not working 
during the past week?”; and TK04: “Did you work at a family-owned (farm or non-farm) business during 
the past week?” And employments are respondents who only answer working/trying to work/help to earn 
income in the first question; and respondents who answered yes (working) for the remaining questions.  
19 Answers could be: self-employment, self-employment with unpaid family worker/temporary worker, 
self-employment with permanent worker, government worker, private worker, casual worker in agriculture, 
casual worker not in agriculture, and unpaid family worker. The answer choices are slightly different with 
those of IFLS3 which has no choice of casual workers; only self-employment, unpaid workers, government 
and private workers. However, the present study can ignore this difference, since this will not affect the 
following analysis. 
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study focuses on government (public) and private sectors in the waged sector, since they 
have a similar characteristic of receiving wages regularly, for instance monthly wages. 
Yet, it is difficult to distinguish between formal and informal sector among those firms 
because the other information is limited, there is a contract question/data, but not all 
respondents who answer that question, as a consequence the sample size may shrink. And 
a small sample size also affects the reliability of a survey's results because it leads to a 
higher variability, which may lead to bias. The final sample in the present study is around 
90 per cent of employment in 2000 and 85 per cent of employment in waged sectors in 
2014, as shown in Table 3.6. In additions, the disabled are dropped from the sample, since 
the nature may be different with the other workers. 
Table 3.6: Sample Restrictions 
Sample 2000 2014/15 
  
Number 
of Jobs % Lost 
Number 
of Jobs % Lost 
Initial sample         
Age 14-110 25,825 - 36,381 - 
          
Restrictions:         
Age 16-55 21,073 18.4 29,797 18.1 
Employment:  all employment status 
(tk01|tk02|tk03|tk04=1) 14,741 30.0 21,180 28.9 
All employment status 
(tk01|tk02|tk03|tk04=1); including self-
employment 12,580 14.7 16,672 21.3 
          
Emp=1 and tk24a =4 and 5; 4: public 
workers; 5: private workers, excluding 
self-employed (only waged sector) 7,043 44.0 9,509 43.0 
          
Education (non-missing) 
(tk01a==1 and tk01==1) and tk24a =4 
and 5 6,718 4.6 9,423 0.9 
         
Wage (non-missing) 6,634 1.3 9,139 3.0 
          
Wage (non-zero) 6,537 1.5 9,008 1.4 
          
Total sample 6386 2.3 8119 9.9 
(control variables missing)         
     
Source: The author’s calculation.  
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3.3.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 3.7 reports the summary statistics for the main variables and other control variables 
only for the sample in the present research. There were 6,386 observations in 2000 and 
8,119 observations in 2014, respectively. For the dependent variables, in 2000, the 
minimum value of real hourly wages was IDR 0.0004287; it is worth noting that wage 
variable in the present study is self-reported, and the measurement error likely occurs, as 
Bauhoff (2014) asserted, self-report bias is the deviation between the self-reported and 
true values of the same measure. The bias is a type of measurement error that may be 
random or systematic and constant or variable. It can mislead descriptive statistics and 
causal inferences. While, the mean of real hourly wages was IDR 3,882.9 or GBP 0.29; 
this increased to around 2.9 times to IDR 16,046.8 or GBP 0.85 in 2014. The maximum 
hourly wages in 2014 was GBP 1,168.9 which was significantly different from the 
maximum hourly wage in 2000 (GBP 159.2). This increase in wage is in line with ILO’s 
(2015) finding that the average net wages per month for regular employees (in real term, 
2007=100) was around GBP 59.1 (IDR 1 million) in 2006, increased to GBP 61.5 (IDR 
1.2 million) in 201420.  
In addition, there are several methods to eliminate the outliers, such as: using the National 
Minimum Wage as the standard of bottom limit, for example: the minimum wage in 2014 
was IDR 1,584,391, or the hourly wage was around IDR 9902.4 (GBP 0.54). The number 
of observations that have value less than 0.54 was 603 or around 2% of the sample. 
Alternative method of handling extreme scores (trimming) involves dropping the top and 
the bottom scores or some percentage of score, such as the top and bottom of 1% of scores 
(Warner, 2013).   
 
 
 
20 1 GBP=IDR 16,909.6 in 2006; 1 GBP=IDR 19,503.2 in 2014. 
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Table 3.7: Summary Statistics, 2000 and 2014 Periods  
  
IFLS3 IFLS5 
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Percentiles 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Percentiles 
25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 
Dependent Variables  
Real Hourly 
wages (IDR) 6386 3882.9 26450.9 0.0 2000800.0 1020.8 1908.6 3841.5 8119 16046.8 254681.1 9.3 22700000.0 3591.3 6992.9 12968.7 
Real Hourly 
wages (log) 6386 7.6 1.1 -7.8 14.5 6.9 7.6 8.3 8119 8.8 1.1 2.2 16.9 8.2 8.9 9.5 
                                  
Independent Variables  
Main Variables 
Years of 
schooling 
(years) 6386 9.7 3.3 6.0 15.0 6.0 9.0 12.0 8119 11.5 3.4 6.0 22.0 9.0 12.0 15.0 
Experience 
(years) 6386 15.8 10.3 0.0 43.0 7.0 14.0 23.0 8119 16.1 10.2 0.0 43.0 7.0 15.0 23.0 
Other Control                                 
Job and Firm related 
Tenure (years) 6386 6.6 7.4 0.0 50.0 1.0 2.0 10.0 8119 6.5 7.3 0.0 40.0 1.3 4.0 9.2 
  
Control Variables: Categorical Variables  
Education 
group  6386     1.0 4.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 8119     1.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 
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Personal Characteristics 
Sex 6386     0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 8119     0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Marital Status 6386     1.0 3.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 8119     1.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Religion 6386     1.0 5.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 8119     1.0 6.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Ethnicity 6386     1.0 7.0 1.0 2.0 5.0 8119     1.0 7.0 1.0 2.0 7.0 
Job and Firm related 
Full-time 6386     0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 8119     0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Sector  6386     0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 8119     2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Industry 6386     1.0 9.0 3.0 6.0 9.0 8119     1.0 10.0 3.0 6.0 9.0 
Firm size 6386     1.0 4.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 8119     1.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 
Regional 
Urban  6386     0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 8119     0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
Province 6386     12.0 73.0 31.0 33.0 35.0 8119     11.0 76.0 31.0 33.0 36.0 
Source: The author’s calculation  
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For the dependent variables, Table 3.8 provides the distribution of education levels of the 
sample; most of the individuals in 2000 had primary school qualifications or below (36 
per cent). In contrast, most of the sample had senior high school (39.5 per cent) and 
university qualifications (26.4 per cent) in 2014. There is a significant decline in workers 
with only primary school qualifications or below (-54 per cent); a possible reason for this 
change is the successful education reform and the compulsory education program. Before 
2008, the compulsory education is up to 6 years (primary school only); after that, the 
program extends to 9 years of education (primary and junior high schools). The success 
of those programs is also confirmed by years of schooling data, as the mean value of years 
of schooling in 2000 was 9.7 years (around junior high school) which then increased to 
11.5 years in 2014 (around senior high school). On the other hand, there was a significant 
rise in workers with university degrees, from 14.8 per cent to 26.4 per cent between the 
periods; this is in line with The British Council’s (2012) finding that Indonesia’s higher 
education participation grew by 53 per cent from 2000 to 2009 and is projected to 
continue growing. 
Table 3.8: Sample Distribution Based on Education 
Education Level 
2000 2014 
Freq. Per cent Freq. Per cent 
Group 1: Primary School or below 2,299 36.0 1,404 17.3 
Group 2: Junior High School 1,162 18.2 1,360 16.8 
Group 3: Senior High School 1,978 31.0 3,210 39.5 
Group 4: University 947 14.8 2,145 26.4 
Total 6,386 100.0 8,119 100.0 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
The mean value of experience in 2000 is 15.8 years, which then increases slightly in 2014 
to 16.1 years (Table 3.7). Nonetheless, the maximum, minimum and percentile of years 
of experience in both waves are similar, min. 0 year; max. 43 years; 25 per cent percentile: 
7 years; 75 per cent percentile: 23 years, except for the 50 per cent percentile which was 
14 years in 2000 but then increases to 15 years in 2014.  
For the other control variables, firstly: sex, 66 per cent of the sample from 2000 was males 
and 34 per cent was females. Female increased to 39 per cent in 2014 (Table 3.9), possibly 
due to the increase of female participation in the economy, particularly in urban areas; as 
Schaner and Das (2016) find that younger women in urban areas have increased their 
labour force participation in recent years.  
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Table 3.9: Sample Distribution Based on Sex 
Sex 
2000 2014 
Freq. Per cent Freq. Per cent 
Male 4,216 66.02 4,946 60.92 
Female 2,170 33.98 3,173 39.08 
Total 6,386 100 8,119 100 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Secondly, marital status: married and cohabitate status was 66.5 per cent and single was 
29.5 per cent in 2000. Married and cohabitate individuals then increase by 13.3 per cent 
to 74.4 per cent in 2014 (Table 3.10). With regards to religion, 89.76 per cent in 2000 and 
89.43 per cent in 2014 were Muslims (Table 3.11). This is in line with the fact that almost 
90 per cent of the population in Indonesia is Muslims.  
Table 3.10: Sample Distribution Based on Marital Status 
Marital Status 
2000 2014 
Freq. Per cent Freq. Per cent 
Single 1,886 29.53 1,660 20.45 
Married and Cohabitate 4,248 66.52 6,122 75.40 
Other (widowed/divorced/separated) 252 3.95 337 4.15 
Total 6,386 100 8,119 100 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Table 3.11: Sample Distribution Based on Religion 
Religion 
2000 2014 
Freq. Per cent Freq. Per cent 
Religion: Islam 5,732 89.76 7,261 89.43 
Religion2: Christian/Protestant 230 3.6 114 1.4 
Religion3: Catholic 121 1.89 278 3.42 
Religion4: Hindu 265 4.15 452 5.57 
Religion5: Buddhist 38 0.6 14 0.17 
Total 6,386 100 8,119 100 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
In terms of ethnicity, Jawa turned out the largest in 2000 (46.8 per cent), Other was 22.1 
per cent (omitted variable) and Sunda was 15.3 per cent. In 2014, the largest ethnicity 
remained the same; 45 per cent of Jawa, 23.5 per cent of Other, and 13.9 per cent of Sunda 
(Table 3.12). 
 
 97 
Table 3.12: Sample Distribution Based on Ethnicity 
Ethnicity Group 
2000 2014 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Jawa 2,989 46.81 3,664 45.13 
Sunda 977 15.3 1089 13.41 
Batak 169 2.65 311 3.83 
Betawi 443 6.94 41 0.5 
Minang 346 5.42 680 8.38 
Tiong Hoa 46 0.72 43 0.53 
Other 1,416 22.17 2,291 28.22 
Total 6,386 100 8,119 100 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Turning to work and firm size, more than 85 per cent of workers are full-time workers. 
Part-time workers made up 14.5 per cent of the sample in 2000 and 16.90 per cent in 2014 
(Table 3.13). Although the majority of sample is full-time workers, there is a rise in the 
number of part time workers (people who work less than 30 hours per week) in the 
sample. In additions, part time is defined as workers in the waged sector who work less 
than 30 hours per week that follows The ILO Part-Time Work Convention, 1994 (No. 
175), part time workers could work both in public and private sector.   
The mean value for tenure in 2000 was 6.6 year which then decreased slightly in 2014 to 
6.5 years21 (Table 3.8). If the sample is separated by gender, the mean value became 6.3 
years for males’ tenure and 5.8 years for females’ tenure. This average was the same for 
both 2000 and 2014. For sector dummy, public sector was only around 16 per cent of the 
total sector in both waves. Also, the sample was dominated by private sectors, i.e. more 
than 80 per cent (Table 3.14). A possible reason for the decrease in tenure is that many 
employees work on short-term contracts. Allen (2016) confirms that the main form of 
labour market flexibility in the formal economy in Indonesia is through short-term 
contracting or outsourcing arrangements. However, according to the Manpower Law 
13/2003, short-term contracts cannot be provided for work that is permanent in nature 
 
21 There is a difference between the maximum number of tenures in 2000 (50 years) and the maximum 
experience (43 years), this is due to the definition of variables. The present study uses potential experience 
and actual tenure based on IFLS question in the estimation. As a result, there are negative values of tenure. 
According to ACAPS (2016), there are common mistakes in needs assessments in the data, one of the 
mistakes is values are outside of the acceptable range of values for that question, including negative values 
in fields that can only have positive values. In addition, the number of respondents with tenure of more than 
40 years is 21 observations or only 0.14 per cent of total sample; thus, those negative values are set to zero. 
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and short-term work agreements can only be made for an initial period of two years with 
an option to extend for an additional 12 months.  
 
Table 3.13: Sample Distribution Based on Working Hours 
Employment 
Status 
2000 2014 
Freq. Per cent Cum. Freq. Per cent Cum. 
Part time 929 14.55 14.55 1,372 16.90 16.90 
Full time 5,457 85.45 100 6,747 83.10 100 
Total 6,386 100.00   8,119 100.00   
Source: The author’s calculation. 
 
Table 3.14: Sample Distribution Based on Sector 
Sector 
2000 2014 
Freq. Per cent Freq. Per cent 
Public 1,060 16.6 1,391 17.13 
Private 5,326 83.4 6,728 82.87 
Total 6,386 100 8,119 100 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
In terms of industry, most of the respondents in 2000 was from social services (34.6 per 
cent), manufacturing (21.5 per cent), and agriculture (15.2 per cent). In 2014, the top three 
sectors were social services (36.7 per cent), manufacturing (21.9 per cent), and wholesale, 
retail, restaurants and hotels (17.5 per cent), as shown in Table 3.15. This change confirms 
that structural change indeed took place in Indonesia, shifting from the agricultural sector 
to the service sector.  
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Table 3.15: Sample Distribution Based on Industry 
Industry 
2000 2014 
Freq. Per cent Freq. Per cent 
Agriculture 968 15.16 553 6.81 
Mining and quarrying 56 0.88 141 1.74 
Manufacturing 1,374 21.52 1,772 21.83 
Electricity, gas and water 39 0.61 76 0.94 
Construction 534 8.36 342 4.21 
Wholesale, retail, restaurants and 
hotels 764 11.96 1,408 17.34 
Transportation, storage, and 
communications 340 5.32 224 2.76 
Finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services 103 1.61 522 6.43 
Social services 2,208 34.58 2,975 36.64 
Other   0.00 106 1.31 
Total 6,386 100.00 8,119 100.00 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
 
Furthermore, most of the industries in both periods were micro (1-4 workers) and small 
firms (5-19 workers). There is an increasing number of medium and large firms; 
Particularly for large firms, there was a significant rise from less than 10 per cent in 2000 
to more than 20 per cent in 2014 (Table 3.16).  
Table 3.16: Sample Distribution Based on Firm-Size (Number of Workers) 
Number of workers 
2000 2014 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
1-4 workers 2,215 34.69 1,848 22.76 
5-19 workers 2,218 34.73 2,459 30.29 
20-99 workers 1,351 21.16 2,069 25.48 
≥100 602 9.43 1,743 21.47 
Total 6,386 100 8,119 100 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
The last category is regional/residence dummy; 63 per cent of the sample in 2000 lived 
in urban areas, this then increased to 71.65 per cent in 2014. This implies that most of the 
respondents lived in urban areas (Table 3.17). Meanwhile for provinces, most respondents 
in 2000 lived in Jawa Barat (19.9 per cent), Jawa Timur (14.3 per cent), and DKI Jakarta 
– the capital region (13.2 per cent); a similar trend also persists for the 2014 period. This 
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also confirms that most Indonesian population lived in Jawa island - the most populous 
and developed island in Indonesia (Table 3.18).  
Table 3.17: Sample Distribution Based on Rural/Urban Area 
Residency 
2000 2014 
Freq. Per cent Freq. Per cent 
Rural 2,364 37.02 2,302 28.35 
Urban 4,022 62.98 5,817 71.65 
Total 6,386 100 8,119 100 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
 
Table 3.18: Sample Distribution Based on Province 
Province 2000 2014 Freq. Per cent Freq. Per cent 
Aceh     1 0.01 
Sumatera Utara 337 5.28 485 5.97 
Sumatera Barat 291 4.56 389 4.79 
Riau 40 0.63 60 0.74 
Jambi   0.00 12 0.15 
Sumatera Selatan 211 3.30 311 3.83 
Lampung 162 2.54 229 2.82 
Kepulauan Bangka 
Belitung   0.00 80 0.99 
Kepulauan Riau   0.00 27 0.33 
DKI Jakarta 843 13.20 702 8.65 
Jawa Barat 1,271 19.90 1,178 14.51 
Jawa Tengah 822 12.87 1030 12.69 
D I Yogyakarta 414 6.48 469 5.78 
Jawa Timur 915 14.33 1005 12.38 
Banten   0.00 377 4.64 
Bali 296 4.64 490 6.04 
Kalimantan Barat   0.00 521 6.42 
Kalimantan Tengah 306 4.79 4 0.05 
Kalimantan Selatan 7 0.11 15 0.18 
Kalimantan Timur 242 3.79 341 4.20 
Sulawesi Selatan 4 0.06 52 0.64 
Sulawesi Tenggara 225 3.52 329 4.05 
Papua Barat     12 0.15 
Total 6,386 100.00 8,119 100.00 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Note: DKI Jakarta is the capital city.   
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3.4 Estimation Result  
3.4.1 Basic Mincer Equation 
 
Based on the estimation of the basic Mincer equation (Table 3.19), the marginal return 
(hourly wage) to complete each additional level of education (relative to primary school 
or below) increases alongside the level of education in both 2000 and 2014 periods. 
Furthermore, the present study provides other Mincer equation specifications, a model 
with basic and personal characteristics, and a model with basic, personal characteristics, 
work related and firm size. The estimation result is provided in Appendix VI. This part 
will elaborate the result for main variables, i.e., education level and experience. While, 
the control variables analysis is provided in Section 3.4.6.  
Table 3.19: Estimation Result: Basic Mincer Wage Equation, All Individuals, 2000 and 
2014 Periods 
Log of real hourly wage 
Basic Regression 
2000 2014 
Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>t 
Junior High School 0.427 0.035 *** 0.326 0.040 *** 
Senior High School 0.899 0.030 *** 0.755 0.035 *** 
University 1.597 0.037 *** 1.268 0.038 *** 
Experience  0.059 0.004 *** 0.044 0.004 *** 
Experience squared -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** 
Constants 6.369 0.040 *** 7.649 0.044 *** 
Observation 6386 8119 
the R-squared statistic 0.260 0.153 
Source: The author’s calculation.  
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent.  
 
In 2000, the highest return to education occurred in the university level; 159.7 per cent 
higher than primary school or below, and the lowest was the return to junior high school 
(42.7 per cent) relative to the base group. Experience coefficient was positive and 
significant (0.059), implying that an additional year of experience will increase hourly 
wage by 5.9 per cent; thus, hourly wages grow as a (concave) function of experience. 
Also, coefficient of experience squared was negative and significant (-0.001); this 
confirms that there is a diminishing return on experience, as stated in Section 3.2.2. All 
of the variables are significantly different from zero or statistically significant at 1 per 
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cent. The R-squared statistic for this model is 0.260 per cent which implies that 26 per 
cent of the variation in log of hourly wage is explained by the variation in education level, 
experience and experience squared (the standard Mincer equation). These results come 
from 6,386 observations.  
Similar pattern of return to education from the year 2000 continues to 2014; the highest 
return was at the university level (126.8 per cent higher than the base group) and the 
lowest return was at the junior high school (32.6 per cent higher than primary school or 
below). The experience coefficient was 0.044 (positive and significant) and the 
experience square coefficient was -0.001 (negative and significant). The R-squared 
statistic is 0.153 or only 15.3 per cent with the number of observations being 8,119. These 
findings from both years confirm the human capital and signalling theories and previous 
empirical studies (Montenegro and Patrinos, 2013; Purnastuti et al., 2013; and Dong, 
2016), i.e. the returns to schooling in Indonesia tend to increase as the level of education 
increases. 
Furthermore, adding control variables does not change the pattern of the main variables; 
the return to education still increases in line with the education level. Nonetheless, each 
coefficient value decreases slightly compared to the basic model; for instance, the return 
to university level was 119.3 per cent in 2000 and 95.8 per cent in 2014 (Table 3.20). The 
coefficients are the measurement of how much each variable explains the response 
variable; adding more correlated variables causes the effect to overlap in explaining the 
response, thus adding more variables will affect each coefficient. Besides, including more 
coefficients also boosts the R-squared statistic; as explanatory variables are added to the 
model, each explanatory variable will explain some of the variance in the dependent 
variable (log of wages) as simply due to chance. One could continue to add predictors to 
the model, which would continue to improve the ability of the predictors to explain the 
dependent variable. In fact, R Square will always increase when adding more predictors. 
However, some of this increase in R Square is simply probably because of chance 
variation in that particular sample; it would not necessarily mean that the model gets 
better. Correspondingly, Ryznar and Vidican (2006) argue that the adjusted R Square 
attempts to yield a more honest value to estimate the R Squared for the population.  
Compared to previous empirical studies, the result from the present study is more similar 
to that of Gropello and Sakellariou (2010) rather than other studies in Indonesia (as 
explained in Section 3.2
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time period and model specifications. The difference between the return to high school 
and junior high school was around 25-35 per cent, and the difference between return to 
university and senior high school was around 50 per cent during 2000 and 2014 periods.  
Table 3.20: Estimations Result: Mincer Wage Equation with Control Variables, All 
Individuals, 2000 and 2014 Periods 
Log of real hourly wage 
2000 2014 
All All 
Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>t 
Junior High School 0.285 0.034 *** 0.221 0.037 *** 
Senior High School 0.637 0.033 *** 0.480 0.035 *** 
University 1.193 0.044 *** 0.958 0.043 *** 
Experience  0.032 0.005 *** 0.022 0.004 *** 
Experience squared -0.001 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 
Sex (1=female) -0.345 0.025 *** -0.279 0.022 *** 
Married and cohabitate 0.099 0.033 *** 0.048 0.033   
Other (Separated, divorced and widowed) -0.048 0.064   0.101 0.059 * 
Religion1: Islam -0.011 0.106   0.069 0.091   
Religion2: Christian/Protestant 0.079 0.121   0.232 0.123 * 
Religion3: Catholic 0.048 0.127   0.207 0.106 * 
Religion5: Buddhist  -0.195 0.198   0.156 0.303   
Ethnicity1: Jawa -0.039 0.047   0.117 0.033 *** 
Ethnicity2: Sunda -0.062 0.057   -0.123 0.373   
Ethnicity3: Batak 0.073 0.094   0.011 0.045   
Ethnicity4: Betawi 0.014 0.066   0.287 0.167 * 
Ethnicity5: Minang 0.038 0.093   -0.045 0.912   
Ethnicity6: Tiong Hoa 0.121 0.157   0.175 0.323   
Status: full-time (30 hours a week or more) -0.636 0.032 *** -0.461 0.029 *** 
Tenure 0.021 0.005 *** 0.019 0.004 *** 
Tenure squared 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   
Sector: private -0.291 0.038 *** -0.286 0.034 *** 
Industry2: mining and quarrying 0.373 0.120 *** 0.383 0.087 *** 
Industry3: manufacturing 0.139 0.040 *** 0.053 0.045   
Industry4: electricity, gas and water 0.139 0.143   0.155 0.112   
Industry5: construction 0.339 0.048 *** 0.307 0.062 *** 
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and 
hotels 0.097 0.046 ** -0.018 0.046   
Industry7: transportation, storage, and 
communications 0.187 0.057 *** 0.115 0.072   
Industry8: Finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services 0.432 0.093 *** 0.235 0.057 *** 
Industry9: Social services 0.119 0.038 *** -0.130 0.044 *** 
Firm size2: 5-19 people 0.183 0.027 *** 0.067 0.029 ** 
Firm size3: 20-99 people 0.243 0.032 *** 0.246 0.031 *** 
Firm size4: >= 100 people 0.353 0.043 *** 0.525 0.035 *** 
Province1: Aceh    (omitted)   1.285 0.918   
Province2: Sumatera Utara  0.372 0.085 *** 0.425 0.061 *** 
Province3: Sumatera Barat  0.273 0.110 ** 0.518 0.062 *** 
Province4: Riau  1.075 0.156 *** 0.808 0.126 *** 
Province5: Jambi    (omitted)   0.580 0.268 ** 
Province6: Sumatera Selatan  0.207 0.080 *** 0.368 0.068 *** 
Province7: Lampung  0.153 0.092 * 0.170 0.076 ** 
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Province 8: Kepulauan Bangka Belitung    (omitted)   0.599 0.110 *** 
Province 9: Kepulauan Riau    (omitted)   0.966 0.181 *** 
Province10: DKI Jakarta  0.538 0.076 *** 0.694 0.057 *** 
Province11: Jawa Barat  0.412 0.074 *** 0.434 0.060 *** 
Province12: Jawa Tengah  0.156 0.074 ** 0.108 0.059 * 
Province13: D I Yogyakarta  0.018 0.081   0.069 0.067   
Province14: Jawa Timur  0.176 0.070 ** 0.139 0.057 ** 
Province15: Banten    (omitted)   0.632 0.067 *** 
Province16: Bali  0.147 0.111   0.609 0.094 *** 
Province17: Kalimantan Barat    (omitted)   1.329 0.460 *** 
Province18: Kalimantan Tengah  0.780 0.332 ** 1.309 0.241 *** 
Province19: Kalimantan Selatan  0.336 0.075 *** 0.523 0.065 *** 
Province20: Kalimantan Timur  0.912 0.437 ** 0.943 0.134 *** 
Province21: Sulawesi Selatan  0.010 0.077   0.323 0.065 *** 
Province22: Sulawesi Tenggara    (omitted)   0.217 0.266   
Urban 0.002 0.026   0.147 0.024 *** 
Constants 7.040 0.132 *** 8.471 0.154 *** 
Observation 6386    8119    
The R-squared statistic 0.372     0.301     
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent.  
 
 
3.4.2 Mincer Wage Equation by Gender 
In this part, the analysis of basic Mincer equation is separated by gender. The pattern of 
coefficient in the estimations does not change and the return to education (in the standard 
regression) increases in line with the level of education for both males and females. 
Nevertheless, in terms of the coefficient of education level, the result shows that the 
females’ coefficient is higher than that of the males’, implying that the return to education 
for females is higher than that for males, though the result could be overestimated since 
females have shorter working hours and experience, as explained in Chapter 2.  
It is worth noting as well that the present study uses potential experience as experience 
variable. Potential experience is likely to be an overestimate of true experience, 
particularly for women, since women may have shorter work experience and working 
hours as discussed in Chapter 2. This is not picked up by the Mincer equation or by 
Heckman selection; as a result, an upward bias could occur in Mincer wage equation, and 
cautious interpretation of return to schooling is required particularly related to the gender 
gap. The finding is in line with Abbasa and Foreman-Peck (2008), who assert that high 
measured returns to females’ education is caused by a combination of much lower 
workforce participation and fewer average years in the labour force than males. Thus, the 
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actual returns are much lower. Presumably, higher returns are necessary to compensate 
for the shorter period and lower probability of wages.  
In 2000, the highest return to education for males was at the university level (142.5 per 
cent) and the lowest return was at junior high school (around one-fourth the return to 
university). The effect of experience on wages was 5.8 per cent and was diminishing. On 
the other hand, the return of females was significantly higher i.e. 40.7 per cent for junior 
high school relative to the primary school or below and 186.7 per cent for university 
graduates. The effect of experience on female’s wages was slightly lower than on males; 
only 5.4 per cent, with the R-squared statistic of females slightly higher than that of males. 
This implies that the combination of education level and experience have more effects on 
females than on males. The estimations also show similar pattern in 2014, however with 
lower value of coefficient for both males and females (Table 3.21); this trend is also 
similar to estimations for all individuals (the sample).  
Table 3.21: Estimation Result: Basic Mincer Equation by Gender, 2000 and 2014/16 
Periods 
Log of real 
hourly wage 
Gender 
2000 2014 
Male Female Male Female 
Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>t 
Junior High 
School 0.355 0.040 *** 0.407 0.066 *** 0.268 0.048 *** 0.381 0.068 *** 
Senior High 
School 0.734 0.036 *** 1.127 0.055 *** 0.654 0.042 *** 0.823 0.062 *** 
University 1.425 0.046 *** 1.867 0.061 *** 1.213 0.047 *** 1.386 0.062 *** 
Experience  0.058 0.005 *** 0.054 0.007 *** 0.043 0.005 *** 0.037 0.006 *** 
Experience 
squared -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 
Constants 6.571 0.049 *** 6.113 0.068 *** 7.845 0.055 *** 7.458 0.073 *** 
Observation 4216 2170 4946 3173 
The R-
squared 
statistic 0.22 0.34 0.15 0.17 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent.  
 
Adding control variables, as shown in Table 3.22, also does not change the pattern of 
coefficient for both genders (the other model specifications are provided in Appendix VI) 
although the value is slightly lower than basic regression result. The highest return to 
education is still at the university level and the lowest is at junior high school, relative to 
primary school or below for both genders and both periods. Experience squared for 
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females is insignificant in both periods; implying that experience squared does not have 
a diminishing return for females. 
Additionally, the present study run the other estimations using the interaction variables 
between gender and years of schooling, as provided in Appendix VI.5, the coefficient of 
the interaction term is positive and significant affect wages. Thus, there is a combination 
effects of gender – years of schooling and the wages.  
In short, the present study finds that the return to education is relatively higher for females 
than for males. This is in line with previous empirical studies such as: Psacharopoulos 
(1994), Harmon et al. (2000), and Dumauli (2015), as explained in Section 3.2.3. 
Dougherty (2005) also furthers that there are some possible explanations for gender 
differences in the return to education, one of which is female advantages, for example: 
garment companies prefer to recruit females. The higher return for females is affected by 
both of supply and demand side. From the demand side, the changes are in line with 
economic transformation and improvements that increases the opportunity of female 
workers to participate in the labour market. From the supply side, there is an increase in 
education participation of females. Finally, education increases female’s skills and 
productivity, as it does with male, and in addition it appears to reduce the gap in male and 
female earnings attributable to factors such as discrimination, tastes, and circumstances 
(Dougherty, 2005).    
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Table 3.22: Estimation Result: Mincer Wage Equation with Control Variables, by Gender 
Log of real hourly wage 
Female Male 
2000 2014 2000 2014 
Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE. P>t Coef. SE. P>t Coef. SE P>t 
Junior High School 0.251 0.063 *** 0.308 0.063 *** 0.281 0.040 *** 0.176 0.045 *** 
Senior High School 0.770 0.060 *** 0.586 0.061 *** 0.572 0.040 *** 0.423 0.042 *** 
University 1.311 0.077 *** 1.019 0.074 *** 1.101 0.055 *** 0.899 0.053 *** 
Experience  0.017 0.008 ** 0.022 0.007 *** 0.044 0.006 *** 0.024 0.005 *** 
Experience squared 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 ** -0.001 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 
Married and cohabitate 0.085 0.055   -0.089 0.055   0.121 0.042 *** 0.135 0.040 *** 
Other (Separated, divorced and widowed) 0.022 0.083   0.001 0.083   0.057 0.120   0.164 0.091 * 
Religion1: Islam 0.118 0.173   0.124 0.147   -0.077 0.134   0.028 0.114   
Religion2: Christian/Protestant 0.318 0.193 * 0.354 0.196 * -0.074 0.153   0.141 0.156   
Religion3: Catholic 0.224 0.213   0.372 0.171 ** -0.073 0.157   0.071 0.134   
Religion5: Buddhist  -0.102 0.345   0.079 0.547   -0.216 0.240   0.163 0.359   
Ethnicity1: Jawa -0.063 0.085   0.140 0.057 ** -0.032 0.056   0.117 0.040 *** 
Ethnicity2: Sunda 0.014 0.102     (omitted)   -0.125 0.069 * -0.134 0.360   
Ethnicity3: Batak -0.078 0.164   0.015 0.077   0.136 0.114   0.017 0.054   
Ethnicity4: Betawi 0.142 0.114   0.290 0.303   -0.090 0.081   0.275 0.198   
Ethnicity5: Minang 0.046 0.160     (omitted)   -0.007 0.113   0.019 0.880   
Ethnicity6: Tiong Hoa 0.033 0.264   -0.433 0.947   0.185 0.193   0.395 0.333   
Status: fulltime (30 hours a week or more) -0.584 0.049 *** -0.361 0.043 *** -0.722 0.042 *** -0.622 0.040 *** 
Tenure 0.029 0.008 *** 0.025 0.007 *** 0.013 0.006 ** 0.014 0.005 *** 
Tenure squared 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   
Sector: private -0.436 0.068 *** -0.338 0.056 *** -0.218 0.045 *** -0.254 0.044 *** 
Industry2: mining and quarrying 1.213 0.500 ** 0.501 0.367   0.324 0.124 *** 0.438 0.089 *** 
Industry3: manufacturing 0.168 0.071 ** -0.195 0.085 ** 0.159 0.048 *** 0.173 0.053 *** 
Industry4: electricity, gas and water 0.229 0.358   -0.331 0.485   0.144 0.154   0.272 0.114 ** 
Industry5: construction 0.063 0.166   0.447 0.226 ** 0.316 0.052 *** 0.319 0.066 *** 
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and hotels 0.153 0.078 ** -0.236 0.086 *** 0.083 0.057   0.097 0.055 * 
Industry7: transportation, storage, and communications -0.174 0.221   0.155 0.231   0.181 0.060 *** 0.169 0.075 ** 
Industry8: Finance, insurance, real estate and business 
services 0.544 0.157 *** 0.138 0.113   0.361 0.115 *** 0.291 0.064 *** 
Industry9: Social services 0.134 0.070 * -0.287 0.083 *** 0.164 0.046 *** -0.045 0.052   
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Firm size2: 5-19 people 0.333 0.049 *** 0.021 0.048   0.105 0.033 *** 0.080 0.036 ** 
Firm size3: 20-99 people 0.419 0.056 *** 0.285 0.053 *** 0.142 0.039 *** 0.206 0.038 *** 
Firm size4: >= 100 people 0.590 0.069 *** 0.636 0.060 *** 0.232 0.054 *** 0.454 0.042 *** 
Province1: Aceh    (omitted)     (omitted)     (omitted)   1.268 0.886   
Province2: Sumatera Utara  0.618 0.148 *** 0.436 0.104 *** 0.290 0.103 *** 0.430 0.075 *** 
Province3: Sumatera Barat  0.218 0.192   0.739 0.100 *** 0.329 0.133 ** 0.376 0.078 *** 
Province4: Riau  1.288 0.310 *** 0.998 0.272 *** 0.967 0.179 *** 0.772 0.140 *** 
Province5: Jambi    (omitted)   0.724 0.553     (omitted)   0.428 0.299   
Province6: Sumatera Selatan  0.241 0.147   0.518 0.123 *** 0.200 0.094 ** 0.299 0.080 *** 
Province7: Lampung  0.062 0.176 * 0.101 0.136   0.169 0.107   0.184 0.090 ** 
Province8: Kepulauan Bangka Belitung    (omitted)   0.733 0.184 ***   (omitted)   0.521 0.135 *** 
Province9: Kepulauan Riau    (omitted)   1.262 0.395 ***   (omitted)   0.907 0.200 *** 
Province10: DKI Jakarta  0.737 0.133 *** 0.803 0.099 *** 0.460 0.092 *** 0.633 0.069 *** 
Province11: Jawa Barat  0.510 0.131 *** 0.531 0.102 *** 0.389 0.088 *** 0.383 0.073 *** 
Province12: Jawa Tengah  0.203 0.131   0.116 0.099   0.142 0.089   0.110 0.073   
Province13: D I Yogyakarta  0.096 0.140   0.177 0.112   0.016 0.098   0.011 0.083   
Province14: Jawa Timur  0.326 0.126 *** 0.177 0.096 * 0.120 0.083   0.133 0.069 * 
Province15: Banten    (omitted)   0.890 0.112 ***   (omitted)   0.458 0.083 *** 
Province16: Bali  0.533 0.185 *** 0.851 0.155 *** -0.020 0.138   0.468 0.118 *** 
Province17: Kalimantan Barat    (omitted)   1.635 0.678 **   (omitted)   1.054 0.625 * 
Province18: Kalimantan Tengah  1.431 0.616 ** 0.909 0.431 ** 0.628 0.388   1.495 0.285 *** 
Province19: Kalimantan Selatan  0.637 0.142 *** 0.442 0.113 *** 0.228 0.088 *** 0.552 0.078 *** 
Province20: Kalimantan Timur  0.481 0.876   0.815 0.237 *** 1.041 0.499 ** 1.021 0.161 *** 
Province21: Sulawesi Selatan  0.204 0.135   0.174 0.106   -0.085 0.093   0.451 0.081 *** 
Province22: Sulawesi Tenggara    (omitted)   -0.275 0.551     (omitted)   0.335 0.297   
Urban -0.037 0.047   0.187 0.041 *** 0.027 0.031   0.126 0.030 *** 
Constants 6.438 0.224 *** 8.250 0.250 *** 7.156 0.162 *** 8.545 0.195 *** 
Observation 2170    3173    4216    4946    
The R-squared statistic 0.471     0.332     0.314     0.285     
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** significance level at 1 per cent.  
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3.4.3 Mincer Wage Equation by Sectors  
This part elaborates on the analysis based on sectors (public and private sectors). As 
explained in Section 2.1.3, wage determination in public and private sector is different. 
Wages in private sector in Indonesia are largely determined by the market. On the other 
hand, the determination of public service’s wage is more complicated, involving 
seniority, position, rank, and political approach. Thus, the hypothesis is the return to 
education in public sector is relatively higher than in private sector, as Psacharopolous 
(1979) and Chevalier et al. (2004) findings.  
The result of basic Mincers equation for public and private sectors in 2000 and 2014 
shows a consistency; the return to education increases in line with the level of education 
and the highest return is at the university level, as shown in Table 3.23. Also, experience 
has a positive and significant effect and experience squared has a positive and diminishing 
effect. The R-squared statistic is higher for public sector than for private sector, however, 
the R-squared statistic for both sectors tend to decrease in 2014, possibly because more 
variables which are accounted for in the present study affect wage equation in certain 
ways following recent developments.  
Table 3.23: Estimation Result: Basic Mincer Wage Equation by Sector 
Log of real 
hourly 
wage 
Sector 
2000 2014 
Public  Private Public  Private 
Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t 
Junior High 
School 0.413 0.126 *** 0.375 0.037 *** 0.180 0.250   0.254 0.040 *** 
Senior High 
School 0.961 0.100 *** 0.789 0.034 *** 0.852 0.205 *** 0.629 0.036 *** 
University 1.532 0.103 *** 1.474 0.051 *** 1.484 0.202 *** 1.027 0.043 *** 
Experience  0.052 0.010 *** 0.054 0.005 *** 0.084 0.011 *** 0.034 0.004 *** 
Experience 
squared 0.000 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** 
Constants 6.450 0.130 *** 6.470 0.045 *** 7.015 0.212 *** 7.888 0.046 *** 
Observation 1060 5326 1391 6728 
The R-
squared 
statistic  0.264  0.166  0.229  0.096  
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent.  
  
When comparing both sectors, the result shows that most of the coefficients’ value in the 
public sector are higher than in the private sector, except for the return to junior high 
school in 2014 which was only 18 per cent in the public sector (but insignificant in 
contrast to return to primary school and below). This is in line with Filmer and Lindauer 
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(2001), Sharma (2013), and Taniguchi and Tuwo (2014) who assert that public sector in 
Indonesia receives substantially higher wages than other sectors. The distribution of 
earnings across the public sector suggests that government wage-setting institutions are 
very different from those of the private economy. A possible argument for this is that the 
public sector prefers workers with high education level, with at least senior high school 
qualifications. For unskilled jobs such as cleaning, the public sector prefers outsourcing 
or using private firms’ services, rather than hiring directly22. That being said, our finding 
is in contrast to that of Byron and Takahashi (1989)23.   
Some possible reasons for higher return in the public sector are: (1) civil servants’ salary 
has increased significantly in real terms and at a much faster rate than those in the private 
sector since Indonesia's economy recovered from the 1997 financial crisis (The World 
Bank, 2000); (2) the majority of the sample is urban settlers with more than 60 per cent 
for both periods (Table 3.17), who tend to earn higher wages than those who settle in rural 
employment; (3) central government employees are covered by a unified salary structure 
that do not differentiate on the basis of rural or urban location (Filmer and Lindauer, 
2001); and (4) private sector is more efficient than public sector in terms of productive 
and allocative efficiency (Rao, 2015).  
Furthermore, Psacharopolous (1979) who studies a similar distinction between the public 
and private sectors argues that wages could exceed productivity in the public sector but 
not in the competitive private sector. The lack of competition in the public sector allows 
higher returns to education. Chevalier et al. (2004) also add that higher returns in the 
public sector support some signalling values of education.  
Turning to the effect of experience on wages, the private sector had a slightly higher 
experience effect in 2000, i.e. 5.2 per cent for public sector and 5.4 per cent for private 
sector. In contrast, experience had higher effect on wages in the public sector (8.4 per 
cent) than on private sector (3.4 per cent) during 2014. Both sectors had a diminishing 
 
22 This is in line with The Minister of Manpower Regulation Number 19 of 2012 on the Terms to Outsource 
Work to Another Company’ (Regulation 19). The regulation states that outsourcing activities may only be 
implemented in the following lines of work, i.e. janitorial work (or cleaning services), catering services, 
security guard services, supporting services in the mining and oil sectors; and transportation services. 
23 Byron and Takahashi (1989) study the return to education in the government and private sectors of urban 
Java, using the 1981 SUSENAS data. The return to the private sector is more generous than the return to 
the public sector. The general returns to education were of the order of 15-17 per cent additional income 
for each additional year of schooling. In comparison, the return to education in Indonesia was relatively 
higher than other countries in 1981.    
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return of experience (the coefficient of experience squared is negative and significant at 
1 per cent). This is possibly related to the significant increase of education and experience 
levels in the public sector. In contrast, there is a slight decrease of experience in the private 
sector.    
Furthermore, adding control variables does not change the pattern of return to education; 
the result shows that the coefficients are lower compared to the basic model (Table 3.24) 
- the other model specifications are provided in Appendix VI. Adding more correlated 
variables causes an overlap effect in explaining the response, thus the addition will affect 
each coefficient, as explained in the basic regression part. Those values, however, still 
imply that the returns to education increases in line with the education level, as in all 
individuals and estimation by gender.  
In terms of experience variables and its squared in public sector, those variables are 
insignificant in the year 2000, suggesting that experience could not have any effect on 
return to education, as well as do not have a diminishing effect on wages. One of possible 
reason is insignificant different of wages between workers with 1-year experience and 
workers with 0-year experience, even though they have the same education qualification. 
As asserted in the Government Regulation 6/1997 (effective since 2000), for example: 
wages increase that allowed by the government, for rank level 3 (entry level for an 
undergraduate degree) with 0 to 1-year experience is IDR 241,800 per month (around 
GBP 18.4); for those with 2-year experience the wages increase is IDR 253,900 per month 
(around GBP 19.3). And this is consistent with the estimation result without experience 
variables, as indicated in Appendix VIII.    
In contrast to public sector, experience and its squared significantly affect the wages in 
private sector in 2000. And both of them turn insignificant in 2014. One of possible 
reasons is the Minimum Wage Policy (MWP), as stated in the Ministry of Labour and 
Transmigration’s regulation No. 7/2013. This law becomes compulsory for all private 
sectors, the adoption of the MWP was dominated by various forms of politicization that 
made irrational wage increases and caused uncertainty. Rather than considers workers’ 
experience, the employers attempt to fulfil the MWP.   
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Table 3.24: Estimation Result: Mincer Wage Equation with Control Variables, by Sectors 
Log of real hourly wage 
Private Public  
2000 2014 2000 2014 
Coef. Std. Err. P>t Coef. Std. Err. P>t Coef. Std. Err. P>t Coef. Std. Err. P>t 
Junior High School 0.259 0.036 *** 0.179 0.037 *** 0.335 0.129 *** 0.168 0.240   
Senior High School 0.577 0.036 *** 0.414 0.035 *** 0.825 0.107 *** 0.672 0.202 *** 
University 1.177 0.054 *** 0.826 0.045 *** 1.290 0.113 *** 1.326 0.206 *** 
Experience  0.032 0.005 *** 0.007 0.004   0.006 0.013   0.062 0.013 *** 
Experience squared -0.001 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   -0.001 0.000 ** 
Sex (1=female) -0.409 0.028 *** -0.304 0.024 *** -0.054 0.053   -0.143 0.057 ** 
Married and cohabitate 0.097 0.036 *** 0.069 0.034 ** 0.236 0.096 ** 0.294 0.103 *** 
Other (Separated, divorced and widowed) -0.058 0.070   0.101 0.062   0.182 0.171   0.536 0.178 *** 
Religion1: Islam -0.050 0.127   0.015 0.098   0.047 0.178   0.329 0.226   
Religion2: Christian/Protestant 0.084 0.145   0.283 0.133 ** -0.018 0.203   0.224 0.296   
Religion3: Catholic 0.092 0.151   0.222 0.115 * -0.233 0.220   0.196 0.258   
Religion5: Buddhist  -0.215 0.213   0.068 0.304   -0.017 0.807   1.583 1.002   
Ethnicity1: Jawa -0.045 0.053   0.098 0.035 *** 0.023 0.095   0.154 0.089 * 
Ethnicity2: Sunda -0.054 0.065   -0.172 0.362   -0.141 0.122     (omitted)   
Ethnicity3: Batak 0.095 0.106   -0.008 0.046   0.080 0.216   -0.017 0.140   
Ethnicity4: Betawi 0.030 0.073   0.244 0.163   -0.303 0.179 *   (omitted)   
Ethnicity5: Minang -0.007 0.106   0.092 0.885   0.112 0.183     (omitted)   
Ethnicity6: Tiong Hoa 0.102 0.161   0.277 0.362     (omitted)   -0.381 0.695   
Status: fulltime (30 hours a week or more) -0.687 0.036 *** -0.514 0.033 *** -0.464 0.068 *** -0.341 0.064 *** 
Tenure 0.020 0.005 *** 0.037 0.005 *** 0.041 0.011 *** -0.002 0.012   
Tenure squared 0.000 0.000 * -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 ** 0.001 0.000   
Industry2: mining and quarrying 0.339 0.125 *** 0.373 0.090 *** 0.801 0.552   0.440 0.282   
Industry3: manufacturing 0.127 0.042 *** 0.072 0.046   0.083 0.150   -0.375 0.279   
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Industry4: electricity, gas and water 0.179 0.183   0.247 0.118 ** 0.016 0.224   -0.416 0.324   
Industry5: construction 0.342 0.051 *** 0.331 0.062 *** 0.155 0.188   -0.030 0.511   
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and 
hotels 0.099 0.048 ** -0.006 0.047   -0.150 0.207   -0.273 0.405   
Industry7: transportation, storage, and 
communications 0.188 0.061 *** 0.119 0.072   0.212 0.156   0.643 0.374 * 
Industry8: Finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services 0.476 0.104 *** 0.260 0.058 *** 0.307 0.202   0.158 0.206   
Industry9: Social services 0.087 0.042 ** -0.123 0.046 *** 0.157 0.102   -0.170 0.143   
Firm size2: 5-19 people 0.172 0.029 *** 0.059 0.030 ** 0.169 0.072 ** 0.128 0.104   
Firm size3: 20-99 people 0.255 0.035 *** 0.231 0.033 *** 0.194 0.077 ** 0.327 0.104 *** 
Firm size4: >= 100 people 0.418 0.047 *** 0.531 0.036 *** 0.133 0.107   0.596 0.116 *** 
Province1: Aceh    (omitted)   1.126 0.892    (omitted)     (omitted)   
Province2: Sumatera Utara  0.480 0.096 *** 0.373 0.070 *** 0.050 0.204   0.609 0.133 *** 
Province3: Sumatera Barat  0.357 0.127 *** 0.417 0.073 *** 0.077 0.211   0.664 0.118 *** 
Province4: Riau  1.233 0.168 *** 0.662 0.135 *** 0.045 0.471   1.297 0.333 *** 
Province5: Jambi    (omitted)   0.504 0.261 *  (omitted)     (omitted)   
Province6: Sumatera Selatan  0.272 0.091 *** 0.321 0.076 *** 0.054 0.159   0.342 0.152 ** 
Province7: Lampung  0.208 0.103 ** 0.097 0.082   0.107 0.213   0.243 0.195   
Province8: Kepulauan Bangka Belitung    (omitted)   0.610 0.129 ***  (omitted)   0.651 0.209 *** 
Province9: Kepulauan Riau    (omitted)   0.910 0.196 ***  (omitted)   1.292 0.447 *** 
Province10: DKI Jakarta  0.633 0.087 *** 0.644 0.063 *** 0.214 0.157   0.798 0.171 *** 
Province11: Jawa Barat  0.520 0.085 *** 0.381 0.066 *** 0.076 0.141   0.489 0.153 *** 
Province12: Jawa Tengah  0.243 0.085 *** 0.030 0.066   -0.128 0.146   0.315 0.143 ** 
Province13: D I Yogyakarta  0.053 0.094   -0.019 0.074   -0.010 0.151   0.274 0.161 * 
Province14: Jawa Timur  0.253 0.081 *** 0.106 0.064 * 0.011 0.134   0.160 0.131   
Province15: Banten    (omitted)   0.580 0.072 ***  (omitted)   0.192 0.264   
Province16: Bali  0.187 0.132   0.482 0.103 *** 0.071 0.188   0.984 0.238 *** 
Province17: Kalimantan Barat    (omitted)   1.302 0.448 ***  (omitted)     (omitted)   
Province18: Kalimantan Tengah  1.016 0.397 *** 1.406 0.274 *** 0.429 0.560   0.827 0.491 * 
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Province19: Kalimantan Selatan  0.405 0.090 *** 0.409 0.075 *** 0.156 0.128   0.742 0.132 *** 
Province20: Kalimantan Timur  0.963 0.444 ** 0.915 0.139 ***  (omitted)   0.614 0.444   
Province21: Sulawesi Selatan  0.111 0.094   0.359 0.077 *** -0.214 0.126 * 0.260 0.120 ** 
Province22: Sulawesi Tenggara    (omitted)   0.019 0.338    (omitted)   0.714 0.442   
Urban 0.016 0.029   0.120 0.027 *** 0.006 0.053   0.273 0.059 *** 
Constants 6.823 0.148 *** 7.957 0.122 *** 6.697 0.244 *** 6.354 0.340 *** 
Observation 5326    6728    1060    1391    
The R-squared statistic 0.303     0.263     0.355     0.357     
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** significance level at 1 per cent.  
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3.4.4 Years of Schooling as Education Variable 
This part discusses another specification of Mincer wage equation by replacing education 
level with years of schooling. This is aimed mainly at simplifying the robustness test for 
these models; besides, the model can estimate the effect of one extra year of schooling on 
wages.  
From all sample estimation (Table 3.25), the result shows that one extra year of schooling 
increased wages by 12.4 per cent (significant at 1 per cent) in 2000. One extra year of 
experience also increased the wages by 3.3 per cent, and the effect is diminishing. In 
2014, one extra year of schooling and experience affected the wages by 9.9 per cent and 
2 per cent, respectively. Gender wise, the result shows that the effect of an additional year 
of schooling on females is slightly higher than on males in both periods. This result is 
similar to that of Dumauli's (2015) who finds that the OLS estimates of return to education 
in Indonesia is around 10 per cent and 12 per cent in 2007; and the return to education of 
females is higher than males. This result reciprocates with our previous result based on 
education level. By sector, the return to education in the public sector is higher than in 
private sector for both periods, this in line with our findings in Section 3.4.3. In short, 
there is a positive relationship between years of schooling and wages; confirming our 
findings in the previous section that wages increase in line with the education levels/years 
of schooling.  
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Table 3.25: Mincer Equation with Years of Schooling as Education Variable  
Log of real hourly wage  All Sample Female Male Private Public 
2000 2014 2000 2014 2000 2014 2000 2014 2000 2014 
Years of schooling 0.124 *** 0.099 *** 0.143 *** 0.105 *** 0.112 *** 0.092 *** 0.114 *** 0.084 *** 0.149 *** 0.148 *** 
  0.005  0.004   0.008  0.007   0.006  0.005   0.005  0.004   0.011  0.012   
Experience 0.033 *** 0.020 *** 0.020 ** 0.021 *** 0.045 *** 0.022 *** 0.032 *** 0.006   0.005  0.054 *** 
  0.005  0.004   0.008  0.007   0.006  0.005   0.005  0.005   0.013  0.013   
Experience squared -0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.000  0.000 * -0.001 *** 0.000 *** -0.001 *** 0.000   0.000  -0.001 * 
  0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000   
Sex (1=female) -0.328 *** -0.266 *** (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) -0.396 *** -0.295 *** -0.049  -0.123 *** 
  0.025  0.022             0.028  0.024   0.053  0.057   
Married and cohabitate 0.102 *** 0.056 * 0.089  -0.079   0.121 *** 0.144 *** 0.101 *** 0.074 ** 0.241 ** 0.314 *** 
  0.034  0.033   0.055  0.055   0.042  0.040   0.036  0.034   0.096  0.102   
Other (Separated, 
divorced and widowed) 
-0.051  0.106 * 0.022  0.008   0.043  0.175 * -0.056  0.105 * 0.180  0.542 *** 
  0.065  0.059   0.083  0.083   0.120  0.091   0.070  0.062   0.171  0.177   
Religion1: Islam -0.017  0.067   0.146  0.117   -0.100  0.024   -0.050  0.019   0.045  0.310   
  0.107  0.091   0.173  0.147   0.134  0.114   0.128  0.098   0.178  0.225   
Religion2: 
Christian/Protestant 
0.081  0.244 ** 0.353 * 0.352 * -0.086  0.158   0.100  0.303 ** -0.019  0.223   
  0.121  0.122   0.193  0.196   0.154  0.156   0.145  0.133   0.203  0.295   
Religion3: Catholic 0.047  0.205 * 0.245  0.364 ** -0.081  0.068   0.121  0.229 ** -0.240  0.169   
  0.128  0.106   0.213  0.171   0.157  0.134   0.152  0.115   0.219  0.257   
Religion5: Buddhist  -0.184  0.151   -0.121  0.109   -0.215  0.131   -0.198  0.072   -0.030  1.574   
  0.199  0.302   0.346  0.546   0.241  0.358   0.214  0.304   0.807  0.999   
Ethnicity1: Jawa -0.043  0.108 *** -0.066  0.136 ** -0.040  0.109 *** -0.051  0.089 ** 0.021  0.151 * 
  0.047  0.033   0.085  0.056   0.056  0.040   0.054  0.035   0.095  0.089   
Ethnicity2: Sunda -0.064  -0.133   0.015  (omitted) -0.132 * -0.149   -0.061  -0.182   -0.139  (omitted) 
  0.058  0.373   0.102     0.069  0.360   0.065  0.362   0.122     
Ethnicity3: Batak 0.058  0.008   -0.100  0.018   0.127  0.013   0.080  -0.013   0.061  0.000   
  0.094  0.044   0.164  0.077   0.114  0.054   0.106  0.046   0.215  0.140   
Ethnicity4: Betawi 0.005  0.302 * 0.141  0.292   -0.102  0.294   0.018  0.257   -0.312 * (omitted) 
  0.067  0.167   0.114  0.302   0.081  0.198   0.073  0.163   0.179     
Ethnicity5: Minang 0.052  0.111   0.061  (omitted) 0.002  0.177   0.022  0.229   0.105  (omitted) 
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  0.093  0.911   0.160     0.114  0.879   0.106  0.885   0.183     
Ethnicity6: Tiong Hoa 0.109  0.181   0.070  -0.461   0.166  0.417   0.082  0.284   (omitted) -0.343   
  0.157  0.323   0.265  0.944   0.194  0.333   0.161  0.362     0.693   
Status: fulltime (30 hours 
a week or more) 
-0.646 *** -0.461 *** -0.587 *** -0.352 *** -0.736 *** -0.629 *** -0.696 *** -0.517 *** -0.469 *** -0.324 *** 
  0.032  0.029   0.049  0.043   0.042  0.040   0.036  0.032   0.068  0.064   
Tenure 0.022 *** 0.019 *** 0.028 *** 0.025 *** 0.013 ** 0.014 ** 0.020 *** 0.037 *** 0.041 *** -0.001   
  0.005  0.004   0.008  0.007   0.006  0.005   0.005  0.005   0.011  0.012   
Tenure squared 0.000 * 0.000   0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000   0.000 * -0.001 *** -0.001 ** 0.001   
  0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000   
Sector: private -0.311 *** -0.289 *** -0.452 *** -0.330 *** -0.234 *** -0.258 *** (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
  0.038  0.034   0.067  0.055   0.045  0.044             
Industry2: mining and 
quarrying 
0.360 *** 0.374 *** 1.183 ** 0.473   0.314 ** 0.431 *** 0.322 *** 0.369 *** 0.787  0.432   
  0.121  0.087   0.501  0.366   0.124  0.089   0.125  0.090   0.552  0.281   
Industry3: manufacturing 0.118 *** 0.042   0.140 ** -0.197 ** 0.141 *** 0.159 *** 0.109 ** 0.061   0.067  -0.388   
  0.040  0.045   0.070  0.085   0.048  0.053   0.042  0.046   0.149  0.278   
Industry4: electricity, gas 
and water 
0.126  0.133   0.245  -0.337   0.128  0.248 ** 0.188  0.229 * -0.005  -0.430   
  0.143  0.112   0.359  0.483   0.154  0.113   0.183  0.118   0.223  0.322   
Industry5: construction 0.337 *** 0.306 *** 0.071  0.436 * 0.312 *** 0.317 *** 0.341 *** 0.328 *** 0.141  0.079   
  0.049  0.062   0.166  0.225   0.053  0.066   0.051  0.062   0.187  0.504   
Industry6: wholesale, 
retail, restaurants and 
hotels 
0.070  -0.036   0.124  -0.248 *** 0.060  0.084   0.073  -0.019   -0.177  -0.312   
  0.045  0.046   0.077  0.085   0.057  0.055   0.048  0.047   0.205  0.401   
Industry7: transportation, 
storage, and 
communications 
0.167 *** 0.104   -0.186  0.140   0.162 *** 0.158 ** 0.170 *** 0.109   0.199  0.659 * 
  0.057  0.072   0.222  0.230   0.060  0.075   0.062  0.072   0.155  0.373   
Industry8: finance, 
insurance, real estate and 
business services 
0.434 *** 0.224 *** 0.538 *** 0.125   0.368 *** 0.280 *** 0.490 *** 0.253 *** 0.296  0.153   
  0.094  0.057   0.157  0.112   0.115  0.064   0.105  0.058   0.202  0.205   
Industry9: social services 0.114 *** -0.136 *** 0.126 * -0.300 *** 0.158 *** -0.049   0.091 ** -0.124 *** 0.138  -0.167   
  0.038  0.044   0.070  0.082   0.046  0.052   0.042  0.046   0.100  0.142   
Firm size2: 5-19 people 0.183 *** 0.067 ** 0.336 *** 0.013   0.106 *** 0.084 ** 0.174 *** 0.061 ** 0.170 ** 0.116   
  0.027  0.029   0.049  0.048   0.033  0.036   0.030  0.030   0.072  0.103   
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Firm size3: 20-99 people 0.249 *** 0.243 *** 0.426 *** 0.272 *** 0.147 *** 0.205 *** 0.266 *** 0.233 *** 0.194 ** 0.301 *** 
  0.032  0.031   0.056  0.053   0.039  0.038   0.035  0.033   0.077  0.104   
Firm size4: >= 100 
people 
0.339 *** 0.513 *** 0.585 *** 0.620 *** 0.216 *** 0.446 *** 0.409 *** 0.526 *** 0.129  0.556 *** 
  0.043  0.035   0.070  0.060   0.054  0.042   0.047  0.036   0.107  0.116   
Province1: Aceh  (omitted) 1.348   (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 1.345   (omitted) 1.191   (omitted) (omitted) 
    0.917          0.886     0.892        
Province2: Sumatera 
Utara 
0.361 *** 0.417 *** 0.625 *** 0.444 *** 0.277 *** 0.412 *** 0.462 *** 0.365 *** 0.065  0.628 *** 
  0.086  0.061   0.149  0.103   0.103  0.075   0.096  0.070   0.204  0.133   
Province3: Sumatera 
Barat  
0.251 ** 0.500 *** 0.211  0.728 *** 0.306 ** 0.353 *** 0.312 ** 0.405 *** 0.086  0.629 *** 
  0.111  0.061   0.192  0.100   0.133  0.078   0.127  0.073   0.210  0.118   
Province4: Riau (omitted) 0.796 *** (omitted) 0.985 *** (omitted) 0.758 *** (omitted) 0.653 *** (omitted) 1.275 *** 
    0.126     0.272     0.140     0.135     0.332   
Province5: Jambi  (omitted) 0.579 ** (omitted) 0.695   (omitted) 0.432   (omitted) 0.504 * (omitted) (omitted) 
    0.267     0.552     0.299     0.261        
Province6: Sumatera 
Selatan 
0.198 ** 0.362 *** 0.240  0.512 *** 0.185 ** 0.287 *** 0.264 *** 0.317 *** 0.050  0.340 ** 
  0.080  0.068   0.147  0.122   0.094  0.080   0.091  0.076   0.158  0.151   
Province7: Lampung 0.150  0.166 ** 0.068  0.103   0.166  0.176 ** 0.202 * 0.096   0.112  0.217   
  0.092  0.075   0.176  0.135   0.108  0.090   0.103  0.082   0.213  0.195   
Province8: Kepulauan 
Bangka Belitung 
(omitted) 0.570 *** (omitted) 0.695 *** (omitted) 0.497 *** (omitted) 0.585 *** (omitted) 0.602 *** 
    0.110     0.184     0.135     0.129     0.208   
Province9: Kepulauan 
Riau 
1.037 *** 0.942 *** 1.279 *** 1.217 *** 0.931 *** 0.886 *** 1.176 *** 0.891 *** 0.052  1.275 *** 
  0.156  0.181   0.310  0.393   0.179  0.200   0.168  0.195   0.470  0.445   
Province10: DKI Jakarta  0.543 *** 0.685 *** 0.743 *** 0.802 *** 0.467 *** 0.617 *** 0.637 *** 0.637 *** 0.220  0.797 *** 
  0.076  0.057   0.133  0.099   0.093  0.069   0.087  0.063   0.157  0.170   
Province11: Jawa Barat  0.419 *** 0.430 *** 0.526 *** 0.527 *** 0.395 *** 0.376 *** 0.526 *** 0.381 *** 0.080  0.458 *** 
  0.074  0.060   0.131  0.102   0.088  0.073   0.085  0.066   0.141  0.152   
Province12: Jawa Tengah 0.165 ** 0.113 * 0.221 * 0.114   0.150 * 0.117   0.250 *** 0.037   -0.123  0.305 ** 
  0.075  0.059   0.132  0.099   0.089  0.073   0.086  0.066   0.146  0.143   
Province13: D I 
Yogyakarta  
0.020  0.059   0.109  0.172   0.015  -0.004   0.049  -0.025   -0.004  0.262   
  0.081  0.067   0.140  0.112   0.099  0.083   0.094  0.074   0.151  0.161   
Province14: Jawa Timur  0.181 ** 0.136 ** 0.347 *** 0.176 * 0.119  0.123 * 0.250 *** 0.106 * 0.020  0.158   
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  0.070  0.057   0.126  0.096   0.084  0.069   0.081  0.064   0.134  0.131   
Province15: Banten  (omitted) 0.628 *** (omitted) 0.885 ***   0.447 *** (omitted) 0.578 *** (omitted) 0.155   
    0.067     0.111     0.083     0.072     0.263   
Province16: Bali  0.137  0.602 *** 0.568 *** 0.846 *** -0.051  0.458 *** 0.179  0.482 *** 0.071  0.978 *** 
  0.111  0.094   0.185  0.155   0.138  0.118   0.132  0.103   0.188  0.237   
Province18: Kalimantan 
Barat  
(omitted) 1.373 *** (omitted) 1.641 ** (omitted) 1.113 * (omitted) 1.340 *** (omitted) (omitted) 
    0.459     0.675     0.625     0.447        
Province19: Kalimantan 
Tengah  
0.736 ** 1.318 *** 1.422 ** 0.930 ** 0.578  1.485 *** 0.959 ** 1.414 *** 0.457  0.840 * 
  0.332  0.240   0.617  0.430   0.389  0.285   0.398  0.274   0.559  0.489   
Province20: Kalimantan 
Selatan  
0.331 *** 0.514 *** 0.652 *** 0.440 *** 0.219 ** 0.538 *** 0.400 *** 0.401 *** 0.156  0.734 *** 
  0.076  0.065   0.142  0.112   0.088  0.078   0.090  0.075   0.128  0.132   
Province21: Kalimantan 
Timur  
0.902 ** 0.922 *** 0.481  0.810 *** 1.039 ** 0.990 *** 0.941 ** 0.899 *** (omitted) 0.600   
  0.438  0.134   0.878  0.236   0.500  0.160   0.445  0.139     0.443   
Province22: Sulawesi 
Selatan  
0.006  0.319 *** 0.209  0.175 * -0.094  0.442 *** 0.104  0.356 *** -0.213 * 0.257 ** 
  0.077  0.065   0.135  0.106   0.093  0.081   0.094  0.077   0.125  0.120   
Province23: Sulawesi 
Tenggara  
(omitted) 0.200   (omitted) -0.289   (omitted) 0.324   (omitted) 0.021   (omitted) 0.683   
    0.266     0.549     0.297     0.338     0.440   
Urban -0.004  0.140 *** -0.040  0.177 *** 0.023  0.121 *** 0.013  0.116 *** 0.004  0.261 *** 
  0.026  0.024   0.047  0.041   0.031  0.030   0.029  0.027   0.053  0.059   
Constants 6.286 *** 7.842 *** 5.496 *** 7.595 *** 6.508 *** 7.958 *** 6.109 *** 7.404 *** 5.770 *** 5.374 *** 
  0.140  0.163   0.237  0.264   0.172  0.207   0.155  0.129   0.264  0.333   
Observation 6386   8119   2170   3173   4216   4946   5326   6728   1060   1391   
R Square 0.36   0.30   0.46   0.33   0.30   0.28   0.29   0.26   0.33   0.34   
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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3.4.5 The Effects of Education Expansion in Indonesia  
To estimate the change in return to education, the present study calculates the percentage 
of the change and runs a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR)24 for both periods, 
implemented via Stata’s -suest- command, followed by the Wald test with the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the return to education are common to both models and 
identical (!!,#$! = !!,#), for example: the coefficient of return to junior high school in 
2000 is equal to the coefficient of return to junior high school in 2014. This is aimed at 
testing the equality of coefficients across two models or Mincer wage equation for 2000 
and 2014. On the other hand, this become the limitation of this study, i.e.: restrictiveness 
because the present study imposes a common coefficient of return to education across the 
years.  
From the test result (Table 3.26), the hypothesis is rejected at 1 per cent significance level. 
Thus, the test confirms that there was a decrease in the returns to each education level in 
both periods. From 2000 to 2014, the returns of each education level decreased. In the 
basic regression, the highest decrease was the return of university (relative to primary 
school and below), at -0.329 percentage point. The coefficient of experience decreased 
slightly from 5.9 per cent in 2000 to 4.4 per cent in 2014. Experience square coefficient 
was still the same, implying that there is a diminishing return of experience on wages.  
In full regression, the result shows a similar pattern of decline as what Gropello and 
Sakellariou (2010) find (Table 3.4); the decline of return to university (-0.235 percentage 
point) was higher than the decrease of return to senior high school (-0.157 percentage 
point), and the hypothesis of the Wald test is rejected, or the coefficients are not identical 
and there is a decline in the return to education. Meanwhile, the decline of return to junior 
high school was around –0.064 percentage point, however, the Wald test’s hypothesis 
cannot be rejected.  
 
24 The SUR is a generalization of a linear regression model that consists of several regression equations; 
each equation has its own dependent variable and potentially different sets of exogenous explanatory 
variables. And, each equation is a valid linear regression on its own and can be estimated separately. The 
errors are assumed to be correlated across the equations since those equations have the same unobservable 
variables such as ability. The error of each equation may have its own variance. Each equation is assumed 
correlating with the others in the same time period. 
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Similar result is also obtained for the estimation based on gender (Table 3.27) and private 
sector (Table 3.28); the return of senior high school and university decreased, except for 
the junior high school coefficient. Wald test results also confirm that return for males 
decreases (at 10 per cent significance level). A possible reason for the contrasting results 
of the junior high school is because the GER of primary and junior high school is already 
relatively high (Figure 2.2); subsequently, the expansion of education affects more 
significantly on higher education levels (senior high school and university in particular).   
In contrast, the public sector yields different results; the hypotheses of proportionality of 
the coefficients of the two models cannot be rejected. The changes are insignificant. This 
is possibly due to the wage rigidity in the public sector as the sector has its own wage 
mechanism that is not based on the market’s mechanism, as explained in Chapter 2. It is 
worth noting that public and private sectors in developing countries are non-competing, 
as asserted by Fields (2011), in which individuals belong to one labour market segment 
or another, and they cannot or will not switch from one to another. Other possible 
explanations are firstly, the non-transparent remuneration, as McLeod and Macintyre 
(2007) assert that civil servants in Indonesia receive a range of supplementary allowances 
in addition to their basic salaries. Some of these allowances (such as payments for 
attending meetings) border on the absurd, because they amount to payments simply for 
doing one’s job. These additional allowances make civil servants’ overall remuneration 
non-transparent, and certainly make their take-home pay considerably higher than what 
the published basic pay level would indicate. Secondly, following the bureaucracy reform 
initiative implemented in the Ministry of Finance in 2007, there is an additional allowance 
that substantially increases civil servants’ take-home pay, particularly for workers in 
several ministries such as the Ministry of Finance (Tjiptoherijanto, 2015).  
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Table 3.26: The Change of Main Variables, All Individuals 
Log of real hourly 
wage 
All Sample 
Basic Regression 
(coefficients) Full Regression (coefficients) SUR 
2000 2014 Change 2000 2014 Change 
Wald 
Test 
Junior High School 0.427 0.326 -0.101 0.285 0.221 -0.064   
Senior High School 0.899 0.755 -0.144 0.637 0.480 -0.157 *** 
University 1.597 1.268 -0.329 1.193 0.958 -0.235 *** 
Experience  0.059 0.044 -0.015 0.032 0.022 -0.01 
  
Experience squared 
-
0.001 -0.001  
-
0.001 0.000  
Constants 6.369 7.649 
 
7.040 8.471 
 
Observation 6386 8119 6386 8119 
The R-squared statistic 0.26 0.15 0.37 0.30 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent.  
 
Table 3.27: The Change of Main Variables, by Gender 
Log of real hourly 
wage 
Female Male 
2000 2014 Change 
Wald 
Test 2000 2014 Change 
Wald 
Test 
Junior High School 0.251  0.305  0.054   0.281  0.174  -0.107 * 
Senior High School 0.770  0.583  -0.187 ** 0.572  0.421  -0.151 ** 
 University 1.311  1.015  -0.296 *** 1.101  0.897  -0.204 *** 
Constants 6.438 8.258 
  
7.156 8.557 
  
Observation 2170 3173 4216 4946 
The R-squared 
statistic 0.471  0.333  0.314  0.285  
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent.  
 
Table 3.28: The Change of Main Variables, by Sector 
Log of real hourly 
wage 
Private Public 
2000 2014 Change 
Wald 
Test 2000 2014 Change 
Wald 
Test 
Junior High School 0.259  0.178  -0.081   0.335  0.155  -0.18   
Senior High School 0.577  0.412  -0.165 *** 0.825  0.664  -0.161   
University 1.177  0.824  -0.353 *** 1.290  1.317  0.0267   
Constants 6.823 7.968 
  
6.697 6.386 
  
Observation 5326 6728 1060 1391 
The R-squared 
statistic 0.303  0.264  0.355  0.359  
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent.  
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This decline is also in line with the global trend, for instance, Gropello et al. (2011) find 
a sharp decline in returns during the past few decades, reflecting the sharp rise in 
schooling levels worldwide; the world population aged 15 and above was estimated to 
have an average of 8 years of schooling in 2010, having increased steadily from just over 
5 years in 1980. In the meantime, the returns to schooling have declined significantly 
since the 1980s, when they were above 13 percent, to just over 9 percent in recent years.  
The highest decrease in return to education is the return for males with junior high school 
qualifications (relative to primary school or below), probably due to more workers having 
higher education attainment in 2014/2015. A possible explanation for the proliferation of 
educated workers is the success of the 9-year (primary and junior high school) 
compulsory education program; thus, the expanding supply side. Correspondingly, on the 
demand side, more companies prefer higher qualifications, for example: an increase in 
retail sector causes supermarkets and mega-malls to replace the traditional market.  This, 
subsequently, decreases the demand for unskilled labour within these sectors, particularly 
the demand for unpaid family workers, and vice versa increases the demand for workers 
with higher education attainment (Allen, 2016), at least with senior high school 
qualifications. As a result, the supply of junior high school graduates outstrips the demand 
and return to education of junior high school decreases more substantially than other 
levels, as confirmed by the data of job seekers and vacancies (Figure 2.13).  
Similarly, return to senior high school decreased from 63.7 per cent in 2000 to 48 per cent 
in 2014, or around -24.6 per cent (in full regression result). Based on gender, males could 
have more contribution to this decrease of -26.40 per cent. This is probably because of 
employment outcomes in manufacturing, which would have favoured the males, have 
been modest between 2005 and 2014 period (Allen, 2016). In similar vein, Purnastuti et 
al. (2013) and Gropello and Sakellariou (2010) note how most of the declines occurring 
in the senior high school level is associated to vocational senior high schools, because 
specialised skills may lose value more rapidly in a dynamic labour market.  
By sector, higher decrease has been experienced by the private sector. A possible reason 
is due to the more competitive nature of the private sector; as Amiti (2011) asserts that 
wages in Indonesia are largely determined by the market, with the exception of minimum 
wages which are set by provincial governments. Likewise, Psacharopolous (1979, in 
Chevalier et al., 2002) elaborates on a similar distinction between the private and the 
public sectors and argues that wages could exceed productivity in the public sector but 
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not in the more competitive private sector. As such, the lack of competition in the public 
sector allows higher returns to education in that sector.   
The result also shows that the return to university decreased in all individuals, around -
19.7 per cent, from 119.3 per cent in 2000 to 95.8 per cent in 2014. Figure 2.13 shows 
that the number of vacancies for university is still slightly higher than the number of job 
seekers, but the data were taken in 2011, and unfortunately there is no updated data for 
2014, hence there is no information whether or not the trend has changed. A possible 
explanation is the mismatch between the supply and demand of university graduates, 
which could be in terms of quantity, quality, subject (engineers) or skill.  
There are several empirical studies reveal that there is a mismatch between labour demand 
and supply in terms of quality and quantity in Indonesia. Firstly, Boston Consulting Group 
(2013) predicts that there would be a 40 per cent to 60 per cent gap between the demand 
and supply for middle management jobs in 2020. Meanwhile, the shortage of entry level 
problems will worsen quickly. Consequently, top companies cannot fill about one-half of 
their entry-level positions with fully qualified candidates. Boston Consulting Group also 
predicts that service sector expansion in the future will increase administrative and 
managerial positions from 36 per cent in 2013 to 55 per cent in 2020. Meanwhile, 
Indonesia already produces fewer graduates for those positions than the current demand. 
Moreover, Dumauli (2015) also reveals that high skilled jobs are not in demand in the 
country; as a result, the return to education decreases. Besides that, the low return to 
education in Indonesia may be induced by the low quality of the education system. In 
other words, there is an excess of supply of university graduates, which in turn reduces 
the wage of university graduates. 
Regarding education quality, Beatty et al. (2018) assert that the learning level declines 
during 2000 and 2014 periods; the downward trend occurs for a long period and is 
expected to persist without any interventions, as explained in Chapter 2, Figure 2.1. PISA 
result also confirms that education quality in Indonesia is relatively low as the country 
only performs below the 25th percentile of the OECD average (World Bank, 2018).  
In terms of sector, it seems that the market determines only the wages in the private sector, 
while the public sector has its own mechanism, as explained in Section 3.4.3. However, 
this result is in contrast to Purnastuti et al (2013) who find that the profitability of 
university degrees in Indonesia increases between 1993 and 2007/08 for both males and 
females.  
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In terms of years of schooling (Table 3.29), the result also shows a decline in return to 
education in Indonesia. The coefficient of years of schooling for all individual in 2000 
was 12.4 per cent, which then decreased to 9.9 per cent in 2014. Although the return to 
education of females was higher than that of males, females experienced more significant 
decrease in the return of schooling (from 14.3 per cent to 10.5 per cent) than male (11.2 
per cent to 9.2 per cent). A possible explanation is that young females in urban areas have 
increased their labour participation in recent years (Schaner and Das, 2016). Finally, the 
return to private sector experienced a significant decline from 11.4 per cent to 8.4 per cent 
during the period, which is in line with previous analysis that competition in the private 
sector may lead to this significant decrease. The hypothesis of Wald test for public sector 
is also rejected, similar to the education level analysis.   
Table 3.29: Wald Test for Years of Schooling as the Education Variable 
Years of 
schooling 
2000 2014 Change Wald Test 
(SUR) 
All Sample 0.124 *** 0.099 *** -20.0 *** 
Std. Err. 0.005   0.004       
Observation 6386   8119       
R Square 0.36   0.30       
  
Female 0.143 *** 0.105 *** -26.3  *** 
Std. Err. 0.008   0.007       
Observation 2170   3173       
R Square 0.46   0.33       
  
Male 0.112 *** 0.092 *** -17.6  ** 
Std. Err. 0.006   0.005       
Observation 4216   4946       
R Square 0.30   0.28       
  
Private 0.114 *** 0.084 *** -26.3  *** 
Std. Err. 0.005   0.004       
Observation 5326   6728       
R Square 0.29   0.26       
  
Public 0.149 *** 0.148 *** -0.7   
Std. Err. 0.011   0.012       
Observation 1060   1391       
R Square 0.33   0.34       
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent.  
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In general, the estimation results show that the return to each level of education decreases 
between 2000 and 2014, as per Gropello and Sakellariou (2010). In addition, the return 
to one additional year of schooling also confirms this decrease. A possible explanation 
for these declines is that Indonesia is in the third stage of education expansion, hence the 
shifting of the supply side. However, the demand side in the waged sector has not yet 
adjusted optimally; in other words, changes in the labour supply outstrip the changes in 
the labour demand. Similarly, Allen (2016) asserts that slow job growth has been a 
persistent challenge for Indonesia, due to the combined slower rates of economic growth 
and job creation which have limited the expansion of quality jobs and slowed the pace of 
structural transformation in the country. As such, the relative employment rate increases 
while the relative wage decreases, as explained by the supply and demand framework in 
the literature review.  
 
3.4.6 Control Variables 
In terms of the control variables, some control variables affect the wage both in 2000 and 
2014 period, such as: sex, job status, tenure, sector and some industries as well as some 
dummies of province. The present study’s finding for those control variables are 
consistent with previous empirical studies, as mentioned in Section 3.2.2, with the 
exception of job status variable that need further investigation. 
The result shows that coefficient of sex is negative and significant at 1 per cent in all 
sample estimation (Table 3.20), including OLS with years of schooling. Even for the 
results by sector, gender affects wages in both public and private sectors, implying that 
males receive higher hourly wages than females, as in line with Becker’s employer taste 
model of discrimination and the statistical discrimination theory. Becker’s model is based 
on the idea that some workers, employers or customers do not want to work with or come 
into contact with members of other racial groups or with women25 (Becker, 1971). 
Meanwhile, the statistical discrimination theory asserts that inequality may exist and 
persist between demographic groups even when economic agents (consumers, workers, 
 
25 This is to say that discrimination can persist only if there are factors which limit the amount of 
competition in the labour market or in the product market. If these markets are competitive, the increased 
profitability of non-discriminating firms compared to the discriminating ones will encourage non-
discriminators to enter the market. This will put downward pressure on the price level and eventually force 
the higher-cost discriminating firms out of business (Becker, 1971). 
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employers, etc.) are rational and not prejudiced. This result is also similar to those of 
Comola and de Mello’s (2013), Purnastuti’s et al (2015), and Dong’s (2016).  
Married and cohabitate status coefficient was positive and significant at 1 per cent 
(different from single status) in 2000 but turned insignificant in 2014 (Table 3.20). The 
other marital dummy was insignificant. In regression by gender, the result shows that the 
married status affects males in both periods (Table 3.22). In regression by sector, married 
and cohabitate status had a positive and significant effect on wages in both public and 
private sectors (Table 3.23). A possible explanation is that family allowances are part of 
wage, particularly for the public sector (The World Bank, 2000). Subsequently, married 
workers can have higher wages than single workers whereas in the literature, the expected 
sign of marital status coefficient is ex ante unclear. This could have positive relationship, 
since married individuals might have better health, thus having more energy and higher 
productivity (Guner et al., 2018). Furthermore, marriage can also generate efficiencies 
through specialisation and the division of labour where tasks are divided between spouses, 
thus freeing up time (Baker and Jacobsen, 2007). On the contrary, the married status could 
have a negative relationship, which might occur when individuals have less time available 
for work because of family commitments (Mishra and Smyth, 2013).   
Turning to religion, most religion dummies were not significantly different, relative to 
Hindu religion, except for Catholic and Christianity/Protestant in 2014 (positive and 
significant at 5 per cent) as shown in Table 3.22. The results should be interpreted 
cautiously; this (probably) does not mean that certain religion has higher wages. Instead, 
this is probably because of the average education of the believers of certain religion is 
higher than the other, for example: most Christian/Protestant and Catholic individuals 
have higher education, more than 80 per cent has (at least) senior high school and 
university qualifications.  
Furthermore, all ethnicity dummies were statistically insignificant, relative to other 
ethnicities in 2000. The result slightly changed in 2014; several majority ethnicities have 
a positive and significant effect on wages, for instance Jawa (significant at 1 per cent) and 
Betawi (significant at 10 per cent). Estimations based on gender and sector show that the 
Jawa ethnicity (the Javanese) leads to higher wages for both males and females, and in 
both public and private sectors. It seems that the majority ethnicity still has an advantage.  
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Regarding work related and firm size variables; the first variable, tenure, had a positive 
and significant coefficient at 1 per cent in most specifications, as in line with Chevalier 
et al. (2002) and Purnastuti et al. (2015), except in the public sector in 2014. Tenure 
squares were insignificant in most regressions, except for regression by sector, which may 
imply that tenure does not have a diminishing effect on wages in general and by gender. 
A possible argument is that regular employees, the youth, women and those with lower 
levels of educational attainment tend to have shorter periods of job tenure than other 
workers, suggesting that these groups are more likely to work on short-term contracts 
than on permanent ones, due to the segmentation in the labour market (Allen, 2016). 
In terms of sector, the private sector yielded a negative and significant coefficient at 1 per 
cent for each specification (all individuals and by gender) in both periods, implying that 
wages in the private sector was less than wages in the public sector. This is in line with 
the report from World Bank (2000) that civil service salaries have increased significantly 
in real terms and at a much faster rate than those in the private sector; thus, the average 
government worker earned more, not less, than her/his private sector counterpart. 
Additionally, most of the industry dummies show a positive and significant difference, 
relative to agriculture sector at 5 per cent. While in 2014, more sectors were insignificant, 
such as: (1) manufacturing; (2) electricity, gas and water; (3) wholesale, retail, restaurant 
and hotels; and (4) transportation, storage, and communication industry. Possible 
explanations for this insignificant difference are: the sample is from the waged sector 
(public and private companies), some of them are formal sector and generally the 
minimum wage laws cover the formal sector (ASEAN, 2013); moreover, the labour 
intensive manufacturing sectors have experienced a decline (Aswicahyono et al., 2011), 
as have the agriculture sectors.  
Regarding the full-time dummy variable, the result shows that all coefficients are negative 
and significant. However, cautious interpretation is needed, as this (probably) does not 
mean that full-time workers earn less than part-time workers. In the detailed summary 
statistic of the sample from 2014, workers with less than 30 hours a week were relatively 
more educated (40 per cent are university graduates and 25 per cent are high school 
graduates); had more experience (the mean value being 16.7 year); and mostly work in 
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social services (62.4 per cent)26. This is related to one of the (non-financial) incentives of 
being public sector workers in Indonesia being the flexible working hours (UNDP, 2014). 
In the private sector, some companies in Indonesia have already offered flexible working 
hours arrangements, such as Kraft foods which offers extended leave (sabbatical) and 
Dow Chemical which offers adjusted working hours to care for a child with special 
needs/or elders, telecommuting, and compressed work week. Offering flexible working 
hour is also driven by the traffic congestions that appear to be a particularly challenging 
problem in Indonesia’s urban areas. Furthermore, Kraft estimates that 100 per cent of 
their employees use their flexible time at least occasionally, while Dow estimates that 15 
per cent of their workforce utilises this option (Anell and Hartmann, 2007).  
The last control variable in work related and firm size category is the firm size. The result 
shows that all of the coefficients were positive and significantly different (at 1 per cent) 
from firms with only 1-5 workers (small firms). In general, this implies that the bigger 
the firms are; the higher the wages that the workers can earn. This is in line with Dhanani 
and Islam (2004) who assert the labour productivity varied substantially according to the 
size of the manufacturing units. An exception for the public sector is that the central 
government determines the wages and the changes, if any, by government regulation.  
With regards to region/residence as control variables, most provinces show a positive and 
significant difference with the benchmark province (Nusa Tenggara Barat/NTB), except 
for DI Yogyakarta (located in Jawa Island, as the centre of the economy). A possible 
explanation is that the living cost and the minimum wage in DI Yogyakarta are very low. 
Meanwhile, the capital province (DKI Jakarta) has a higher wage than NTB.  The present 
study has omitted some provinces (besides NTB): Aceh, Sumatera Selatan, and Sulawesi 
Tenggara in 2000; and Papua Barat in 2014. This is due to the absence of individuals from 
those provinces in those periods, or that no one in those provinces past our restriction, 
particularly the employment restriction, or there is a missing variable in the sample such 
as missing wages, thus rendering those individuals unanalysable.   
The last control variable is the urban/rural dummy (Urban=1). The result shows that this 
dummy was insignificant in 2000; but turned positive and significant at 1 per cent in 2014. 
 
26 On the other hand, only 23.5 per cent workers who worked more than 30 hour a week have university 
qualifications; their mean of experience was less than the other group (16 years); they worked mostly in 
social services (31 per cent), manufacturing (24.5 per cent) and wholesale, retail, restaurants and hotels (19 
per cent). 
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A possible explanation why urban and rural areas were insignificantly different in 2000 
is because rural wages rose in most Asian countries in the early 2000s, including some 
provinces of Indonesia. The potential drivers of rural wages are the incline in agricultural 
labour productivity, growth of manufacturing output and the increase in rural working 
populations (Wiggins and Keats, 2014). In 2014, there was a significant difference 
between the urban and rural as urban areas affect higher hourly wages in all individuals, 
by gender and by sector, as is in line with Comola and de Mello (2011). 
 
 
3.4.7 Robustness Test 
This part will address the issue of Mincer wage equation limitation, i.e. the endogeneity 
and sample selection bias. This robustness test is aimed to investigate the decrease that 
also occurs in IV and Heckman model, which is in line with the OLS results. Besides the 
instrument used in this part, other possible instruments in both years based on literature 
are provided in Appendix VII. 
 
Endogeneity 
The Instrumental Variable (IV) is used to gauge the role of omitted variables (ability bias) 
in the OLS estimates of the return to schooling in the Indonesian labour market. This part 
discusses the robustness test for all individuals, a similar model to the OLS. Sector and 
gender analysis is attached in Appendix VIII for further information.  
Following previous studies (see Duflo, 2001; Comola and de Mello, 2010; Purnastuti et 
al., 2015) which find that there is a strong correlation between education policies and the 
increase of enrolment (supply side shifting) as well as policy instruments are used in this 
study. There are three different policy instruments used; the school construction program 
(INPRES), the 6-year compulsory education program (CSAL1), and the 9-year 
compulsory education program (CSAL2), as explained in Chapter 2. However, this study 
will not use all of the instruments in each model, considering that those policies have the 
similar aim to increase primary school participation.  
The main advantages of using policy instruments are that it is relatively easy to construct 
by defining the dummy variables and it retains the number of observations in our sample 
(Appendix VII). The idea of policy instruments is that an individual who was born before 
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the policies were implemented would have a lower level of education compared to the 
people born later, who would be affected by the policies.  
Despite the policy instruments’ advantages, Purnastuti et al., (2015) highlight some 
limitations; firstly, variables for compulsory schooling laws may confound changes due 
to the cohort effects with these laws; and secondly, the accessibility or availability of 
schooling instruments may be sensitive to the relative size of the returns to schooling of 
the groups most affected by the changed conditions reflected in the instrument (a 
heterogeneity in returns to education argument).   
The break points of those policies are 1967, 1977 and 1987; the year of 1974 refers to the 
year when the primary school buildings were completely constructed under the INPRES 
program and the age of 7 was the official age to start primary education. The dummy 
variable for the INPRES program therefore has a value of 1 for individuals born after 
1967 and zero for all other individuals; or, INPRES=1 if individual was born in 1967 and 
later, otherwise 0. CSAL1=1 if an individual was born in 1977 and later, otherwise 0; and 
CSAL2=1 if an individual was born in 1987 and later. The sample’s age range is 16-55 
years old (referring to the age restriction), and mostly was born before the year of 1987; 
thus, all individuals in 2000 were not affected by CSAL2. Vice versa, 90 per cent of 
respondents in 2014 were affected by INPRES, since all of them were born after 1967. In 
additions, the distribution of year of schooling and birth cohort is provided in Appendix 
VIII, Table VIII.1. For the IV model of the year 2000, the present study does not consider 
using CSAL1 as the instruments because the sample which is affected by the policy are 
aged between 16-23 years old; and 23 years of age is too young in this case, as most 
Indonesians only finish university at the age of 22-23 years old. Subsequently, INPRES 
will be the only instruments of that year.  
Furthermore, CSAL1 and/or CSAL2 are selected as the instruments for 2014 (considering 
that CSAL2 substitutes for and is the expansion of CSAL1). In contrast to the year 2000, 
this study does not consider INPRES because most individuals are aged 16-44 years old, 
and most of them are affected by the policy (around 90 per cent of the sample). Moreover, 
INPRES is already replaced by CSAL1 in recent years. In addition, this study will 
estimate two IV models for 2014, the first one being both CSALs (CSAL1 and CSAL2) 
and the second being only CSAL1. The distributions of individuals based on instruments, 
education level, and age are provided in Appendix VIII.  
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Table 3.30 presents the estimates of Mincer wage equation using policy instruments for 
the year 2000. The reduced-form-schooling equation has a relatively small R squared 
(around 10 per cent), while F-statistic in first stage estimation is relatively high, at 701.24, 
and significant at 1 per cent, suggesting that the instrument is not weak. The coefficient 
of years of schooling is 0.108 (the second stage), significant at 1 per cent, which is slightly 
lower than its coefficient in the OLS model (0.124). However, INPRES has a significant 
and negative coefficient. The 2014 model also shows a similar result; both of CSAL1 and 
CSAL2 instruments are negative and significant effects on years of schooling 
(endogenous variable), this could be due to failure to allow for time trend/time dummies 
or in this context is the instruments, one possible reasons is there is multicollinearity 
between the instruments and experience variables, both of variable could be highly 
linearly related. F-tests are relatively high, more than 1000 (Table 3.31). Likewise, the 
coefficients of years of schooling are 0.066 (Model 1) and 0.088 (Model 2), which is also 
slightly lower than coefficient of the OLS model (0.099).   
This result’s interpretation is inconsistent with the idea of policy instruments (an 
individual born earlier or before the policy is implemented would have a lower level of 
education as compared to the people born later who would be affected by the policies). It 
is also contradictory with the aim of the policies to increase the school participation rate. 
A possible reason for this unexpected sign is the multicollinearity between the policies 
and experience, since we define experience from potential experience (age – years of 
schooling – starting school age), and policy instruments are also defined by age, as 
explained previously. According to Aronow and Carnegie (2013) IV estimation is 
commonly used, but it is subject to an often-overlooked limitation. Wald (1940) in 
Aronow and Carnegie (2013) revealed many researchers intend to estimate the average 
treatment effect (ATE) for the entire population interest, but IV estimation only covers 
the local average treatment effect (LATE) or the ATE for the subpopulation that is 
influenced by the IV. When treatment effect are heterogenous across units, the LATE and 
the ATE may take on different values, this potentially causing complication in the 
interpretation, as well as makes comparison difficult.  
This study also tried to estimate by using alternative models by removing experience and 
experience squared (Appendix VIII), then testing the instruments with hypothesis: 
instruments are weak. The result shows that the partial R-squared are relatively low, but 
the F-tests have p-value of less than 5 per cent, which indicates that the instruments are 
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not weak. In contrast, with the models including experiences, the policy instruments now 
have a positive sign and a significant effect, which implies that individuals who are 
affected by the policies would have an extra year of schooling compared with individuals 
who are not, except for the 9-year compulsory education (CSAL2) in 2014, which is 
insignificant. A possible argument is that the age distribution of individuals who are 
affected by CSAL2, which is 16-27 years old (29.6 per cent of total sample), is too young 
compared to the entire individuals’ age distribution.  
The results of the endogeneity test for Model 1 of 2014 show a very small p-value (less 
than 5 per cent), suggesting that we can reject H0; thus, years of school variable is an 
endogenous variable, or the endogeneity problem occurs in that model. Meanwhile, for 
Model 1 of 2000 and Model 2 of 2014, the p-values are insignificant, or the endogeneity 
problem may not occur. This agrees with Duflo (2001) and Comola and de Mello (2010) 
who report that there is little evidence of ability bias in the OLS estimates of the return to 
schooling in Indonesia, and that the OLS estimates are not likely to be biased upwards.  
The Anderson canonical correlation LM statistic can check rank condition for 
identification. The result shows that the excluded instruments are correlated with the 
endogenous regressor and the equation is thus identified. Meanwhile, Sargan statistic 
(overidentification test of all instruments) suggests that the estimations are exactly 
identified, since we have one endogenous variable and one instrument, except for model 
1 of 2014 where we have two instruments for one regressor. Thus, we have an 
overidentification in Model 1 of 2014. In spite of the instruments’ weaknesses, often-
overlooked limitation, and complication in the interpretation (Aronow and Carnegie, 
2013), the IV result confirms that there is a decline of year schooling coefficient from 
0.108 in 2000 to 0.066 (Model 1) and 0.088 (Model 2) in 2014.    
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Table 3.30: IV Specification with Years of Schooling in 2000, All Individuals 
2000: Log of real hourly wage 
1st Stage 2nd Stage 
Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>z 
Years of schooling      0.108 0.015 *** 
Experience -0.403 0.013 *** 0.029 0.006 *** 
Experience squared 0.003 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** 
… … …   … …   
INPRES -2.788 0.105 ***       
Constant 15.204 0.358 *** 6.467 0.215 *** 
Observation 6386    6386    
R Squared 0.10     0.37    
Test Results on Instruments             
F-Test 701.24  *** 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic): 636.17  *** 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): Exactly identified   
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors: 1.23     
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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Table 3.31: IV Specification with Years of Schooling in 2014, All Individuals 
2014: Log of real hourly wage 
Model 1: 1st Stage Model 1: Second Stage Model 2: 1st Stage Model 2: 2nd Stage 
Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>z Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>z 
Years of schooling     0.066 0.008 ***    0.088 0.011 *** 
Experience -0.547 0.013 *** 0.015 0.004 *** -0.231 0.011 *** 0.019 0.005 *** 
Experience squared 0.004 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 
… … …  … …   … …  … …   
CSAL1 -3.950 0.088 ***       -3.303 0.095 ***       
CSAL2 -3.652 0.092 ***                   
Constant 25.622 0.366 *** 8.447 0.202 *** 20.861 0.379 *** 8.052 0.248 *** 
Observation 8119  *** 8119    8119   8119    
The R-squared statistic 0.27   0.30    0.13   0.30    
Test Results on Instruments                         
F-Test 1521.18  ***    1216.65  *** 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic): 2224.24  ***    1064.36  *** 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 7.36  ***    Exactly identified   
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressor: 24.42   ***       1.03     
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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Furthermore, the present study also performs IV based on conventional instruments 
(father and mother education), but the result is very sensitive to the sample size, and using 
conventional instruments reduces sample size up to around half of the sample of each 
year, thus the results of both the OLS and the IV changes are significantly different to the 
models in this research.  
Another alternative instrument is smoking (as one of bad habit variables), and the result 
is provided in Appendix IX. The idea of using bad habit as an instrument is because more 
educated people have better health and better health habits and completed years of formal 
schooling is the most important correlation of good health (Grossman, 2008). Smoking 
variable is defined in question KM01a in IFLS questionnaires “Have you ever chewed 
tobacco, smoked a pipe, smoked self-rolled cigarettes, or smoked cigarettes/cigars?”. The 
dummy is 1 if ‘Yes’ and 0 otherwise. The result shows that smoking dummies have a 
negative correlation with years of schooling, as expected, and are significant at 1 per cent. 
The coefficient of years of schooling of the IV model is slightly lower than the OLS’ 
coefficient for the same specification. For example: the coefficient of years of schooling 
of the OLS is 0.120 and the coefficient of the IV is 0.102 in the year 2000; likewise, the 
coefficient of IV in 2014 is 0.088, slightly lower than the OLS’ of 0.099. The F-test for 
the year 2000 is 35 and for 2014 is 71, indicating that the instrument is not weak. 
Comparing both periods, the IV results also confirm that there is a decrease of year 
schooling variable from 0.102 in the year 2000 to 0.088 (around -13.7 per cent) in 2014. 
Additionally, the endogeneity tests yield insignificant results in both periods, suggesting 
that endogeneity problem may not occur under these specifications.  
From the discussion above, the IV models, either by using policy instruments or smoking 
as a bad habit variable, confirm that there is a decline in the return to education between 
the year 2000 and 2014, as is in line with the OLS models.  
 
Sample Selection Bias 
There are two issues with regard to the sample selection bias. Firstly, the bias arose from 
non-random sampling for employment. Secondly, the bias is for female workers, as 
explained in Section 3.2.2. This part will focus on all individuals (selection on labour 
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force participation). Meanwhile, Two-Step Heckman models for gender are provided in 
Appendix X.  
To conduct the analysis, the present study follows Dumauli (2015) to define the 
instruments. Dumauli (2015) uses household assets, regional unemployment rate, marital 
status and household size. However, the OLS models in the present study already use 
marital status as a control variable and regional employment rate is also already 
represented as the regional control variable (province dummies). Household assets data 
are available in the survey but using this instrument would reduce the number of 
observations substantially. As such, this study considers using only household size, 
defined by the number of household members, to retain the number of observations. 
Household size can influence the decision (particularly for females) to join the labour 
market since these variables can influence females (likewise, males) in terms of 
housework load and the time that has to be allocated for their families.  
Doan et al. (2016) further that household size may affect wage and employment 
participation probabilities through changing the opportunity cost of being in the waged 
labour force. However, an employer is unlikely to pay a different wage rate depending on 
one’s household size or non-labour income. In the agriculture sector, household size may 
affect waged employment participation due to low productivity. Besides, limited arable 
land in the agricultural sector has resulted in labour surplus in the sector if households 
have more members. Therefore, household size relates to labour surplus and affects 
waged employment participation. The other alternative instrument is the number of 
dependent children in the household, some households reported there had children, some 
of them did not reported, this may imply zero children or missing data.  
Ideally, the instrument is decided by pre-treatment measures. The key assumptions for a 
pre-treatment variable to be a valid instrument are: 1) the instrument variable is associated 
with the treatment; 2) the instrument variable is not associated with unmeasured 
confounders after conditioning on measured confounders (i.e., after controlling for 
measured confounders by regression or matching); 3) the affects the outcome only 
through the treatment (i.e., there is no direct effect of the on outcome; this assumption is 
known as “exclusion restriction”) (Ertefaie, et al., 2017). 
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The present study uses household size as the instruments to retain the number of 
observations, follows previous studies such as: Dumauli (2015) and Doan et al. (2016), 
in particular Dumauli also study Indonesia case. In additions, agricultural sector in 
Indonesia is still relatively large, although the trend has decreased, around 23 per cent 
workers are in agriculture, forestry and fisheries (SAKERNAS, 2017). The other 
alternative instruments and pre-treatment measures can be elaborate in the future 
research.  
Table 3.32 shows the summary statistics of households as an instrument. The main 
advantage of the instrument is that it can retain the number of observations; Two-Step 
Heckman models have 6,286 and 8,115 uncensored observations in 2000 and 2014 
models, respectively. The mean value of household size decreases significantly from 6 
members (on average) in 2000 to 4 members in 2014. This could imply that the more 
educated people tend to have fewer children and smaller household size.  
Table 3.32: Summary Statistics of Household Size 
Variable Obs Year Mean SD Min Max 
Uncensored 
observations 6386 2000 6.02 3.00 1 23 
Number of obs. 13307 2000 6.04 2.87 1 37 
Uncensored 
observations 8115 2014 4.41 3.32 1 27 
Number of obs. 18794 2014 4.50 3.22 1 27 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Tables 3.33 and Table 3.34 show the estimation result of the Two-Step Heckman for non-
random sample for employment (all individuals). The coefficient of household size that 
is included in the Probit model has the expected sign (a negative sign) and is statistically 
significant for all individuals in 2000 and 2014; the negative sign implies that there is a 
negative relationship between the household size and the decision to join the labour 
market, as well as the trade-off between time that has to be allocated for their families 
and the time for working or joining the labour market. The coefficient of Inverse Mills 
Ratio (IMR) is negative and significant at 10 per cent for both years. A significant 
coefficient for IMR signals the presence of the sample selectivity, as explained in Section 
3.3.2. Thus, selection problem exists in our model for all individuals according to this 
estimation.  
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In terms of the years of schooling coefficient, the results of Two-Step Heckman show a 
slightly lower value than the OLS. The returns to years of school (additional years of 
schooling) were 12.4 per cent and 9.9 per cent based on OLS model for 2000 and 2014, 
respectively. Based on Two-Step Heckman, the return in the year 2000 was 11.8 per cent, 
which declined to 9.8 per cent in 2014 (around 17 per cent decrease). This result also 
confirms that there was a decline in return to education between 2000 and 2014, as is in 
line with the OLS results, despite the sample selectivity problem in the models. In 
addition, the likelihood-ratio test (the LR test) is used to perform a test against the nested 
alternate model. The p-value of LR test is 0, thus, the null hypothesis is rejected on 5 per 
cent and 10 per cent levels of significance, implying that the Heckman selection equation 
with these data is useful and better than the standard OLS regression27.  
Table 3.33: Heckman Estimation, All Individuals: 2000 
 
2000 
OLS First Step: Probit Second Step: OLS 
Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>z Coef. SE P>t 
HH Size    -0.022 0.008 ***     
          
Years of Schooling 0.124 0.005 *** 0.111 0.009 *** 0.118 0.004 *** 
Experience  0.033 0.005 *** 0.050 0.010 *** 0.032 0.005 *** 
Experience squared -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** 
Sex (1=female) -0.328 0.025 *** -0.127 0.050 *** -0.328 0.024 *** 
Married and 
cohabitate 0.102 0.033 *** -0.038 0.075   0.100 0.033 *** 
Other (Separated, 
divorced and 
widowed) -0.051 0.065  -0.016 0.128   -0.050 0.064   
Religion1: Islam -0.017 0.107  -0.002 0.186   -0.012 0.106   
Religion2: 
Christian/Protestant 0.081 0.121  0.152 0.220   0.083 0.121   
Religion3: Catholic 0.047 0.128  -0.316 0.237   0.061 0.128   
Religion5: Buddhist -0.184 0.199  0.778 0.359 ** -0.205 0.198   
Ethnicity1: Jawa -0.043 0.047  0.022 0.093   -0.044 0.047   
Ethnicity2: Sunda -0.064 0.057  0.221 0.123 * -0.064 0.057   
Ethnicity3: Batak 0.058 0.094  -0.253 0.186   0.063 0.094   
Ethnicity4: Betawi 0.005 0.067  0.010 0.155   0.010 0.066   
Ethnicity5: Minang 0.052 0.093  -0.078 0.192   0.053 0.093   
Ethnicity6: Tiong 
Hoa 0.109 0.157  -1.526 0.274 *** 0.151 0.158   
 
27 The Heckman models for gender and private sector analysis is provided in Appendix X for further 
information. However, Two-Step Heckman model results are not always valid for gender analysis since 
household size (an instrument variable) is insignificant, particularly for the model for males in the year of 
2000 and females in 2014. Moreover, considering the different characteristics of the public and private 
sectors, Heckman model cannot be applied on the sectoral model.  
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Status: fulltime (30 
hours a week or 
more) -0.646 0.032 *** 0.435 0.055 *** -0.650 0.032 *** 
Tenure 0.022 0.005 *** 0.073 0.009 *** 0.020 0.005 *** 
Tenure squared 0.000 0.000 * -0.002 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000   
Sector: private -0.311 0.038 *** 3.682 0.063 *** -0.380 0.059 *** 
Industry2: mining 
and quarrying 0.360 0.121 * 0.277 0.294   0.355 0.120 *** 
Industry3: 
manufacturing 0.118 0.040 * 0.239 0.083 *** 0.119 0.040 *** 
Industry4: electricity, 
gas and water 0.126 0.143  1.236 0.310 *** 0.109 0.143   
Industry5: 
construction 0.337 0.049 *** 0.207 0.110 * 0.329 0.049 *** 
Industry6: wholesale, 
retail, restaurants and 
hotels 0.070 0.045  -0.057 0.078   0.076 0.045 * 
Industry7: 
transportation, 
storage, and 
communications 0.167 0.057 *** 0.391 0.104 *** 0.166 0.057 *** 
Industry8: Finance, 
insurance, real estate 
and business services 0.434 0.094 *** 1.582 0.342 *** 0.405 0.094 *** 
Industry9: Social 
services 0.114 0.038 *** 1.259 0.069 *** 0.092 0.040 ** 
Firm size2: 5-19 
people 0.183 0.027 *** 0.989 0.054 *** 0.167 0.029 *** 
Firm size3: 20-99 
people 0.249 0.032 *** 1.441 0.080 *** 0.222 0.034 *** 
Firm size4: >= 100 
people 0.339 0.043 *** 1.500 0.140 *** 0.320 0.044 *** 
province1: Aceh  (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
province2: Sumatera 
Utara -0.542 0.438  -0.698 1.616   -0.533 0.437   
province3: Sumatera 
Barat -0.652 0.445  -0.676 1.622   -0.651 0.444   
province4: Riau  0.135 0.457  -0.138 1.645   0.148 0.456   
province5: Sumatera 
Selatan  -0.705 0.438  -1.009 1.613   -0.688 0.438   
province6: Bengkulu  (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
province7: Lampung  -0.752 0.441 * -0.875 1.616   -0.747 0.440 * 
province8: DKI 
Jakarta  -0.359 0.437  -0.968 1.614   -0.355 0.436   
province9: Jawa 
Barat  -0.483 0.437  -0.820 1.613   -0.481 0.436   
province10: Jawa 
Tengah  -0.738 0.437 * -0.779 1.613   -0.735 0.436 * 
province11: D I 
Yogyakarta  -0.882 0.439 ** -0.788 1.614   -0.877 0.438 ** 
province12: Jawa 
Timur  -0.722 0.437 * -0.807 1.612   -0.720 0.436 * 
province13: Bali  -0.765 0.446 * -0.510 1.620   -0.758 0.445 * 
province15: 
Kalimantan Tengah  -0.902 0.438 ** -0.516 1.612   -0.907 0.437 ** 
province16: 
Kalimantan Selatan  -0.166 0.545  1.287 1.993   -0.175 0.543   
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province17: 
Kalimantan Timur  -0.571 0.438  -0.249 1.612   -0.574 0.437   
province18: Sulawesi 
Selatan  -0.896 0.439 ** -0.637 1.612   -0.891 0.438 ** 
province19: Sulawesi 
Tenggara  (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
Urban -0.004 0.026  0.019 0.052   -0.007 0.026   
IMR         -0.100 0.058 * 
Constants 7.188 0.454 *** -3.503 1.624 ** 7.337 0.460 *** 
Uncensored 
observations    6386   6386   
Number of 
observations    13307      
The R-squared 
statistic    0.37     0.37   
        
LR 
chi2(4
8) 
1468
4.07   
F( 48,  
6337) 78.09   
        
Prob > 
chi2 0.00   
Prob > 
F 0.00   
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent.  
 
 
 
Table 3.34: Heckman Estimation, All Individuals: 2014 
 
2014: All Individuals 
OLS First Step: Probit Second Step: OLS 
Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>z Coef. SE P>t 
HH Size       -0.015 0.004 ***     
            
Years of Schooling 0.099 0.004 *** 0.012 0.005 ** 0.098 0.004 *** 
Experience  0.020 0.004 *** 0.017 0.005 *** 0.019 0.004 *** 
Experience squared 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 *** 
Sex (1=female) -0.266 0.022 *** -0.507 0.030 *** -0.238 0.026 *** 
Married and 
cohabitate 0.057 0.032 * -0.014 0.046   0.057 0.032 * 
Other (Separated, 
divorced and 
widowed) 0.107 0.059 * 0.304 0.078 *** 0.089 0.060   
Religion1: Islam 0.058 0.091   -0.096 0.120   0.059 0.091   
Religion2: 
Christian/Protestant 0.252 0.123 ** -0.206 0.175   0.261 0.123 ** 
Religion3: Catholic 0.213 0.111 * -0.269 0.145 * 0.226 0.111 ** 
Religion5: Buddhist 0.103 0.301   0.122 0.459   0.090 0.301   
Ethnicity1: Jawa 0.132 0.036 *** 0.053 0.050   0.129 0.036 *** 
Ethnicity2: Sunda 0.030 0.046   0.114 0.068 * 0.025 0.046   
Ethnicity3: Batak 0.020 0.076   -0.237 0.097 ** 0.033 0.076   
Ethnicity4: Betawi -0.092 0.164   0.061 0.240   -0.102 0.164   
Ethnicity5: Minang 0.155 0.072 ** -0.118 0.091   0.161 0.072 ** 
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Ethnicity6: Tiong 
Hoa 0.367 0.166 ** -0.467 0.224 ** 0.395 0.167 ** 
Status: fulltime (30 
hours a week or 
more) -0.461 0.029 *** 0.347 0.031 *** -0.487 0.031 *** 
Tenure 0.019 0.004 *** -0.027 0.005 *** 0.021 0.004 *** 
Tenure squared 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000   
Sector: private -0.290 0.034 *** 0.816 0.015 *** -0.334 0.040 *** 
Industry2: mining 
and quarrying 0.370 0.087 *** 0.732 0.139 *** 0.295 0.093 *** 
Industry3: 
manufacturing 0.039 0.045   0.959 0.053 *** -0.045 0.060   
Industry4: 
electricity, gas and 
water 0.135 0.112   0.927 0.195 *** 0.053 0.118   
Industry5: 
construction 0.302 0.062 *** 0.779 0.065 *** 0.226 0.072 *** 
Industry6: 
wholesale, retail, 
restaurants and 
hotels -0.040 0.046   0.440 0.044 *** -0.088 0.051 * 
Industry7: 
transportation, 
storage, and 
communications 0.099 0.072   0.793 0.091 *** 0.023 0.080   
Industry8: Finance, 
insurance, real estate 
and business 
services 0.222 0.056 *** 1.185 0.093 *** 0.131 0.071 * 
Industry9: Social 
services -0.140 0.044 *** 1.583 0.045 *** -0.260 0.072 *** 
Firm size2: 5-19 
people 0.068 0.029 ** 1.131 0.033 *** -0.029 0.054   
Firm size3: 20-99 
people 0.244 0.031 *** 1.697 0.050 *** 0.123 0.065 * 
Firm size4: >= 100 
people 0.514 0.035 *** 1.823 0.064 *** 0.390 0.068 *** 
Province 1: Aceh 
(11) 1.319 0.916   0.237 3.488   1.321 0.916   
Province 2: 
Sumatera Utara (12) 0.387 0.071 *** 0.138 0.089   0.379 0.072 *** 
Province 3: 
Sumatera Barat (13) 0.358 0.090 *** 0.406 0.113 *** 0.333 0.091 *** 
Province 4: Riau 
(14) 0.721 0.130 *** 0.686 0.173 *** 0.673 0.132 *** 
Province 5: Jambi 
(15) 0.546 0.268 ** -0.041 0.311   0.539 0.268 ** 
Province 6: 
Sumatera Selatan 
(16) 0.349 0.068 *** 0.239 0.078 *** 0.340 0.068 *** 
Province 7: 
Lampung (18) 0.148 0.077 * 0.103 0.087   0.144 0.077 * 
Province 8: 
Kepulauan Bangka 
Belitung (19) 0.564 0.110 *** 0.123 0.159   0.556 0.110 *** 
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Province 9: 
Kepulauan Riau 
(21) 0.886 0.184 *** 0.375 0.333   0.869 0.184 *** 
Province 10: DKI 
Jakarta (31) 0.667 0.058 *** 0.210 0.082 *** 0.657 0.058 *** 
Province 11: Jawa 
Barat (32) 0.408 0.061 *** 0.081 0.081   0.403 0.061 *** 
Province 12: Jawa 
Tengah (33) 0.088 0.061   0.173 0.078 ** 0.077 0.061   
Province 13: D I 
Yogyakarta (34) 0.035 0.069   0.059 0.093   0.032 0.069   
Province 14: Jawa 
Timur (35) 0.115 0.058 ** -0.082 0.072   0.120 0.058 ** 
Province 15: Banten 
(36) 0.612 0.068 *** 0.082 0.101   0.609 0.068 *** 
Province 16: Bali 
(51) 0.593 0.094 *** 0.233 0.127 * 0.576 0.095 *** 
Province 18: 
Kalimantan Barat 
(61) 1.344 0.460 *** (omitted) (omitted) 
Province 19: 
Kalimantan Tengah 
(62) 1.264 0.242 *** -0.076 0.344   1.250 0.242 *** 
Province 20: 
Kalimantan Selatan 
(63) 0.400 0.084 *** 0.323 0.101 *** 0.384 0.084 *** 
Province 21: 
Kalimantan Timur 
(64) 0.913 0.143 *** 0.462 0.240 ** 0.882 0.143 *** 
Province 22: 
Sulawesi Selatan 
(73) 0.321 0.065 *** -0.003 0.081   0.323 0.065 *** 
Province 23: 
Sulawesi Tenggara 
(74) 0.205 0.266   0.209 0.316   0.183 0.266   
Province 24: Papua 
Barat (91) (omitted) (omitted)  (omitted) 
Urban 0.139 0.024 *** 0.279 0.032 *** 0.123 0.026 *** 
Mills           -0.188 0.089 ** 
Constants 7.862 0.163 *** -3.652 0.165 *** 8.247 0.244 *** 
Uncensored 
observations   8119      8115  
Number of 
observations     187934     
The R-squared 
statistic     0.303         0.30    
      
LR 
chi2(5
3) 
15150.8
5   
F( 53,  
8060) 66.2   
        
Prob > 
chi2 0   
Prob > 
F 0   
 Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
Throughout the literature on education and wages in Indonesia, most studies focus on the 
relationship between wages, education levels or years of schooling, experience, gender, 
marital status and areas or residence. The Mincer wage equation model in the present 
study is relatively more systematic and comprehensive (with many control variables 
included) than the previous studies in Indonesia. 
This chapter has focused on three research questions, as addressed in section 3.1. The first 
research question is: “What are the estimated return to education in the year 2000 and 
2014?” Some alternative Mincer wage equations are estimated in this study, and the result 
is consistent among those estimations. Overall, the return to education varies and 
increases in line with education level, as predicted by the human capital theory. More 
specifically, the return to junior high school in the year 2000 (relative to primary school 
and below level) was 28.5 per cent, senior high school was 63.7 per cent and university 
was 119.3 per cent. In 2014, the return to junior high school was 22.1 per cent and to 
senior high school and university were 48 per cent and 95.8 per cent, respectively. In 
terms of years of schooling, the result shows that one additional year of schooling 
increased wages by 12.4 per cent in 2000 and by 9.9 per cent in 2014.  
Regarding the effects of gender on the return to education, there is a gender disparity in 
wages, with the return to education for females being higher than males, particularly for 
the senior high school and university graduates. The results also show the same pattern; 
the return to education increases in line with education level for both males and females, 
confirming the findings of Psacharopoulos (1994), Harmon et al. (2000), and Dumauli 
(2015). Some possible explanations are the self-selection, a more limited supply of skilled 
female workers, and the different technological requirements in female-dominated and 
male-dominated jobs (Ren and Miller, 2012). 
In terms of sectors, the return to education is generally higher in the public sector than in 
the private sector for both periods, similar to Filmer and Lindauer (2001). But it appears 
that public and private sectors in developing countries are non-competing, as stated in 
intersectoral linkages in the labour market (Fields, 2010). Some possible reasons for the 
premium in the public sector are: the increase of wage in the public sector is higher and 
faster (The World Bank, 2000), around 60 per cent of the sample chose to settle in urban 
areas which tend to provide higher wages than the rural employment, there is a lack of 
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competition in the public sector (Psacharopolous,1979), and the private sector is more 
efficient than the public sector (Rao, 2015), especially in productive and allocative 
efficiency28, thus wage rigidity may occur more in the public sector.  
The last research question examines the change in the return to education between those 
periods. The results show that the return to education tends to decline for most education 
levels between 2000 and 2014. This agrees with Gropello and Sakellariou (2010), even 
though the result is slightly different to Purnastuti et al. (2013) who assert that the 
profitability of university qualifications increases between the years 1993 and 2007. 
Moreover, the expansion in education significantly affects the return of lower levels of 
education (junior high school relative to primary school). This could be attributed to the 
9-year compulsory education program’s effect which causes a surge in the net enrolment 
ratio (NER); thus, more individuals have at least junior high school qualifications. On the 
other hand, more companies prefer workers with higher qualifications, as Allen (2016) 
asserts. In contrast, Dumauli (2015) argues that the decline in return to education in 
Indonesia is probably because high skilled jobs are not in demand in Indonesia, and the 
low quality of the education system affects the quality of the graduates. As such, in terms 
of sectors, the private sector experienced a significant decline in the return to education 
between the year 2000 and 2014.  
Anticipating that endogeneity problems and selection bias may occur in the estimations, 
the present study performs the robustness tests. The IV results show that endogeneity 
problems do not occur, while the Heckman model confirms that selection bias could occur 
in the OLS models. Despite the instruments’ limitation, the result of IV and Heckman 
model indicate that the return to education increases in line with education level. Those 
models also confirm that there is a decline in the return to education in Indonesia between 
the year 2000 and 2014. More specifically, the OLS returns are slightly higher than the 
Heckman and IV results. Since the patterns of return to education are similar among the 
OLS, the IV and the Heckman model; and the limitation of the IV and the Heckman 
model, the present study prefers the OLS model.  
 
28 Productive efficiency refers to the maximisation of outputs over inputs or doing the most work with the 
fewest resources. Allocative efficiency refers to the match between the demand for services and their supply 
or allocating resources to the right place to do the right job (UNDP Global Centre for Public Service 
Excellence, 2015).    
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In terms of other control variables, ethnicity caused a different effect; generally 
insignificant in the year 2000, but some ethnicities, such as Jawa, turned significant in 
2014, thus suggesting that being a majority ethnicity has an advantage on wages. Similar 
to previous studies, the present study evidences a positive relationship between firm size 
and wages. Furthermore, working in non-agricultural industries still offered higher wages 
(relative to agriculture) in the year 2000. However, as labour-intensive industry 
experienced a significant decline (Aswicahyono et al., 2011), wages from labour 
intensive industries (such as: manufacturing; wholesale, retail, restaurant and hotels) 
became insignificantly different from wages in the agriculture sector in 2014. In terms of 
provinces and areas, living on the Jawa island and urban areas could provide higher 
wages, thus still being an appeal for a migration into those areas.      
This research has some implications, especially for individuals who choose the public or 
private sector for his/her future career, higher education offers the higher wages based on 
the model, despite the decline in the return to education overtime. For the government, 
investing in higher education and improving the quality of the educational institutions are 
necessary. Nonetheless, as Irandoust (2013) asserts, despite the increase in years of 
schooling and greater overall participation in higher education, graduates are found to be 
unprepared for the job market. Nowadays, a university qualification does not necessarily 
guarantee that individuals will fit the needs of the industries or workplaces.  
Moreover, as the public sector provides higher hourly wages than the private sector, this 
could create a crowding-out in the economy. Behar and Mok (2013) emphasize that 
crowding-out can occur through many channels, such as the labour market where higher 
wages, more job security, or a higher probability of finding a public-sector job can make 
an individual more likely to seek or wait for a public-sector employment rather than 
searching for or accepting a job in the private sector. Also, individuals seek qualifications 
appropriate for entering the public sector through the education market rather than 
seeking the skills needed for productive employment in the private sector. Slightly 
different to this few, according to intersectoral linkages in the labour market, both public 
and private sector is a noncompeting group in which individuals belong to one labour 
market segment or another, and they cannot or will not switch from one to another. 
This research also has some limitations that can be improved in further studies. The first 
one is related to the IV instruments. As policy instruments have some limitations, the 
concern is to retain the number of observations of the OLS. Other alternative instruments 
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can be explored for better estimations in further research. The model also could have 
included casual workers, since their wage data are available in IFLS5 (2014), hence the 
analysis could have given a more comprehensive picture of the return to education in 
Indonesia. And finally, one finding of this chapter is that the excess supply of college 
graduates turns to reduce the wages for them, which could relate to education mismatch 
in the labour market. Such issues will be analysed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4 Education Mismatch in Indonesia 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 of the present study finds that there is an expansion in education, especially at 
high school and university levels, as The Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) of both levels 
increases significantly, as indicated in Figure 2.2. In contrast, there is a decline in the 
relative wages of university and senior high school graduates (relative to primary school 
and lower qualifications). Freeman (1976) finds that overeducation occurs when the 
supply of university graduates increases more rapidly than its demand. Meanwhile, the 
human capital theory suggests that wages will always be equal to the individual worker’s 
marginal product. However, firms need to adjust production process in order to fully 
utilise their human capital in the short run. Similarly, workers need time to find a more 
appropriate match. Thus, it is possible to suggest that education mismatch has occurred 
in Indonesia, and this will be discussed further on in this part.     
Education mismatch arises when the educational qualifications of the workers are 
different from the qualifications required by their jobs, therefore the phenomenon can 
either be an undereducation or an overeducation. In Indonesia, Nazara and Safuan (2005) 
estimate this mismatch using Sakernas data and find that undereducation decreased from 
16.8 per cent in 1999 to 9.13 per cent in 2002, while overeducation increased from 26.7 
per cent to 34.7 per cent in the same period. Using the same data source for later periods, 
ILO (2017) also finds that there was a decrease in overeducation from 27 per cent in 2006 
to 19.2 per cent in 2016; for undereducation, the trend increased from 10 per cent to 17 
per cent for the same period. Comparing the latest periods, both overeducation and 
undereducation proportion in Indonesia are significantly higher than both proportions in 
OECD; the average of undereducation for OECD countries is around 19.1 per cent, while 
the average of overeducation is 14.9 per cent in 2015.  
Allen (2016) argues that the education system is not providing enough graduates in some 
sectors in Indonesia, while in other sectors those who are graduating do not have the right 
skills. Consequently, a large number of individuals with post-secondary qualifications 
work in low-skill occupations, which suggests that despite holding degrees, they lack the 
right skills. Allen also finds that 52 per cent of the employed population was 
underqualified for their positions in 2015. McKinsey Global Institute (2012) estimates 
149 
 
that the demand for semi-skilled and skilled workers may rise to 113 million by 2030, 
which is likely to see skills shortages and skills mismatches worsen throughout the 
economy.     
Hence, this chapter aims: to investigate the education mismatch and to update the existing 
literature on education mismatches, particularly in the waged sectors in Indonesia during 
the 2000 and 2014 periods; to analyse variables that affect the mismatch in the waged 
sectors, and; to explore the changes on the mismatch determinants between these periods. 
The present research seeks to answer the following research questions: (4.1) Does 
education mismatch (both undereducation and overeducation) exist in the waged sectors 
in Indonesia? (4.2) What are the estimates of education mismatch in 2000 and 2014? How 
does the aggregate trend of education mismatch change between these periods? Are there 
any distinctions among genders and sectors?  (4.3) What are the variables which 
determine undereducation and/or overeducation? And are there any distinctions among 
genders and sectors?  
Similar to Chapter 3, this chapter uses IFLS3 of 2000 and IFLS5 of 2014 to provide 
answers to the aforementioned research questions. Furthermore, since the rapid expansion 
and reform in education occurred in mid 2000s, thus the 2000 data represent the situation 
before the reform, and the 2014 data (the latest IFLS data available) represent situation 
after the reform. To estimate the education mismatch, this research employs objective 
measures (calculating mode and standard deviation) or realised method (RM)29. In 
measuring the mismatch, the mode30 years of education could be a better instrument 
compared to the mean level of education because mode is commonly used for categorical 
data like mismatch data. Furthermore, mode is a better measure than the mean when the 
data are skewed or not normally distributed (Lund and Lund, 2018). In fact, data with 
normal distribution will have equal mean, mode and median. 
Besides the data source, time period, and method (mode or mean), another aspect that can 
offer different results of mismatch estimations is occupational segregation31. IFLS data 
 
29 Commonly, most of previous studies uses mean. Mode is in terms of year of education. 
30 Mode refers to the most frequent data which appear in the dataset.  
31 According to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08), occupation groups are 
divided by major groups (1 digit), sub major groups (2 digits), minor groups (3 digits), unit groups (4 digits 
occupation categories). When a mismatch is measured by the mean of occupation, different levels of 
occupation category may have different mean; as a result, the mismatch estimations may differ.  
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provide general categories (1 digit)32 and sub-categories (2 digit); using either 1 or 2 digit 
generates several issues such as a wide range of years of schooling within the occupation 
category for 1 digit and a low number of observations for the 2 digits. As such, the present 
study rearranges the occupation group (the hybrid category) in order to reduce 
heterogeneity and to avoid low number of observations, by keeping sub-categories which 
have relatively large observations, and merges the remaining (particularly sub-categories 
with sample size of less than 30). Compared to previous studies such as Nazara and 
Safuan (2005) and ILO (2017), this occupation group (hybrid) is relatively more detailed. 
Likewise, Foxton (2016) asserts that using an appropriate digit level of occupation 
category can provide a good balance between a strong sample size and reducing the level 
of heterogeneity in roles within occupational grouping.   
The present research develops a mismatch determination model that consists of personal 
characteristic variables, household characteristics, work-related and firm size variables 
and residence or area dummy variables. Multinomial Logit Model (MNL) is also applied 
to estimate the mismatch model. The main advantage of using MNL is its capability to 
analyse more than two possible discrete outcomes, i.e. both overeducation and 
undereducation, and the simpler logit model is also often preferable to the more complex 
probit model (Dow and Endersby, 2004). The waged sector is chosen for this study 
considering that the characteristics of public and private sectors are relatively similar; 
they have regular wages and the data are available. Moreover, the waged sectors, 
especially the public sector, are very attractive for job seekers, for example; the ratio of 
job opportunities in the public sector to the number of applicants is around 1:200 (Sindo, 
2013).  
The present study also extends the analysis based on sector and gender to examine the 
different effects each variable has on gender and sector, since different characteristics of 
gender and sector may have a substantial effect on matches. For instance, ILO (2017) 
reveals that male workers in Indonesia tend to have lower education levels than the female 
workers. However, males receive relatively higher wages than females. Public sectors 
also have a relatively higher return to education than the private sectors (see findings in 
Chapter 3). In addition, there is a change in regulation for example, the Government 
 
32 1-digit IFLS categories are similar to the ISCO-08 major occupation group from ILO, which were 
commonly used by previous studies such as: Allen (2016), Chua and Chun (2016), Lee et al. (2016) and 
Flisi et al. (2017). 
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Regulation 30/2015 on list of basis salaries of civil servants, the basic salaries is based on 
entry ranks, which are mainly determined by education level, and increases in rank are 
largely driven by seniority, civil servants in Indonesia are divided into four ranks, from I 
(the lowest) to IV (the highest). Rank I through III are divided into four grades (a, b, c, 
and d), and Rank IV has five grades (a, b, c, d, and e), making a total of 17 grades from I 
(a) to IV (e). Individual civil servants’ ranks are based on their educational qualifications 
and seniority. Ranks III and IV require and university degree, while Rank I only need an 
elementary and secondary education and Rank II mostly occupied by who has finished a 
senior high school (Tjiptoherijanto, 2018). The regulation is revised every year to adjust 
the civil servants wage with the inflation that applies to both of new entrants and the 
remaining civil servants. This may affect the increase of overeducation incidences in 
Indonesia since workers prefer to have at least university qualifications and they can entry 
with rank III with higher wage standard. In the other side, the public sector also prefers 
to hire workers with at least senior high school qualifications. While, for unskilled jobs 
such as cleaning, the public sector prefers outsourcing or using private firms’ services 
rather than hiring directly. The other regulations that may affect education mismatch such 
as: the minimum requirement for lecturer is PhD in top five universities. Such regulations 
can be addressed in the future research.      
The present study will also provide results of a sensitivity test by providing some 
alternative methods: (1) using mean, as previous studies have commonly practised; (2) 
using multinomial probit (MNP); and (3) extending the sample by adding casual workers 
for 2014, to see if the model still applies and is consistent with the main model (the waged 
sector). As these casual workers are added, analysing both the waged  sector and casual 
workers can provide a more comprehensive picture on Indonesia’s labour market, since 
around 60 – 70 per cent of the workforce is estimated to engage in informal employment, 
which include casual workers (Statistics Indonesia, 2010). Unfortunately, the model with 
casual and waged workers cannot be applied in the year 2000 because the casual workers’ 
data are not available in IFLS3. 
Therefore, Chapter 4 is structured into: Section 4.2, providing a summary of the 
Indonesia’s context; Section 4.3, reviewing various theories and the determinants of 
education mismatch, including the change of mismatch; Section 4.4 explaining the data 
and methods of the study; Section 4.5, discussing the estimation result and test of 
sensitivity results and finally; Section 4.6, presenting the conclusion of this chapter.     
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4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Mismatch Definitions and Measurements 
Mismatch Definitions 
Freeman (1976) introduced the notion of education mismatch, particularly overeducation, 
in which education is measured objectively by comparing a worker’s level of education 
attainment with what is required by the worker’s job. Consequently, education mismatch 
arises when the educational qualifications of the workers, individually or in the aggregate, 
are different from the qualifications required by or specified for their jobs (Sattinger, 
2012), and as such it can be an over/undereducation. Overeducation refers to the 
phenomenon where workers have more education than their job requires (Silles and 
Dolton, 2002), while undereducation occurs when workers have lower education than the 
requirement. In other words, a match occurs when workers have exactly the education the 
job requires. Here, education is defined as the highest level or years of education achieved 
by individuals.   
Conceptually, many studies have also explored different definitions of education 
mismatch, such as Rumberger (1981) who defines the mismatch in three ways: firstly, as 
a decline in the economic position of educated individuals relative to historically higher 
levels; secondly, as an under-fulfilled expectation of the educated with respect to their 
occupational attainments; and thirdly, as the possession of greater educational skills than 
their jobs require. Furthermore, Oliveira et al., (2000) argue that undereducation is the 
outcome of a process in which market-acquired capital substitutes for insufficient school-
supplied qualifications, where overeducation is associated with excess schooling but short 
tenure and job experience. In a similar vein, Gosling and Zhu (2010) separate 
overeducation definitions based on micro and macro levels. In micro level, overeducation 
is defined similar to Silles and Dolton’s (2002) definition. Meanwhile, in macro level, 
there are some characteristics of overeducation, such as a labour market which has “too 
many” graduates, a credentialism tendency and thus represents a disequilibrium.  
As a result, a match is the most efficient condition for the economy, education mismatch, 
overeducation in particular, is potentially costly to the economy, the firms and the 
individuals. At the macroeconomic level, national welfare is potentially lower than what 
would be the case if the skill of all under/overeducated workers were fully utilised within 
the economy. It is also (probably) related to tax revenues being wasted on equipping 
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individuals with non-productive education. At the firm level, overeducation could be 
associated with lower productivity, as Tsang (1987) finds that overeducated workers have 
a negative effect on output. At the individual level, overeducated workers, by virtue of 
the fact that a proportion of their educational investment is unproductive, are likely to 
earn a lower return on their investment relative to similarly educated individuals whose 
jobs match their education (Ortiz, 2010).  
According to previous empirical studies, overeducation measurement could also belong 
to the upper tail of the education distribution based on statistical definition. Similarly, 
undereducation refers to the lower tail of the distribution (Rumberger, 1981). Hartog 
(1997) defines overeducation as departing from more than one standard deviation from 
the mean, resulting in finding similar proportions of over and under educated workers - 
around 15 per cent of the population, if education is measured in years and the distribution 
of education per occupation is normally distributed. Kampelmann and Rycx (2012) find 
an increase of one year in the incidence of undereducation among young workers is found 
to decrease productivity on average by 3.5 per cent one year later.   
In additions, another strand of literature on overeducation finds that there is a negative 
relationship between overeducation and job satisfaction (Battu et al., 1999; Chevalier, 
2003). Chevalier (2000) proposes an alternative measure of mismatch based on 
occupation and job satisfaction, more precisely, whether the graduate is satisfied with the 
match between her education and her occupation. Graduates in a sub-graduate occupation 
who are satisfied are defined as apparently over-educated, whereas those who are 
dissatisfied are called genuinely over-educated. One advantage of using this definition of 
mismatch is that it refers to qualifications, not only education, and does not require an 
assessment of the educational level which requires doing the same job. Yet, it can be 
argued that this definition does not measure overeducation accurately, because the 
dissatisfaction between qualification and occupation could be due to undereducation; the 
dissatisfaction could reflect that despite being in a graduate job, this occupation is not 
related to the academic subject studied at university; and/or the job may require most of 
the skills that were learnt at university but also some more from a different field. To 
answer these criticisms, the definition of overeducation (based on job satisfaction) should 
be combined with the Professional Job Analysis (JA) method. Similarly, the negative 
correlation between overeducation and job satisfaction is also confirmed by Clark (2014).  
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In a similar respect, Chevalier (2000) distinguishes overeducation into two parts: apparent 
overeducation (i.e. overeducated only) and genuine overeducation (i.e. both overeducated 
and mismatched skill-wise). Moreover, a mismatch can either be vertical or horizontal or 
both. A vertical mismatch occurs when the level of the employee’s qualification is not 
the one required by the job, for instance, a graduate employee who works in a job that is 
typically considered a non-graduate job, in which case the graduate is over-educated. 
Meanwhile, a horizontal mismatch occurs when the level of the employee’s qualification 
is at the correct level for the job, but the type of the qualification is not, for example an 
individual with a degree in engineering working in a job that requires no engineering 
knowledge at all. A horizontal and vertical mismatch occurs when an individual may have 
a qualification that is both at the wrong level and of the wrong type for the job they are 
hired to do.  
It is also worth noting that education and skill are not synonymous33. As Flisi et al., (2017) 
distinguish, education refers to an individual’s qualifications at a given point in time, 
which are bound by differences across countries and cohorts for the same level attained. 
By contrast, skills are acquired and lost over an individual’s entire lifespan, thereby 
providing a more concise and updated measure of competencies34. McGuinness et al. 
(2017) further that overskilled is a situation where a worker believes that they possess 
more skills than their current job requires, while underskilled occurs if the worker 
believes that their current skills do not meet the demands of the job. Mavromaras et al. 
(2009) argue that overskilled could be a more accurate measure of mismatch amongst 
existing workers than overeducation on the grounds that overeducation assumes that; (a) 
job entry requirements accurately reflect job skill content, and (b) a worker’s 
qualifications adequately reflect their total work-related human capital. Thus, the 
overeducation approach ignores the fact that job entry requirements may be weakly 
 
33 Flisi et al. (2014) report that around 30 per cent of EU employment is overeducated (but not overskilled), 
17 per cent of them are overskilled (but not overeducated), and around 15 per cent are simultaneously 
mismatched; both overeducated and overskilled. 
34 In terms of skill, World Bank (2010) has published an Indonesia skills report which reviews the main 
characteristics of demand skills, documents the existence of a possible skill mismatch between employer 
demands and available supply and the contribution of the education and training sector to the mismatch. 
The analysis is based on employer and employee skill survey, involving around 473 medium and large 
firms and 200 employees in manufacturing and services sector in five provinces. The report highlights; an 
evidence of serious gap in generic and technical skills which puts young workers particularly in critical 
situation; at the more macro level, the employer survey suggests that skills are not yet a binding constraint 
to business development though the skills-for-needs issue does nevertheless appear non-trivial and, 
subjective assessments of difficulties of matching needs with available skills provide further evidence that 
skills are becoming a problematic aspect in Indonesia’s economy.  
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related to job content, and more reflective of qualification inflation and credentialism, 
while individual human capital will also consist of (non-formal and informal) skills 
acquired through labour market experience and training. Another reason why overskilled 
may be a more comprehensive measure of mismatch is that it compares all the skills and 
ability, irrespective of whether they are learned in the classroom or work environment, 
with the actual skill requirements of the worker’s current job (McGuinness et al., 2017). 
Although some studies find overskilled more accurate and comprehensive, there are 
several drawbacks of the method, such as: overskilled and underskilled are measured 
through separate questions, unlike education mismatch where a single question can be 
used to identify both over and undereducation. Also, skill mismatch is commonly 
measured through direct assessment by human resource specialists, and such direct 
measures are rarely captured in datasets. The questions adopted to investigate 
overskilled/underskilled vary substantially across datasets, consequently making it 
difficult to compare the estimates. Overskilled questions also could not allow the 
researcher to identify the relative importance of underused skills deriving from labour 
market experience, training, innate ability or formal schooling. In addition, skill mismatch 
measurement also could pose a bias in the estimates, for instance, the respondents’ job is 
related to their hobbies, as such when they formulate the response, their consideration of 
skills and abilities is totally unrelated to the workplace (McGuinness et al., 2017).   
 
Mismatch Measurement 
There are some basic approaches to measure a mismatch. These choices are typically 
restricted by data availability. Nonetheless, there is a growing literature centred on 
assessing the levels of consistency and potential biases associated with the various 
approaches. The summary of mismatch measurement is shown in Table 4.1, and the 
explanation follows after the table. 
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Table 4.1: Mismatch Measurement 
Type of 
mismatch 
Measurements Approach Method 
Education 
Mismatch 
Objective 
Measures 
Normative/Professional 
Job Analysis (JA) 
Using information provided by 
professional job analysts: comparing 
job titles with actual education 
attainments 
Statistical/Realised 
Match (RM) 
Comparing education attainments with 
the mean of education level (± 
standard deviation) 
Subjective 
Measures 
Self-
declared/ 
Self-
reported/ 
Self-
assessment 
Direct 
measures 
(DSA) 
Asking respondents directly whether 
they are over/undereducated/matched 
  Indirect 
measures 
(ISA) 
Asking respondents to give 
information on minimum job 
requirements and individual's acquired 
education 
  Mixed/ Alternative 
methods (EMX) 
Mixed between those methods  
Adapted from: Filsi et al., 2014.  
 
(1) Objective measures 
Overeducation can be assessed objectively: (1) the Job Analysis (JA) method; by using 
the information provided by professional job analysts/JA (such as in the Standard 
Occupational Classification System in the UK or the Dictionary of Occupational Titles in 
the US) to determine an individual’s required education on the basis of their job title and 
again comparing this with their actual level of education (Rumberger, 1987); (2) 
Statistical/Realised Match (RM); by calculating the mean education level for a range of 
occupations with an individual defined as being overeducated if their qualifications are 
more than one standard deviation above their occupation’s mean education level 
(Sicherman, 1991); while undereducation occurs if the actual education attainment is 
lower than the mean level of education within their occupation (known as Realised 
Matches/RM). Apart from the mean, median or mode of educational level in an 
occupation can be used as well (Kiker et al., 1997).  
These measures are also open to criticisms such as: (1) some occupations may contain a 
number of skill levels, so that in fact people with the same job titles may be doing very 
different jobs, for instance, the tasks undertaken by managers are likely to vary widely; 
and (2) rising education levels in the economy imply that employers will allocate workers 
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differently. For example, Mason (1996) reports that managers are now employing 
university graduates in mid-clerical positions, the posts traditionally held for persons 
educated to O and A levels standard (predominantly high school graduates). Thus, the 
educational requirements of various occupations will evolve with changes in relative 
supply; a factor that is not always readily incorporated into occupational classification 
systems that tend to be relatively static in nature. Hartog (2000) adds that a carefully 
conducted job analysis method should not lead to any systematic bias. Yet, this requires 
a regular update of the classification scheme. Otherwise, a general upgrade of skill 
requirements due to skill-biased technological change might lead to overestimation of the 
incidence of overeducation.  
In terms of empirical evidence, Kiker et al. (1997) study the determinants of 
overeducation and undereducation in Portugal using Personnel Records (Quadros de 
Pessoal) dataset in 1991, collected by the Portuguese Ministry of Labour. Years of 
schooling variable is used to calculate the mismatch. The study employs three alternative 
methods to measure overeducation and undereducation: (1) the Verdugo and Verdugo 
(1989) or VV model, where job requirement is defined as actual occupation attainments 
of workers within occupations disaggregated at a 3-digit level. Workers whose education 
attainments fall within plus or minus one standard deviation of the mean value within the 
occupation are considered to be adequately educated; (2) the Mode model, where 
educational attainments equal the modal (mode) value within each occupation, 
overeducation or undereducation equals to modal education level plus or minus the 
standard deviation; and (3) the measurement based on job analysts’ opinion. The study 
finds that overeducation and undereducation exist in the Portuguese labour market. 
Comparing these methods, over and undereducation are highest under the third method, 
around 33.1 per cent and 37.5 per cent of the sample, respectively. Meanwhile, the second 
method (mode) results are only 25.5 per cent for overeducation and 17 per cent for 
undereducation. The lowest estimation is reported by VV method, only 9.4 per cent for 
overeducation and 5 per cent for undereducation. The study also reports another period 
(1985) of the same data and by using the same method finds that there is an increase of 
overeducation from around 18 – 26 per cent in 1985 to 25 – 33 per cent in 1991 and a 
similar increase for undereducation as well. Furthermore, overeducated workers are more 
likely to be the young members of the employed labour force, while undereducated 
workers are more likely to be the older members. The finding from Kiker et al. (1997) 
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seems to be more supportive of the role of technological change rather than of human 
capital in explaining overeducation/undereducation for the Portuguese economy; 
characterised by intensive efforts to promote economic growth, modernization of the 
industrial structure, and the upgrade of educational qualifications.  
 
(2) Subjective measures 
Overeducation can also be measured subjectively: (1) the Indirect Self-Assessment (ISA); 
by asking the respondents to give information on the minimum requirements of their jobs 
and then comparing this with the individual’s acquired education - some studies employed 
this method such as Duncan and Hoffman (1981) and Hartog and Oosterbeek (1988); or 
(2) the Direct Self-Assessment (DSA); by simply asking the respondents whether or not 
they are overeducated - used by Halaby (1994). And the last method is mixed or 
alternative method (EMX); by combining two or more methods above (Chevalier and 
Lindley, 2009).  
There are some criticisms against these measures: (1) overeducated workers may be less 
likely to respond to questionnaires due to higher levels of job apathy which may lead to 
underestimation of the incidence of overeducation; (2) workers in smaller and/or less 
structured organisations may lack sufficient benchmarks against which they can assess 
their job requirements, a factor which will again lead to measurement error; and (3) even 
where benchmarks are available, respondents may be applying differing criteria when 
assessing their job requirements, i.e. the actual level of education required to do specific 
tasks or the formal educational requirements necessary to get the job.  
Hartog (2000) highlights the obvious bias in self-assessment for the measure that is based 
on the assessment of the required level to get the job. These measures provide an 
indication of the credentials gap (Livingstone, 1998); nevertheless, the concept of 
credentials and overeducation is not exactly the same. For instance, employers might 
increase hiring standards in response to cyclical or structural oversupply of educated 
workers, possibly causing the level required to get the job to deviate from the actual level 
required to do the job. Conversely, if the self-assessment measure is based on this last 
level, the bias is likely to be less severe. Nonetheless, there might still be a problem if 
individuals tended to inflate the status of their own position or if they adapted their 
answers to their personal ambitions and expectations. These biases might also be a 
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problem for measures that are based on DSA. Moreover, these indicators might measure 
skill mismatches instead of education mismatches, particularly if they were based on 
questions regarding skill utilisation. 
In addition, Groot and Brink (2000) study education mismatch in the US and EU, using 
meta-analysis. By analysing 25 studies, they obtain 50 estimates on the incidence of 
overeducation and 36 estimates on the incidence of undereducation. They find that the 
unweighted average of the overeducation incidence is 23.3 per cent (with a standard 
deviation of 9.9 percentage points), while the unweighted average incidence of 
undereducation is 14.4 per cent (with a standard deviation of 8.2 percentage points). The 
unweighted averages of the rates of return to the different educational components are: 
5.6 per cent for years of education attained, 7.8 per cent for years of education required 
for the job, 3.0 per cent for years of overeducation and 21.5 per cent for years of 
undereducation. They also find that the different definitions lead to large differences in 
the incidence of overeducation. Overeducation rate in the EU also appears lower than the 
US; the average value of overeducation among studies for the United States is 26.3 per 
cent, compared to 21.5 per cent among the European studies. In terms of aggregate trend, 
they also point out that the trend of overeducation and undereducation declines between 
1970s and 1990s. With the decline in the incidence of overeducation over time, the 
average rate of return to years of overeducation has declined as well. With a similar trend 
for undereducation, subsequently, the joint decline in overeducation and undereducation 
suggests that skill mismatches in the labour market have decreased since the 1970s. 
McGuinness (2006) also documents many studies on mismatch for various education 
levels, particularly overeducation in the US, Canada, Hong Kong, the UK and seven 
European countries35, using RM and years of schooling as education attainment variable. 
The study concludes that objective measures with RM (mean) is found to generate lower 
estimate; around 22 per cent, some 7 per cent points below the comparable subjective 
figure. For cross-country comparisons The Netherlands yields the lowest incidence level 
under both subjective and objective measures (Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1988; Groot and 
Brink, 2000), whilst studies of the US labour market generate the highest incidence level 
irrespective of the measurement approach adopted (Tsang et al., 1991; McGoldrick and 
Robst, 1996).  
 
35 Germany, the Netherlands, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and North Ireland. 
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In a similar vein, Chua and Chun (2016) study the mismatch in Asian countries, using the 
World Bank survey data for Armenia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC, Yunnan), 
Georgia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Sri Lanka, and Viet Nam 
between 2012 and 2013. The sample per country comprise around 3,000 adults aged 15 
to 64 who were located in urban areas. The method used to estimate the mismatch is ISA. 
The study finds that urban Viet Nam has the highest share of individuals working in jobs 
for which they are overeducated. Undereducated incidence is most prevalent in Armenia, 
where 29.1 per cent lacks years of schooling to meet the job requirements.   
 
 
4.2.2 Mismatch Theories 
There are at least nine theories relevant to education mismatch, as indicated in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2: Summary of the Main Features of Mismatch Theories 
Theory Authors Persistence Main characteristic 
Human capital 
theory  Becker (1964) Temporary 
The mismatch can easily be solved via 
individuals or firm adjustment 
Matching theory Pissarides (2000) Temporary Both individuals and firms look for matches 
Job competition 
model Thurow (1975) Persistent 
Labour market allocation is based on 
hierarchy of workers and jobs' education 
level 
Assignment theory Sattinger (1993) Temporary or persistent 
Takes into account individuals' 
preferences on job/sector/wage 
maximisation 
Career/job mobility 
theory  
Sicherman and 
Galor (1990) 
Temporary 
or persistent 
Individuals are unable to properly signal 
their skills become overeducated 
Search frictions 
Gautier et al. 
Temporary Lack of information in the beginning of one’s career (2010) 
Signalling / 
screening Spence (1973) Persistent 
Informational asymmetry exists in the 
labour market, education acts as an 
important signal 
Preferences Gottschalk and Hansen (2003)    
The same productivity exists among 
workers, college workers voluntarily 
choose to work in the non-college sector 
in equilibrium 
Technological 
change theory 
Mendes De 
Oliveira et al. 
(2000) 
Temporary 
or persistent 
Rapid technological change increases the 
undereducated, both individuals and 
firms look for matches 
Adapted from: Capsada-Munsech, 2017. 
The job competition theory offers a demand side explanation, in contrast to the supply 
side approach of the human capital and career mobility theories. There are several 
alternative theories to explain the mismatch such as: the assignment models, search and 
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frictions, signalling/screening, technological change theory, and preferences. However, 
this part only elaborates some of the key theories that have been used in most of education 
mismatch studies, i.e. the human capital, job competition theory, assignment, the career 
mobility (Linsley, 2005), signalling and screening, and technological change theory. 
 
Human Capital Theory 
The discussion under this section focuses on the human capital theory in relation to 
education mismatch or overeducation. As briefly explained in part 3.2.1, the human 
capital theory argues that education endows an individual with productivity-enhancing 
ability, and workers will always be paid by their marginal product (Becker, 1975). One 
of the propositions of the theory is that firms are willing to fully utilise the skills of their 
workforce by adapting their production processes in response to any changes in the 
relative supply of labour. Consequently, wages will always be equal to the individual 
worker’s marginal product, which in turn will be determined by the level of human capital 
that they have accumulated through either formal education or on-the-job training. Also, 
overeducation or undereducation will not exist in equilibrium since there will be no under-
utilisations of human capital in the labour market.  
According to the theory, overeducation is associated with worker’s under-utilisation and 
wage rates which are below the marginal product; overeducation would appear entirely 
inconsistent with this view of the labour market. However, as overeducation will become 
apparent, some economists have continued to argue that the human capital theory remains 
fully consistent despite the existence of overeducation. Overeducation phenomenon does 
not certainly overturn human capital theory as it is entirely plausible that workers will be 
overeducated in the short run (temporary), at the same time as firms adjust their 
production processes in order to fully utilise the individuals’ human capital or 
alternatively for as long as it takes workers to find a more appropriate match through job 
search. Thus, the human capital theory can be rationalised by allowing for the existence 
of short-run disequilibria.  
The explanation of overeducation is also provided by empirical framework, adopted for 
testing the human capital theory; this could also be entirely consistent with the 
neoclassical view. The standard approach was developed by Mincer (1974) and is based 
on wages regression centred on years of schooling which is replaced by overeducation 
variables; less formal measures of human capital such as on-the-job training, which 
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Becker (1975) argues is directly substitutable with schooling, are ignored in this case. 
Thus, this specification implies that individuals with more schooling may be 
compensating for a lack of work-related human capital, and the apparent lower wages of 
these ‘overeducated’ may be attributable to an omitted variables problem, such as a lack 
of controls for less formal measures of human capital accumulation. Furthermore, it may 
also be the case that overeducated workers are in some way less able relative to their 
adequately matched counterparts; hence, lower wages are merely a reflection of lower 
ability and/or productivity.  
In addition, Freeman (1976) examines overeducation using US universities data and 
empirically finds that the long-run mismatch arose in the US in 1970’s because the supply 
of university graduates increased more rapidly than the demand for it. As a result, many 
individuals with higher education levels were unable to find jobs that require something 
similar to their education attainment. Long-run mismatch also contributes to the short-run 
mismatch in the form of overeducation for many individuals. Nonetheless, even in the 
absence of any long-run mismatches, short-run mismatches would continue to exist due 
to the difficulty of finding a job without mismatches in a reasonable amount of time 
(Sattinger, 2012).  
Kiker et al. (1997) also study the mismatch in Portuguese labour market using the 1991 
Quadros de Pessoal data, where years of schooling variable is used to calculate the 
mismatch using several different approaches (explained previously in the objective 
measure part), and find that oth overeducation and undereducation exist in the market. 
Moreover, the phenomenon of overeducation should be a transitory situation (temporary), 
where workers accumulate human capital which eventually allows them to improve their 
job situation.  
Furthermore, Green et al. (1999) offer a sensible explanation for overeducation; it is 
related to the fact that the quality and type of education acquired differs by institution and 
depends on the curriculum studied. Not all school graduates are equal in terms of their 
skills and productivity, or that educational human capital cannot be characterised as a 
homogenous stock. As such, worker productivity and earning will vary according to the 
quality and type of education obtained (grade, place of study, curriculum studied, etc.) 
and equally based on the demand for these different types of skills. 
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The Job Competition Model 
The job competition model offers a demand side explanation for the existence of 
overeducation. This model is based on Thurow’s (1975) book entitled ‘Generating 
Inequality’. The model suggests that job characteristics may be the only factor to 
determine wages. The central element of the Job Competition Model is based around the 
observation (Thurow cites US surveys) that the majority of workplace skills are acquired 
through on-the-job training as opposed to formal education. Therefore, the labour market 
is not a bidding market for selling existing skills but a training market where training slots 
must be allocated to different workers. How these training slots are distributed across 
individuals depends on factors determining where individuals are located within a 
particular job queue and the distribution of jobs (training opportunities) in the economy. 
Once individuals reach the top of the queue and are allocated a job, their wages will be 
pre-determined by the characteristics of the job in question. Thus, the marginal product 
resides in the job rather than the individual’s characteristics. 
The Job Competition Model emphasises the importance of a person’s relative position. 
Thurow postulates that were an individual to observe his/her neighbour participating in 
education, then under the human capital framework that individual would be less likely 
to participate in education, as the supply would be higher and the return less (Thurow, 
1975). Slightly differently, under the Job Competition Model, the same individual would 
now be more likely to participate as education is a defensive need, necessary to protect 
their place in the queue. The larger the number of educated persons in the economy, the 
more imperative it becomes for individuals to invest in education.  
The Job Competition Model provides a clear explanation for educational overinvestment 
as well as overeducation. The model is similar to the signalling framework in that 
preserving one’s position motivates individual investments. In Spence’s (1973) model, 
there is a limit to the amount of education in which an individual will invest (it is only 
based on the balance between wages and the cost of education). However, it is difficult 
to determine how a ceiling is reached within the Job Competition framework with respect 
to educational participation. This model provides a theoretical framework with which 
overeducation is entirely consistent. The implications of the Thurow’s model are that 
wages will be wholly dependent upon required education and that the returns to education 
that are over and above that is required by the job (education surplus) will be zero 
(McGuinness, 2006). 
164 
 
In a similar respect, Muysken and Weel (1999) apply the job competition theory among 
skilled workers in European countries. They formalise the observation of increasing 
supply of skilled workers without rising wages. The study categorise the jobs based on 
skilled and unskilled jobs; and years of schooling is used as the proxy of education 
variable. They find that the results fit the facts for the Netherlands and other European 
countries quite well, since educational attainment had increased over the past decades 
whereas wages did not rise dramatically. The adjustment process went through on the one 
hand bumping down of skilled workers into unskilled jobs and on the other hand crowding 
out of unskilled workers into unemployment.  
Moreover, Linsley (2005) studies overeducation in Australia labour market using the 
NLC survey. The study employs ISA and tests four of the key theories, i.e. the human 
capital, job competition, assignment and the career mobility theories. Various levels of 
education represent the education variable. The study concludes that job competition 
model is the best model to explain overeducation in Australia labour market. The model 
offers several implications: (1) overeducation persists and leads to less skilled workers 
being bumped down into low-skilled, low wage positions or crowded out of the labour 
market entirely; (2) a proportion of an individual’s investment in education has limited 
productive benefit. Thus, reallocation of investment in education towards vocational 
education and training institutions which provide intermediate skills for individuals is 
necessary.  
 
Assignment Models 
The assignment models originate from Tinbergen’s (1951) analysis of the determinants 
of income distribution. In this early model, there is a distribution of jobs (varying by some 
characteristics) and a different distribution of workers. Workers are affected by the 
mismatch between jobs and their own characteristics. Differences in wage rates arise 
which reconcile the distributions of jobs and workers by compensating workers for taking 
a job that does not match their characteristics (Sattinger, 2012). 
Sattinger (1993) further asserts that there is an allocation problem in assigning 
heterogeneous workers to jobs, which differ in their complexity. The issue is that the 
frequency distributions on the demand and supply side are unlikely to match and 
education mismatches may be a persistent problem if the job structure is relatively 
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unresponsive to changes in relative supplies of educated labour. Moreover, assignment 
models differ significantly from the Job Competition interpretation in that the models 
stress that choice of job or sector creates an intermediate step between an individual’s 
characteristics and their wages, i.e. the job allocation process is not merely a lottery. 
Income maximisation guides workers to choose particular jobs over others. Subsequently, 
higher wages for workers with some characteristics play an important role in the economy 
rather than simply being rewards for the possession of particular characteristics. Workers 
find jobs in particular sector are not randomly distributed but are there based on the 
choices made to maximise their income or utility.  
The central and crucial prediction arising from the literature is that in order to adequately 
explain changes in the distribution of wages, it must consider individuals and job 
characteristics. Therefore, overeducation is entirely consistent with the Assignment 
Interpretation suggesting that marginal products and wages will depend to some extent 
on both the individuals and the jobs; these models also imply that there is no reason to 
expect that wage rates will be wholly related to acquired schooling or other individual 
attributes (Human Capital theory), neither should it be expected that wage rates will be 
wholly related to the nature of the job (Job Competition Model). In short, match, 
overeducation and undereducation are determined by workers’ and jobs’ characteristics.  
In terms of empirical evidence, Rigg et al. (1990) suggest that in the 1980s approximately 
one-quarter of UK employers had substituted university graduates for non-graduates, but 
that approximately one-third of the jobs where this substitution had occurred had not been 
upgraded in line with the higher educational requirements. Similarly, Pietro and Urwin 
(2006) study education mismatch in the Italian graduate labour market (university level) 
in 1997 and 2003, and find little evidence to support the assignment theory; individuals’ 
pay is determined by both their human capital and the characteristics of their job. Instead, 
they identify a relatively weak wage effect arising from education mismatch associated 
with employers’, as opposed to employees’, perceptions of the job requirements. This is 
probably because employers have re-categorised jobs as requiring a degree, when they 
were previously filled by non-graduates, and many have not altered pay scales 
accordingly. 
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Career Mobility Theory 
The theory of career mobility suggests several specific predictions especially related to 
the effect of schooling on wages and firm mobility. One of the predictions is the effect of 
schooling on the probability of being promoted from an occupation (within or across 
firms) will be higher if the returns to schooling are lower while one works in a specific 
occupation. Similarly, it will be rational for some individuals to spend a portion of their 
working careers in occupations that require a lower level of schooling than they have 
acquired. Thus, an individual may choose a job with a lower wage return to education but 
with a higher probability of promotion in the future than other available jobs with higher 
wage effects of schooling (Sicherman and Galor, 1990).  
Furthermore, Sicherman (1991) applies this theory to explain overeducation, using the 
1976 and 1978 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) with male heads 
of household, aged 18-60 years old as the sample. The education variable is presented by 
years of schooling, and occupation is in two digits occupational category. The study uses 
RM to analyse and ultimately concludes that overeducated people are willing to choose a 
job for which their educational levels are higher than needed in order to acquire skills or 
better opportunities to make a career upgrade in the future. However, Nielsen (2007) 
argues that this theory only takes effect if overeducated individuals indeed move to a 
higher level of job to fully utilise their educational qualifications. According to the 
literature, this theory could be unrealistic for two reasons. Firstly, there is a lack of 
empirical evidence. For instance, Sicherman (1991) finds that both overeducated people 
and undereducated people have a positive probability of promotion. Moreover, Büchel 
and Mertens (2004) point out that overeducated people remain in mismatched status 
within five years. Secondly, this theory fails to provide a rational explanation in terms of 
undereducation. 
 
Signalling/Screening 
Spence (1973) assumes that the labour market has an informational asymmetry. On the 
employers’ side, they are not completely certain about true productivity of their 
employees when they make the employment decisions and even after hiring. There is a 
signal transfer mechanism passing the information about employees to the employers in 
order to identify the most productive and motivated workers for the firms. Education acts 
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as an important signal in this mechanism, acting as a screening device representing some 
unobserved personal characteristics, such as problem-solving skills, communication skills 
and motivation. High educational levels signal high productivities. Individuals will keep 
on investing in education in order to distinguish themselves from others. Thus, 
investments in schooling are efficient from an individual’s point of view but do not 
necessarily affect a worker’s productivity.  
This theory is not only able to help firms reduce the cost of hiring but is also beneficial 
for the final occupational distribution and placement in the labour market; by education 
signal, the most productive workers will be placed in the jobs that make them more 
productive. If high returns of investment in education remain, incentives for investment 
in education will last long (Tsang and Levin, 1985). Based on this theory, overeducation 
may be a persistent phenomenon, or in contrast to Freeman’s argument (Freeman, 1976). 
In addition, signalling and screening are similar; the difference is that workers move first 
to choose their education level in order to signal their productivity to the employers. 
While in the screening theory, employers move first to decide the education level required 
for a job.    
Green et al. (1999) sum up previous studies on overeducation and the signalling model 
in the UK. They highlight the findings from Rigg et al. (1990) that about 25 per cent 
employers in late 1980s had substituted graduates for non-graduates, and only about a 
third of these jobs had been upgraded in terms of content. Meanwhile, the Institute of 
Personnel and Development (IPD, 1997) conducted a survey of employers, recruitment 
firms, outplacement agencies and graduate careers offices. One in ten employers felt that 
they had a problem attracting too many over-qualified people to their job advertisements. 
This problem was even greater among medium and large firms, with one in four reporting 
a problem with over-qualified applicants. However, employers may use the term 'over-
qualified' to politely indicate that a candidate is, in their view, too old or experienced for 
the job. 
In terms of empirical evidence, Ordine and Rose (2009) study overeducation in Italian 
graduate labour market, using the data from the Italian Ministry of Education and the 
Italian commission for academic research evaluation. For the method, the study uses the 
probit model, and overeducation is defined by DSA. The study focuses on educational 
choices in a signalling setting in the presence of heterogeneous working ability 
imperfectly correlated with schooling costs. In light of the theory, the study shows that 
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equilibria may occur with forward induction reasoning, in which individuals with 
different abilities acquire the same educational level. Meanwhile, the assumed strategic 
interaction between firms and individuals’ choices considers explicitly the externality 
generated by low-ability individuals with low indirect costs who use education in order 
to signal the abilities that they do not have. As such, education mismatch derives from 
the emergence of pooling equilibria related to the dimension of the “ability effect” with 
respect to the “indirect costs effect” in human capital investment. When education quality 
is low, the latter effect may prevail, and it increases the probability of overeducation. The 
study further highlights that the larger the share of innovative firms is, the higher the 
quality of education must be in order to avoid overeducation. This is because low-ability 
individuals may see better job opportunities by acquiring higher education and they do 
not internalise the impact of their choices on the firms’ behaviour. Moreover, empirically, 
the study concludes that overeducation in Italian graduates’ labour market appears to be 
strongly determined by university quality and by other variables which characterise the 
individual’s socioeconomic background. In addition, many other studies also use this 
model to estimate the wage premium rather than the determinant of overeducation. 
 
Technological Change Theory 
According to Oliveira et al. (2000), there are two possibilities for the existence of 
education mismatch, and one of them is technological change36. Rapid technological 
change may require school-provided skills or education higher than those already 
possessed by currently employed workers. Even in the presence of positive adjustment 
costs, better-educated workers cannot be made instantaneously. The employers and the 
employees could be locked into a situation of disequilibrium (at least in the short run) and 
hence pockets of undereducation would arise. In less flexible labour market settings (as 
is the case, in general, in European countries), these pockets might be persistent. At the 
same time, firms upgrade their hiring standards and the recently hired employees (those 
with higher educational qualifications than their older co-workers) are perceived to be 
overeducated.  
Empirically testable hypotheses derived from the technology-based hypothesis contradict 
those of the human capital approach. Overeducated workers are those that the employer 
 
36 The other one is human capital.  
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wishes to retain and for whom the bulk of training and firm-specific investments is 
slotted; hence, their tenure is rewarded. Undereducated workers, on the other hand, are 
confined in dead-end jobs and should expect no such benefits from continuing with the 
same employer. 
Oliveira et al. (2000) use an extensive dataset based on staff records (Quadros de Pessoal) 
collected in 1991 by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment from all business firms with 
more than one paid employee; and apply a decomposed Mincer wage equation. Oliveira 
et al. test two competing hypotheses; the first hypothesis, undereducation is the outcome 
of a process in which market-acquired capital substitutes for insufficient school-supplied 
qualifications, whereas overeducation is associated with excess schooling but short tenure 
and job experience. And the second one considers upon changes in the technology of 
production and marketing to explain why some workers end up as inadequately educated 
for the tasks that they perform, while at the same time, others (holding identical jobs but 
more schooling) are perceived to be overeducated. They find employers tend to value and 
prize overeducation and at the same time they penalize undereducation. With prolonged 
tenure, overeducated workers are granted an ascending path of their relative earnings, 
while undereducated workers will see their relative position eroded. Furthermore, there 
is an indication that overeducation or undereducation in the Portuguese economy occurs 
due to the role of technological change rather than human capital. This is characterised 
by intensive efforts to promote economic growth, modernisation of the industrial structure 
and the upgrade of educational qualifications in the last decade.  
Carnevale and Rose (2013) also study undereducation in the US using the statistical 
framework developed by Autor et al. (2008) while the supply and demand are estimated 
based on Goldin and Katz’s (2008) data. They argue that undereducation increases in the 
US because of under-producing and high demand of workers with higher education 
qualifications. If qualified workers are in short supply relative to the employers’ demand 
for them, the rational response on the part of employer’s is to bid up wages for the workers 
they want. As a result, the large and growing gap between the wages of workers with 
different education attainment grows even wider.   
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4.2.3 Determinants of Mismatch  
Referring to the compilation of selected related studies (Appendix XI), the present study 
classifies the determinants of mismatch into some categories: (1) personal characteristics 
such as gender, ethnicity and age; (2) household characteristics such as number of young 
children in the household; (3) work related and firm size, including job status, tenure, 
sector, dummies of industry and dummies of firm size; and (4) residence, including 
urban/rural and capital/non-capital province. In addition, other macroeconomics variables 
can be considered in the model, such as GDP per capita as well as the share of 
manufacturing and regional unemployment. The analysis then focuses on the first four, 
since some macroeconomic variables are similar to those categories, for instance, the 
share of manufacturing which is represented by dummies of industry (including 
manufacturing) in the model.     
 
Personal Characteristics 
In terms of personal traits, variables which have received a large amount of attention in 
recent literature are sex, marital status, ethnicity, age, age squared and subject of study. 
Firstly, a clear picture on the direction and significance of the effect of sex has yet to 
emerge. So far, many studies find that male employees face a slightly higher 
overeducation risk (European Commission, 2012) than female employees. This is also 
confirmed by Yin (2016); males were more prone to be overeducated than females in 
China during 1989-2009 period, as China has the patrilineal system is key to traditional 
Chinese family and gender values (Hu and Scott, 2014), males is perceived to have more 
responsibility to support the family life than females, and thus more likely to accept jobs 
that require lower educational level than their own. In contrast, Clark et al. (2017) 
analyses overeducation in the US, using the NLSY79 data combined with the CPS from 
1982 to 1994 with the probit model and finds that females were about 5 to 13 per cent 
more likely to be overeducated than males. However, Chua and Chun (2016) find that 
females are more likely to be overeducated, while males are slightly more likely to be 
matched or undereducated. Other studies have also found that gender has insignificant 
effect on matches (Büchel and Pollmann-Schult, 2001; Battu and Sloane, 2002; Groot 
and Brink, 2003; Frenette, 2004; Green and McIntosh, 2007; Capsada-Munsech, 2015).  
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In terms of marital status, the theory of Differential Overqualification developed by Frank 
(1978) states that overeducation frequently occurs among females, particularly the 
married ones. The theory hypothesizes that married individuals, especially women, face 
a significantly higher probability of being overeducated, which is a consequence of 
matching problems. In traditional gender role model settings where the couple’s priority 
is the job match for the husband, the husband acts as a first-mover, i.e. he performs his 
job search first. After he has found a match, the wife will conduct her job search. 
However, due to the co-location restriction, she can do that merely within a much smaller 
market area. The likelihood of finding a job adequate to her qualification level is therefore 
much lower for her than for her husband, thus explaining a striking incidence of 
overeducation among married females (Boll et al., 2016). Having said that, McGoldrick 
and Robst (1996) reject the hypothesis of differential overqualification; instead, it appears 
for them that the larger number of vacancies in large labour markets are offset by a larger 
number of job searchers. Likewise, Battu and Sloane (2002) find that marital status have 
no significant effect on education mismatch.  
With respect to ethnicity, Battu and Sloane (2002) assert that there are no studies that 
explicitly focus on mismatch amongst ethnic minorities. However, the limited research 
on ethnic group and overeducation finds that overeducation incidence is greater for non-
whites (minorities). An argument specific to non-whites is simply that of discrimination. 
Theoretically, the same argument can be applied for females and different religion. Yet, 
empirically gender have no significant effect on the probability of being matched or 
otherwise (Battu and Sloane, 2002). If non-whites find it more difficult to acquire any 
jobs they may well be more likely to take a job that is not proportional to their 
qualifications, so that a higher number of non-whites will end up being over-educated. 
Battu and Sloane further focus on overeducation among ethnic minorities in Britain, using 
the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (FNSEM) in 1993/1994. The ethnic 
population is composed of six groupings (Caribbean, Indian, Pakistani, African-Asian, 
Bangladeshi, and Chinese), while education attainment covers non-educational, O-level, 
A-level and university degrees. The study uses a multinomial logit model to investigate 
the determinants of over and undereducation. The dependent variable is earnings, which 
refer to usual gross pay from the sample’s main job including overtime and bonuses 
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before any deductions37. The study finds that only African-Asians have a significantly 
greater likelihood of being mismatched, relative to the omitted category of Indians. Using 
interaction terms, the study concludes that African-Asians who are born in the UK and 
who have foreign qualifications are less likely to be overeducated. By way of contrast, 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi workers with foreign qualifications have a higher probability 
of being overeducated.  
Turning to age, the literature (such as Boll et al., 2016) asserts that age and overeducation 
have a negative relationship, suggesting that there is a risk-reducing effect of age. 
Similarly, Flisi et al. (2014) affirm that older age category implies lower probability of 
being severely mismatched rather than matched in all countries. Regarding 
overeducation, common results are found for older age groups, since in almost all 
countries age groups 55+ and 45-54 have lower probabilities of being overeducated than 
age group 35-44. But for younger age groups, there are some relevant differences by 
country: age group 25-34 is less likely to be overeducated than age group 35-44. The 
effect of the square of age is negative, implying that there are diminishing returns in age. 
The quadratic function of age variable could capture the fact that the marginal effect of 
education mismatch declines over time.  
Other variables commonly included in previous empirical studies are subject of study 
(Silles and Dolton (2002), McGuinness (2006), and Boll et al. (2016)). Boll et al. study 
the overeducation in 25 EU countries using the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) 
data; and emphasise that high-skilled workers from the fields of agriculture, veterinary 
and services are much more frequently overeducated than high-skilled workers from the 
fields of teaching, education and health, and welfare (Ordine and Rose, 2009).  
In addition to determinant variables, education mismatch may be influenced by the other 
skills dimension, such as lifelong learning, on-the-job training. Vocational lifelong 
learning is the responsibility of the Ministry of Manpower that conducted in both public 
and private employment training centres. In 2014, there were 1,555 private employment 
training centres in Indonesia–almost five times the number of public employment training 
centres (Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and Microsoft, 2016). In addition, for 
 
37 Earning is in bands. The study finds that earnings for non-whites overall are significantly lower, with 
Bangladeshis having the lowest earnings and African-Asians and the Chinese displaying parity with Whites. 
It is worth noting that at one point in history, an Indian master degree was considered in the UK equal to a 
UK undergraduate degree. 
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lifelong learning, the present study identifies at least two programmes that the government 
have launched: improving adult literacy and digital business training; according to the 
Ministry of Education and Culture (2013) around 3 million people participate in literacy 
programmes in Indonesia. A particular emphasis is placed on increasing women’s literacy 
levels, combining more generic life skills with literacy courses. For on-the-job training, 
the government encourages industry or companies to conduct competency-based job 
training for workers and prospective workers (TNP2K, 2015). Those variables are 
available in the IFLS data. There are some questions related to on-the-job training and 
life-long learning: have you ever received any training from your employer? What kind 
of training did you receive in the last 12 months? The answers are computer, language, 
technical training, teamwork, leadership, and others.  
 
Household Characteristics 
In terms of household characteristics, most of the relevant literature has focused on the 
presence of children as a determinant of overeducation. Boll et al., (2016) find that the 
coefficients of children are insignificant in general; children of any number and age 
composition do not affect overeducation risk for male workers. Yet, the interaction terms 
with gender are relevant for female workers. More specifically,  having an additional 
child below the age of six is predicted to reduce the overeducation probability 
significantly for high-skilled female workers. For medium-skilled workers, the risk-
reducing effect of small children is of lower magnitude and is only weakly significant. A 
reason could be because medium-skilled workers are, on average, expected to be less 
wealthy than the high-skilled ones, which could force them to accept barely adequate jobs 
when living with children.  
Meanwhile, Sloane et al. (1999) assert that the presence of young children in the 
household poses different effects across gender, as younger children reduce 
overeducation for males and raise overeducation for females. Hence, females with 
children are forced to make more compromises in the labour market. Empirically, raising 
the number of children between the ages of 0 and 2 from zero to one reduces the 
probability of being overeducated for males by 7.38 per cent and raises the probability of 
being overeducated for females by 17.32 per cent. Sloane et al use subjective measure 
based on a question in the Social Change and Economic Life Initiative (SCELI), which is 
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funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). The survey covered six 
British local labour markets between 1986 and 1987.  
Other household-related variables that could affect mismatch determinant are number of 
adults with unemployment status in the household, number of inactive people, and 
number of older people.  
In contrast, Dolton and Silles (2002) conduct a research based on the Newcastle Alumni 
Survey, collected at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne in 1998, and find that there 
was no measurable effect between children and marital status on overeducation in the UK 
labour market (in particular university graduates). A possible explanation is that the 
sample is not large enough to allow a meaningful interaction between family 
commitments and gender.  
 
Work Related and Firm Size  
In work related, another potential variable is working experience. Both the Human Capital 
Theory and the Job Competition Theory confirm that there is a negative relationship 
between work experience and overeducation risk. Moreover, the Career Mobility Theory 
asserts that the longer a worker stays in a firm, the higher is the likelihood of advancement 
into better positions with higher skill requirements and thus a lower overeducation risk. 
Meanwhile, Groot (1996) finds a positive relationship between experience and 
overeducation probability, since low-productive workers receive fewer job offers and 
therefore tend to remain stuck in bad matches which under-utilize their skills. The effect 
of tenure is similar to experience, both of them significantly reduce the risk of 
overeducation (Büchel and Pollmann-Schult, 2004). This is because individuals 
accumulate human capital by working. Furthermore, human capital can be dichotomised 
into general and firm-specific human capitals. Moreover, the quadratic function of 
experience and tenure (squared) variable could capture the fact that on-the-job training 
investments decline over time in a standard lifecycle human capital model, as explained 
in Chapter 3.2.2.  
In terms of job status, some studies use full-time and part-time (less than 30 hours a week) 
as job status variable (Lindley and Machin, 2016) which is commonly determined by the 
number of working hours a week. Other studies prefer to use the alternative proxy i.e. 
working hours per week or per year (Clark et al., 2012, and Boll et al., 2016). In particular, 
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Boll et al. (2016) find that working hours have a negative and significant coefficient, 
which implies that workers with more working hours are less likely to become 
overeducated, especially in high-skilled jobs. This is because jobs with longer working 
time can create better opportunities for training participation and advancement, thereby 
improving the match quality over time. Similarly, Frank (1978) and Ofek and Merrill 
(1997) add that part-time work leads to a higher probability of being overeducated. Sloane 
et al. (1999) also assert that being a part-time worker reduces the probability of being 
undereducated and increases the probability of being overeducated. They argue that a 
part-time work for the overeducated may simply facilitate job search, thereby 
representing a short-lived mismatch as part of a longer-run career development path. 
Meanwhile, the European Commission (2012) does not detect any significant associations 
between education mismatch and working hours or job status. Morano (2014) also finds 
that part-time and temporary employments both lead to higher overeducation. 
Turning to sectors, Dolton and Vignoles (2000) study overeducation in the UK using the 
1980 National Survey of Graduates and Diplomats. They put forward that education 
mismatch, particularly overeducation, is found in broadly equal proportions in both the 
public and private sectors. However, a higher proportion of those working in government 
administration were specifically overeducated in 1986. Similarly, Ortiz (2010) studies 
overeducation in France, Italy, and Spain, using The European Community Household 
Panel from 1999 to 2001. The method used to calculate overeducation is RM. The 
Multinomial Logit (MNL) is also applied to estimate the determinants. The study finds 
that working in the public sector increases the likelihood of being overeducated, relative 
to working in the private sector. The main reason is working in the public sector is 
generally considered more secure. In contrast, Yin (2016) finds that workers in the private 
and collective sectors in China are more likely to be overeducated than individuals in the 
government sector. This is likely due to the government sector having higher wages, 
stable working environment and attractive welfare, which makes it easier to hire matched 
workers. Another possible reason is because individuals may find jobs in the private 
sector only temporarily to gain experience in order to find better matched and stable jobs 
in the government sector later. 
Regarding occupation, Dolton and Silles (2002) study the determinants of graduate 
overeducation in the UK using data from the Newcastle Alumni Survey. They employ 
cohort effect to analyse the effect of initial overeducation on the probability of being 
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overeducated in the future. Most importantly, the study includes occupation (manager, 
professional and associate professor, with the base group being other occupations). The 
study finds that graduates in professional, associate professional and managerial 
occupations have a greater propensity to be in graduate level jobs than those in the base 
group. In similar vein, Morano (2014) analyses the determinants of overeducation in Italy 
using the Continuous Labour Force Survey (Rilevazione Continua delle Forze di Lavoro). 
The study uses some occupation categories in the model: director, manager, blue-collar 
worker and trainer, with the base group being clerical jobs. The study finds that these 
occupations have negative and significant coefficients; with the exception of blue-collar 
workers who have a positive and significant coefficient. Negative and significant 
coefficients indicate that the probability of being overeducated is lower for these 
categories than for the base group (clerical jobs).  
Another possible variable to influence education mismatch is industry, as Allen (2016) 
asserts that occupation mismatch in Indonesia tends to be associated with the low 
education levels of production workers and agricultural laborers. On the other hand, a 
large number of clerks are over-qualified for their jobs. Undereducation is also a 
challenge in higher-level occupations. The high levels of under-qualification and lower 
levels of over-qualification point towards an issue of skill shortages. Meanwhile, Morano 
(2014) finds that workers in the service sector are less likely to be overeducated than those 
in the agricultural or industry sectors. These results can be interpreted by the different 
nature of employment in the three economic sectors and the relatively less skilled nature 
of the jobs in the agriculture or industry sectors with respect to service work.  
Furthermore, firm sizes could also determine education mismatch, as indicated in 
previous empirical studies. For instance, Dolton and Vignoles (2000) find that 
overeducation was the highest amongst those who work for small firms (of less than 20 
people), although generally the incidence of overeducation does not decrease linearly 
with firm size. Interestingly, more than 70 per cent of the graduates who are overeducated 
and work in small firms claim to require no qualifications for their job. It may be that the 
lack of benchmark jobs and formal qualifications causes a higher incidence of 
overeducation to be recorded amongst graduates who work in small firms. Morano (2014) 
also finds that overeducation decreases as firm size increases, which is consistent with 
the idea that bigger firms have more accurate recruitment techniques which reduce the 
risk of hiring a worker who does not match the educational requirements associated to the 
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vacancy (Dolton and Silles, 2001). Moreover, there is a wider range of positions that 
enables the management to internally relocate workers in case of mismatch in big firms. 
Yin (2016) also adds that workers in large firms with between 20 and 100 employees and 
in firms with fewer than 20 employees are less likely to be overeducated than workers in 
firms with more than 100 employees. This could be due to employees in large firms 
having more opportunities to be promoted, having better career prospects and receiving 
more fringe benefits compared to those who work in a small company. Thus, 
overqualified workers may voluntarily choose to stay in large firms due to the 
consideration of the above benefits. This finding is in contrast to Morano (2014), implying 
that firm size definition, country and time period may lead to different conclusions.  
Another alternative variable is job contract length. Boll et al. (2016) consider the 
incidence of overeducation is strongly related both to job type (includes contract length) 
and firm characteristics in 25 European Countries. The study argues that people with 
fixed-term contracts are more likely to work in positions for which they are overeducated 
than people with permanent contracts. This is due to the transitory nature of fixed-term 
jobs; workers are less concerned about qualification levels, as they tend to view these 
matches as mere temporary solutions on their way to more favourable permanent 
positions. Similarly, Green and McIntosh (2007) and Ortiz (2010) also identify evidence 
for a significantly lower overeducation risk among workers in permanent positions.  
In addition to determinant variables, Chua and Chun (2016) emphasise that labour 
markets in developing countries are unique for their large shares of informal sector 
employment. This sector is comprised largely by either microenterprises or menial wage 
work, where high level skill or training is not required. The study also adds that the formal 
sector has better matches than the informal sector, even the informal salaried and self-
employed sectors. In fact, overeducation is particularly severe among self-employed 
workers, which plausibly explained by the preponderance of small businesses with low 
skill requirements.  
 
Area 
In terms of residence or area category, urban/rural is used in some studies, such as Clark 
et al. (2013) study the relationship between education mismatch and urban area based 
on the NLSY 1979 combined with the pooled 1989-1991 waves of the CPS. They found 
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that workers in urban areas in general have a higher risk of being overeducated than 
workers in rural areas, which is surprising. One would expect cities and areas with low 
unemployment rates to have a labour market with relatively lower levels of search 
frictions, making it easier for individuals to sort into an occupation with a required level 
of education that matches theirs. However, they empirically find insignificant coefficient 
of urban areas in the US.  
Likewise, Clark et al.  also use regional or unemployment rate variable as a mismatch 
determinant. The study finds that individuals who live in urban areas are more likely to 
be overeducated, while individuals living in regions with low unemployment rates are 
less likely to be overeducated. A possible argument is that cities and areas with low 
unemployment rates have a labour market with relatively lower levels of search frictions. 
As such, it becomes easier for individuals to sort into an occupation with a required level 
of education that matches their educational qualifications.  
In the developing countries, the trend could be different. Yin (2016) argue that urban 
workers in China have a higher average educational level and better quality of education 
than total workers. Yet, job vacancies in urban labour market are more abundant than in 
rural areas, competition is sharper in urban areas than in rural areas. Under the fierce 
competition in the urban labour market, urban workers may work in a job that is lower 
than education level in order to make a living and thus they have higher probability of 
being overeducated than rural workers. This is consistent with Allen (2016) that most new 
jobs are generated in urban areas in Indonesia.  
Quang and Tran-Nam (2019) study mismatch and earning in Vietnam using Duncan and 
Hoffman (1981) model and the Labour Force Survey as the data. They argue 
disaggregation by regions of settlement does not show significant difference in the 
distribution of mismatch. However, the situation in rural areas seems to be better, 
evidenced by higher well-matched rate and lower under-education rate. One of possible 
reasons is people move from rural to urban areas to find employment, which, thus, raises 
the incidence of under-education in the city. 
In addition, the Harris Todaro model (1970) can explain rural-urban effect on internal 
migration. Although the model does not directly explain the effect on education 
mismatch, it gives an explanation that rural-to-urban migration still exists despite high 
levels of urban unemployment. The model argues that the labour market in developing 
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countries is not clear. In short, the model is as follows: the urban minimum wage is set to 
be higher than the wage rate paid to rural labour which is valued at its marginal product. 
This results in a wage differential between the two sectors. Rural workers have an 
incentive to migrate to the urban areas despite of urban unemployment, because of the 
potential of higher earnings in the urban sector. Such migration will continue as long as 
there is a possibility for migrants to increase their income by moving to a city. Some 
migrants will have arranged employment before leaving the countryside. Others will 
begin searching for employment only once they have arrived at their destination. Some 
will necessarily join the pool of urban unemployed. However, even in that case, the 
presence of the migrant in the city may increase his chance of finding urban employment 
there at a later date. This explains why there is a continuous flow of migrants observed in 
developing countries despite of the high urban unemployment rates (Bahns, 2005).   
 
 
4.2.4 Aggregate Trends and Comparison of the Prevalence of Education Mismatch  
Empirical studies find various results on the change of education mismatch depending on 
the methods and data used. Whereas some studies find that the trend increases (Nazara 
and Safuan (2005), Mehta et al. (2011), McGuinness et al. (2017)); some others find it 
decreasing (Yin, 2016); and even remaining stable (McGuinness, 2006). In particular, 
Nazara and Safuan (2005) find that the trend of undereducation in Indonesia decreases.  
McGuinness (2006) tries to plot in the graphs based on subjective and objective measures 
to determine whether the overeducation phenomenon may be becoming more important 
over time. Based on subjective measures, there are no indications that the incidence of 
overeducation has been rising over time; in fact, fitting a linear time trend to the 
observations is suggestive of a slight decrease instead. Nevertheless, given the 
problematic nature of the data, it would not be wise to attach too heavy a weight to the 
very slight negative slope of the best-fit line. Slightly differently, objective measures have 
a positive, sloped trend line. Thus, the study argues that it is probably reasonable to 
conclude, on the basis of the graphical and tabular evidence, that the incidence of 
overeducation has remained relatively stable during 1971 – 2000 periods.   
Furthermore, McGuinness et al. (2017) analyse the patterns in overeducation between 
countries using a specifically designed panel dataset constructed from the quarterly 
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Labour Force Surveys of 28 EU countries over a twelve to fifteen-year period. 
Mcguinness et al. use the Barro regressions38 (Barro, 1997) to analyse the relationship 
between the initial level and the growth rate of overeducation. The study concludes that 
overeducation is consistently rising across all European countries; in fact, there is a 
positive trend in fewer than half the countries in the sample which shows overeducation 
remaining either constant or falling in most cases. Moreover, overeducation is higher 
among females in the vast majority of these countries. In the more aggregated level, the 
average trend in overeducation across all 28 countries appears to be relatively stable over 
the period of 2003 - 2013; though substantial differences do exist depending on the 
geographical country block. Overeducation rates tend to be the highest and most volatile 
over time in peripheral European countries, while overeducation in central European 
countries tends to be lower and appears to follow a somewhat cyclical pattern. 
Overeducation is consistently the lowest and stable over time in eastern European 
countries. There is also an on-going convergence in overeducation, where countries with 
the lowest initial values of overeducation tend to experience the highest growth rates over 
time. Finally, in terms of the factors driving cross-country differentials, factors relating 
to both the composition and level of labour demand, labour supply and the structure of 
educational provision all appear important. 
In Asian and other developing countries, Mehta et al. (2011) study overeducation in 
unskilled jobs in several developing countries (India, Mexico, The Philippines and 
Thailand) between 1990s and 2000s. Overeducation is determined by RM method and by 
comparing the mean and the mode. The study find that overeducation increased slightly 
in the 1990s while undereducation decreased slightly under the mean criterion. The 
opposite result is found under the mode criterion, where overeducation declined sharply 
and undereducation rose substantially. Nonetheless, the result shows that a job’s mean 
and modal years of schooling are poor proxies for required education. Moreover, it also 
indicates that only 25 per cent of the overeducated workers under the unskilled jobs test 
are classified as overeducated by the mean method. In other words, 75 per cent of workers 
who they identify as earning low returns relative to their education are not classified as 
overeducated by the mean method, because their education backgrounds are not atypical. 
 
38 The Barro model is used to examine the relationship between the growth rate of overeducation and the 
initial level of overeducation using as regression model, as formulated by: 
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Meanwhile, Yin (2016) adds that the marginal effects of overeducation in China for seven 
waves are negative, possibly indicating that the years after 1989 are less likely to 
experience overeducation compared to the year 1989. This decrease could be because the 
average educational level of the labour force is increasing, and the increasing degree of 
economic openness and the accelerated growth of the private sector may provide more 
opportunities from which the workers can choose. 
Handle (2017) analyses education and skills mismatch in developing countries, using The 
World Bank's Skills Measurement Program. 12 countries which were observed are: 
Ghana, Kenya, China – Yunnan, Lao, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Bolivia, Colombia, Armenia, 
Georgia, Macedonia, and Ukraine. The data were collected between March 2012 and 
August 2017. The sample was random but was in working age of between 15 – 64 years 
old. Handle then highlights several issues in developing countries which affected the 
mismatch: a very high rate of informality, self-employment, and micro-firms (around 55-
80 per cent of the total firms). Very low employment rates among the working age 
population (around 33 – 55 per cent of the total population) creates other issues such as 
selection issues and unemployment or inactivity. In turn, these issues reflect a very weak 
job market and low job generation as well as gender dynamic. Handle also argues that the 
mismatch likely occurs due to some drivers, such as: (1) labour market friction (imperfect 
information); (2) transitory business cycle, for example increasing unemployment and job 
seekers choosing any jobs available without considering their education level and 
background; (3) life cycle stage, particularly the youth; (4) work/family preferences, for 
instance women with young children; and (5) social exclusion, such as minority 
ethnicities or immigrants. Besides, education mismatch prevalence could also reflect 
problems with education (such as quality) and with the job market (such as low 
employment rate and low investment) in the country. This finding is consistent with the 
Harris-Todaro model, as explained in Section 4.2.3.      
In Indonesia, Nazara and Safuan (2005) study the overeducation in the formal sector in 
the Indonesian labour market, using Sakernas data from 1996, 1999 and 2002. 
Overeducation and undereducation are defined as the deviation from the mean of years 
of schooling. Furthermore, occupation is divided into 9 groups: professional, 
management, administrative, sales, labour service establishment, agriculture, production 
workers and labour, transportation operator, and moving equipment and unskilled 
workers. The study reveals that there is an indication that overeducation exists in 
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Indonesia. Moreover, the study estimates that undereducated, matched and overeducated 
workers in 1999 were 16.8 per cent, 56.5 per cent, and 26.7 per cent from the sample, 
respectively. The share of undereducation then decreased to 9.13 per cent in 2002; in 
contrast, the share of overeducation increased to 34.7 per cent. The study argues that 
overeducated workers exist probably due to limited choices resulting in a very 
competitive labour market for highly educated people whilst the job-search cost is 
relatively high. Alternatively, another possible explanation is that this result only reflects 
the distribution of ability. Wajdi et al. (2017) also study the urbanisation in Indonesia. 
Even though it is not directly related to overeducation, their findings may support the 
argument that migration to DKI Jakarta (the capital city) and other metropolitan areas is 
most likely undertaken for better education or job prospects, since most jobs for highly 
educated people are more available in the metropolitan areas.  
Similarly, Allen (2016) measures the mismatch using the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO) and the International Standard Classification of 
Education (ISCED). This measure of mismatch divides major occupational groups (1-
digit ISCO levels) into four sub-groups and assigns a level of education to each 
occupational group in accordance with the ISCED. Workers in a particular group who 
have the assigned level of education are considered well-matched. Those who have a 
higher (lower) level of education are considered overeducated (undereducated). The study 
finds that 51.5 per cent of workers are undereducated, 40.0 per cent are matched and 8.5 
per cent are over-educated for their occupations, as shown in Figure 4.1.  
In particular, occupation mismatch (overeducation) in Indonesia tends to be associated 
with the low education levels of production workers and agriculture labourers, as well as 
a large number of clerks who are overeducated for their jobs. Meanwhile, undereducated 
is also an issue in higher level occupations, such as legislators, senior officials, and 
managers (Figure 4.1). Furthermore, the large proportion of undereducated workers could 
be a reason for the slow labour productivity growth and slow transition to high value 
activities throughout the economy, as well as for the prevalent skill and/or education 
shortages to occur in Indonesia.  
Moreover, education becomes the most important factor for career progression; 
production workers with post-secondary education are likely to have upward career 
mobility into more technical or managerial occupations over a 12-month period. 
Meanwhile, once workers with tertiary education move into professional and technical 
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occupations, they are likely to still be working in such occupations 12 months later. Thus, 
workers with university qualifications tend to have a higher incidence of long-term 
overeducation, which could be explained by jobs rationed by queuing39. Allen (2016) also 
further asserts that limited education attainment may tend to act as a barrier to career 
progression, for instance, workers with junior high school or lower qualifications are 
likely to shift between working as production workers and as agriculture labours 
throughout the year. However, these workers find it more difficult to climb the career 
ladder.   
 
Figure 4.1: Education Mismatch in Indonesia, August 2015 
Source: Allen (2016). 
Note: Blue is undereducated, orange is matched, and grey is overeducated workers.  
 
 
39 Jobs rationed refer to a system of shared beliefs about who should have access to the job market. Given 
the limited supply of jobs, a system of norms has developed about how work should be distributed. Thus, 
certain individuals are encouraged to consider themselves unsuitable candidates for employment under 
existing conditions of job scarcity (Furstenberg, 1975).  
184 
 
ILO (2017) also calculates the undereducation and overeducation levels in Indonesia by 
using RM method (comparing the mean of occupation group and its standard deviation). 
The data used are SAKERNAS from 2006, 2009 and 2016. ILO finds that there was an 
increasing trend of undereducation from around 10 per cent in 2000 to around 17 per cent 
in 2016. Meanwhile, overeducation trend decreased from around 27 per cent in 2006 to 
19 per cent in 2009; though it then became relatively stagnant at around 19.2 per cent in 
2016. ILO also reveals some interesting trends during these periods: male workers tend 
to have lower education level than female workers; higher undereducation rate occurs in 
urban areas; older generation experiences being undereducated which could also  indicate 
improvement of education achievement; and around 25 per cent of people aged 15-34 
years old tend to experience overeducation.   
 
4.3 Method and Data 
4.3.1 Method 
Marginal effects (ME) 
Besides the MNL estimation, the present study also provides a marginal effect calculation 
for each dependent variable. It is worth noting that those coefficients of the MNL are 
different from the marginal effect. Multinomial logit coefficients can only be interpreted 
in terms of relative probabilities (this will be discussed in the next part) whereas the 
marginal effect calculation is needed to reach conclusions about the actual probabilities. 
Furthermore, marginal effects can be an informative means for summarising how changes 
in a response are related to changes in a covariate. As Cameron and Trivedi (2010) point 
out, a marginal effect, or partial effect, most often measures the effect on the conditional 
mean of y of a change in one of the regressors, for example; xj. In addition, the marginal 
effect calculation is based on the first order derivatives; for interaction (age squared and 
tenure squared) between two variables, the second order derivative is then required.  
 
The multinomial logit (MNL) model 
Most studies on overeducation use binomial logistic regression (logit) model to analyse 
the determinants of overeducation. Some other studies use multinomial logit model to 
extend their analysis and to investigate the determinants of both overeducation and 
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undereducation. MNL is a simple extension of the binomial logistic regression model, 
allowing for more than two categories of the dependent or outcome variables. It is used 
to predict categorical placement in or the probability of category membership on a 
dependent variable based on multiple independent variables. The independent variables 
can either be dichotomous (binary) or continuous (interval or ratio in scale). MNL uses 
maximum likelihood estimation to evaluate the probability of categorical membership, 
similar to binary logistic regression. MNL is also often considered an attractive analysis 
because it does not assume normality, linearity, or homoscedasticity (Starkweather and 
Moske, 2011). MNL specification is tractable and simple to estimate. And the most 
important thing is the independent errors of MNL force an assumption called the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. As Dow and Endersby (2004) 
asserted the idea of IIA is that if a chooser is comparing two alternatives according to a 
preference relationship, the ordinal ranking of these alternatives should not be affected 
by the addition or subtraction of other alternatives from the choice set. Thus, the IIA 
property is a minimal condition for logical consistency. The probabilistic analogue 
imposed by MNL, strengthens this by requiring that the odds ratio of choosing any two 
alternatives be independent of the addition or subtraction of other alternatives from the 
choice set. Specifically, the ratio of choice probabilities for any two alternatives does not 
depend on the characteristics of any of the other alternatives. This is consistent with the 
context of education mismatch; a worker can be either matched or mismatched 
(undereducated/overeducated) without any influence from the other alternatives. It is 
worth noting that the IIA is a logical property of decision-making, not a statistical 
property such as consistency and unbiasedness. 
Moreover, most of the studies which analyse education mismatch adopt MNL, for 
instance Chevalier (2007), Battu and Sloane (2002), Kiker et al. (1997), Flisi et al. (2014) 
and Diem (2015). Thus, the multinomial logit (MNL) model in the present analysis is as 
follows:  !!,# = #$,# +Σ#%,&,#P!,&,# + Σ#',&,#HH!,&,# + Σ#(,&,#F!,&,# + Σ#),&,#A!,&,# + *!,#     (4.1), 
where:  !!,# is Match category (the dependent variable), consisting of 1 to 3, where: 1 is 
overeducated, 2 is matched and 3 is undereducated. + represents set or vector of 
explanatory variables; ,!,&,# is personal characteristics (1…/ number of personal 
characteristic variables); 00!,&,# is household characteristics (1…	/ variables); 2!,&,# is 
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work-related and firm size variable (1…	/ no of variables); 3!,&,# is residence or area 
dummy variables (1…n number of residence dummies). i is individual (1…I); and t is at 
time t (2000 or 2014). It is also worth noting that the coefficients in equation 4.1 are not 
the same in terms of notation as in 4.2. The model is a probabilistic model, so the 
coefficients in 4.1 are interpreted as relative probabilities.   
The baseline category of this analysis is the matched category; thus, the interpretation of 
the variables would be the likelihood of being in either one of the remaining two mismatch 
categories (overeducated and undereducated), compared to being matched. The variables 
are considered to be statistically significant at 1 per cent, 5 per cent or 10 per cent 
significance level.  
 
The multinomial probit (MNP) model 
Another alternative method is the multinomial probit (MNP) models, as used by 
Berlingieri and Zierahn (2014). The main different between MNL and MNP is 
assumptions about the probability functions. Technically, MNL and MNP are very 
similar; they differ only in the distribution of the error terms and each model has its own 
advantages and disadvantages. The advantages of MNL are that the specification is 
tractable, simple and faster in estimating the models. However, MNL imposes the 
restrictive assumption that choices are independent across alternatives.  
These disadvantages of the MNL’s can be solved by using MNP. The primary advantage 
of MNP relative to MNL centres on the IIA property. MNP has errors which are not 
necessarily independent, and these errors are distributed by a multivariate normal 
distribution. MNP does not assume IIA. On the other hand, MNP imparts a number of 
potentially serious problems. These are sufficiently difficult to detect that, in the absence 
of investing exceptional effort in model diagnostics, researchers are justified in using the 
MNL specification. The most important problem is that even formally identified MNP 
specifications are often weakly identified in application. This is serious because weak 
identification is difficult to diagnose and may lead to plausible, yet arbitrary or misleading 
inferences. The MNP presents a difficult maximum likelihood optimization problem that 
sometimes fails to converge at a global optimum or produces parameter estimates that are 
sufficiently imprecise as to make statistical inferences suspect. Except for cases of 
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profound misspecification, the logit likelihood will optimize at its global maximum and 
is not prone to optimization errors (Dow and Endersby, 2004).  
Considering those advantages and disadvantages, the present study prefers the MNL as 
the main model of the present study since MNL is appropriate in this context, IIA property 
can be fulfilled. Some studies even find that logit estimation (MNL) performs as well or 
even better than MNP, such as Dow and Endersby (2004). Yet, this study will also 
perform MNP as a sensitivity analysis and the results of both models will be compared.   
 
 
4.3.2 Measures 
Mismatch Determination 
The present study analyses the education mismatch in Indonesia in 2000 and 2014 using 
the multinomial (MNL) model. The model is adopted from Battu and Sloane (2002) to 
estimate two sets of coefficients: β1 which represents the overeducation coefficient and 
β3 which represents the undereducation coefficient. The probability pnm of individual n 
being overeducated (m=1) or undereducated (m=3) is conditional on a vector of 
characteristics Ki (vector of explanatory variable of mismatch determinants). And the 
probability of individual n being in the over or undereducated group m (relative to the 
probability of being in the default group 2 (matched) is given by: *!"*!# = exp	[8!+(#, − #')] for m = 1,3       (4.2) 
with normalisation of β2 to equal 0. To permit identification of the model, the probabilities 
are: =!' = %[%.∑ 012	[4!$5"]]"%&,(  for m=2        (4.3) =!, = 012	[4!$5"][%.∑ 012	[4!$5"]]"%&,(  for m=1,3       (4.4). 
Educational match (!) is defined based on the difference between the workers’ highest 
educational attainment and the mean of education attainment in the same occupation (as 
the proxy of job requirement). Thus, the mismatch formula is as follows:  ! = #$%&'()*+	'((')+-.+( − (-*$.	*1	.$%&'()*+	2)(ℎ)+	*&&%4'()*+	 ± 	)(6	6('+$'7$	$.8)'()*+) (4.5).  
The formula is adapted from Hartog (1997). M has three categories: 1 is overeducated, 2 
is matched, and 3 is undereducated. Individuals are defined as being correctly matched 
(category 2) to their occupation if their own years of education or education levels are 
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within plus or minus one standard deviation40 of the mode for their occupation. 
Alternatively, the mode can be replaced by the mean to calculate match (this will be 
further elaborated in the sensitivity part41).  
Furthermore, an alternative measure of overeducation is provided as defined by Chevalier 
(2000), who separates overeducation into genuine and apparent overeducation: graduates 
in a sub-graduate occupation who are satisfied are defined as apparently overeducated, 
whereas those who are dissatisfied are called genuinely overeducated. As such, job 
satisfaction data are needed to define the overeducation. However, only the latest wave 
of the survey (IFLS5 2014) that asks a question related to job satisfaction42 in the data. 
Most respondents also assert that they are relatively satisfied with their job, making the 
respondents of those genuinely undereducated and overeducated relatively small, with 
only 304 and 345 respondents (out of 8489 respondents/total sample), respectively, or 
less than 5 per cent of the total sample in 2014. Thus, the present study only focuses on 
the combined general measure rather than distinguishing between the genuine and 
apparent overeducation. 
The present study also does not consider skill mismatch, due to the unavailability of skill 
data. IFLS have a question on the highest education achieved, but the surveys do not have 
questions related to the type of education. Subsequently, horizontal mismatches cannot 
be explored in the present study. In addition, IFLS questionnaire has several questions 
related to job characteristics, such as physical conditions, skill in dealing with people, and 
computer capabilities, but there are no questions that are commonly used to measure skill 
mismatch or any direct comparisons between skill endowments and skill use43.  
 
40 Standard deviation also has some criticisms, especially because of the arbitrary nature of the choice of 
cut-off points; also, if a particular occupation contains a large proportion of overeducated workers, this will 
raise the occupational average and the corresponding cut-off point thus underestimating the true level of 
the overeducation. The assumption of symmetry that the standard deviation method implies also seems 
unrealistic (Hartog, 1997). 
41 Mean refers to average value or sum of all of the given data; then, divided by the number of data entry 
or observation. While, mode refers to the number that occurs most often in the category. 
42 IFLS5 of 2014 has job satisfaction data (tk16c1): “How satisfied are you with your current job?” The 
alternatives for the answer are “very satisfied”, “satisfied”, “unsatisfied” and “very unsatisfied”. Thus, 
“very satisfied” and “satisfied” answers can be categorised as apparently over-educated, and “unsatisfied” 
as well as “very unsatisfied” are grouped into genuinely mismatched. According to the results, it seems that 
most of the sample is satisfied with the job, with more than 80 per cent of the sample is apparently 
mismatched, for both undereducation and overeducation. 
43 Jones and Sloane (2010) study the disability and skill mismatch in the UK, using the 2004 British 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS). To measure skill mismatch, they asked questions like 
“How well do the work skills you personally have match the skills you need to do your present job?” 
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Mismatch Determinants (Explanatory Variables) 
Explanatory variables here are determined by the explanatory variables mostly used in 
previous empirical studies (Appendix XI, Table XI.1 and Table XI.2), or the other 
variables relevant to the Indonesia context. Explanatory variables in this study are then 
classified into four categories: personal characteristics, household characteristics, work 
related and firm size, and area/residence variables.  
Firstly, the personal characteristic variables consist of:  
(1) sex (1=female),the hypotheses is: male faces a slightly higher educational mismatch 
risk than female, as asserted by European Commission (2012); 
(2) marital status (single, married and cohabitate) with the hypothesis is married 
workers face a slightly higher probability of being overeducated (educational 
mismatch);  
(3) ethnicity (1=Javanese) as majorities, the hypothesis is mismatch incidence has a 
greater probability for minorities; and 
(4) age and the square of age, the hypothesis here is that age and overeducation have a 
negative relationship (Boll et al., 2016). In additions, the present study prefers to 
choose age and square of age, rather than experience and square of experience to 
avoid multicollinearity problem44.  
Another potential variable is the subject of study, as explained in the overeducation 
determinant part, but the data are not available in all waves of the IFLS.  
With regards to household characteristics, the present study chooses to use the presence 
of young children (0-5 years old) in the household as a variable. The hypothesis is the 
number of children (young children aged between 0 – 5 year old) has a significant effect 
on the risk of overeducation for female workers in particular. 
Turning to work related and firm size, this category consists of45:  
 
44 Multicollinearity refers to a situation in which two or more explanatory variables in a multiple regression 
model are highly linearly related. The present study follows Dong’s (2016) to calculate potential 
experience, as explained in Chapter 3, which depends on age and year of schooling. On the other hand, a 
match is also defined by year of schooling and its average. Choosing age (rather than potential experience) 
could then minimise multicollinearity problem. 
45 Another alternative variable is contract, as Boll et al. (2016), Green and McIntosh (2007) and Ortiz 
(2010), and around 30 per cent of the studies in Appendix XI consider job status. In the present study, there 
is question TK25A5 from IFLS5 (2014) which asks, “Do you work with a contract?” with the alternative 
answers being “Yes, with no fixed contract”, “Yes, with fixed contract”, “No” and “Do not know”. 
However, the data from IFLS3 (2000) do not have a similar question. Thus, the present study chooses not 
to use contract as a variable, considering the comparability model between 2000 and 2014. Furthermore, 
the present study does not employ any occupation categories because the matched variable is calculated by 
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(1) tenure and tenure squared (as well as experience and experience squared), the 
hypothesis is: longer tenure reduces the risk of overeducation; 
(2) working status: part time and full-time workers46, the hypotheses are: being a part-
time worker reduces the probability of being undereducated and increases the 
probability of being overeducated (Sloane et al., 1999);   
(3) sector (private/public), the hypothesis is working in the public sector could increase 
the likelihood of being overeducated (Ortiz, 2007);  
(4) industries, educational mismatch tends to be associated with the low education level 
of production and agricultural workers (Allen, 2016); 
(5) firm size47, the hypothesis is workers in small firm face a higher probability being 
educational mismatch (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000).  
The last category is region or area, which consists of urban or rural areas and provinces. 
Indonesia has 34 provinces which have diverse characteristics, with a wide range from 
medium to very high human capital development. To simplify the analysis, the present 
study defines two dummy variables for province: capital province (DKI Jakarta) and non-
capital province (the other provinces). The capital province is considered since most 
companies’ headquarters and central government offices are located here. Moreover, 
most new jobs are generated in urban areas in Indonesia (Allen, 2016). This is also based 
on the Harris Todaro model that rural workers have an incentive to migrate to the urban 
areas despite of urban unemployment, because of the potential of higher earnings in the 
urban area. Then, the hypothesis is: workers in urban or the capital province (which has 
a high unemployment rate) have a higher risk of being overeducated, while individuals 
living in regions with low unemployment rates are less likely to be overeducated (as per 
Clark et al. (2012) finding).  
 
 
 
the difference between education qualifications that is achieved and the average education of each 
occupation category. This is to avoid multicollinearity problem. In fact, most of the literatures in Appendix 
XI use occupation as part of cohort analysis (Dolton and Silles, 2002; and Morano, 2014). 
46 full-time workers are defined as those working equal to or more than 30 hours per week, following ILO’s 
definition. 
47 Consists of: firm with 1-19 workers (small firms), 20-99 workers (medium firms), and more than 100 
workers (large firms).  
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4.3.3 Data 
IFLS3 (2000) and IFLS5 (2014) are selected for the present study; these surveys were 
fielded in 2000 and in late 2014 - early 2015, respectively. The consideration in choosing 
these years is similar to Chapter 3; the year 2000 represents the circumstances before the 
Education System Law (No. 20 of 2003) was enforced and 2014-2015 represents the 
situations after the law had been effective; or in other words, the situations before and 
after the education expansion occurred in Indonesia. 
 
Education Variable 
According to previous empirical studies (Appendix XI), there are two alternatives to 
determine a match, i.e. years of education and education level. Both of these are similar, 
except that years of education divide university level into diploma, undergraduate, master 
and PhD; thus, having more detailed education segregation compared to education level. 
The present study prefers years of education (the upper band or highest years of each 
category) in line with the questions in the IFLS surveys; the highest education attained. 
Years of education are a continuous variable and is divided into 7 categories:  
1. 0-6 years of primary education or less, represented by 6 years in the data; 
2. 7-9 years for junior high school, represented by 9 years; 
3. 10-12 years for senior high school, represented by 12 years; 
4. 13-15 years for diploma degree, represented by 15 years; 
5. 13-16 years for undergraduate degree, represented by 16 years; 
6. 17-18 years for master’s degree, represented by 18 years; and 
7. 19-22 years for doctoral degree, represented by 22 years.  
 
Occupation Classification  
Turning to occupation classification, the IFLS has 11 categories and 86 sub-categories, 
with these sub-categories further defined by appropriate and adjacent occupations. The 
11 categories (1-digit code) are similar to the ISCO-08 major occupation group from ILO, 
which are commonly used by previous studies such as: Allen (2016), Chua and Chun 
(2016), Lee et al. (2016) and Flisi et al. (2017).  
Each category has a varied number of sub-categories, for example: the first category is 
the professional or category 0 which has 9 sub-categories, consisting of physical 
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scientists, architects, surveyors, aircraft officers, medical practitioners, statisticians, and 
economists. The third category only has 6 sub-categories: legislative officials; managers; 
administrators of the government, non-government and unknown; and school principals 
and other managers. Meanwhile, the last category only consists of the military and police 
personnel. The complete sample distribution based on categories is indicated in Table 4.3 
while the more detailed list of sub-categories (86 sub-categories) is shown in Appendix 
XII.  
Using the very detailed 86 sub-categories gives a very small observation. For instance, 
physical scientists and related technicians only allows 2 observations48. On the other 
hand, using 11 categories would have a very wide range of means of education, 
subsequently mean and mode would have a significant difference and the result could not 
be robust. For instance, in professionals or category 0, the education mean of aircraft and 
ship's officers is 15.67 years; whereas the education mean of physical scientists and 
related technicians is substantially lower (11 years), see Appendix XII for more detailed 
data.  
As such, the present study arranges the occupation category by collapsing some sub-
categories (with low observation) which could reduce low number of observations, but at 
the cost of increasing heterogeneity within an occupation. Also, keeping some categories 
which have large number of observations will retain the homogeneity within those groups. 
As Foxton (2016) asserts, using an appropriate digit level of occupation category can 
provide a good balance between strong sample size and reducing the level of 
heterogeneity in roles within occupational grouping. Similarly, Nordin et al. (2010) point 
out that detailed education and occupation classifications make it possible for researchers 
to objectively decide whether there is a match or mismatch.   
Principally, the present study keeps the sub-categories which have relatively large sample 
and merges the remaining (particularly sub-categories with sample size less than 30), for 
 
48 Regarding the sample size and the minimum sample for each category, Agresti and Min (2002) suggest 
a sample size of 30 as a lower bound for large-sample inference about the mean of a quantitative variable. 
The motivation for this size is the similarity when n ≥ 30 between the standard normal distribution and t 
distribution, with a normal population. However, that simple guideline cannot apply well to all cases and 
may fail for high non-normal populations. Meanwhile, other studies assert that the most common is the 
lower bound of 10 for each category (Moore and McCabe, 1998), and 5 observations (Triola, 2000). Battu 
and Sloane (2002) use 2-digits classification of occupation, where occupations with fewer than 10 
observations merge with the other appropriate and adjacent occupation.  
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example: professionals or category 0 has 151 observations in 2000 and 328 observations 
in 2014. The present study then re-categorises it into 3 sub-categories (sub-category 3, 7 
and the remaining observations in professionals or category 0). The present study also 
keeps surveyors (subcategory 3) and nurses, midwives, x-ray technicians, and traditional 
medicine practitioners (subcategory 7) since they have more than 30 observations; and 
merges the remaining, which makes the total remaining of 42 and 53 observations in 2000 
and 2014, respectively. From 11 occupation categories (consisting of 86 sub-categories), 
the present study then disaggregates them into 44 categories. The comparison list of 
occupations that merge and the same as the original sub-category is provided in Appendix 
XII Table XII-3. While, the summary statistic for this hybrid group of occupation is 
shown in Table 4.3.  
This hybrid category indeed affects mean and/or mode within occupation group. For 
instance, teacher (code 13) as a part of the other professional category, has mean of years 
of schooling of 14.25 and mode of 12 in the year 2000. The other professional category 
itself previously has lower mean compared to the teacher category (12.38 year). 
Meanwhile, the mean of the other professionals (including teachers) now become 13.68 
years. In addition, teacher has the large number of observations consisting of 451 cases, 
more than 75 per cent of the sample in category 1X (the other professionals). Thus, the 
hybrid category is better than the aggregate (1-digit category), in terms of retaining the 
homogeneity of sample with large observation and maintaining minimum number of 
observations for the category with small observation at once. 
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Table 4.3: Sample Distribution Based on Group of Occupation and Years of Schooling, 2000 and 2014 
Occupation Code and Title 2000 2014 
N Mean Mode SD Min Max N Mean Mode SD Min Max 
0X Professional/Technical workers 42 13.31 12 3.04 6 18 53 13.92 12 2.59 6 18 
03 Surveyors, draftsmen, engineering assistants 40 11.5 12 2.48 6 16 59 12.49 12 2.6 6 18 
07 Nurses, midwives, x-ray technicians, traditional medicine practitioners 69 12.13 12 2.31 6 16 216 14.21 15 2.27 6 22 
1X The other professionals  117 12.38 12 2.93 6 16 123 13.31 16 3.28 6 18 
13 Teacher 451 14.25 12 2.1 6 18 878 15.68 16 1.54 6 22 
2X Administrative /managerial workers  25 14.08 12 2.16 12 18 57 13.61 16 3.1 6 18 
3X Clerical and related workers 89 11.8 12 2.63 6 16 144 11.92 12 2.86 6 18 
30 Clerical supervisors 78 11.96 12 3.01 6 16 70 13.26 12 2.69 6 18 
31 Government executive officials 126 12.66 12 2.56 6 16 199 14.09 16 2.75 6 18 
33 Bookkeepers, cashiers, and related workers 122 12.51 12 2.47 6 18 305 12.87 12 2.52 6 18 
39 Clerical and related workers not elsewhere classified 160 12.59 12 2.49 6 16 354 12.62 12 2.77 6 18 
4X Sales workers 47 12.23 12 2.83 6 16 151 12.95 12 2.79 6 22 
44 Insurance, real estate, securities and business services, salesman and auctioneers 69 13.51 12 2.32 6 18 147 13.97 12 2.11 9 18 
45 Salesmen, shop assistants and related workers 459 9.72 12 2.85 6 16 624 10.89 12 2.85 6 18 
5X Service workers 59 8.61 6 2.8 6 16 214 10.07 12 2.94 6 16 
51 Working proprietors (catering and lodging services) 167 9.84 12 2.98 6 16 266 11.48 12 2.7 6 16 
54 Maids and related housekeeping service workers NEC 451 8.58 6 3.03 6 16 424 10.47 6 3.72 6 22 
55 Building caretakers, char workers, cleaners and related workers 75 9.08 6 2.86 6 16 158 10.54 12 2.77 6 18 
58 Protective service workers 121 10.23 12 2.56 6 16 216 11.46 12 2.3 6 16 
59 Service workers not elsewhere classified 167 10.44 12 3.08 6 16 238 12.04 12 2.85 6 18 
6X Agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry workers, fishermen and hunters 141 7.72 6 2.57 6 18 154 9.82 6 3.58 6 18 
62 Agricultural and animal husbandry workers 654 6.98 6 2.06 6 16 462 8.8 6 3.05 6 18 
63 Forestry workers 175 8.31 6 2.72 6 16 99 9.25 6 2.79 6 18 
7X Craft and related trade workers 44 7.84 6 2.61 6 12 83 9.4 6 2.9 6 16 
70 Production supervisors and general foreman 77 11.6 12 2.52 6 16 100 11.9 12 2.78 6 18 
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71 Miners, quarrymen, well drillers and related workers 42 8.6 6 2.84 6 16 36 10.22 6 3.83 6 18 
74 Chemical processors and related workers 43 8.95 6 3.13 6 16 65 9.94 12 2.88 6 18 
75 Spinners, weavers, knitters, dyers, and related workers 115 8.57 6 2.67 6 16 80 9.31 12 2.88 6 16 
77 Food and beverage processors 232 9.15 6 3.17 6 16 328 10.43 12 3.1 6 22 
79 Tailors, dressmakers, sewer, upholsterers and related workers 189 8.5 6 2.68 6 16 257 9.44 12 2.49 6 16 
8X Plant and machine operators and assemblers  66 9.05 12 2.71 6 12 97 10.92 12 2.65 6 16 
80 Shoemakers and leather goods makers 34 8.82 6 2.66 6 15 59 10.34 12 2.54 6 16 
81 Cabinet makers and related wood makers 99 8.46 6 2.65 6 16 92 10.53 12 2.84 6 16 
84 Machinery fitters, assemblers, repairers and precision instrument makers (except electrical) 78 10.09 12 2.58 6 16 164 11.12 12 2.31 6 16 
85 Electrical fitters and related electrical and electronics workers 42 11.05 12 2.54 6 16 60 10.78 12 2.73 6 18 
87 Plumbers, welders, sheet-metal and structural metal preparers and erectors 32 8.53 6 2.65 6 12 42 9.55 12 2.91 6 16 
9X Elementary occupation 60 8.6 9 2.24 6 12 95 9.67 12 2.71 6 16 
92 Printers and related workers 73 9.71 12 3.03 6 16 101 10.41 12 2.76 6 16 
94 Production and related workers not elsewhere classified 48 8.31 6 2.64 6 15 62 9.69 6 3.11 6 16 
95 Bricklayers, carpenters and other construction workers 519 7.99 6 2.69 6 16 425 9.49 6 3.06 6 18 
97 Material handling and related equipment, operators, dockers and freight handlers 137 8.86 6 3.14 6 16 249 10.39 12 3.19 6 18 
98 Transport equipment operators 339 8.81 6 2.66 6 16 304 10.19 12 2.77 6 18 
99 Labourers not elsewhere classified 155 9.13 6 3.25 6 16 158 10.68 6 3.9 6 22 
M Armed forces occupation 57 11.18 12 2.21 6 18 21 13.29 12 1.87 12 16 
    6385           8489           
Source: The author’s calculation.  
Note: Code number and X (e.g. 0X and 1X) refers to occupation category. 2 digits code (e.g. 03 and 62) refers to occupation sub-category. 
N is the number of observations, SD: standard deviation, min: minimum value of each occupation category, max: maximum value of each 
category. Occupation code is based on 1 and 2 digits of IFLS classification. The calculation of mean, mode and other descriptive statistics 
presented in this table are for the years of schooling variable. 
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Sample Restrictions 
Sample restrictions are also applied for the estimations to ensure that the individuals are 
in the labour market (Table 4.4). The first restriction is age; between 16-55 years old. 
This restriction considers the age of finishing compulsory education and the retirement 
or state pension age, similar to previous studies (e.g. Dockery and Miller, 2012). The 
actual sample of IFLS range from 14 years of age or 14+.  
The next restriction is employment status (non-missing data); it takes away around 17 per 
cent of the sample in 2014, and even bigger in 2000 (30 per cent). The third restriction is 
wages, i.e. the waged sector (both public and private) considering the same characteristics 
(receiving regular wages). Here, 31 per cent and 54 per cent of the sample are lost in 2014 
and 2000 respectively. Other possible reasons are because most of the individuals are 
casual workers (not included in the sample from 2000), the proportion of self-employment 
is relatively high, or the proportion of sample which does not fill their employment status 
is relatively large. The remaining (non-missing personal characteristics/HH/job/area) is 
not absolute restriction. Some losses also occur because of missing data, though it is not 
really significant compared to the previous restrictions.  
Table 4.4: Sample Restrictions 
  2000 % Lost Waged and Casual Waged Only 2014 % Lost 2014 % Lost 
All sample 25,825   36,381   36,381   
Age 16-55 21,100 -18.30 29,797 -18.10 29,797 -18.10 
Employment status data 
(non-missing) 14,771 -30.00 24,473 -17.87 24,473 -17.87 
Employment status 
(Government workers, 
Private workers, Casual 
workers not in agriculture 
and in agriculture) ==> 
without self-employment 
    12,698 -48.11 12,698 -48.11 
Employment status 
(Government workers, 
Private workers) 6,780 
-54.10     8,712 -31.39 
Mismatch (non-missing) and 
Personal characteristics 6456 -4.78 10,852 -14.54 8,712 0.00 
Mismatch (non-missing) and 
HH (Number of children) 6456 0.00 10,852 0.00 8,712 0.00 
Mismatch (non-missing) and 
Job characteristics 6385 -1.10 10,594 -2.38 8,498 -2.46 
Mismatch (non-missing) and 
Residence/Area 6385 0.00 10,594 0.00 8,498 0.00 
Source: The author’s calculation.  
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Furthermore, waged sector and casual data in 2014 are used to test the sensitivity of the 
results. From 25,825 individuals in 2000 and 36,385 individuals in 2014, this study has 
the final sample of 6,385 individuals and 8,488 individuals in 2000 and 2014, 
respectively; or around 23-25 per cent of the total sample in each year data (Table 4.4).  
Turning to casual workers, it is defined as workers who do not have regular or systematic 
hours of work or an expectation of continuing the work. A typical casual employee is 
employed on a daily basis when the employer’s need arises. Statistics Indonesia defines 
casual workers as those who have no permanent employers for a certain time, for example 
less than three months for the construction sector. Casual workers generally have an 
education attainment of junior high school or less and receive comparatively low levels 
of remuneration. 
Casual workers and unpaid workers are also associated with informal employment. 
Informal employment can be classified into informal self-employment and informal 
wage-employment. Under informal self-employment are employers in informal 
enterprises, own-account workers in informal enterprises, unpaid family workers and 
members of informal producers’ cooperatives. Informal wage-employment includes 
employees who are employed either in formal or informal enterprises without formal 
contracts, worker benefits, or social protections. In addition, informal enterprises are 
household enterprises engaged in the production of goods or services with the primary 
objective of generating employment and incomes for the persons concerned, and which 
typically operate at a low level of organisation, with little or no division between labour 
and capital as factors of production, and on a small scale. Labour relations—where they 
exist—are based mostly on casual employment, kinship, or personal and social relations 
rather than contractual arrangements with formal guarantees (Cuevas, et. al., 2009). Allen 
(2016) also adds that one of the industries that have a large proportion of casual workers, 
particularly in the non-agriculture industry, is the construction industry.  
According to ILO (2002), informal sector can have different definition across the 
countries, as indicated in the latest ILO published data on informal sector enterprises that 
are based on information from 54 countries; most of which still adhere to their own 
national definitions of the informal sector which are not entirely in line with the 
international statistical definition adopted by the 15th ICLS and the 1993 System of 
National Accounts (1993 SNA). Under the 1993 definition, only one category of informal 
wage workers is counted, namely employees of informal sector enterprises, and 
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individual countries can decide what size of unregistered units to include in the informal 
sector and whether the agricultural sector and domestic workers should be covered. 
Rothenberg et al, (2016) refer informal sector as all economic activities conducted by 
firms that are not formally registered with the government and do not pay taxes. Statistics 
Indonesia defines casual workers that do not have permanent employers for a certain time. 
ADB (2009) emphasise informal employment is bound more by social relations rather 
than contractual arrangements with formal guarantees. While, Cuevas et al, (2009) argue 
given the limitation of the data, informal employment in Indonesia is defined as 
employment on casual basis and unpaid work.   
Considering IFLS data, an individual in the survey could choose between several 
employment sectors if he/she was determined as working (TK24A):  
1. self-employed (without help), 
2. self-employed with the help of householders/temporary workers,  
3. self-employed with the help of regular workers,  
4. government worker/employee,  
5. private worker/employee,  
6. unpaid family worker.  
In the 1997 survey, all the self-employed sectors are combined into one sector called the 
self-employed. However, IFLS adds two additional sectors in 2007:  
7. casual worker in agriculture, and  
8. casual worker in non-agriculture. 
Casual workers in the present study refer to category 7 and 8 (casual workers in 
agriculture and non-agriculture). However, the IFLS surveys do not provide any specific 
definitions on these employments. Thus, the present study follows Cuevas et al, (2009), 
informal sector covers unpaid family workers and casual workers both in agriculture and 
non-agriculture or categories 6, 7 and 8.  In 2014/15, IFLS5 has a total sample of 36,381 
individuals, 27.43 per cent of the sample is waged workers, 25.27 per cent is self-
employed, 7.12 per cent is unpaid family worker, and 7.47 per cent is casual worker both 
in agriculture and non-agriculture; Thus, the proportion of informal sector in 2014 is 
around 14.6 per cent.  
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4.3.4 Summary Statistics 
This part will focus on the dependent variables for all individuals, based on gender and 
sector. But before getting there, the comparison between mode and mean, as well as the 
normality test will be discussed. The present study chooses mode as the main model or a 
better measurement of education mismatch than mean because mode is more suitable for 
categorical data like the match variable. Moreover, mode is a better measure than mean 
when the data are skewed. Table 4.5 shows the distribution and normality test of the match 
variable. The standard deviation and variance of mode of the model are slightly higher 
than the mean of the model for each period. Meanwhile, skewness49 and kurtosis50 of 
mode model are slightly lower than mean model. The skewness of mode is a negative 
value, implying that the distribution is skewed to the left. This is in contrast to mean 
model; the skewness is positive, or that the distribution is skewed to the right. According 
to the rule of thumb of normal distribution (skewness value is 0 and kurtosis is 3), only 
the mean model of 2014 is eligible. The present study also conducts Skewness/Kurtosis 
tests for Normality in Stata, and the result confirms that only the mean model of 2014 that 
has a normal distribution; the mode model of both years and the mode of 2014 are not 
normally distributed. Thus, mode method is better for this case (not normally distributed), 
as is in line with Lund Research (2013) that mode is a better measure than mean when 
the data are skewed. In addition, in symmetric unimodal distributions (such as the normal 
distribution), the mean, median and mode all coincide (Lane, 2007). Thus, mode model 
is advantageous for both normally and non-normally distributed data.   
The mode level of education could be a better measurement than the mean level of 
education in measuring required education, since it captures the most common level of 
education in a particular occupation, with the assumption is no bimodality in any 
occupation. This is in line with Kiker et al. (1997). Another advantage of using mode is 
that it is less sensitive to outliers and to technological and workplace changes (Battu and 
Sloane, 2002).  
  
 
49 Skewness is a measure of the symmetry in a distribution; a symmetrical data (normal distribution) will 
have a Skewness of equal to zero. 
50 Kurtosis is a measure of the combined sizes of the two tails. It measures the amount of probability in the 
tails. The value of kurtosis in a normal distribution is equal to 3.  
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Table 4.5: Normality Test of Match Variable 
  
2000 2014 
Match (Mode) Match (Mean) Match (Mode) Match (Mean) 
Obs 6385 6385 8489 8489 
Mode/Mean 2.15 2.04 2.01 1.99 
SD 0.63 0.55 0.68 0.57 
Variance  0.40 0.30 0.46 0.32 
Skewness  -0.13 0.03 -0.01 0.00 
Kurtosis  2.43 3.34 2.17 3.13 
Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality 
Pr(Skewness) 0.00 0.40 0.78 0.96 
Pr(Kurtosis) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Joint        
Prob>chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 
  
not normally 
distributed 
not normally 
distributed 
not normally 
distributed 
normally 
distributed 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
 
This part answers the first, second and third research questions all at once; firstly, does 
education mismatch (both undereducation and overeducation) exist in the waged sector 
in Indonesia? Secondly, what are the estimated proportions of education mismatch in 
2000 and 2014 periods? And finally, how does education mismatch change between these 
periods? 
Based on the mismatch definition (mode model)51, around 53-58 per cent of the sample 
was in the match category for both periods. In 2000, the proportion of undereducation 
was 13.6 per cent which then increased to 22.8 per cent in 2014. This implies that there 
was a significant increase in undereducation during the periods. In contrast, 
overeducation proportion in 2000 was around 28.5 per cent, which then decreased to 23.4 
per cent in 2014 (Table 4.6).  
This finding confirms that education mismatch indeed occurred in Indonesia in 2000 and 
2014. Overall, education mismatch slightly increases during these periods (from 42 per 
cent to 46 per cent), and this increase is driven by the increase in undereducation. The 
finding also agrees with ILO’s (2017) finding; an increasing trend in undereducation and 
a decreasing one in overeducation. This finding is also in line with the technological 
 
51Individuals are considered undereducated (category 1) if they have years of education (education level) 
more than one standard deviation below their occupation’s mode; and overeducated (category 3) if they 
have years of education (education level) more than one standard deviation above their occupation’s mode 
(adapted from Dockery and Miller, 2012). 
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change theory that while technology changes rapidly, better-educated workers cannot be 
made instantaneously - the mean of years of schooling was 9.7 years in 2000, which then 
increased to 11.5 years in 2014. In other words, the increase amounts to only around 2 
years of schooling during the periods. In addition, education quality in Indonesia is 
relatively low compared to other countries in the region. Meanwhile, McKinsey (2012) 
estimates that the demand for semi-skilled and skilled workers (reflected by high 
education qualifications) may rise to 113 million by 2030. As a result, undereducation 
incidence would arise.  
Arguably, this trend could also be due to underproduction and high demand for workers 
with higher education qualifications, characterised by high wage premium (Carnevale and 
Rose, 2013). Although the trend of return to education decreases between 2000 and 2014, 
workers with university qualifications still obtain relatively higher wage premium 
compared to workers with lower qualifications (see Chapter 3). Moreover, workers with 
junior high school or lower education are likely to shift between working as production 
workers and agriculture labours throughout the year, but these workers find it more 
difficult to climb the career ladder. 
Besides, the minimum wage policy could also affect undereducation. The minimum wage 
in Indonesia is determined at province, district and occupational levels (Article 89 of 
Labour law Number 13/2003), as explained in Chapter 2. As a result, if workers with 
primary school and senior high school qualifications apply for the same occupation (e.g. 
blue-collar works in textile factories), they will be offered the same amount of wages, 
which is equal to the minimum wage. As such, this policy could dishearten individuals to 
pursue higher education level and increases undereducation coincidence.  
The mixed effect of the increasing minimum wage in Indonesia is also found by Smeru 
(2002). Smeru finds that the increase in minimum wages push up wages of blue-collar 
workers. Moreover, there is a positive relationship between minimum wages and average 
wages of most other groups of workers, such as females, the youth, the less educated and 
white-collar workers. In contrast, the increase in minimum wages have a negative impact 
on urban and the waged sector employment, with the exception of white-collar workers. 
Also, Del Carpio et al. (2015) find that the effect of minimum wages in Indonesia are 
more binding in small firms. Though their study does not provide an analysis based on 
education level, it shows that the effect of minimum wages could be different among 
groups of workers.   
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And finally, another argument is related to the method used in this research: the weakness 
of the Realise Method (RM) is that it only considers the supply side, so the changes in the 
mode only reflects the changes in average workers’ education. The measurement cannot 
represent the changes because the jobs demanded higher education qualifications. Also, 
changes in education levels in the economy imply that employers will allocate workers 
differently (Mason, 1996).  
By using the mean, the estimation provides a relatively higher proportion of matched 
category than the estimation by mode; the match of mean model is more than 68 per cent, 
meanwhile the match in the mode model was around 53 per cent in 2014; a similar pattern 
also occurred previously in 2000. Overeducation and undereducation proportions are 
relatively lower when estimated by the mean model than by the mode model. 
Nevertheless, the conclusion for both mode and mean is the same; there was an increase 
in undereducation, as well as a decrease in overeducation, and a decrease in education 
matching in aggregate between 2000 and 2014 periods.  
It seems that the decrease in overeducation and the increase in undereducation also occur 
when the sample is separated by gender and by sector, except for the public sector. In the 
public sector, there was an increase in overeducation, from 29.32 per cent to 31.81 per 
cent, as well as a decrease in undereducation from 15.51 per cent to 10.82 per cent 
between 2000 and 2014 periods. In line with the findings in Chapter 3, it is possible that 
the public sector prefers workers with high education levels: those with at least senior 
high school qualifications. For example, teacher’s education requirement is at least 
Diploma II for rural areas and Diploma IV or undergraduate in general. For unskilled jobs 
such as cleaning, the public sector prefers outsourcing or using private firms’ services, 
rather than hiring directly. The present study will elaborate this further in the part about 
estimation by sector, but this finding could also imply that the private sector is the main 
contributor in the increase of undereducation.  
In terms of gender, the present study confirms the ILO’s finding that male workers tend 
to have lower education levels than female workers, in particular for education of at least 
13 years or university level (see Appendix XIII). In terms of the trend of mismatches, the 
increase in undereducation was around 38-42 per cent for both males and females. Males 
experienced a substantial decrease in overeducation from 31.8 per cent to 25.5 per cent 
while overeducated female decreased from 22 per cent to 20 per cent (Table 4.6). In other 
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words, the pattern persists throughout the sample; a decrease in overeducation and an 
increase in undereducation.  
Table 4.6: Match Based on Mode and Mean (in per cent) 
Year 
Match (Mode) 
2000 2014 
UE M OE Total UE M OE Total 
All Individuals                 
Number of obs. 869 3,697 1,819 6,385 1,931 4,576 1,982 8,489 
Proportion 13.61 57.90 28.49 100.00 22.75 53.91 23.35 100.00 
Males                 
Number of obs. 564 2,301 1,339 4,204 1,127 2,712 1,316 5,155 
Proportion 13.42 54.73 31.85 100.00 21.86 52.61 25.53 100.00 
Females                 
Number of obs. 305 1,396 480 2,181 804 1,864 666 3,334 
Proportion 13.98 64.01 22.01 100.00 24.12 55.91 19.98 100.00 
Public                 
Number of obs. 156 555 295 1,006 152 806 447 1,405 
Proportion 15.51 55.17 29.32 100.00 10.82 57.37 31.81 100.00 
Private                 
Number of obs. 713 3,142 1,524 5,379 1,779 3,770 1,535 7,084 
Proportion 13.26 58.41 28.33 100.00 25.11 53.22 21.67 100.00 
         
         
Year 
Match (Mean) 
2000 2014 
UE M OE Total UE M OE Total 
All Individuals                 
Number of obs. 828 4,478 1079 6,385 1,384 5,774 1,331 8,489 
Proportion 12.97 70.13 16.90 100.00 16.30 68.02 15.68 100.00 
Males                 
Number of obs. 567 2,854 783 4,204 780 3,491 884 5,155 
Proportion 13.49 67.89 18.63 100.00 15.13 67.72 17.15 100.00 
Females                 
Number of obs. 305 1,396 480 2,181 604 2,283 447 3,334 
Proportion 13.98 64.01 22.01 100.00 18.12 68.48 13.41 100.00 
Public                 
Number of obs. 154 621 231 1,006 64 952 389 1,405 
Proportion 15.31 61.73 22.96 100.00 4.56 67.76 27.69 100.00 
Private                 
Number of obs. 674 3857 848 5,379 1,320 4,822 942 7,084 
Proportion 12.53 71.70 15.77 100.00 18.63 68.07 13.30 100.00 
Source: The author’s calculation.  
Note: UE: undereducated; M: matched; OE: overeducated.  
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In terms of changes, the present study performs t-test to ensure that there is an equality of 
means between the data from 2000 and 2014. The hypothesis (H0) is that the difference 
between mean of 2014 and mean of 2000 is equal to zero. The t-test is conducted in 
STATA and the result indicates that H0 is rejected, or the difference of means in the 
mismatch between 2014 and 2000 are different from zero (all is significant at 5 per cent). 
Thus, this result implies that the increase in the fraction of undereducation is statistically 
significant. Likewise, the decrease in the fraction of overeducation is also statistically 
significant. The t-test result for all individuals is shown in Table 4.7 and the remaining 
results are provided in Appendix XIV52. 
Although the mean and mode results are slightly different, the present study finds a 
similar pattern of education mismatch; an increase of undereducation and a decrease of 
overeducation, except for the public sector. Hence, the mean or mode methods give the 
same conclusions of education mismatch in Indonesia between 2000 and 2014 periods53.  
Table 4.7: T-Test of the Main Model (All Individuals)  
  
Mean 
 
Difference 
T-
Statistic 
Degree of 
Freedom P-value 
2000 2014         
Main Model 
(Mode)             
UE 0.14 0.23 0.09 14.20 14872 *** 
M 0.58 0.54 -0.04 -4.86 14872 *** 
OE 0.28 0.23 -0.05 -7.13 14872 *** 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
 
Table 4.8 shows the summary statistics of all individuals from both periods. The 
dependent variable of the main model is match (mode), and the number of observations 
in 2000 and 2014 were 6,385 and 8,489 - respectively. The alternative dependent variable 
or match (mean) will be discussed further in the sensitivity test part. Turning to the 
independent variables, this part highlights some findings based on sex, age, tenure, urban 
and capital (residence in capital city). Most of the observations are males; females were 
only 34 per cent in 2000 and 39 per cent in 2014. As age is the first restriction in the 
present study, the minimum age was 16 and the maximum was 55. In 2000, the average 
 
52 The other results are similar to the main model result, except for the increase in fraction of overeducation 
in public sector which seems to be insignificant.  
53 The present study also estimates the mismatch based on 1-digit occupation classification (the aggregate 
one) and finds an inconsistent result between mode and mean (see Appendix XII).  
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age of the waged sector was 31.66 years, increased to 33.28 years in 2014. Meanwhile, 
the tenure variable had a minimum value of 0 year and a maximum value of 50 and 40 
years for 2000 and 2014, respectively. The maximum age was 55 years while the 
maximum tenure was 50 years, which is nonsense. However, only 4 out of 6,385 
individuals in 2000 (less than 1 per cent) had tenure of more than 40 years. As such, those 
negative values were set to zero. The average tenure in 2000 was 6.56 years, which 
slightly decreased to 6.34 in 2014. In terms of sector, more than 80 per cent of the sample 
in both periods were from the private sector. Most of the sample also lived in urban areas; 
more than 60 per cent of the sample which is slightly higher than the data from Statistics 
Indonesia (around 55 per cent living in urban areas). Moreover, only around 10 per cent 
of the sample lived in the capital city.
Table 4.8: Summary Statistics, All Individuals  
Variable 
2000 2014 
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variable:            
Match (mode) 2.15 0.63 1 3 2.01 0.65 1 3 
Alternative Dependent 
Variable:            
Match (mean): Sensitivity 
Test 2.04 0.55 1 3 1.99 0.57 1 3 
Independent Variables:            
Sex (1=Female) 0.34 0.47 0 1 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Marital Status 1.74 0.52 1 3 1.82 0.48 1 3 
Ethnicity (1=Javanese) 0.62 0.49 0 1 0.45 0.5 0 1 
Age 31.66 9.91 16 55 33.28 9.57 16 55 
Age squared 1100.5 677.94 256 3025 1198.89 676.48 256 3025 
Young children (0-5 years 
old) 0.14 0.38 0 2 0.36 0.58 0 3 
Tenure 6.56 7.45 0 50 6.34 7.22 0 40 
Tenure squared 98.53 198.88 0 2500 92.36 192.04 0 1600 
Status: part time 0.15 0.35 0 1 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Sector: private 0.84 0.36 0 1 0.83 0.37 0 1 
Industry 5.54 3.01 1 9 6.18 2.78 1 9 
Firm Size 1.4 0.65 1 3 1.68 0.8 1 3 
Urban 0.63 0.48 0 1 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Capital 0.13 0.34 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Number of Obs. 6385       8489       
Source: The author’s calculation. 
 
The present study also extends the analysis based on sub-sector (Table 4.9) and finds that 
there is no substantial difference between the genders in terms of the summary statistics. 
Thus, it is not surprising if gender does not have a significant effect on education 
mismatch and its determinants. In terms of sector, the present study highlights at least two 
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variables having a significant difference between the private and public sectors, i.e. age 
and tenure. The public sector had a significantly higher age average (38-39 years) than 
the private sector (30-32 years). Generally, the private sector employs younger workers 
than the public sector. Similarly, the public sector has a significantly longer tenure than 
the private sector. The average tenure in the public sector was around 12 years while the 
private sector had tenure of around 5-6 years between those periods. However, the longer 
tenure and older age do not necessarily suggest a lower mismatch in the public sector; the 
present study will elaborate this issue further in the sector analysis.     
Table 4.9: Summary Statistics (Mode Model) based on Sub-categories, 2000 and 2014 
 
  2000 2014 2000 2014 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
  Female Male 
Match (Mode) 2.08 0.59 1.96 0.66 2.18 0.65 2.04 0.69 
Sex (1=Female) 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Marital Status 1.76 0.61 1.85 0.52 1.74 0.47 1.80 0.45 
Ethnicity 
(1=Javanese) 0.64 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.61 0.49 0.44 0.50 
Age 30.54 9.72 32.52 9.59 32.24 9.96 33.76 9.53 
Age squared 1027.30 646.46 1149.76 671.33 1138.47 690.73 1230.67 677.95 
Young children 
(0-5 years old) 0.13 0.36 0.31 0.55 0.14 0.38 0.40 0.59 
Tenure 6.11 7.16 6.00 7.10 6.80 7.58 6.56 7.29 
Tenure squared 88.53 187.25 86.40 191.45 103.72 204.49 96.21 192.34 
Status: part time 0.20 0.40 0.25 0.43 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.33 
Sector: private 0.84 0.36 0.81 0.39 0.84 0.37 0.85 0.36 
Industry 5.68 3.08 6.58 2.71 5.47 2.96 5.93 2.80 
Firm Size 1.45 0.69 1.64 0.80 1.37 0.63 1.70 0.80 
Urban 0.67 0.47 0.72 0.45 0.60 0.49 0.71 0.45 
Capital 0.15 0.36 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.33 0.09 0.29 
Number of Obs. 2181   3334   4204   5155   
  Private Public 
Match (Mode) 2.15 0.63 1.97 0.68 2.14 0.66 2.21 0.62 
Sex (1=Female) 0.34 0.47 0.38 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.45 0.50 
Marital Status 1.71 0.54 1.80 0.50 1.92 0.37 1.93 0.37 
Ethnicity 
(1=Javanese) 0.64 0.48 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.32 0.47 
Age 30.27 9.50 32.32 9.26 39.09 8.68 38.08 9.67 
Age squared 1006.49 637.20 1130.48 639.20 1603.15 668.23 1543.84 750.12 
Young children 
(0-5 years old) 0.14 0.37 0.35 0.57 0.17 0.40 0.41 0.62 
Tenure 5.39 6.56 5.36 6.30 12.80 8.70 11.30 9.26 
Tenure squared 72.14 171.62 68.35 152.72 239.60 264.59 213.40 296.19 
Status: part time 0.15 0.35 0.16 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.26 0.44 
Sector: private 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Industry 5.11 2.91 5.72 2.72 7.89 2.38 8.54 1.68 
Firm Size 1.38 0.65 1.66 0.81 1.47 0.64 1.74 0.74 
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Urban 0.62 0.49 0.73 0.45 0.65 0.48 0.65 0.48 
Capital 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.18 
Number of Obs. 5379   7084   1006   1405   
Source: The author’s calculation. 
 
 
 
4.4 Estimation Result: Education Mismatch Determinants  
The main model for the analysis is mismatch based on mode (MNL). The estimations in 
the main model show that education mismatch in Indonesia is determined by personal and 
household characteristics, work-related and firm size as well as area of residency 
variables, all of which are observed and analysed in this research. The analysis of this 
chapter will now begin with undereducation, followed by overeducation as well as gender 
and sector analysis.   
 
4.4.1 Undereducation 
Table 4.10 presents the estimation result of Multinomial Logit Model (MNL) for all 
individuals based on mode in 2000 and 2014. Most variables observed in the present study 
significantly determine the probability of undereducation; except for ethnicity, tenure 
square and capital area.  
Table 4.10: Education Mismatch, MNL (Mode)  
Mode 
 
2000 2014 
Coef. Std. 
Err. 
P>z ME Coef. Std. 
Err. 
P>z ME 
UE              
Sex (1=Female) -0.454 0.090 *** -0.03 0.045 0.060   0.01 
Married and 
cohabitate 
0.346 0.130 *** 0.04 0.416 0.095 *** 0.08 
Other (Separated, 
divorced and 
widowed) 
0.610 0.218 *** 0.08 0.458 0.154 *** 0.09 
Ethnicity 
(1=Javanese) 
-0.122 0.085   -0.01 0.005 0.057   0.00 
Age -0.121 0.034 *** 0.00 -0.059 0.024 ** 0.00 
Age squared 0.002 0.000 ***  0.001 0.000 ***  
Young children (0-5 
years old) 
-0.020 0.110   0.00 -0.145 0.054 *** -0.02 
Tenure 0.038 0.018 ** 0.00 -0.017 0.012  -0.00 
Tenure squared -0.001 0.001    0.000 0.000    
Status: part time 0.217 0.115 * 0.03 -0.066 0.080   -0.00 
Sector: private -0.028 0.130   0.02 0.742 0.110 *** 0.13 
Industry2: mining 
and quarrying 
2.898 0.938 *** 0.03 0.747 0.224 *** 0.23 
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Industry3: 
manufacturing 
4.195 0.588 *** 0.12 1.512 0.133 *** 0.31 
Industry4: 
electricity, gas and 
water 
5.539 0.695 *** 0.37 1.733 0.301 *** 0.14 
Industry5: 
construction 
1.785 0.682 *** 0.01 -0.753 0.250 *** -0.05 
Industry6: 
wholesale, retail, 
restaurants and 
hotels 
5.834 0.588 *** 0.47 1.312 0.135 *** 0.20 
Industry7: 
transportation, 
storage, and 
communications 
2.913 0.660 *** 0.03 1.407 0.189 *** 0.22 
Industry8: Finance, 
insurance, real 
estate and business 
services 
4.170 0.689 *** 0.12 0.643 0.179 *** 0.05 
Industry9: Social 
services 
4.271 0.585 *** 0.16 0.677 0.131 *** 0.08 
Firm size2: 20-99 
people 
-0.439 0.110 *** -0.05 -0.452 0.072 *** -0.08 
Firm size3: >= 100 
people 
-0.383 0.152 ** -0.05 -0.572 0.080 *** -0.11 
Urban -0.211 0.093 ** -0.03 -0.335 0.063 *** -0.07 
Capital -0.062 0.127   -0.01 -0.012 0.101   -0.01 
Constants -3.659 0.776 ***   -1.804 0.398 ***  
               
OE              
Sex (1=Female) -0.403 0.070 *** -0.06 -0.120 0.061  -0.00 
Married and 
cohabitate 
-0.318 0.089 *** -0.07 -0.481 0.096 *** -0.07 
Other (Separated, 
divorced and 
widowed) 
-0.882 0.211 *** -0.16 -0.658 0.192 *** -0.11 
Ethnicity 
(1=Javanese) 
-0.117 0.064 * -0.02 0.013 0.061   0.00 
Age 0.144 0.026 *** 0.00 0.121 0.028 *** 0.00 
Age squared -0.002 0.000 ***  -0.002 0.000 ***  
Young children (0-5 
years old) 
-0.265 0.086 *** -0.05 0.026 0.054   0.01 
Tenure -0.047 0.014 *** -0.01 -0.011 0.013   -0.00 
Tenure squared 0.001 0.001    -0.000 0.000    
Status: part time -0.376 0.097 *** -0.07 -0.420 0.088 *** -0.05 
Sector: private -0.797 0.100 *** -0.15 -0.638 0.086 *** -0.13 
Industry2: mining 
and quarrying 
0.693 0.298 ** 0.14 -0.184 0.253   -0.08 
Industry3: 
manufacturing 
-0.050 0.103   -0.05 -0.956 0.136 *** -0.17 
Industry4: 
electricity, gas and 
water 
-0.532 0.455   -0.20 -0.484 0.331  -0.10 
Industry5: 
construction 
0.185 0.120   -0.04 0.272 0.156 * 0.07 
Industry6: 
wholesale, retail, 
restaurants and 
hotels 
-1.196 0.152 *** -0.29 -0.488 0.131 *** -0.11 
Industry7: 
transportation, 
0.593 0.139 *** 0.12 -0.432 0.213 ** -0.11 
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storage, and 
communications 
Industry8: Finance, 
insurance, real 
estate and business 
services 
0.009 0.235   0.04 0.482 0.141  *** 0.08 
Industry9: Social 
services 
-0.826 0.103 *** -0.19 -0.130 0.115  -0.04 
Firm size2: 20-99 
people 
0.246 0.075 *** 0.05 0.230 0.071 *** 0.05 
Firm size3: >= 100 
people 
0.471 0.104 *** 0.10 0.522 0.083 *** 0.10 
Urban 0.549 0.072 *** 0.01 0.544 0.074 *** 0.08 
Capital 0.342 0.093 *** 0.02 -0.217 0.108 ** -0.03 
Constants -1.560 0.411 ***   -2.631 0.454 ***  
               
Number of obs. 6385      8489     
LR chi2(46) 1663.37      1357.57     
Prob > chi2 0      0     
Pseudo R-Squared 0.1378       0.0816       
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent.  
Pseudo R-Squared of 2014 is slightly lower than Pseudo R-Squared of 2000. The Pseudo 
R-Squared is treated as a measure of effect size, similar to how R-Squared is treated in 
standard multiple regressions (Starkweather and Moske, 2011). The decrease of Pseudo 
R-Squared in 2014 could imply that there are other unobserved variables which affect 
education mismatch.   
      
The first variable is sex (female). The coefficient of this variable was negative and 
significant in 2000 (negative relative probability of undereducation rather than match), 
which indicates that females are less likely to be undereducated than males. The marginal 
effect was -0.03 which indicates that the probability of undereducation is, on average, 
about 3 percentage points lower for females than for males. There are some advantages 
for female workers compared to males, as World Bank (2011) documents: (1) garment 
companies prefer to recruit female for the sewing jobs; and (2) bank and teaching jobs 
are considered safe and respectable for women. Thus, firms may consider females with 
lower education qualifications for a job with higher education requirement to fill in some 
job categories. These assertions are supported by the coefficients of manufacturing and 
finance, insurance, as well as real estate and business services which are positive and 
significant, suggesting that those working in these industries are more likely to be 
undereducated, relative to the agriculture industries. Skill could also affect this mismatch 
calculation. However, the present study is limited by the lack of skill data. The analysis 
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could have been more comprehensive otherwise. That being said, sex turned insignificant 
in 2014.  
The married and cohabitate status, as well as the other marital status, had a positive and 
significant coefficient in both periods. The marginal effect of the married variable in 2000 
was 4 per cent, which increased to 8 per cent in 2014. For household characteristics, the 
only variable observed is the number of young children aged between 0-5 years in the 
family. The result shows that the presence of young children in the family was 
insignificant in 2000, but turned negative and significant in 2014, with the marginal effect 
equal to -0.02. To provide a more detailed analysis, the present study will further elaborate 
this issue in the estimation by gender, in the gender part.  
In work-related category, most variables were significant in both periods. Tenure had a 
marginal effect of 0.00, implying the relative probability of undereducation was the same 
for any job-tenure. An example is garment companies (World Bank, 2012); as long as the 
workers have sewing skill, tenure does not have any impacts. Unfortunately, IFLS data 
do not have any information on skill, thus the present study cannot explore this issue.  
The result also shows that the private sector experiences a higher relative probability of 
undereducation incident. This confirms the finding in Table 4.6 that the increase of 
undereducation incident is partly driven by the private sector. The marginal effect of the 
private sector was 13 per cent in 2014. A possible explanation is that market mechanism 
occurs in the private sector. When most workers have lower education levels, companies 
will hire the best ones from the applicants. In addition, around 39 per cent of the sample 
in 2014 had 6 and 9 years of education (equal to primary and junior high school 
qualifications). Also, around 42 per cent of the sample had 12 years of education (senior 
high school qualifications). Thus, the sample is dominated by those with lower education 
qualifications. The present study will elaborate this issue further in the section on 
estimation by sector.  
Moreover, most of the industry dummies are positive and significant. This suggests that 
mismatch (undereducation) is more likely to occur in non-agriculture sectors. This is in 
line with Allen (2016) who asserts that undereducation is a challenge in higher-level 
occupations. On the other hand, most workers with higher education qualifications work 
in the non-agriculture industry.  
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In terms of firm size, the coefficients were negative and significant, thus suggesting that 
those working in medium and large firms were less likely to be undereducated. Also, the 
marginal effect decreases with company size. For example, the marginal effect of medium 
firms was -8 per cent and for the large firm -11 per cent. Yin (2016) asserts that workers 
in large firms have more opportunities to be promoted, have better career prospects and 
receive more fringe benefits compared to those who work in smaller companies. Allen 
and Kyloh (2016) further that several large companies in the private sector have also 
developed their own training centres in order to meet their specialised training needs. In 
other words, although the workers do not have sufficient education qualifications, the 
firms could provide the necessary on-the-job training before they start working.  
For area variables, only the urban area category that had a negative and significant 
coefficient in both models and in both periods, with the marginal effect changing from -
3 per cent in 2000 to -7 per cent in 2014. This suggests that those working in urban areas 
were less likely to be undereducated compared to those working in rural areas. A possible 
explanation is that most new jobs are generated in the urban areas in Indonesia (Allen, 
2016). 
Furthermore, the Pseudo R2 of 2000 and 2014 models are 0.14 and 0.08, respectively. 
The interpretation is not as straightforward as the R-squared of the OLS model. The 
Pseudo R-squared is defined as the proportion of the variance of the latent variable that 
is explained by the covariate. It is basically the change in terms of log-likelihood from 
the intercept-only model to the current model. Nevertheless, the higher is still the better 
fit, but they should be interpreted with caution. It is worth noting that the Pseudo R-
Squared are useful tools in evaluating multiple models predicting the same outcome on 
the same dataset, but they cannot be interpreted independently or compared across 
different datasets. In other words, a pseudo R-squared statistic without context has little 
meaning. A pseudo R-squared only has meaning when compared to another pseudo R-
squared of the same type, on the same data, predicting the same outcome (Abdulhafedh, 
2017). In the present study, the Pseudo R-Squared of 2000 and 2014 cannot be compared 
and interpreted independently since both of periods have different dataset.  
Finally, the Likelihood Ratio chi-square test is alternative test of goodness-of-fit. The LR 
chi2 test shows that both equations (undereducation relative to match and overeducation 
relative to match) have at least one of the predictors’ regression coefficients not equal to 
zero. Prob > chi2 is the probability of getting LR test as extreme as the observed 
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conditions under the null hypothesis (all the regression coefficients across both models 
are simultaneously equal to zero). The small p value leads to the conclusion that at least 
one of the regression coefficients in the model is not equal to zero.  
 
4.4.2 Overeducation 
Turning to the overeducation analysis, the female variable had a negative and significant 
coefficient in 2000, turning insignificant in later period. This is similar to the 
undereducation estimation (Table 4.10). Again, this could be due to several advantages 
possessed by female workers, as discussed previously in the undereducation section.  
The married and other marital status variable has the opposite sign of coefficient of the 
undereducation variable. The relative probability of overeducation was negative and 
significant relative to match. The marginal effect of the married status was -7 per cent in 
both periods. Most of the previous studies elaborate the analysis with interaction terms 
between marital status and sex or other variables. However, a cautious interpretation is 
needed here, as the data show that more than 65 per cent of the sample was married in 
both periods. A possible explanation is that the large number of vacancies in large labour 
markets is offset by a larger number of job searchers (McGoldrick and Robst, 1996), 
particularly the vacancies for university graduates (Figure 2.13).  
Age had a positive and significant coefficient at 1 per cent for both periods, indicating 
that the older aged are likely to be more overeducated relative to matched individuals. 
This is in contrast to existing models of labour mobility and previous literature, such as 
Boll et al. (2016) and Flisi et al. (2014). However, the marginal effect of age was 
relatively small, even nearly 0 per cent. In other words, the relative probability of 
overeducation was the same for any age. Meanwhile, the coefficient of age square in the 
regression was negative and significant, implying that the function is an inverted U-shape. 
The distribution of age and sample frequency for overeducation is shown in Appendix 
XIII. Nevertheless, the marginal effect cannot be estimated because the second order 
derivative is required for interaction/square terms. Moreover, the effect is slightly 
puzzling. It could be because many people up to the age of early 30s are still looking for 
appropriate jobs, for example, workers with university qualifications who may have 
accepted jobs with diploma (lower degree) qualifications (Farooq, 2016). Another 
possible explanation is because the maximum age limit to apply for jobs in the public 
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sector is 35 years, according to the regulation from Minister of State Apparatus. Some 
people may prefer to find a job in the private sector first and then apply for a job in the 
public sector before reaching the maximum age limit of 35 years. Up to certain age, 
workers possess not only enough education qualifications but also more appropriate 
experience for their job as their age increases and the probability of overeducation 
decreases. The downward trend afterwards is consistent with the existing models of 
labour mobility and with previous literature.     
With regards to work-related and firm size variables, the coefficient of tenure was 
negative and significant for overeducation mean and mode models for 2000. The marginal 
effect is at -1 per cent. This suggests a negative relationship between tenure and 
probability of being overeducated or the relative probability of overeducation is, on 
average, about 1 percentage points lower for one additional year of the job tenure, which 
agrees with the human capital theory and the job competition theory, as explained in 
Section 4.2.2. This later turned insignificant in 2014 for both models. Tenure function is 
a linear function because the coefficient of tenure square was insignificant.  
Regarding the part-time variable, the result indicates that coefficients in the main model 
were negative and significant at 1 per cent for both periods with the marginal effect being 
-0.07 in 2000 and -0.05 in 2014. The result is in contrast to literatures asserting that part-
time work leads to a higher probability of being overeducated (Frank, 1978; Ofek and 
Merrill, 1997; and Sloane et al., 1999). Cautious interpretation is needed in this case. This 
finding could be related to one of the (non-financial) incentives of being a public sector 
worker or to the fact that several private sectors in Indonesia offer flexible working hours 
(UNDP, 2014; Tjahjono, 2017; and Anell and Hartmann, 2007). Thus, there will be more 
opportunities for these workers to be with their families or to have an additional job and 
in turn earning more money for a living.  
The next potential variable is private (job sector). The result shows that the coefficient of 
the private variable was negative and significant at 1 per cent for both models and in both 
periods. The marginal effects of main model were -0.15 and -0.13 for 2000 and 2014, 
respectively. This result agrees with Dolton and Vignoles (2000) and Ortiz (2010). 
McLeod (2006) also adds that all parts of the Indonesian bureaucracy have a very rigid 
organisational structure in which the number of positions at each level in the hierarchy is 
fixed mechanically by formula, rather than by reference to the volume of work required 
to be carried out at that level. Consequently, there is a ubiquitous gross overstaffing at the 
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lower levels. Furthermore, the private sector follows the market mechanism more 
efficiently in terms of productive and allocative efficiency (Rao, 2015). As such, 
overeducation is less likely to occur in the private sector.  
In terms of the industry variable, manufacturing (wholesale, retail, restaurants and hotels) 
and social services have a negative and significant coefficient. This suggests that the 
probability of being overeducated is lower in these industries relative to the agriculture 
industry. This finding is in line with Allen’s (2016) that occupation mismatch 
(overeducation) in Indonesia tends to be associated with the low education levels of 
production workers and agriculture labourers. Meanwhile, financial industries have a 
higher probability for their workers to be overeducated (relative to the agriculture 
industry) in both periods, which is similar to the finding in Europe that the finance 
industry is significantly more open to overeducation than manufacturing (Tarvid, 2015). 
For firm size variables, the result shows that the coefficient was positive and significant 
at 1 per cent with respect to small firms (1-19 workers) in both periods. As Dolton and 
Vignoles (2000) assert, overeducation is the highest amongst those who work for small 
firms, although generally the incidence of overeducation does not decrease linearly with 
firm size. Interestingly, more than 70 per cent of the graduates who are overeducated and 
working in small firms claimed to require no qualifications for their job. It is worth noting 
that the sample in the present study is concentrated in small firms (around 69.6 per cent 
and 53 per cent of the total sample in 2000 and 2014, respectively). Thus, the lack of 
benchmark jobs and formal qualifications which cause a higher incidence of 
overeducation to be recorded amongst graduates who work in small firms could also occur 
in the present study.  
Regarding urban and capital residency, the result shows a positive and significant 
coefficient. Hence, living in urban areas increases the likelihood of being overeducated. 
The marginal effect of urban in 2000 was 0.10, which then decreased slightly to 0.08 in 
2014. Statistics Indonesia adds that unemployment rate in urban areas is far higher than 
in rural areas, for example in February 2017 the unemployment rate in urban areas was 
6.5 per cent and in rural areas was 4 per cent (Kontan, 2018). This is in line with Clark et 
al. (2012) who argue that areas with low unemployment rates which have a labour market 
with relatively lower levels of search frictions make it easier for individuals to sort into 
an occupation with a required level of education that matches theirs. Besides, more than 
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60 per cent of the sample in the present study live in urban areas which have higher 
proportion of overeducation. 
Finally, the last variable is capital city. It is interesting that the coefficient changes from 
positive and significant in 2000 to negative and significant in 2014. The hypothesis of the 
variable is that workers in urban areas or the capital province (which has high 
unemployment rate) have a higher risk of being overeducated. One of the possible reasons 
is improvement in the economy goes in line with rapid technological change. DKI Jakarta 
is the capital city as well as the centre of the country’s politics and businesses. Most 
headquarter offices are strategically located there, thus the need for workers with higher 
education qualifications increases recently in line with the rapid development in 
technological changes in the labour market (Employment Policy Forum, 2018). 
 
4.4.3 Estimation Result by Gender 
The present study separates the analysis by gender since gender disparity occurs in 
Indonesia. The disparity could occur in terms of education levels and wages. In terms of 
education level, females have a slightly higher average of education attainment than 
males. The average years of schooling of females in 2000 was 9.73 years, compared to 
9.68 years for males. In 2014, the average was 11.83 years for females and 11.33 years 
for males. The return to education for females is higher than for males, particularly for 
senior high school and university graduates. This finding is inconsistent with Becker’s 
employer taste model (Becker, 1971). This is possibly because of self-selection: a more 
limited supply of skilled female workers and different technological requirements in 
female-dominated and male-dominated jobs (Chapter 3 finding). In terms of the mismatch 
proportion (Table 4.6), an increase in undereducation and a decrease in overeducation 
occur when the sample is separated by gender. Yet, both females and males generally 
experience the same trend. 
In terms of mismatch determinants (Table 4.11), this section will highlight several 
variables related to gender differences: marital status and the presence of young children. 
It is worth noting that besides those variables, the model includes ethnicity, age, job 
tenure, job status, industries, and area variables as the control variables in order to limit 
omitted variable bias.  
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In terms of undereducation, married and cohabitate status and the other marital status’ 
coefficients are positive and significant, implies workers with those marital statuses have 
higher probability to be undereducated. This result is in line with the main model. In 
contrast, for overeducation, married and cohabitate status’ coefficients are negative and 
significant for males and females in both periods. In other words, both married workers 
have lower probability to be overeducated. In similar vein, McGoldrick and Robst (1996) 
reject the hypothesis of differential over-qualification; instead, it appears that the large 
number of vacancies in large labour markets is offset by a larger number of job searchers. 
With regards to job vacancy and the number of job seekers, Figure 2.13 shows that the 
number of vacancies for university graduates slightly exceeds the number of job seekers 
in 2011.  
Furthermore, female workers who have young children had lower probability to be 
undereducated in 2000 and 2014; and had also lower probability to be overeducated in 
2000. Schaner and Das (2016) points out that many Indonesian women exit waged work 
due to family and childcare constraints. As such, a possible explanation for the negative 
relationship between the presence of young children in the household and the likelihood 
of undereducation/overeducation is because these workers prefer to exit the waged work 
rather than being overeducated or undereducated.  
 
4.4.4 Estimation Result by Sector  
Similar to gender analysis, sectoral disparity also occurs in Indonesia. One of the key 
findings of Chapter 3 is that the public sector has a higher return to education than the 
private sector. The average education level in the public sector is significantly higher than 
in the private sector in both periods. In 2000, the average education in the public and 
private sectors were 12.71 years and 9.14 years, respectively. In 2014, the average 
education in the public sector became 14.64 years while the private sector only reaches 
10.92 years. The public sector also has substantially longer job tenure and older workers 
(on average) than the private sector. Moreover, the public sector has had many changes 
in regulations related to the education requirements for civil servants (the government 
regulation 11/201754) and certification of professions (the government regulation 
 
54 The government regulation of 11/2017 regulates the requirements for civil servants’ applicants, such as 
ageing 18 – 35 years old and having coherent education background with the job requirements.  
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74/2008). Thus, the determinants could be different. The present study will discuss the 
difference further in this part. 
In terms of the education mismatch proportion, the private sector retains a similar pattern 
with all individuals. Meanwhile, the public sector has a contrary result; there is an 
increase in overeducation and a decrease in undereducation. The existing requirements or 
regulations can be an explanation for this. For instance, the Government Regulation 
30/2015 states entry ranks are mainly determined by education level, and increases in 
rank are largely driven by seniority, with the maximum rank depending on the entry-level 
of the civil servant. More specifically, an undergraduate entry-level is IIIA and a master’s 
is IIIB. In terms of wages, IIIB with 0-year experience receives a slightly higher wage 
(around GBP 7 per month) compared to IIIA with 0-year experience. Thus, workers with 
master’s degrees still have an incentive (higher wages) to apply for the same position 
compared to those with undergraduate degree.   
Table 4.12 shows several variables that determine undereducation in the public sector: 
sex and ethnicity. For overeducation in 2000, there were some determinants such as sex, 
marital status, age and age square, part time, industry dummy (social services) as well as 
urban and capital residence. In 2014, personal characteristic variables seem to no longer 
affect the determinants, but only several industry dummies, firm size and urban residence 
variables. As the public sector has its own mechanism of remuneration, recruitment and 
promotion (explained in Chapter 2), thus other factors (outside variables observed in the 
present study) may have a bigger effect on determining the undereducation and 
overeducation. Meanwhile, determinants of education mismatch in the private sector are 
similar throughout all individuals, as the sample is dominated by private sector workers 
(more than 80 per cent of total sample). Again, the present study finds that the 
determinants of overeducation are very sensitive in response to sector analysis.    
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Table 4.11: Determinants of Education Mismatch by Gender, 2000 and 2014 
Gender  
Males Females 
2000 2014 2000 2014 
Coef. SE P>z ME Coef. SE P>z ME Coef. SE P>z ME Coef. SE P>z ME 
UE                           
Married and 
cohabitate 0.284 0.166 * 0.03 0.183 0.120   0.04 0.331 0.218  0.04 0.871 0.160 *** 0.16 
Other 
(Separated, 
divorced and 
widowed) 0.541 0.441   0.06 0.179 0.247   0.05 0.526 0.293 * 0.07 0.923 0.220 *** 0.17 
Ethnicity 
(1=Javanese) -0.254 0.104 ** -0.02 0.061 0.073   0.01 0.171 0.155  0.02 -0.094 0.092  -0.01 
Age -0.171 0.042 *** 0.00 -0.072 0.031 ** -0.00 -0.028 0.058  0.00 -0.068 0.039 * -0.00 
Age squared 0.002 0.001 ***  0.001 0.000 ***  0.000 0.001   0.001 0.001 **  
Young children 
(0-5 years old) 0.124 0.131   0.02 -0.114 0.068  * -0.02 -0.324 0.215  -0.02 -0.176 0.093 * -0.03 
Tenure 0.025 0.022   0.00 -0.006 0.016   -0.00 0.063 0.030 ** 0.01 -0.016 0.019  -0.00 
Tenure squared 0.000 0.001    -0.000 0.001    -0.001 0.001   0.000 0.001   
Status: part time -0.109 0.160   -0.00 -0.250 0.114 ** -0.03 0.745 0.181 *** 0.08 0.219 0.115 * 0.05 
Sector: private -0.042 0.156   -0.02 0.629 0.141 *** 0.13 -0.012 0.247  -0.01 0.929 0.184 *** 0.16 
Industry2: 
mining and 
quarrying 2.942 1.025 *** 0.27 1.521 0.241 *** 0.26 -8.627 1125.71  -0.85 1.319 0.975  0.20 
Industry3: 
manufacturing 4.257 0.720 *** 0.41 1.415 0.163 *** 0.26 4.044 1.025 *** 0.38 2.244 0.240 *** 0.37 
Industry4: 
electricity, gas 
and water 5.757 0.816 *** 0.58 1.009 0.314 *** 0.19 -8.777 982.738  -0.84 -11.43 595.72  -1.82 
Industry5: 
construction 1.509 0.821 * 0.14 -0.898 0.270 *** -0.15 4.198 1.267 *** 0.38 0.488 0.821  0.04 
Industry6: 
wholesale, retail, 
restaurants and 
hotels 5.536 0.720 *** 0.57 1.148 0.166 *** 0.20 6.319 1.023 *** 0.61 1.681 0.240 *** 0.27 
Industry7: 
transportation, 
storage, and 
communications 2.861 0.783 *** 0.26 1.388 0.210 *** 0.24 3.862 1.473 *** 0.36 1.280 0.630 ** 0.20 
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Industry8: 
Finance, 
insurance, real 
estate and 
business services 4.431 0.820 *** 0.43 0.510 0.211  ** 0.08 3.252 1.450 ** 0.30 1.009 0.352 *** 0.12 
Industry9: Social 
services 4.411 0.717 *** 0.45 0.904 0.161 *** 0.15 4.022 1.019 *** 0.39 0.511 0.232 ** 0.07 
Firm size2: 20-
99 people -0.566 0.137 *** -0.06 -0.607 0.090 *** -0.10 -0.248 0.190  -0.03 -0.226 0.122 * -0.05 
Firm size3: >= 
100 people -0.873 0.212 *** -0.09 -0.843 0.103 *** -0.15 0.233 0.241  0.01 -0.236 0.134 * -0.05 
Urban -0.179 0.115   -0.03 -0.254 0.082 *** -0.06 -0.233 0.167  -0.03 -0.467 0.103 *** -0.09 
Capital 0.184 0.156   0.01 0.112 0.126   0.03 -0.436 0.225 * -0.04 -0.130 0.176  -0.02 
Constants -2.677 0.959 ***   -1.218 0.521 **   -6.013 1.358 ***   -2.445 0.640 ***   
                            
OE                           
Married and 
cohabitate -0.265 0.110 ** -0.06 -0.306 0.123  ** -0.05 -0.417 0.155 *** -0.07 -0.759 0.156 *** -0.12 
Other 
(Separated, 
divorced and 
widowed) -0.340 0.329   -0.08 -0.561 0.305 * -0.09 -1.267 0.299 *** -0.20 -0.812 0.259 *** -0.13 
Ethnicity 
(1=Javanese) -0.094 0.076   -0.01 0.062 0.077  0.01 -0.200 0.121 * -0.03 -0.064 0.104  -0.01 
Age 0.118 0.032 *** 0.00 0.085 0.035 ** 0.00 0.257 0.055 *** 0.00 0.207 0.048 *** 0.03 
Age squared -0.002 0.000 ***  -0.001 0.000 **  -0.004 0.001 ***  -0.003 0.001 ***  
Young children 
(0-5 years old) -0.172 0.099 * -0.04 0.035 0.067   0.01 -0.530 0.179 *** -0.07 0.004 0.096  0.01 
Tenure -0.061 0.016 *** -0.01 -0.027 0.017 * -0.00 0.005 0.031  0.00 0.012 0.024  0.00 
Tenure squared 0.001 0.001 **  0.000 0.001    -0.002 0.001   -0.001 0.001   
Status: part time -0.331 0.121 *** -0.06 -0.305 0.119 ** -0.04 -0.458 0.171 *** -0.08 -0.516 0.132 *** -0.07 
Sector: private -0.784 0.121 *** -0.15 -0.786 0.113 *** -0.14 -0.785 0.185 *** -0.11 -0.414 0.136 *** -0.08 
Industry2: 
mining and 
quarrying 0.572 0.306 * 0.03 -0.292 0.266  -0.10 2.212 1.384  0.48 0.203 0.931  0.00 
Industry3: 
manufacturing -0.156 0.122   -0.15 -0.938 0.159 *** -0.19 0.204 0.201  0.04 -0.851 0.275 *** -0.17 
Industry4: 
electricity, gas 
and water -0.946 0.543 * -0.34 -0.708 0.358 ** -0.14 1.057 0.950  0.31 1.275 1.033  0.46 
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Industry5: 
construction 0.068 0.128   -0.03 0.090 0.169  0.05 1.036 0.435 ** 0.08 1.353 0.523 *** 0.16 
Industry6: 
wholesale, retail, 
restaurants and 
hotels -1.344 0.192 *** -0.41 -0.509 0.157 *** -0.12 -0.934 0.265 *** -0.25 -0.242 0.259  -0.08 
Industry7: 
transportation, 
storage, and 
communications 0.537 0.147 *** 0.03 -0.531 0.233 ** -0.13 0.283 0.553  -0.03 0.234 0.557  -0.00 
Industry8: 
Finance, 
insurance, real 
estate and 
business services -0.069 0.294   -0.13 0.200 0.165   0.11 0.162 0.402  0.04 1.344 0.289 *** 0.14 
Industry9: Social 
services -0.827 0.122 *** -0.28 -0.227 0.137 * -0.07 -0.724 0.204 *** -0.18 0.266 0.235  0.02 
Firm size2: 20-
99 people 0.205 0.090 ** 0.05 0.152 0.089 *  0.04 0.261 0.137 * 0.04 0.357 0.120 *** 0.05 
Firm size3: >= 
100 people 0.293 0.132 ** 0.08 0.447 0.102 *** 0.10 0.647 0.173 *** 0.09 0.673 0.146 *** 0.10 
Urban 0.535 0.083 *** 0.11 0.464 0.092 ** 0.08 0.593 0.147 *** 0.09 0.724 0.131 *** 0.10 
Capital 0.414 0.117 *** 0.07 -0.299 0.137 *** -0.05 0.213 0.159  0.04 -0.031 0.180  -0.00 
Constants -1.163 0.492 **   -1.809 0.570     -3.663 0.824 ***   -4.623 0.792 ***   
                            
Number of obs. 4204      5155      2181     3334     
LR chi2(44) 1042.6      705.1      677     848.08     
Prob > chi2 0      0      0     0     
Pseudo R2 0.1287       0.070       
0.173
6       0.1306       
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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Table 4.12: Determinants of Education Mismatch by Sector, 2000 and 2014 
Gender  
Private Public 
2000 2014 2000 2014 
Coef. SE P>z ME Coef. SE P>z ME Coef. SE P>z ME Coef. SE P>z ME 
UE                          
Sex (1=Female) -0.447 0.100 *** -0.03 0.112 0.063  * 0.02 -0.574 0.225 ** -0.05 -0.523 0.198 *** -0.05 
Married and 
cohabitate 0.303 0.135 ** 0.04 0.413 0.098 *** 0.09 0.795 0.548  0.11 0.155 0.414  0.02 
Other (Separated, 
divorced and 
widowed) 0.565 0.234 ** 0.07 0.435 0.161 *** 0.10 1.214 0.714 * 0.19 0.447 0.602  0.04 
Ethnicity 
(1=Javanese) 0.072 0.097   0.01 -0.026 0.060   -0.00 -0.878 0.203 *** -0.09 0.092 0.195  0.00 
Age -0.104 0.037 *** 0.00 -0.069 0.025 *** 0.00 -0.117 0.125  0.00 0.128 0.108  0.00 
Age squared 0.001 0.001 **  0.001 0.000 ***  0.002 0.002   -0.001 0.001   
Young children 
(0-5 years old) -0.039 0.126   0.00 -0.126 0.056 **  -0.02 -0.088 0.241  -0.00 -0.300 0.186  -0.02 
Tenure 0.040 0.020 ** 0.00 -0.012 0.013   0.00 -0.006 0.043  -0.00 -0.075 0.038 * -0.00 
Tenure squared 0.000 0.001    0.000 0.013    0.000 0.001   0.002 0.001   
Status: part time 0.327 0.130 ** 0.04 0.008 0.085   0.01 -0.088 0.262  -0.01 -0.287 0.218  -0.00 
Industry2: mining 
and quarrying 2.893 0.937 *** 0.25 1.499 0.236 *** 0.27 15.467 7994.62  1.20 1.383 0.774 * 0.14 
Industry3: 
manufacturing 4.130 0.590 *** 0.39 1.841 0.138 *** 0.35 14.789 693.23  1.68 0.652 0.798  0.11 
Industry4: 
electricity, gas and 
water 5.619 0.754 *** 0.53 1.124 0.314 *** 0.21 16.821 693.23  1.92 -0.531 1.190  -0.03 
Industry5: 
construction 1.801 0.683 *** 0.16 -0.656 0.252  *** -0.13 0.421 1546.01  0.02 -13.047 683.37  -1.16 
Industry6: 
wholesale, retail, 
restaurants and 
hotels 5.799 0.589 *** 0.57 1.390 0.140 *** 0.26 16.775 693.227  1.90 2.041 1.001 ** 0.23 
Industry7: 
transportation, 
storage, and 
communications 2.690 0.686 *** 0.24 1.533 0.193 *** 0.28 15.242 693.227  1.71 -12.107 444.23  -1.12 
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Industry8: 
Finance, 
insurance, real 
estate and business 
services 4.130 0.702 *** 0.39 0.736 0.184  *** 0.11 15.349 693.228  1.71 -0.648 1.163  -0.10 
Industry9: Social 
services 4.209 0.588 *** 0.41 0.750 0.136 *** 0.13 15.404 693.227  1.77 -0.010 0.508  -0.02 
Firm size2: 20-99 
people -0.203 0.122 * -0.03 -0.471 0.077 *** -0.09 -1.424 0.279 *** -0.16 -0.280 0.204  -0.03 
Firm size3: >= 100 
people -0.228 0.163   -0.04 -0.640 0.083 *** -0.13 -1.375 0.495 *** -0.14 -0.000 0.280  -0.03 
Urban -0.197 0.106 ** -0.03 -0.407 0.067 *** -0.09 -0.109 0.207  -0.03 0.041 0.198  0.01 
Capital -0.027 0.133   -0.01 0.023 0.103   0.01 0.101 0.472  0.02 -0.057 0.570  -0.01 
Constants -4.033 0.793 ***   -0.965 0.403 **   -14.733 693.230    -3.978 1.94 **   
                           
OE                          
Sex (1=Female) -0.401 0.078 *** -0.06 0.040 0.076   0.00 -0.392 0.173 ** -0.05 -0.178 0.132  -0.02 
Married and 
cohabitate -0.309 0.094 *** -0.06 -0.571 0.105 *** -0.09 -0.596 0.302 ** -0.13 -0.155 0.250  -0.03 
Other (Separated, 
divorced and 
widowed) -0.845 0.226 *** -0.16 -0.790 0.218 *** -0.12 -1.531 0.638 ** -0.31 -0.097 0.432  -0.03 
Ethnicity 
(1=Javanese) -0.120 0.070 * -0.02 -0.045 0.069   -0.00 -0.222 0.159  -0.01 0.111 0.137  0.02 
Age 0.187 0.030 *** 0.00 0.147 0.031 *** 0.02 0.167 0.090 * 0.00 0.077 0.074  0.00 
Age squared -0.003 0.000 ***  -0.002 0.000 ***  -0.002 0.001 *  -0.000 0.000   
Young children 
(0-5 years old) -0.248 0.095 *** -0.04 0.064 0.063   0.01 -0.278 0.207  -0.05 -0.083 0.112  -0.01 
Tenure -0.048 0.016 *** -0.01 -0.001 0.017   -0.00 -0.037 0.036  -0.01 -0.048 0.029 * -0.01 
Tenure squared 0.001 0.001    -0.001 0.001    0.000 0.001   0.000 0.001   
Status: part time -0.293 0.106 *** -0.06 -0.202 0.101 * -0.03 -0.719 0.251 *** -0.12 -0.883 0.169 *** -0.16 
Industry2: mining 
and quarrying 0.653 0.308 ** 0.05 -0.112 0.278   -0.06 16.73 3832.79  2.41 -0.378 0.665  -0.12 
Industry3: 
manufacturing -0.046 0.108   -0.10 -0.823 0.145 *** -0.17 -0.480 0.431  -0.56 -1.578 0.780 ** -0.32 
Industry4: 
electricity, gas and 
water -0.396 0.578   -0.20 -0.506 0.387  -0.10 -0.690 0.779  -0.67 -0.680 0.710  -0.11 
Industry5: 
construction 0.207 0.125 * 0.00 0.417 0.162 *** 0.08 0.777 0.552  0.12 -1.717 1.174  -0.08 
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Industry6: 
wholesale, retail, 
restaurants and 
hotels -1.229 0.160 *** -0.35 -0.391 0.138 *** -0.10 -0.410 0.622  -0.62 -1.439 1.220  -0.34 
Industry7: 
transportation, 
storage, and 
communications 0.662 0.147 *** 0.06 -0.393 0.227 * -0.10 0.191 0.467  0.46 -0.058 0.699  -0.37 
Industry8: 
Finance, 
insurance, real 
estate and business 
services -0.109 0.261   -0.11 0.490 0.151  *** 0.03 0.454 0.622  0.42 0.973 0.477  0.21 
Industry9: Social 
services -0.774 0.113 *** -0.23 -0.022 0.126  -0.03 -1.130 0.287 *** -0.70 -0.590 0.309 ** -0.11 
Firm size2: 20-99 
people 0.329 0.084 *** 0.06 0.129 0.083 *** 0.05 -0.166 0.172  0.02 0.191 0.143  0.05 
Firm size3: >= 100 
people 0.625 0.113 *** 0.12 0.274 0.096 *** 0.08 -0.383 0.288  -0.02 0.873 0.179 *** 0.17 
Urban 0.545 0.079 *** 0.10 0.437 0.088 *** 0.08 0.616 0.185 *** 0.11 0.559 0.145 *** 0.11 
Capital 0.260 0.099 *** 0.05 -0.256 0.116 ** -0.03 1.054 0.296 *** 0.18 0.214 0.326  0.04 
Constants -2.944 0.441 ***   -3.710 0.499 ***   -2.207 1.507    -1.502 1.296    
                           
Number of obs. 5379      7084      1006     1405     
LR chi2(44) 1497.9      873.14      276.24     217.73     
Prob > chi2 0      0      0     0     
Pseudo R2 0.1482       0.071       0.1405       0.0840       
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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4.5 The Sensitivity Test of the Results  
4.5.1 Multinomial Logit/MNL Model (Mean) 
The first sensitivity test is conducted by comparing the mode and mean results, as most 
studies use mean as a base of their analysis (see Sicherman, 1991; Kiker et al., 1997; 
Chevalier, 2000; Nazara and Safuan, 2005; and ILO, 2017b). Mean and mode are 
different by definition, as mean refers to the average value or the sum of all of the given 
data which is then divided by the number of data entry or observation while mode refers 
to the number that occurs most often in the category. Commonly the mean, median, and 
mode of a normal distribution are equal. However, the distributions of educational 
attainment are potential non-normally distributed, this could indicate there is a case for 
looking at the different measures of central tendency in the defining over-education. 
In terms of the mismatch determinants, it seems that the set of variables are sensitive to 
the method used, as different method gives different result of the determinants (Table 
4.13). However, most of the variables are still significant in determining education 
mismatch in Indonesia; some variables which have different results are sex, ethnicity, age 
and age square, young children, and part time (job status).   
Table 4.13: Determinants of Education Mismatch, MNL (Mean), 2000 and 2014 
Mean 
2000 2014 
Coef. SE P>z ME Coef. SE P>z ME 
UE               
Sex (1=Female) -0.237 0.092 *** -0.02 0.295 0.070 *** 0.04 
Married and cohabitate 0.216 0.130 * 0.03 0.388 0.116 *** 0.06 
Other (Separated, 
divorced and widowed) 0.468 0.214 ** 0.07 0.657 0.171 *** 0.09 
Ethnicity (1=Javanese) -0.056 0.084   -0.00 -0.193 0.066 *** -0.02 
Age 0.002 0.034   0.00 -0.023 0.028   -0.01 
Age squared 0.000 0.000    0.001 0.000 ***  
Young children (0-5 
years old) 0.015 0.106   0.01 -0.160 0.063 ** -0.02 
Tenure 0.039 0.017 ** 0.00 -0.026 0.013 * 0.00 
Tenure squared 0.000 0.001    0.001 0.000    
Status: part time 0.112 0.113   0.02 0.066 0.087   0.01 
Sector: private 0.216 0.127 * 0.04 1.715 0.154 *** 0.22 
Industry2: mining and 
quarrying 3.343 0.661 *** 0.07 0.873 0.282 *** 0.11 
Industry3: manufacturing 3.643 0.461 *** 0.12 1.532 0.151 *** 0.20 
Industry4: electricity, gas 
and water 4.752 0.605 *** 0.27 0.788 0.367 ** 0.11 
Industry5: construction 1.245 0.575 ** 0.01 2.228 0.187 *** 0.24 
Industry6: wholesale, 
retail, restaurants and 
hotels 4.739 0.461 *** 0.30 0.942 0.155 *** 0.12 
Industry7: transportation, 
storage, and 
communications 5.218 0.470 *** 0.32 1.020 0.225 *** 0.13 
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Industry8: Finance, 
insurance, real estate and 
business services 3.428 0.590 *** 0.10 0.301 0.220   0.03 
Industry9: Social services 3.937 0.457 *** 0.16 0.794 0.148 *** 0.10 
Firm size2: 20-99 people -0.340 0.107 *** -0.04 -0.481 0.084 *** -0.06 
Firm size3: >= 100 
people -0.611 0.159 *** -0.06 -0.937 0.101 *** -0.12 
Urban -0.322 0.090 *** -0.05 -0.460 0.072 *** -0.06 
Capital -0.094 0.127   -0.01 -0.172 0.124   -0.01 
Constants -5.833 0.694 ***   -4.220 0.472 ***   
                
OE               
Sex (1=Female) -0.276 0.083 *** -0.03 -0.111 0.070   -0.02 
Married and cohabitate -0.428 0.103 *** -0.06 -0.596 0.101 *** -0.08 
Other (Separated, 
divorced and widowed) -1.064 0.266 *** -0.13 -0.691 0.206 *** -0.10 
Ethnicity (1=Javanese) -0.202 0.074 *** -0.03 -0.019 0.065   0.00 
Age 0.318 0.033 *** 0.00 0.128 0.029 *** 0.02 
Age squared -0.005 0.000 ***  -0.002 0.000 ***  
Young children (0-5 
years old) -0.277 0.103 *** -0.04 0.032 0.058   0.01 
Tenure -0.056 0.016 *** -0.01 -0.006 0.014   0.00 
Tenure squared 0.001 0.001    -0.001 0.001    
Status: part time -0.583 0.126 *** -0.07 -0.334 0.095 *** -0.04 
Sector: private -0.866 0.110 *** -0.13 -0.809 0.092 *** -0.13 
Industry2: mining and 
quarrying 0.930 0.339 *** 0.14 -0.194 0.249   -0.04 
Industry3: manufacturing 0.060 0.130   -0.01 -0.862 0.142 *** -0.13 
Industry4: electricity, gas 
and water 0.154 0.447   -0.03 -0.649 0.362 * -0.09 
Industry5: construction 0.307 0.148 ** 0.05 1.188 0.173 *** 0.10 
Industry6: wholesale, 
retail, restaurants and 
hotels -0.835 0.177 *** -0.12 -0.472 0.139 *** -0.08 
Industry7: transportation, 
storage, and 
communications 0.906 0.176 *** 0.06 -0.508 0.222 ** -0.08 
Industry8: Finance, 
insurance, real estate and 
business services -0.024 0.265   -0.02 0.193 0.151   0.02 
Industry9: Social services -0.292 0.127 ** -0.06 -0.265 0.124 ** -0.05 
Firm size2: 20-99 people 0.272 0.086 *** 0.04 0.328 0.076 *** 0.05 
Firm size3: >= 100 
people 0.407 0.117 *** 0.07 0.582 0.086 *** 0.09 
Urban 0.790 0.089 *** 0.10 0.471 0.079 *** 0.07 
Capital 0.194 0.103 * 0.03 -0.385 0.120 *** -0.04 
Constants -5.530 0.527 ***   -2.929 0.485 ***   
                
Number of obs. 6385      8489      
LR chi2(46) 1270.34      1465.26      
Prob > chi2 0      0      
Pseudo R2 0.1222       0.1017       
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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4.5.2 Multinomial Probit/MNP Model 
To test the sensitivity of the results, the present study carries out the multinomial probit 
(MNP) model and compares the results with those from MNL. Table 4.14 shows the 
results of MNP for both periods. By comparing Table 4.14 and Table 4.10 it is apparent 
that the patterns of coefficient variables for both undereducation and overeducation are 
similar in the significance, except for several variables such as urban (UE) and ethnicity 
(UE). In terms of the marginal effects, the values are relatively similar for both MNL and 
MNP models. Hence, the interpretations of the results are similar for MNL and MNP. 
The results also show that MNL estimation performs as well as (if not better than) MNP; 
and is in line with the previous study such as Dow and Endersby (2004). Therefore, the 
conclusion in general is the same: the mismatch is determined by workers’ and job’s 
characteristics (the Assignment Model). 
Table 4.14: Determinants of Education Mismatch: MNP (Mode), 2000 and 2014 
MNP 
2000 2014 
Coef. SE P>z ME Coef. SE P>z ME 
UE               
Sex (1=Female) -0.377 0.067 *** -0.04 0.017 0.047   0.01 
Married and 
cohabitate 0.195 0.095 ** 0.03 0.295 0.073 *** 0.08 
Other (Separated, 
divorced and 
widowed) 0.404 0.167 ** 0.08 0.333 0.125 *** 0.09 
Ethnicity 
(1=Javanese) -0.109 0.063 * -0.01 0.004 0.045   0.00 
Age -0.077 0.025 *** -0.00 -0.039 0.019 ** -0.00 
Age squared 0.001 0.000 ***  0.001 0.000 ***  
Young children 
(0-5 years old) -0.011 0.081   -0.01 -0.114 0.042 *** -0.03 
Tenure 0.022 0.013 * 0.00 -0.014 0.009  -0.00 
Tenure squared 0.000 0.000    0.000 0.000    
Status: part time 0.126 0.087   0.03 -0.086 0.062   -0.00 
Sector: private -0.087 0.096   -0.02 0.477 0.079 *** 0.12 
Industry2: mining 
and quarrying 1.566 0.501 *** 0.03 1.116 0.178 *** 0.23 
Industry3: 
manufacturing 2.326 0.257 *** 0.12 1.279 0.100 *** 0.30 
Industry4: 
electricity, gas 
and water 3.311 0.396 *** 0.37 0.696 0.233 *** 0.14 
Industry5: 
construction 0.939 0.305 *** 0.01 -0.484 0.164 
***
  -0.05 
Industry6: 
wholesale, retail, 
restaurants and 
hotels 3.517 0.258 *** 0.46 0.947 0.100 *** 0.19 
Industry7: 
transportation, 1.604 0.305 *** 0.03 1.014 0.148 *** 0.21 
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storage, and 
communications 
Industry8: 
Finance, 
insurance, real 
estate and 
business services 2.282 0.355 *** 0.11 0.486 0.130 
***
  0.05 
Industry9: Social 
services 2.312 0.254 *** 0.16 0.474 0.096 *** 0.08 
Firm size2: 20-99 
people -0.260 0.078 *** -0.04 -0.340 0.056 *** -0.08 
Firm size3: >= 
100 people -0.240 0.109 ** -0.05 -0.415 0.063 *** -0.11 
Urban -0.095 0.070   -0.03 -0.232 0.051 *** -0.07 
Capital -0.001 0.092   -0.01 0.001 0.080   0.01 
Constants -2.025 0.455 ***   -1.376 0.312 ***   
                
OE               
Sex (1=Female) -0.341 0.056 *** -0.06 -0.028 0.050  -0.01 
Married and 
cohabitate -0.232 0.074 *** -0.06 -0.345 0.074 *** -0.09 
Other (Separated, 
divorced and 
widowed) -0.656 0.162 *** -0.15 -0.464 0.142 *** -0.11 
Ethnicity 
(1=Javanese) -0.107 0.052 ** -0.02 0.009 0.047   0.01 
Age 0.106 0.021 *** 0.00 0.090 0.021 *** 0.02 
Age squared -0.002 0.000 ***  -0.001 0.000 ***  
Young children 
(0-5 years old) -0.216 0.068 *** -0.05 0.018 0.042   0.01 
Tenure -0.035 0.011 *** -0.01 -0.009 0.010   -0.00 
Tenure squared 0.000 0.000    0.000 0.000    
Status: part time -0.286 0.076 *** -0.07 -0.297 0.066 *** -0.05 
Sector: private -0.646 0.081 *** -0.15 -0.473 0.069 *** -0.13 
Industry2: mining 
and quarrying 0.618 0.260 ** 0.15 -0.062 0.192   -0.08 
Industry3: 
manufacturing 0.037 0.085   0.04 -0.576 0.101 *** -0.17 
Industry4: 
electricity, gas 
and water -0.316 0.347   -0.19 -0.357 0.252  -0.11 
Industry5: 
construction 0.188 0.102 * 0.04 0.191 0.126  0.06 
Industry6: 
wholesale, retail, 
restaurants and 
hotels -0.743 0.111 *** -0.28 -0.295 0.100 *** -0.11 
Industry7: 
transportation, 
storage, and 
communications 0.552 0.119 *** 0.13 -0.268 0.160 * -0.11 
Industry8: 
Finance, 
insurance, real 
estate and 
business services 0.079 0.198   0.02 -0.423 0.113 *** -0.08 
Industry9: Social 
services -0.595 0.084 *** -0.18 -0.072 0.090  -0.04 
Firm size2: 20-99 
people 0.191 0.061 *** 0.05 0.148 0.055 
***
  0.05 
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Firm size3: >= 
100 people 0.364 0.086 *** 0.10 0.347 0.064 *** 0.10 
Urban 0.429 0.058 *** 0.10 0.383 0.056 *** 0.08 
Capital 0.276 0.076 *** 0.06 -0.154 0.083 * -0.03 
Constants -1.184 0.331 ***   -2.027 0.343 ***   
                
Number of obs. 6385      8489      
Wald chi2(46) 1206.94      1160.54      
Prob > chi2 0       0       
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent. 
 
 
 
4.5.3 Adding Casual Workers 
Besides comparing different methods, the sensitivity could also be tested by adding 
another sample category, i.e. casual workers. However, due to the lack of data availability 
in the 2000 survey, the present study only performs this addition for the data from the 
2014 survey. The new model then adds another control variable (casual workers). The 
hypothesis of casual worker in the model is that the waged sector has better matches than 
casual worker, as per Chua and Chun’s argument (2016). 
Table 4.15 shows the sample distribution with casual workers where the number of 
observations increases from 8,489 to 10,594 individuals. On one hand, adding casual 
workers into the sample decreases undereducation proportion from 22.75 per cent to 21.8 
per cent. On the other hand, the addition increases overeducation proportion from 23.35 
per cent to 25.14 per cent. From 2,105 individuals of casual worker, 18 per cent is 
undereducated and 32.35 per cent is overeducated. Overall, this addition slightly increases 
the proportion of mismatch (overeducation and undereducation) from 46.1 per cent in 
2014 (the main model) to 46.94 per cent in the new model with casual workers added. 
Thus, adding casual workers data in the model increases the mismatch proportion. The 
summary statistics of related variables is provided in Appendix XV.     
In terms of mismatch determinants (Table 4.16), most of the variables have similar sign 
of coefficient and significance as well as similar value of marginal effect, except for some 
variables such as sex and young children presence for undereducation; and several 
industry dummies for overeducation. The results show that coefficient of casual worker 
is positive and significant for undereducation as well as negative and significant for 
overeducation, suggesting that casual workers are more likely to be undereducated, 
229 
 
relative to being matched. In this respect, Allen (2016) asserts that the majority of jobs 
created use short-term contracting arrangements or are in the informal sector. 
Employment quality is also a major issue and compliance with existing labour regulations 
is very low. Youth unemployment, skills shortages, and education/skills mismatches are 
also persistent challenges. 
Table 4.15: Sample Distribution with Casual Workers, 2014 
Match 
(Mode) Freq. Per cent Cum. 
UE 2,309 21.8 21.8 
M 5,622 53.07 74.86 
OE 2,663 25.14 100 
Total 10,594 100   
Source: The author’s calculation. 
 
Table 4.16: Determinants of Education Mismatch, MNL (Mean), 2000 and 2014 
Casual 
2014 
Coef. SE P>z ME 
UE        
Sex (1=Female) -0.095 0.055 * -0.01 
Married and cohabitate 0.363 0.089 *** 0.07 
Other (Separated, divorced and widowed) 0.346 0.141 ** 0.07 
Ethnicity (1=Javanese) 0.006 0.052   0.00 
Age -0.051 0.022 ** -0.00 
Age squared 0.001 0.000 ***  
Young children (0-5 years old) -0.070 0.050   -0.01 
Tenure -0.011 0.010   -0.00 
Tenure squared 0.000 0.000    
Status: part time -0.092 0.069   -0.00 
Sector: private 0.673 0.107 *** 0.12 
Industry2: mining and quarrying 0.772 0.226 *** 0.11 
Industry3: manufacturing 1.611 0.114 *** 0.29 
Industry4: electricity, gas and water 0.883 0.291 *** 0.14 
Industry5: construction -0.805 0.190 *** -0.06 
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and 
hotels 1.253 0.114 *** 0.22 
Industry7: transportation, storage, and 
communications 1.381 0.163 *** 0.25 
Industry8: Finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services 0.388 0.166 ** 0.04 
Industry9: Social services 0.739 0.108 *** 0.11 
Firm size2: 20-99 people -0.393 0.069 *** -0.06 
Firm size3: >= 100 people -0.483 0.078 *** -0.08 
Urban -0.121 0.059 ** -0.03 
Capital 0.060 0.093   0.02 
Casual 0.741 0.122 *** 0.13 
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Constants -1.748 0.362 ***   
         
OE        
Sex (1=Female) -0.221 0.056 *** -0.03 
Married and cohabitate -0.296 0.080 *** -0.07 
Other (Separated, divorced and widowed) -0.451 0.148 *** -0.09 
Ethnicity (1=Javanese) 0.071 0.050   0.01 
Age 0.084 0.021 *** -0.00 
Age squared -0.001 0.000 ***  
Young children (0-5 years old) 0.034 0.045   0.01 
Tenure -0.003 0.010   -0.00 
Tenure squared -0.001 0.000 *  
Status: part time -0.293 0.068 *** -0.04 
Sector: private -0.581 0.081 *** -0.13 
Industry2: mining and quarrying -0.408 0.198 ** -0.11 
Industry3: manufacturing -0.855 0.102 *** -0.22 
Industry4: electricity, gas and water -0.848 0.300 *** -0.19 
Industry5: construction 0.578 0.097 *** 0.15 
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and 
hotels -0.877 0.103 *** -0.21 
Industry7: transportation, storage, and 
communications -0.994 0.190 *** -0.23 
Industry8: Finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services 0.035 0.115   -0.01 
Industry9: Social services -0.557 0.084 *** -0.14 
Firm size2: 20-99 people 0.068 0.062   0.03 
Firm size3: >= 100 people 0.314 0.075 *** 0.08 
Urban 0.240 0.056 *** 0.05 
Capital -0.256 0.097 *** -0.04 
Casual -0.355 0.098 *** -0.09 
Constants -1.001 0.353 ***   
        
Number of obs. 10594      
LR chi2(48) 
1629.1
3      
Prob > chi2 0      
Pseudo R2 0.0757       
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent. 
231 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Throughout the literature on the economics of education, education mismatch is not a new 
issue in Indonesia but most of previous studies focus only on overeducation. This chapter 
has focused on answering the research questions i.e. does education mismatch (both 
undereducation and overeducation) exist in the waged sector in Indonesia? What are the 
estimated proportions of education mismatch in 2000 and 2014? And, how does education 
mismatch change between these periods? 
The results show that mismatch (both overeducation and undereducation) indeed 
increases in Indonesia in both years, i.e., 2000 and 2014; mismatch is a manifestation of 
undereducation. Around 53-58 per cent of the sample was in the match category for both 
periods. In 2000, the proportion of the undereducated was 13.6 per cent, which then 
increased to 22.8 per cent in 2014. The overeducation proportions in 2000 and 2014 were 
around 28.5 per cent and 23.4 per cent, respectively. Similar to overeducation, 
undereducation is inefficient for the economy because an increase in the incidence of 
undereducation could decrease productivity on average (Kampelmann and Rycx, 2012). 
Some possible explanations for the occurrence of overeducation/undereducation in 
Indonesia are firstly, the technological change (Oliveira, 2000) as the country’s economy 
experiences a rapid growth, a modernisation of the industrial structure, and an expansion 
in higher education. ILO (2017b) argues that the current wave of technological advances 
in Indonesia is happening at a much faster rate, which undoubtedly will have a major 
impact on the production processes and the organisation of work. Secondly, it is due to 
under-production and a high demand for workers with higher education qualifications, as 
Carnevale and Rose (2013) explains. Unfortunately, the present research is limited by the 
lack of available labour demand analysis. Figure 2.13 (data of registered job seekers and 
the number of vacancies) could give an indication of the supply and demand of labour 
where the number of vacancies for university graduates is higher than the number of job 
seekers, possibly causing the increase in the demand for workers with higher education 
qualifications to occur in Indonesia. Thirdly, the minimum wage policy possibly 
disheartens individuals from pursuing higher educations because the increase of 
minimum wage has a mixed effect to different groups of workers (Smeru, 2001). And 
finally, the weakness of the Realise Method (RM), particularly the change in the mode 
only reflects the change in average workers’ education and the measurement cannot 
observe this change because the jobs demand higher educations. 
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While Indonesia’s labour market experiences rapid technological development, that 
technology has resulted in a move up from unskilled to semi-skilled employment. In 
addition, both of vertical and horizontal mismatches occur in Indonesia, as Alisjahbana, 
et. al. (2017) found that most of the workers with science and engineering degrees are 
considered to be over-educated regardless of major, or only about 25 per cent to 44 per 
cent of the workers depending on major background and jobs held are considered to be 
adequately educated.  
Furthermore, the highest unemployment rate occurs to senior high school and vocational 
high school qualifications, and where labour with medium education qualifications is not 
optimally absorbed by the jobs available. On the demand side, most companies would 
hardly hire semi-skilled and high-skilled workers (Employment Policy Forum, 2018). 
Thus, the mismatch occurs not only as education-job mismatch, but also as education-
skill-job mismatch. It appears that mitigating these issues require government policies on 
scholarships for higher education or other education policies aimed at increasing 
participation in higher educations, improving compulsory education program, developing 
curriculum that is in line with the industries’ need, and promoting public-private 
collaboration to provide comprehensive and systematic training (internship) programs.  
In terms of the estimation technique, detailed education variable and occupation 
classification (as long as the minimum number of observations is retained: 30 observation 
for each category) are required to determine undereducation and overeducation 
objectively. The aims are to minimise heterogeneity and low observation problem in each 
occupation category. Moreover, estimating mismatch using the mode method is proven 
better than using the mean method, because mode is used commonly for categorical 
variable (like mismatch variable). Mode also has better estimates when the data are 
skewed or not normally distributed.  
The other research questions are: what are the variables that determine undereducation 
and/or overeducation? How does the aggregate trend of education mismatch change 
between 2000 and 2014? And are there any distinctions among gender and sectors?  
In terms of the sample’s sub-categories, sector substantially affects the mismatch; the 
private sector is the main contributor in the increase of undereducation whereas gender 
seems to have insignificant effect on mismatch. Different trends of mismatch are found 
in the public sector; there was an increase in overeducation and a decrease in 
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undereducation between 2000 and 2014 periods. It is possible that this is due to the change 
(adjustment) of regulations in public sector, for instance, the Government Regulation 
30/2015, entry ranks are mainly determined by education level, and increases in rank are 
largely driven by seniority, with the maximum rank depending on the entry-level of the 
civil servant. Furthermore, the public sector recently prefers to hire workers with high 
education levels; those with at least senior high school qualifications. For unskilled jobs 
such as cleaning, however, the public sector prefers outsourcing or using private firms’ 
services rather than hiring directly. 
In terms of determinants, the variables are slightly sensitive to the different methods used, 
the set of variables, the sector/gender and the periods. The results show that education 
mismatch in Indonesia is determined by personal and household characteristics, work 
related and firm size as well as area of residency variables which are all observed in this 
research and which is in line with the Assignment Models (mismatch is determined by 
workers’ and job’s characteristics).  
Therefore, the research implications are the estimation techniques and occupational 
categories could affect the analysis. As the assignment theory suggest, mismatch is 
determined by workers’ and job’s characteristics. Workers can minimise the incidence of 
mismatch by considering their characteristics. For instance, working in urban areas where 
education quality is relatively higher than in rural areas; in urban areas, most of the 
population have higher education attainment and the services sector demands highly 
qualified workers. Thus, those working in urban areas are less likely to be undereducated, 
though they are more likely to be overeducated. 
The present study is aware of the limitations in this chapter, such as: the mismatch is not 
only determined by individual factors and considering the demand for labour could 
improve the analysis from the labour supply and demand point of view. Information on 
the education requirements from firms could also provide a better measurement of the 
changes where the jobs demanded higher education qualifications. Moreover, it is 
necessary to conduct further study using the data on skills and subjects of study, hence 
addressing the vertical and horizontal mismatches. In addition, an impact analysis is 
usually related to issues in wage; this will be discussed further in the following chapter 
(Chapter 5). 
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Chapter 5 The effect of Education Mismatch on Wages in the Waged 
Sector in Indonesia 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In spite of the education expansion in Indonesia, education mismatch55 increases as driven 
by the increase in under-education (see Chapter 4). There are some possible reasons for 
this issue. On the supply side, the population with low education attainment is still far 
higher than those with higher education, meanwhile the quality of the education is still 
relatively low. On the demand side, the production technology in Indonesia changes 
rapidly and could affect more companies to prefer workers with higher educational 
qualifications (Allen, 2016). Allen and Kyloh (2016) argues that young people in 
Indonesia often leave school and enter the workforce with qualifications that do not match 
the needs of potential employers due to low education attainment or quality and poor 
career guidance. With an undereducated workforce, there is a risk of weaker productivity 
growth and a slower structural transition to higher value-added activities.  
Duncan and Hoffman (1981) develop the Over-Required-Undereducated (ORU) model, 
which is an extension of Mincer wage equation. In ORU model, education variables are 
decomposed into required years of schooling (REQ), years of deficit schooling or 
undereducated (UE), and years of surplus schooling or overeducated (OE). Previous 
empirical studies (such as: Daly et al. (2000) and Korpi and Tahlin (2007)) using Duncan 
and Hoffman’s model find one extra year of surplus schooling (overeducated) gains 
premium wages, since the coefficient of wage return to one-year surplus schooling is 
positive and significant. Meanwhile, one extra year of deficit schooling (undereducated) 
receives penalty wages.  
In Indonesia, there are several empirical researchers exploring this issue, yet most of them 
do not account for unobserved heterogeneity by using panel data analysis. Also, most of 
them only focus on the analysis on higher education, while one of the main challenges in 
Indonesia is the domination of workers with lower education levels in the labour market 
(see Chapter 2). In addition, the model used is the modified Verdugo and Verdugo model 
(1989). For instance, using just the data from one survey period (Sakernas of 2014), 
 
55 Education mismatch is measured by objective measures, i.e. calculating the mode and standard deviation, 
or known as realised method (RM). This measurement is in the definition in Chapter 4.  
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Alisjahbana et al. (2017) find that overeducated and undereducated workers receive lower 
wages compared to those with adequate educational levels for their jobs. This result is 
inconsistent with Duncan and Hoffman’s findings, since the model used is different (the 
Verdugo and Verdugo model).  
The present study contributes to the existing analysis on wages from the aspects of both 
the undereducation and overeducation in Indonesia, especially considering that 
undereducation is a rarely studied topic in Indonesia. Similarly, the present study 
contributes to the international literature on empirical evidence of Duncan and Hoffman’s 
findings in developing countries. Furthermore, the increasing trend of undereducation 
may decrease productivity on average. Thus, the analysis of education mismatch is a 
matter of public policy interest. Also, most of the previous studies in Indonesia use cross-
section models; as a result, the panel data used in the present study can contribute to 
enrich the method used to analyse wages and education mismatch in Indonesia.  
This chapter explores the relationship between mismatch incidence and wage by focusing 
on the vertical mismatch among workers in the waged sector by using panel analysis. The 
aims of this chapter are: to investigate the extent to which mismatch incidences affect 
wages; considering the unobserved heterogeneity, to see if mismatch incidences still 
affect  wages; to investigate the effect of gender and sector on returns associated with 
education mismatch; and to contribute to the existing literature on education mismatch 
and returns by taking into account the influence of unobserved heterogeneity. The 
research questions are: (5.1) does education mismatch (undereducation and/or 
overeducation) contribute to determining wages in Indonesia? (5.2) considering 
unobserved heterogeneity, does education mismatch still contribute to determining 
wages, and (5.3) do returns associated with education mismatch differ by gender and by 
sector?  
To estimate the wages, this research employs an extension of the Mincer wage equation 
as proposed by Duncan and Hoffman (1981) i.e. the ORU model with pooled OLS to 
answer research question 5.1, and with panel analysis to answer research question 5.2. 
There are several advantages of using the Duncan and Hoffman model. Firstly, the model 
can provide the estimates necessary to evaluate wages from the monetary perspective. 
Secondly, the model also allows the analysis of both the return to under-education and 
over-education. Thirdly, the model also has a better interpretation of mismatch-wage 
relationships, as it allows the analysis of premium wages to each additional surplus of 
education and penalty wages to each additional deficit of education, not just 
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overeducation and undereducation status. This is important since workers can have 
various years of overeducation/undereducation, for instance, workers with 1 year surplus 
of education may have different levels of wage compared to workers with 3 years surplus 
of education. Fourthly, the panel data model provides a major advantage as it can be used 
to deal with unobserved heterogeneity problem. Panel data model also accommodates 
individual effects such as cognitive ability and motivation which are otherwise given and 
assumed constant over time (Nielsen, 2014).  
This chapter uses the data from IFLS3 of 2000, IFLS4 of 2007, and IFLS5 of 2014 to 
answer the research questions. Adding the 2007 data has the benefit of increasing the 
number of individuals, so the data become more informative and the estimates become 
more reliable (Baltagi, 2015). Moreover, adding the 2007 wave narrows down the gap 
between periods of analysis, thus allowing the present study to analyse around 7 years 
period of change in wages in Indonesia. The waves were chosen to represent the condition 
before the education reform period (the data from 2000), during the initial period of the 
reform (the data from 2007) and after the reform (the data from 2014). To estimate the 
education mismatch, this research employs objective measures (realised method/RM) by 
calculating the mode and standard deviation (see Chapter 4).  
The present study also extends the analysis based on gender and sector, as previous 
chapters find that gender and sector have a substantial effect on wages and mismatch 
incidences. In terms of gender, the return to education for females is higher than that for 
males (Chapter 3 finding). Yet, gender seems to have an insignificant effect in 
determining education mismatch (Chapter 4 finding). Thus, it is interesting to further 
investigate the relationship between gender, mismatch and return associated with 
education mismatch. For instance, Duncan and Hoffman (1981) find that overeducated 
females tend to have lower return than males.   
In terms of sector, the public sector is very attractive in Indonesia. The ratio of job 
opportunities in the public sector to the number of applicants is around 1:200 (Sindo, 
2013). This is because the public sector pays higher wages than the private sector (Chapter 
3 finding). Moreover, Chapter 4 finds that there are different education mismatch trends. 
Generally, there is a decrease in overeducation and an increase in undereducation in the 
private sector. In contrast, the public sector experiences an increase in overeducation and 
a decrease in under-education. Thus, sectors may contribute to the difference in wages 
between overeducation and undereducation in Indonesia. Dolton and Vignoles (2000) 
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further that overeducated workers in the public sector earn less than the overeducated 
ones in the private sector due to the relatively less competitive nature of the public sector.  
The structure of Chapter 5 is organised as follows: Section 5.2 reviews various literature 
on mismatch and wage, including the persistence of mismatch. Section 5.3 explains the 
data and methods of the study. Section 5.4 discusses the estimation results. Finally, 
Section 5.5 presents the conclusion of this chapter.     
 
 
5.2 Literature Review 
Principally, this part will discuss the literature, both the theories and empirical evidence. 
The discussion is divided into several parts: related theories, the ORU model, empirical 
studies on mismatch and wage, the dynamic of wage and mismatch, as well as wage and 
education mismatch based on gender and sector.  
 
5.2.1 Related Theories 
Overeducation and undereducation approach provides a much more comprehensive 
picture of the returns from years of education in the labour market. These have the appeal 
which links the demand-side considerations into the typical supply-oriented human 
capital approach to wage determination (Dockery and Miller, 2012). The consequences 
of mismatch have mostly been addressed in terms of wages in the literature on the topic. 
In this part, the present study highlights several theories related to education mismatch 
and wage. Firstly, the human capital theory suggests that overeducated graduates will 
earn less than their education as their peers in graduate jobs, ceteris paribus (Dolton and 
Vignoles, 2000). This because overeducation may be a temporary consequence of 
graduate accepting lower-paid occupations which require fewer skills to increase their 
experience in the field to improve their chances of obtaining a more suitable job in the 
long term. Thus, the overeducated should not have any pay penalty inflicted upon them. 
Variations in the human capital theory relax the assumptions of perfect abilities of firms 
in adjusting their production technologies to changes in the relative supply of labour 
instantaneously. This hampers the firms’ abilities to fully utilise their workers’ education, 
restricts their productivity and lowers their wages (Cedefop, 2009).  
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The job competition model of Lester Thurow (Thurow, 1975) assumes a fixed 
productivity and education (skills) requirement. The choice of production techniques is 
also assumed not responsive to changes in the relative supply of different education 
(skills) groups. As a result, when individuals work below their education (skills) level, 
the individuals will have levels of wage and productivity that are identical to those of 
individuals whose level of education matches their education (skills) requirement. In 
other words, Thurow’s job competition model suggests that the return to surplus 
education is zero (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981). Similarly, institutional theory suggests 
that only job characteristics determine wages (Cedefop, 2009).  
The assignment theory and heterogeneous skill theory state that a worker’s wage is 
determined by both the required levels of education and the actual skills possessed. A 
close link between educational and skill mismatch is assumed in the assignment theory. 
The theory suggests that overeducated workers are unable to use all of their skills. Hence, 
they are less productive than similar individuals with jobs for which their educational 
attainment is appropriate (matched workers). In contrast, heterogeneous skill theory 
suggests a much weaker link between educational and skill mismatch. The main 
assumption is that there is a significant variability in terms of skills and (sometimes 
unobservable) abilities among individuals with the same level of schooling. In fact, the 
overeducated are less able individuals who actually match with their jobs in terms of skills 
and abilities. These lower returns are consistent with a scenario in which overeducated 
workers’ jobs are imposing an upper limit on the extent to which they can utilise their 
skills with this productivity ceiling reflected in lower wages (McGuinness, 2006).  
 
 
5.2.2 Wage Equation: Required-Under-Overeducated (ORU)  
Duncan and Hoffman Model 
One of the pioneering studies in measuring wage is conducted by Duncan and Hoffman 
(1981) by extending the Mincer wage equation56. The model is commonly called the 
standard Over-Required-Undereducated (ORU) specification. In the ORU model, 
education variables are decomposed into required years of schooling (REQ), years of 
deficit schooling (UE), and years of surplus schooling (OE). Most empirical research uses 
 
56 Similar to the model in Chapter 3.  
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this specification, such as Dolton and Vignoles (2000) and Nieto and Ramos (2017). 
Hartog (2000) points that Duncan and Hoffman’s model lacks a coherent theoretical 
framework. Nevertheless, the model has some advantages (as explained in Section 5.1) 
and it has proven itself as an extension of Mincer wage equation by passing statistical 
testing in several countries for several periods.  
Duncan and Hoffman’s model for pooled model across time is as follows: ln#!,# = %$ + %%	(!,&,#'( +%)	(!,&,#*( + %+	(!,&,#,(- 	+ ∑ %+.&K!,&,#/01% + +!,#  (5.1) 
where: 
ln #!,#: log of real hourly wage (similar dependent variable as Chapter 3),  (!,&,#23/: years of required schooling (equal to mean or mode if using objective measures) ,  (!,&,#43 : years of deficit schooling relative to the average level of education in the 
individual’s occupational category (refers to undereducation), (!,&,#53 : years of surplus schooling relative to the average level of education in the 
individual’s occupational category (refers to overeducation),  K: set or vector of other explanatory (control) variables, 
i is individual (i=1…I), n is the number of explanatory variables  %%: the estimated wage returns to one-year deficit schooling, %): the estimated wage 
returns to one year of surplus schooling, and	%+: the estimated wage returns to one year 
of required schooling.  
By applying the model and using the US data (the Panel Study of Income Dynamics in 
1976) with experience and experience-squared as well as city-size as control variables 
and residence in the south (location) as a dummy variable, Duncan and Hoffman (1981) 
find that the surplus of schooling coefficient (%)) is positive and significant and the deficit 
of schooling coefficient (%%) is negative and significant on wage. This implies that one 
extra year of surplus schooling (overeducated) still gains premium wages; while one extra 
year of deficit schooling (undereducated) receives penalty wages. In terms of coefficient 
values, Duncan and Hoffman find that wage return to one-year surplus schooling is 
approximately half as large as the wage return to one-year required schooling. 
Meanwhile, wage return to one-year deficit schooling is less than wage return to required 
schooling in absolute value. It is worth noting, the limitation in the interpretation of results 
obtained from this approach is that a positive coefficient on overeducation could in fact 
indicate systematic mismeasurement of required years of schooling, this because the 
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issues concerning endogeneity and measurement error, and the estimated return to 
required/under/overeducation cannot be interpreted as casual (Lauven and Oosterbeek, 
2011).   
Duncan and Hoffman also add that a plausible explanation for this is the productivity 
levels on the job are more variable in the US. This finding is also in line with the Human 
Capital theory’s prediction and it also appears to support an assignment model 
interpretation (Sattinger, 1993)57. Meanwhile, Dolton and Vignoles (2000) suggest that 
the positive return to surplus education may explain why individuals continue to invest 
in education although a significant number ends up being overeducated. In contrast, this 
finding rejects Thurow’s job competition model (Thurow, 1975) which suggests that only 
job characteristics, i.e. required education levels, determine earnings.  
 
Key Findings of ORU approach  
Hartog (2000) provides a review of empirical findings from the ORU approach and a 
discussion of the methodological issues. Hartog identifies four key findings from this 
literature: (1) the return from required years of schooling is higher than the return from 
actual years of schooling that is obtained from the standard Mincer wage equation; (2) 
returns from years of surplus schooling are positive, but smaller than returns from years 
of required education; (3) returns from years of deficit schooling are negative but always 
smaller in absolute value than the returns from required education; and (4) these findings 
are robust to different methods of measuring the required education for an occupation, 
including job content analysis, worker self-assessment and realised matches.  
 
Alternative Model: Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) 
In the development, there are some modifications to Duncan and Hoffman’s model. For 
instance, Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) modify the ORU equation by replacing years of 
deficit schooling and years of surplus schooling by dummy variables of undereducation 
and overeducation. The model is as follows: ln#!,# = %$ + %%	()**+_-!,#&'+%(	()**+_-!,#)' + %*	-!,#,+ 	+ ∑ %*,-K!,+,#.-/% + 0!,# (5.2) 
where:  
 
57 whereby workers’ wages are determined in part by the jobs they are doing.  
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,-../_(!,#43: dummy for undereducated; 1 if the nth individual is undereducated, and 0 
otherwise; ,-../_(!,#53: dummy for overeducated; 1 if the nth individual is 
overeducated, and 0 otherwise; and (& is t 
he years of actual completed years of schooling variable. If %% is positive and significant, 
it is interpreted as undereducated workers gaining higher wage (premium) relative to 
workers with actual completed years of schooling. If %) is negative and significant, this 
implies that overeducated workers receive lower wages than workers with actual 
completed years of schooling.  
Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) use the data from the 1980 US census. In contrast to Duncan 
and Hoffman (1981) and the human capital theory’s prediction, Verdugo and Verdugo 
find that the coefficient of overeducation is negative whereas the coefficient of 
undereducation is positive after controlling for education attainment. This suggests that 
overeducated workers earn less than those who are not overeducated. 
There are several possible reasons for this result: (1) the lower return to overeducated 
workers may reflect their employment in low-paying jobs; and overeducated workers will 
be concentrated in occupations where workers have low average education, for example 
elevator operators with one year of college, (2) overeducated workers are unproductive 
and education does not guarantee an increased productivity, and (3) undereducated 
workers appear to have an earnings advantage relative to their overeducated (and 
matched) peers, as they may tend to be excellent performers on their jobs.  
Countering Verdugo and Verdugo’s (1989) finding, Cohn and Kahn (1995) explore both 
models by using the same data. The first model is adapted from Sicherman (1991) or 
similar to Duncan and Hoffman’s model, and the second model is from Verdugo and 
Verdugo. Cohn and Kahn find that a negative estimate on the overeducation dummy for 
both models does not necessarily imply a negative return to overeducation (wage penalty), 
that is as long as the coefficient of years of overeducation is significantly positive in the 
first model. The negative estimate of the years of overeducation coefficient in Verdugo 
and Verdugo model suggests that overeducated workers earn less than matched workers 
with similar levels of schooling. The study argues that the result should not be surprising 
nor conflicting with the finding that the return to overeducation is positive though 
generally less than the return to matches.   
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Control Variables 
In terms of control variables, the ORU model is the extended model of Mincer wage 
equation. Thus, the control variables that are commonly used have already been discussed 
in Chapter 3.  
When applying Mincer wage equation, most research modifies the model with control 
variables, i.e. personal characteristics such as sex (Comola and de Mello, 2009), and 
marital status (Chevalier et al., 2002; Comola and de Mello, 2009); job and firm related 
variables such as present labour market experience or tenure (Purnastuti et al., 2013), firm 
size and firm age (Pereira and Martin, 2001), industries (Comola and de Mello, 2013), 
formal and informal sectors (Dasgupta et al., 2015);  urban and rural area residentials 
(Dumauli, 2015); and some interaction terms such as gender-marital status and gender-
dependency ratio (Comola and de Mello, 2009); with the aim of capturing other factors 
that may affect the wage equation.  
Selected studies which used the ORU model and the control variables are shown in Table 
5.1. There are some additional variables in these studies, such as: unemployment rate and 
occupation (Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989) and disability (Tsai, 2000; Dockery and Miller, 
2012; and Iriondo and Perez-Amaral, 2013).  
  
 
5.2.3 Empirical Studies on Mismatch and Wage 
There have been many studies which look into education mismatch and wage in 
developed and developing countries, including Indonesia. However, most studies in 
Indonesia only review overeducation in the university level. This part will discuss 
previous empirical studies which use Duncan and Hoffman’s model on both 
overeducation and undereducation. The discussion is structured by methods used, cross-
section and panel data. Every sub-section is structured by developed and developing 
countries. The summary of previous empirical studies is presented in Table 5.1.  
243 
 
 
Table 5.1: Return to Undereducation, Overeducation and Required Education in Selected Countries (in per cent) 
Researchers 
(Year) 
Country Data Source Year Method Mismatch 
Variable  
Return to 
Under-education 
Return to 
Required 
(Completed) 
Schooling 
Return to Over-
education 
Cross-Section Studies  
Duncan and 
Hoffman 
(1981) 
US The Panel 
Study of 
Income 
Dynamics 
1976 OLS: white men Years of 
surplus and 
deficit 
schooling  
-0.42* 0.63* 0.29* 
Verdugo and 
Verdugo 
(1989) 
US Census 1980 OLS with controls: 
experience, unemployment 
rate, region, sector, 
occupation, marital status, 
number of weeks 
unemployed, and number of 
hours worked. 
Dummy 
variables 
of UE and 
OE 
0.09** 0.72** -0.13** 
Groot and Van 
Den Brink 
(1997) 
UK The British 
Household 
Panel Survey 
1991 Duncan and Hoffman (OLS) Years of 
surplus and 
deficit 
schooling 
The coefficient values are unspecified, the pattern is 
similar to Duncan and Hoffman (1981) finding, IV 
method is required to deal with ability bias.  
Daly et al. 
(2000) 
US and 
Germany 
The Panel 
Study of 
Income 
Dynamics  
1976, 
1985, 
1984 
Duncan and Hoffman (OLS) Years of 
surplus and 
deficit 
schooling 
US, men, 1976: 
-3.4** 
 
 
Germany, men, 
1984: -7.8** 
US, men, 
1976: 6.1** 
 
 
Germany, 
men, 1984: 
9** 
US, men, 1976: 
4.5** 
 
 
Germany, men, 
1984: 4.9** 
McGuinness 
(2006) 
The US, 
Canada, 
Hong 
Kong, The 
UK and 6 
 1980s 
to 
2000s 
Meta-analysis   General conclusion: similar pattern with Duncan and 
Hoffman (1981) finding. 
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EU 
countries 
Sharma and 
Sharma (2013) 
India Primary survey 2011-
2012 
Duncan and Hoffman (OLS) Years of 
surplus and 
deficit 
schooling 
-0.146**  0.103*** 
Alisjahbana et 
al. (2017) 
Indonesia Labour force 
survey 
2014 Verdugo and Verdugo 
model (OLS) 
Mismatch 
category 
-0.042  -0.321*** 
Panel Data Studies  
Korpi and 
Tahlin (2007) 
Sweden The Swedish 
Level of Living 
Surveys 
1974, 
1981, 
1991 
and 
2000 
  
  
Duncan and Hoffman (OLS) All 
education 
level  
-0.03*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 
      Duncan and Hoffman (OLS 
with additional human 
capital control) 
Years of 
surplus and 
deficit 
schooling. 
-0.02*** 0.06*** 0.02*** 
      Duncan and Hoffman (Fixed 
Effects/FE) 
  -0.02*** 0.03*** 0.01*** 
Tsai (2010) US The Panel 
Study of 
Income 
Dynamics 
1979–
2005 
  
  
Pooled OLS: Duncan and 
Hoffman with controls: sex, 
age, race, marital status, 
number of children, 
disability, tenure, 
experience. 
Dummy 
variables 
of UE and 
OE 
0.06*** 0.11*** -0.04*** 
      Random Effect (RE): 
Duncan and Hoffman with 
controls: sex, age, race, 
marital status, number of 
children, disability, tenure, 
experience. 
 0.03*** 0.09*** -0.02*** 
      FE: Duncan and Hoffman 
with controls: age, marital 
status, number of children, 
disability, tenure, 
experience. 
  0.00*** 0.02*** -0.01** 
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Dockery and 
Miller (2012)  
Australia HILDA Survey  2001-
2008 
Pooled OLS: Duncan and 
Hoffman with controls: sex, 
age group, marital status, 
disability, job status, English 
competence, work 
experience. 
University 
level 
(education 
level). 
-0.04*** 0.12*** 0.05*** 
        RE: Duncan and Hoffman 
with controls: sex, age 
group, marital status, 
disability, job status, English 
competence, work 
experience. 
Years of 
surplus and 
deficit 
schooling.  
-0.06*** 0.10*** 0.05*** 
        FE: Duncan and Hoffman 
with controls: sex, marital 
status, disability, job status, 
English competence, work 
experience. 
  -0.04*** 0.06*** 0.03*** 
Iriondo and 
Perez-Amaral 
(2013) 
11 EU 
countries 
European 
Union Statistics 
on Income and 
Living 
Conditions 
(Eurostat) 
  
2006-
2009 
Pooled OLS: Verdugo and 
Verdugo, controls: sex, 
experience, disable and 
marital status. 
Dummy 
variable of 
overeducat
ion and 
undereduc
ation for 
VV.  
  
0.09*** 0.12*** -0.08*** 
        Pooled OLS: Duncan and 
Hoffman, controls: sex, 
experience, disability and 
marital status. 
Years of 
surplus and 
deficit 
schooling 
for Duncan 
and 
Hoffman. 
-0.03*** 0.14*** 0.04*** 
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Yin (2016) China The China 
Health and 
Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS)  
  
  
1989, 
1991, 
1997, 
2000, 
2004, 
2006 
and 
2009  
  
  
  
  
  
Pooled OLS: Duncan and 
Hoffman with controls: sex, 
urban, sector, firm size, 
occupation, job status, 
experience, region. 
 
 
All 
education 
levels 
Years of 
surplus and 
deficit 
schooling. 
  
-0.04*** 0.23*** 0.03*** 
    Pooled OLS with time 
effect: ORU with controls: 
sex, urban, sector, firm size, 
occupation, job status, 
experience, region and year 
-0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
      
  
FE: Duncan and Hoffman 
with controls: sector, firm 
size, occupation, job status, 
experience and year. 
-0.01 0.02* 0.02*** 
    RE: Duncan and Hoffman 
with controls: sex, urban, 
sector, firm size, occupation, 
job status, experience, 
region and year. 
  -0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
       
         
Source: The author’s compilation.  
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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Studies with Cross-Section Method 
The first part is cross-sectional studies in developed economies. Duncan and Hoffman 
(1981) use the US data (the PSID in 1976)58 and separate their analysis by sex and race. 
There are four models: models of white men, black men, white women, and black women. 
The dependent variable is log of hourly wages while the control variables used are 
experience and experience-squared, city-size, and a dummy variable for residence in the 
south (location). All variables are the same for those four models. Duncan and Hoffman 
find that the surplus of schooling coefficient (!!,#) for white men was positive (2.9 per 
cent) and the deficit of schooling coefficient (!$,#) was negative (-4.2 per cent); all was 
significant at 1 per cent level. Those values were lower compared to the wages of white 
men with required education (6.3 per cent). Those values were also relatively smaller than 
the estimation results for black men. For white women, the coefficient of required 
education, surplus education and deficit education were 9.1 per cent, 5.2 per cent and -
1.4 per cent, respectively. Wage premium for surplus educated workers and wage penalty 
for deficit educated workers occur due to the productivity being more variable in the US, 
as explained in Section 5.2.2. From the workers’ point of view, it also seems that workers 
with required education receive higher return than those undereducated or overeducated  
By applying equation 5.2 and using data from the US 1980 census (as explained in Section 
5.2.2), Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) find that the coefficient of overeducation was -13 
per cent and the coefficient of undereducation was 9 per cent after controlling the 
education attainment. This implies that overeducated workers earn lower relative to 
workers with actual years of schooling. The coefficient of actual years of schooling was 
7.2 per cent. 
In the UK, Groot and Brink (1997) investigate Duncan and Hoffman’s model by using 
the 1991 wave of the British Household Panel Survey and by applying the OLS. Groot 
and Brink identify a pattern similar to that of Duncan and Hoffman’s (1981): the highest 
return is for matched workers, return for overeducated is less than matched, and return 
for undereducated is negative. Nevertheless, they argue that the result could be 
overestimated due to ability bias. IV method is therefore required to deal with the bias.  
 
58 Education is divided into 0-5 grades, 6-8 grades, 9-11 grades, 12 grades, some college, college degree, 
and an advanced degree. Occupation is divided into professional, manager, self-employed, clerical, sales, 
craftsmen and foremen, operatives, labourers, service workers and farmers. Meanwhile, mismatch is 
measured by objective/RM (mean).  
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Furthermore, Daly et al. (2000) evaluate the model by comparing the results based on 
empirical data in the US and Germany. Germany is chosen considering the country’s 
more structured educational system and labour market. The data used are from the PSID 
(1976 and 1985 waves) and The German Socio-Economic Panel (1984 wave). Although 
the data are longitudinal, the analysis conducted is cross-sectional for each year and the 
Chow test is used for the differences in parameters across the sample. Moreover, the 
model is modified by adding years of work experience and city residences as control 
variables. The analysis is then separated by gender. Daly et al. find that the pattern and 
coefficient values (returns) of men for required, surplus and deficit schooling in 197659 
were 6.1, 4.5 and -3.4 per cent, respectively, which is approaching Duncan and Hoffman’s 
(1981) findings. In 1985, those coefficients slightly increased but the pattern was still the 
same. For Germany in 1984, the coefficient values (returns) of men for required, surplus 
and deficit schooling were 9, 4.9 and -7.8 per cent, respectively. In short, this finding is 
consistent with a universalistic view of labour markets; there are more similarities across 
countries than over time. 
McGuinness (2006) documents mismatch studies (meta-analysis) in the US, Canada, 
Hong Kong, the UK and six European countries (Germany, The Netherlands, Spain, 
Portugal, Greece, and Northern Ireland) from 1980s to 2000s periods. McGuinness asserts 
that the evidence on the return to mismatch is in line with the assignment theory, given 
that the lower returns to surplus education suggest that overeducated workers work below 
their potential but are deriving some benefits from the surplus education. These lower 
returns are consistent with a scenario in which overeducated workers’ jobs are imposing 
an upper limit on the extent to which they can utilise their education and skills with this 
productivity ceiling reflected in lower wages. The evidence is certainly not consistent 
with the human capital theory (HCT) which suggests that the returns to surplus and 
required education should be equal and that the overeducated should not have any pay 
penalty (lower wages) inflicted upon them, neither is it consistent with Thurow’s Job 
Competition Model which suggests that the return to surplus education is zero. 
Turning to developing countries, Sharma and Sharma (2013) study the same issue in the 
Indian labour market by using the data from the primary survey by the NSSO in 2011-
2012 and by employing Duncan and Hoffman’s model. The study categorises occupations 
 
59 This is exactly the same data as used by Duncan and Hoffman (1981). 
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into six different categories: professional, administration, clerical, services, production 
and farmers. The study observes that the proportion of workers with the required level of 
education is highest for white-collar jobs and lowest for the blue-collar jobs. This is 
indicative of insufficient employment opportunities available for the highly educated 
workers in the Indian labour market. In terms of wages, the results suggest that the return 
to each surplus year of education (overeducation) is positive and statistically significant, 
whereas the return to each deficit year of education (undereducation) is negative and 
statistically significant, similar to Duncan and Hoffman’s findings. However, the wage 
penalty associated with undereducation is higher than the wage gain associated with 
overeducation.  
In Indonesia, this area of research is not well-explored and most existing research focus 
on higher education levels, as explained in Section 5.1. For instance, Alisjahbana et al. 
(2017) study education mismatch and its effect on the Indonesian labour market by using 
SAKERNAS data of 2014. The mismatch is estimated by 3-digit occupation level and by 
employing a modified Verdugo and Verdugo’s model. Alisjahbana et al. specifically 
focus on university and vocational diploma in science and engineering graduates who 
work in the waged sector. The study find that lower wages (wage penalty) exist in the 
Indonesian labour market, where both the overeducated and undereducated receive lower 
wages compared to those with adequate educational levels for the job that they hold. The 
result is in contrast to Duncan and Hoffman model, since Alisjahbana et al. only analyse 
the data based on mismatch status, either overeducated or undereducated, not in terms of 
extra year of deficit/surplus schooling. Moreover, the effect is greater for university 
graduates compared to vocational diploma graduates, holding individual and employment 
characteristics as well as major of study within the science and engineering field and the 
sector of employment constant. This shows the differential effect of education mismatch 
between university graduates versus vocational diploma graduates, where the former has 
less effect on its average wage rates. 
 
Studies with Panel Data Method 
With regards to studies which apply panel data in developed countries, Korpi and Tahlin 
(2007) investigate the impact of education mismatch on wages in Sweden by using the 
level of living surveys from 1974 to 2000. They find that the result replicates the results 
found in other countries, i.e. in the pooled OLS version; the effect of required schooling 
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is positive, the effect of overeducation is also positive although smaller than the effect of 
required schooling, while the effect of undereducation is negative and smaller in absolute 
size than the effect of required schooling. Both overeducation and undereducation are 
significantly different from required schooling estimate. Furthermore, the findings do not 
support their hypothesis that: (1) education mismatch reflects human capital 
compensation rather than real mismatch, and (2) education mismatch is real but dissolves 
with time spent in the labour market so that its impact on wages tends to move toward 
zero over a typical worker’s career. 
In the UK, Lindley and McIntosh (2009) examine the impact of overeducation by using 
the BHPS of the 1991-2005 periods. Pooled OLS and FE are used to allow controlling 
for unobserved individual heterogeneity in the determinants of incidence and impact of 
overeducation. ORU is modified by replacing years of schooling with dummy variables. 
Thus, overeducation is measured by using 5 binary dummy variables and a categorical 
variable is included to indicate undereducation. Although the method is slightly different, 
the conclusion is similar to previous empirical studies returns to required education are 
almost always greater than that to all overeducation levels and the returns for 
undereducation are negative. Unobserved heterogeneity cannot be the only explanation 
for the existence of overeducation, though the fact that it has some roles to play is shown 
by the overeducation penalties being smaller once unobserved heterogeneity is controlled. 
As a result, the coefficients of FE are lower than the coefficient of pooled OLS.  
Tsai (2010) studies the return to education mismatch in the US by using data from the 
PSID for the period of 1979–2005. The mismatch is measured subjectively. The OLS 
results reveal that overeducated workers earn significantly less and undereducated 
workers earn substantially more than matched workers. Using RE and under the 
assumption that individual-specific error is uncorrelated with the education mismatched 
variables, the result is similar to the OLS, but with slightly lower coefficients for 
undereducation and overeducation, presumably because there is an adjustment for the 
serially correlated components in the error term. 
In Australia, Dockery and Miller (2012) investigate the education mismatches and 
credentialism by using 8 waves of The HILDA survey for the 2001-2008 periods. The 
study identifies larger returns from years of required education and modest returns from 
years of overeducation. Workers benefit from being employed in an occupation for which 
they are undereducated because the positive effect of being in an occupation with a higher 
251 
 
reference level of education outweighs the negative effect of their years of 
undereducation. The most important implications or key policy messages are (1) the 
additional years of schooling associated with credentialism are not wasted: these 
additional years appear to be linked to the development of skills that attracts a reward of 
around 3-6 per cent. This is comforting for advocates of the expansion of the education 
sector. Also, (2) there are large gains that could be potentially achieved through a better 
matching of workers’ actual educational attainment to their job requirements. 
Iriondo and Perez-Amaral (2013) study the effect of education mismatch on wage by 
using a rich panel dataset of workers in 11 European countries60 from 2006 to 2009, drawn 
from the European Union Statistics (Eurostat) on Income and Living Conditions. Pooled 
OLS, RE, FE and IV-FE are used as comparison. The estimation from Duncan and 
Hoffman’s model using the mean index, the results of the pooled model, and the random-
effects model are very similar. In the pooled OLS, wage rises by 14.3 per cent for each 
year of required education, 4.2 per cent for each year of overeducation, but decreases by 
3 per cent for each year of undereducation. When applying FE, the size of the effect falls: 
wage of required year of schooling becomes 2.7 per cent, and a penalty of 0.5 per cent 
per year of undereducation occurs. Meanwhile the overeducation coefficient is not 
statistically different from zero. Iriondo and Perez-Amaral argue that wage basically 
depends on the educational requirements of the jobs. Verdugo and Verdugo model’s 
results show that the inclusion of overeducation and undereducation incidents increases 
the return to schooling from 8.0 per cent to 12.0 per cent in the pooled model. 
Overeducated workers suffer a 7.7 per cent penalty and undereducated workers get a 
return of 9.3 per cent. RE barely change compared to those obtained in the pooled model. 
In contrast, FE estimation shows that the size of the coefficients considerably drops to 1.7 
per cent in return for each year of schooling, -1.5 per cent for overeducation and 1.0 per 
cent undereducation.  
Turning to developing countries, Yin (2016) estimates the overeducation and wage 
penalty in China by using the ORU model (OE and UE are dummy variables while 
required years of schooling is defined as the years of actual completed years of education) 
with the panel data method and by comparing the mean and the mode. The data used are 
from the CHNS from 1989, every two to four years and followed by 1991, 1993, 1997, 
 
60 Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and the 
Netherlands.  
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2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009 (8 waves in total). Yin finds that for the mean method, the 
wage return to an additional year of required education was around 23 per cent, the wage 
returns to one year of surplus schooling (overeducation) was around 3 per cent and the 
coefficient of deficit years of schooling was around 4 per cent. For the mode, the wage 
returns to required schooling level was 26.20 per cent, the wage return to overeducation 
was 9.68 per cent and the negative wage return to each additional level of deficit education 
was about -13.19 per cent.  
In other developing countries, Reis (2015) studies wage and mismatch in Brazil. The 
method used is Duncan and Hoffman’s model (1981) and the data are from the Brazilian 
Census Bureau in the six main Brazilian metropolitan areas between January 2004 and 
December 2012. This study yields a similar finding and also proves Duncan and 
Hoffman’s results. The coefficient for years of deficit schooling was equal to −0.115, 
whereas the number of years of surplus schooling was associated with a positive 
coefficient equal to 0.107. The estimated coefficient for required schooling was 0.170. 
When taking individuals’ fixed effects into account, the estimated impact for each year 
of surplus schooling on labour earnings dropped to 0.009, whereas the estimated penalty 
for each additional year of deficit schooling dropped to 0.110. 
In short, the literature reviewed above shows that most studies focus their analysis on the 
relationship between education mismatch and wage in developed nations such as the US, 
the UK and EU countries. Other studies prove that education mismatch also occurs in 
developing countries and this incidence affects wage. Thus, studies in this area of interest 
are required to consider the different characteristics between developed and developing 
countries. Both Duncan and Hoffman’s and Verdugo and Verdugo’s model confirm that 
there is a distinction between wages of the overeducated, undereducated, and 
matched/adequately educated workers. Using either cross-sectional or panel method, or 
even using a different data source, all the analyses provide a similar wage pattern of 
surplus and deficit years schooling for Duncan and Hoffman’s model. However, some 
studies find that unobserved individual heterogeneity may occur in the cross-sectional 
method, though the panel data model can be used to deal with such issues. In terms of 
control variables, some studies separate their analysis by gender and race. There is also a 
potential difference not only by gender, but also by sector, as per Chapter 3 finding. 
Particularly for Indonesia, Alisjahbana et al. (2017) study this issue using cross-sectional 
method and Verdugo and Verdugo’s model. As such, this chapter will use a different 
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model and method (Duncan and Hoffman’s and panel method which can deal with 
heterogeneity issue) in order to contribute to and enrich the existing literature. 
 
5.2.4 The Dynamic of Wage and Mismatch  
Some studies explore the dynamic of mismatch in terms of wage persistence for 
mismatched graduates, whereas some others explore education mismatch, wage growth 
and the trend of wage penalty overtime.  
In terms of persistence, Dolton and Vignoles (2000) examine the effects of overeducation 
on wage in the UK after graduation and six years later by using Duncan and Hoffman’s 
model. The data are obtained from the UK graduates surveyed in 1980 and 1986. The 
study finds that 38 per cent of graduates were overeducated for their first job and even 
six years later. In terms of wage, overeducated graduates earned lower wages, and the 
wages declined overtime for the same workers. Similarly, Frenette (2004) analyses 
overeducation among young post-secondary graduates in full-time employment in 
Canada, particularly two and three years after their graduation. Using the discrete 
analogue proposed by Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) and the data from the National 
Graduates Surveys (NGS)61, the study finds a slight decline in overeducation and wage 
overtime which occurs once observed heterogeneity is addressed.  
Lindley and McIntosh (2010) investigate the impact and permanence of wage for 
overeducation while controlling unobserved individual heterogeneity. The data used are 
the first 15 waves (1991-2005) of The BHPS. By using ORU equations with OLS and FE 
model as the method, the study find that: (1) holding constant job requirements at a 
particular level will result in variations in the wage penalty suffered by overeducated 
employees working at that level. In addition, the wage was systematically smaller (only 
4 per cent) amongst those workers who would be in a matched job five years later, in 
1996. The systematically lower wages at the same job level amongst those with a history 
of prior overeducation are again taken as an indicator of lower unobserved ability amongst 
this group. Also, (2) overeducated workers in 1996 and 2001 suffered no wage penalty to 
their prior overeducation once they are in a matched job. Temporary overeducation 
 
61 The cohorts are the classes of 1982 (interviewed in 1984/1987), 1986 (interviewed in 1988/1991), and 
1990 (interviewed in 1992/1995).  
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amongst graduates therefore need not be an indicator of lower ability but may simply be 
a part of the normal work history of some graduates as they acquire the work experience 
necessary to complement their higher-level qualifications before they can move into 
graduate-level jobs. 
Turning to wage growth, Korpi and Tahlin (2007) analyse education mismatch and wage 
growth in Sweden by using cross-sectional and panel data from the level of living surveys 
in 1974-2000. The model used focuses on the impact of being mismatched or matched on 
all forms of wage growth, in connection to career promotion and otherwise. Korpi and 
Tahlin argue that overeducated workers should experience greater-than-average wage 
growth because of several considerations: overeducation may be seen, in a career 
perspective, as part of a human capital investment strategy; the gap in returns to schooling 
relative to correctly matched workers should decrease over time and eventually becomes 
zero; and finally, the mismatch is temporary, not in the planned career sense discussed 
above but rather as a result of job search with imperfect information. Korpi and Tahlin 
(2007) also find that wage growth among the overeducated is now significantly lower 
than among the matched workers. Thus, there is no indication of greater wage growth 
associated with overeducation. The study concludes that the overeducated are penalised 
early on by an inferior rate of return to schooling from which they do not recover. 
And finally, only a few studies examine the change of wage penalty overtime, such as 
Green and Henseke (2016). The study analyses the trend of wage penalty in Britain during 
1997/2001 and 2006/2012 periods by using the BHPS. Based on the data, the proportion 
of mismatched graduates in the labour market has remained fairly stable at approximately 
three-in-ten graduates. In terms of the trend of wage penalty overtime, the study finds that 
the log wage penalty of mismatched (i.e. overeducated) graduates relative to matched 
graduates was significant and sizable, being 38 log points in 1997–2001 (consistent with 
other studies). Furthermore, the log increased to 49 points in 2006–2012. Thus, the 
penalty increased overall by 11 log points. To compute that result, the study runs 
regressions comprising the full sample of graduates and non-graduates. The result 
indicates that the premium for matched graduates over matched non-graduates increased 
significantly by 5 points, which is arguably consistent with the persistence of skill-biased 
technological change over this period, while at the same time, there was a 6-point 
significant fall in the premium for mismatched graduates. 
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5.2.5 Wage and Education Mismatches Based on Gender 
In terms of gender, the present study (Chapter 4) finds that male workers tend to have 
lower education levels than female workers, particularly for at least 13 years of education 
or equivalent to university level. However, the return to education for females is higher 
than for males. This could be due to the fact that females have a combination of a much 
lower workforce participation and fewer average years in the labour force than males 
(Abbas and Foreman-Peck, 2008); education has increased the female’s skills and 
productivity and has provided an extra return for females (Dougherty, 2005).  
In terms of the mismatch trend, males tend to have a higher proportion of overeducation 
compared to females, while females have a slightly higher proportion of undereducation 
(Table 4.6). Furthermore, most literature analyses gender effects on mismatch by using a 
dummy variable in the ORU model and only a few studies separate them (see e.g. Duncan 
and Hoffman, 1981; Mcguinness et al., 2010; and Iriondo and Perez-Amaral, 2013). As 
such, exploring the effect of gender on wage is required to contribute to the existing 
literature given that the results may differ between sexes.  
Firstly, Duncan and Hoffman (1981) extend their analysis based on race and gender 
(white men, black men, white women, and black women). They find that overeducation 
has a positive and significant effect on wage rates for all four race-sex sub-groups. 
Specifically, overeducated white and black women receive substantial lower wages than 
overeducated men. Undereducated men earn less than the others, including those with the 
same required level of education, whereas the wages of undereducated white and black 
women are insignificantly different from those with the same required level of education.  
In the UK, Groot and Brink (1997) investigate this aspect by using the 1991 wave of the 
BHPS and by applying the OLS. They find that the rates of return to a year of education 
attained were 4.9 per cent for males and 5.2 per cent for females. The rates of return to a 
year of education required were much higher: 7.7 per cent for males and 8.9 per cent for 
females. The rates of return to a year of overeducation were also negative: -2.4 per cent 
for males and -3.3 per cent for females. Meanwhile, the rates of return to one year of 
undereducation were 5.9 per cent for males and 4.8 per cent for females. In short, males 
generally received slightly higher returns to required, over and undereducation compared 
to females Britain in 1991.   
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McGuinness et al. (2010) use the first seven waves of the HILDA survey, starting from 
2001. The study finds that controlling unobserved heterogeneity (using RE with Mundlak 
corrections and FE) could remove most of the wage impacts only on men who are 
overeducated. Graduate men who change status from a well-matched job to an 
overeducated-only job do not suffer a wage penalty (lower wages)62. In contrast, women 
tend to have lower wages.  
Slightly differently, Iriondo and Perez-Amaral (2013) analyse the IV-FE methods for 
Duncan and Hoffman’s model by gender. The main finding from Duncan and Hoffman’s 
model is that the females in selected European countries have a higher return on attained 
and required schooling than the males. Nonetheless, wage penalty for one year of 
schooling has the same pattern as the return to one year of attained schooling in both 
estimations: the returns to one year of schooling for the overeducated and matched 
workers are not significantly different from zero for both males and females. This could 
imply that wage depends mainly on the educational requirements of the jobs and 
undereducated males tend to suffer a greater penalty in their wages than the females.  
 
 
5.2.6 Wage and Education Mismatch Based on Sector 
A sectoral analysis is also required to have a more comprehensive picture of the 
Indonesian labour market. The public and private sectors have similar characteristics 
(receiving regular wages); yet, the public sector is more attractive for job seekers. For 
instance, the ratio of job opportunities in the public sector to the number of applicants is 
around 1:200 (Sindo, 2013), as explained in Chapter 4, presumably due to the relative 
wage in public sector being higher than the wage in the private sector (Chapter 3’s 
finding). In terms of the changes in mismatch, the present study (Chapter 4) also identifies 
the different trends between the public and private sectors, i.e. there is a decrease in 
overeducation and an increase in undereducation in general and in the private sector in 
particular. In contrast, the public sector experiences an increase in overeducation and a 
 
62 Besides studying education mismatch, the study also analyses over-skilled and both overeducation and 
over-skilled variables. Moreover, it examines the relationship between mismatch and wage, as well as job 
satisfaction and job mobility. However, the study finds that overeducation and over-skilling are distinct 
phenomena with different market labour outcomes. The discussion in this part is limited on overeducation 
only.    
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decrease in undereducation. Thus, sectors may contribute to the difference in wages 
between overeducated and undereducated workers in Indonesia. Similar to gender 
analysis, most of the existing research controls the sector (or occupation) as dummy 
variables.  
In terms of wage, overeducated graduates in the public sector is hypothesised to be less 
fully utilised and to earn less than the overeducated ones in the private sector due to the 
relatively less competitive nature of the public sector (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000). 
Dolton and Vignoles study overeducation in the UK graduate labour market by using a 
one-in-six sample of the 1980 UK graduates surveyed in 1986. The study limits the 
analysis by analysing overeducation in the public sector only. The result shows that public 
sector graduates, in jobs requiring no qualifications, earned 9–10 per cent less than the 
private sector equivalence. There are several possible explanations for this: more than a 
third of public sector graduates who were required no qualifications at all were working 
in welfare jobs. Welfare jobs in the public sector may pay poorly relative to the kinds of 
jobs requiring no qualifications in the private sector (labouring, sales, industrial 
processing, etc.). Those working in the community and social services sector tend to have 
the longest job tenure (Allen, 2016), which implies greater security of tenure in the public 
sector. Moreover, the public pension program is better than the private pension program 
in the past; the government implemented the public pension programs in 2016, which is 
based on the government regulation number 45/2015 on the management of the old age 
security program. Employees in the public and private sectors are covered by both an 
earning-related social insurance scheme and a defined contribution plan (OECD, 2017). 
Another possible human capital explanation is that the private sector responds more 
flexibly; allowing the overeducated graduates to be more fully utilised and paying a wage 
closer to his or her productive potential.  
Different from Dolton and Vignoles (2000), Bauer (2002) does not separate the analysis 
based on sectors. Instead, all sectors are run in general and another model is added to 
exclude all individuals working in the public sector. Nonetheless, excluding the public 
sector does not change the main conclusions; overeducated workers still earn less, and 
undereducated workers earn more than workers with the same level of educational 
attainment but who work in occupations that fully utilise their education.  
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Furthermore, Allen et al. (2013) use data from twenty countries63 to analyse the return 
associated with education mismatch due to heterogeneous skills or institutional effects. 
In terms of heterogeneous skills, the reason overeducated workers earn a lower wage is 
because they have a lower level of skills and are consequently sorted into in lower-level 
jobs, compared to their more skilled peers who find jobs at their own levels.  
Turning to institutional effect, wages are often not based directly on workers’ productivity 
in the job but come about as a result of a process of bargaining involving specific wage-
setting institutions. Allen et al. (2013) conclude that wage-setting institution theory 
explains observed wage effects in the public sector, while heterogeneous skill theory 
explains the one in the private sector. Particularly for the public sector, the study finds 
that overeducated workers are likely to be paid higher wages than one would expect based 
on their productivity. This view is further warranted by the finding that the private sector 
wage’s effects on overeducation are especially strong in countries with high levels of 
relative heterogeneity. Moreover, there is a strongly significant negative interaction 
between collective bargaining coverage and the effect of overeducation, which suggests 
that lower wage (stronger wage penalty) in the public sector is stronger in countries where 
there is a high level of collective bargaining coverage than in countries with lower levels 
of collective bargaining coverage (Allen et al., 2013).  
 
 
5.3 Model, Method and Data 
5.3.1 Model 
Considering data availability as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the model, 
the present study applies the Duncan and Hoffman’s model as it can analyse and compare 
the return to undereducation and overeducation, in terms of additional deficit or surplus 
years of schooling, which is consistent with the aims and research questions of this 
research. Besides, the model also offers some advantages, such as better interpretation of 
 
63 Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom. The sample was graduates who obtained a higher education degree in the 1999/2000 academic 
year. 
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mismatch-wage relationship than the Verdugo and Verdugo’s model64, and the most 
important thing, the model has proven itself a reliable extension of Mincer wage equation 
by passing statistical testing in several countries for several periods based on previous 
empirical studies, as explained in the literature review (some of them are provided in 
Table 5.1).  
The models are as follows: ln#!,# = %$ + %%	(!,&,#'( +%)	(!,&,#*( + %+	(!,&,#,(- 	+ ∑ %+.&K!,&,#/01% + +!,#  (5.3),  
ln "2,3: log of real hourly wage (similar dependent variable to Chapter 3, section 3.4.1).  
In line with Duncan and Hoffman, the model requires variables: (1) years of required 
schooling (#2,4,3%&'), which is equal to the mode of each hybrid occupation category, as 
explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2; (2) years of deficit schooling relative to the mode 
level of education in the individual’s occupational category (refers to undereducation or #2,4,3(& ), or equal to #2,4,3%&' − #, and X is actual years of schooling. #2,4,3)&  or years of surplus 
schooling relative to the mode level of education in the individual’s occupational category 
(refers to overeducation), calculated from # −	#2,4,3%&'. Years of schooling is a continuous 
variable and has 7 categories from 6 to 22 years of schooling. Similar to Chapter 4, the 
objective method (by deviation from mode) and the realised method (RM) are used to 
determine the mismatch, considering the data availability in those IFLS waves. 
Furthermore, mode is used since it has better estimates for skewed or non-skewed 
distributed data and is more suitable for categorical data like match variable. Meanwhile, 
the hybrid category of occupation (44 occupation categories) is constructed with the aim 
of reducing heterogeneity and avoiding low number of observations.   
The control variables used here are the same as in Chapter 3 (Part 3.3.1); thus, all 
definitions and formulas of calculation follow Chapter 3. However, considering the 
finding in Chapter 3, some variables are adjusted for simplification. For instance, 
provinces are simplified into capital and non-capital regions, given that most companies 
have their headquarters in the capital regions. Also, ethnicity is eliminated here because 
those dummy variables are mostly insignificant (see the results in Chapter 3). The control 
variables in the present study are experience and experience squared, and the other control 
variables are divided into some categories:  
 
64 Cohn and Kahn (1995) argue that there may be a misinterpretation of Verdugo and Verdugo’s model.  
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1. personal characteristics; consisting of dummy variables for gender (1=female) and 
marital status (1=single, 2=married and cohabitate, 3=other status). 
2. work related and firm size; consisting of full-time/part-time dummy (1=full-time65 
and 0=part-time), job market experience and its square (in years), tenure or the 
number of years with the current employer and its square (in years), sectoral dummy 
(1=private and 2=public), and industry dummies (agriculture; mining and quarrying; 
manufacturing; electricity, gas and water; construction; wholesale retail restaurant 
and hotels; transportation storage and communications; finance, insurance, real estate 
and business services; and social services). Agriculture and other sectors are omitted 
variables and firm size here refers to the number of workers in the firm66; and  
3. regional dummy variables; consisting of urban/rural dummy and capital/non-capital 
province residence.  
For the pooled OLS method, the present study adds dummy of wave (time), comprising 
of dummy for 2000, 2007 and 2014 periods, with the baseline of the 2000 period. This is 
discussed further in the following part.   
 
 
5.3.2 Methods: Panel Data with Pooled OLS, Fixed Effect (FE) and Random Effect 
(RE) Model  
The first method is the pooled OLS. Hartog (2000) asserts that the ORU model (Duncan 
and Hoffman’s specification) assumes that unobserved heterogeneity (including ability, 
motivation, compensating differentials and other unobserved characteristics) is 
uncorrelated with education mismatch. There is the problem of omitted variable bias if 
this assumption fails to hold. Furthermore, the omission of unobserved heterogeneity may 
lead to underestimation of the rate of return to overeducation if unobserved heterogeneity 
is negatively correlated with overeducation; conversely, the rate of return to 
 
65 A full-time worker is defined as someone working equal to or more than 30 hours per week; this is based 
on ILO which uses 30 hours per week as the cut-off point for its definition of a part-time worker (Felipe 
and Hasan, 2006). 
66 Slightly different from Chapter 3, the dummies of firm size are only of three categories: firms with 0-19 
workers (small enterprise), 20-99 workers (medium enterprise) and more than 100 workers (big enterprise). 
The present study eliminates 0-5 workers as the benchmark, considering some potential bias from 
comparing very small companies with medium/large companies.   
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undereducation is probably overestimated in case of a positive correlation between 
unobserved heterogeneity and undereducation.  
In addition, clustered/robust standard errors (CSEs) can be used in regression models 
where observations can be grouped into clusters, with model errors uncorrelated across 
the clusters but correlated within the clusters; the cluster used for educational mismatch 
is usually by individuals, year and/or occupation. This method aims to obtain correct 
statistical inferences; many empirical applications feature the potential for errors to be 
correlated within clusters. Failure to control within-cluster error correlation can lead to: 
(1) standard errors that are smaller than regular OLS standard errors, (2) narrow 
confidence intervals, (3) T-statistics that are too large, and (4) misleadingly small p-
values (Cameron and Miller, 2015). The present study will elaborate this method and 
estimation that clustered by individual and by year in Section 5.4.1 and Appendix XVII, 
this is to control individual heterogeneity over time. Using this, the results of the pooled 
OLS with dummy year and clustered standard errors by individuals are exactly the same. 
Furthermore, one of the main advantages of using panel data in this context is dealing 
with individual heterogeneity issue. Theoretically, panel data are advantageous since they 
include a much larger dataset, thus providing more information, more variability, less 
collinearity among the variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency. The 
models are definitely attractive and appealing since they provide ways of dealing with 
heterogeneity (Park, 2011). On the other hand, panel data may also have some limitations, 
such as: selectivity problems67 and cross-sectional dependence (Mućk, 2018).  
However, few emerging studies that have applied panel data techniques to analyse 
overeducation have found controversial results on whether or not education and 
occupational mismatch with earnings penalty effects are verified once individual 
heterogeneity is taken into account (Wen and Maani, 2017). For instance, Tsai (2010) 
finds that the estimated wage effect of overeducation in FE model is very small. In 
contrast, Dolton and Vignoles (2000) as well as Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) find the 
effect is significant; and the coefficient values of education mismatch in the FE model is 
lower than the coefficient values of the other models. To deal with this, some previous 
empirical studies attempt to find proxies of unobserved individual heterogeneity, such as 
health and verbal ability (Korpi and Tahlin, 2006), some of which use panel data model. 
 
67 Includes self-selectivity, attrition and non-response. 
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This is because panel data model accommodates individual effect. Thus, panel data can 
capture features of an individual such as motivation and ability that are given and assumed 
constant over time (Nielsen, 2014).  
 
Fixed Effect (FE) versus Random Effects (RE) 
The crucial distinction between FE and RE is whether the unobserved individual effect 
embodies elements that are correlated with the regressors in the model, not whether these 
effects are stochastic or not. The main assumptions of RE model are random and 
uncorrelated with independent variable included in the model. The advantage of FE model 
is that it can be used to analyse the impact of variables that vary over time, so the 
estimated coefficients of FE models cannot be biased because of omitted time-invariant 
characteristics, such as culture, religion, gender, race, etc. Meanwhile, the main 
limitations of FE depend on the number of characteristics being studied, the degrees of 
freedom increased, and whether the estimations are linear.  
In comparison, the coefficients of FE are usually lower than the coefficients of RE or 
pooled OLS. The decrease in the estimates when using FE estimation could be caused by 
measurement error, such as due to required schooling varying within occupation. For 
instance, the required education for a secretary job in a large professional company might 
differ from that in a small business. The other possible cause is heterogeneity issue, as 
Tsai (2010) argues that workers with higher education qualifications have relatively 
higher ability; thus, the negative relationship between overeducation and ability should 
be weaker.  
FE modelling is used more frequently in economics and political science, reflecting its 
status as the “gold standard” default (Schurer and Yong, 2012). However, RE models, 
also called multilevel models, hierarchical linear models, and mixed models, arguably 
would be the preferred choice because of its greater flexibility and generalisability, as 
well as its ability to model context, including variables that are only measured at a higher 
level (Bell and Jones, 2015). The assumptions made by RE models, including the 
exogeneity of covariates and the normality of residuals, are at least as reasonable as those 
made by FE models when the model is correctly specified. Moreover, a set of longitudinal 
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panel data usually has the problem of hierarchies68 occuring in the data, which occur when 
the population is hierarchically structured. A problem of hierarchies in the data could also 
be imposed during data collection. Bell and Jones also assert that the downside of RE 
modelling – correlated lower-level covariates and higher-level residuals – is the omitted-
variable bias, which is solvable with Mundlak’s (1978) formulation.  
Meanwhile, Nielsen (2007) argues that there is another consideration when choosing 
between FE and RE model, not only by the Hausman test. Unobservable earning ability 
can be correlated with the mismatch variables, ethnicity or the other explanatory variables 
since FE uses only within-individual variations. An individual who changes his job to a 
different occupational category, but without changing his level of education, will possibly 
have different values of #*,+,#%&', #*,+,#(& , and #*,+,#)& . By the construction, #*,+,#%&' + #*,+,#)& −#*,+,#(& = #, which is constant. As a result, the within-individual variation in #*,+,#%&', #*,+,#(& , 
and #*,+,#)&  is characterized by perfect multicollinearity for persons whose education level 
is constant in the estimation period. Consequently, the FE model would only identify the 
effect of overeducation or undereducation from information on individuals who change 
their level of education within the sampled period. Nielsen also contends that very few 
individuals in the dataset change status from category of workers with required years of 
schooling to being surplus years of schooling. Thus, RE estimation is preferable, despite 
its more restrictive assumption that individual effect is uncorrelated with the exogenous 
variables. 
 
Post Estimation Test 
Several post estimation tests are performed in the present study to find out the most 
appropriate model. Firstly, Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test is used to 
identify the more favourable model between a RE and a simple OLS regression. The null 
hypothesis (H0) in the LM test is that variances across entities are zero. This means that 
 
68With hierarchical data, particularly with temporal hierarchies which are often characterised by marked 
dependence over time, this is a patently unreasonable assumption. Responses for measurement occasions 
within a given higher level entity are often related to each other. Subsequently, the effective sample size of 
such datasets is much smaller than a simple regression would assume, closer to the number of higher-level 
entities (individuals or countries) than the number of lower-level units (measurement occasions). As such, 
standard errors will be incorrect if this dependence is not taken into account (Moulton, 1986). 
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no significant differences occur across units (i.e. no panel effect). If the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected, this implies that RE is more favourable than pooled OLS.  
The next test is the Hausman test, which can be run to decide between FE and RE. The 
null hypothesis (H0) is that the appropriate model is RE, when there is no correlation 
between the error term and the independent variables in the panel data model. The 
alternative hypothesis (H1) is that the appropriate model is FE, when the correlation 
between the error term and the independent variables in the panel data model is 
statistically significant. The null hypothesis (H0) is rejected if the Hausman statistic is 
bigger than its critical value. It is worth noting that RE models have the additional 
assumption that the individual effects are randomly distributed. It is not just the opposite 
of FE model, but rather a special case. If the RE assumption holds, then the RE model is 
more efficient than the FE model (Baltagi, 2015; Bell and Jones, 2015).  
The present study also performs the test of equality on two coefficients; between 
coefficients of years of surplus schooling (OE) and coefficient of years of required 
schooling (REQ). This assumes that the years of surplus schooling (OE) and the years of 
required schooling (REQ) are on the same scale. The hypotheses are that the years of 
required is equal to the years of deficit schooling and that years of required schooling is 
equal to years of surplus schooling. If those hypotheses are rejected, this implies that the 
coefficients are statistically different. 
 
 
5.3.3 Data 
Sample and Data Restrictions 
The present study uses IFLS data (similar to previous chapter) from 2000 (IFLS3), 2007 
(IFLS4) and 2014 (IFLS5). Adding the 2007 data has the benefit of increasing the number 
of observations. Those waves of survey also represent the condition before the education 
reform period (2000), during the initial period of the reform (2007) and after the reform 
(2014), as explained in Section 5.1.  
It is worth noting that IFLS has five waves up to 2014. 17,295 respondents took part in 
all 5 waves or between 1993 and 2014; this is around 52.3 per cent of household members 
in IFLS1 (1993), of which figure 11,889 (around 54 per cent of the main respondents) 
had interviews in all five waves. In terms of the re-contact rate, IFLS3 (2000) has 95.3 
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per cent re-contact rate of IFLS1 (1993) households. Meanwhile, IFLS4 (2007) has 93.6 
per cent re-contact rate of the original IFLS1 dynasties and the latest wave (IFLS5 - 2014) 
has 92 per cent re-contact rate of IFLS1, as explained in Section 2.2.2.  
Sample restrictions are also applied on the estimations to ensure that the individuals are 
in the labour market. Similar to previous chapters, the main data restriction is age 
(between 16-55 years old) to ensure that the sample is within the age range between 
finishing compulsory education and retiring. Furthermore, restricting the data based on 
employment eliminated around 30 per cent of the sample in 2000 and 2007 and around 
18 per cent in 2014. This is because some of them are in working age but not in the labour 
market, for instance, housewives and university students. Moreover, the loss from age 
restriction to employment status (non-missing) was significantly lower in 2014 than in 
the other waves (17.87 per cent of loss), possibly because the 2014 wave had casual 
employment categories which accommodate more workers to fill the questionnaire69. For 
the waged sector (public and private), this research considers the same characteristics, i.e. 
receiving regular wages. This restriction eliminated more than half of the sample in the 
employment data, which implies that the number of workers in the waged sector was 
lower than workers in the other sectors. A slight loss also occurred in mismatch (non-
missing data) because the sample did not fill the occupation data in their questionnaire. 
The table of sample restriction is shown in Table 5.2. 
It is worth noting that panel data have two approaches in terms of their analysis, i.e. 
balanced and unbalanced panel data. In a balanced panel, each individual (unit) has the 
same number of observations in all time periods. Since it allows an observation of the 
same individual (unit) in every period of time, the main advantage of a balanced panel 
data is minimising the heterogeneity problem. On the other hand, the sample of a balanced 
panel would be smaller than the sample of an unbalanced panel. The downside of a 
balanced panel is that sample representativeness will fall over time, particularly if attrition 
is non-random. Yet, more generally a panel approach does mean that the later waves are 
skewed towards older age groups. Meanwhile, an unbalanced panel is a panel in which 
 
69 According to Statistics Indonesia (2010), around 60-70 per cent of the workforce is estimated to engage 
in informal employment, as explained in Chapter 4.  
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the number of time series observations is different across units; as long as observations 
are missing at random70, an unbalanced panel data are sufficient for the analysis.  
From those three waves, the total number of observations become 21,174, consisting of 
6,385 observations for the 2000, 6,300 observations for 2007, and 8,489 observations for 
2014 (Table 5.2). Therefore, the unbalanced panel are employed in this part of analysis. 
Meanwhile, the balanced panel data are used in Section 5.4.5 (Robustness test).  
Table 5.2: Data Restrictions, 2007 
  2000 2007 2014 
Number of 
observations 
% Lost Number of 
observations 
% Lost Number of 
observations 
% Lost 
All individuals 25,825   29,967   36,381   
Age 16-55 21,100 -18.30 25,162 -16.03 29,797 -18.10 
Employment status 
data (non-missing) 
14,771 -30.00 17,620 -29.97 24,473 -17.87 
Employment status 
(Government 
worker, Private 
worker) 
6,780 -54.10 7,148 -59.43 8,712 -64.40 
Mismatch (non-
missing) 
6456 -4.78 6,930 -3.05 8,712 0.00 
Wage (non-
missing) and other 
control variables  
6385 -1.10 6,300 -9.09 8,498 -2.46 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
 
 
Longitudinal Elements of the Survey 
Using panel data element, the actual number of individuals reduces to only 15,440 
individuals from those observations (21,174 observations), as shown in Table 5.3. 
Individuals who participated in all those three waves were around 7.3 per cent of the 
sample (1,128 individuals). 579 individuals in 2014 were interviewed in 2000 (excluding 
the sample that participated in all three waves). Also, there were 3,477 individuals who 
were only interviewed in 2000 (discontinued sample). Most of the respondents in the 
latest wave were new; more than 5,000 individuals for 2014, which follows the rules 
expansion in IFLS3 in determining the new sample, as explained in Section 2.2.2. In total, 
 
70 Missing at random (MAR) means that the missing data could be a non-random subset of the data, but 
that the non-randomness can be completely explained by variables that are in the data. 
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there are 1,128 individuals who participated in all three waves, and from this sample, a 
balanced panel data analysis can be conducted. The rows reflect mismatch status in initial 
year or in the first table is year of 2000, the columns reflect the mismatch status in the 
later periods. The first row of the table indicates some of 55.73 per cent of undereducated 
workers in 2000 remained undereducated in 2007. 41.4 per cent of undereducated workers 
became matched in 2007. And only 2.87 per cent of undereducated workers became 
overeducated in 2007.  
 
Table 5.3: Number of Individuals and the Transitions Based on Panel Data Element 
Number Pattern 
Total 
Freq. Per cent Cum. 
1 2014 5,084 32.93 32.93 
2 2000 3,477 22.52 55.45 
3 2007 2,273 14.72 70.17 
4 2007 and 2014 1,698 11 81.17 
5 2000 and 2007 1,201 7.78 88.94 
6 2000-2007-2014 1,128 7.31 96.25 
7 2000 and 2014 579 3.75 100 
    1,5440 100   
 
Transition: 2000-2007 
  2007 
2000 UE M OE 
UE 175 130 9 
  55.73 41.4 2.87 
M 317 795 175 
  24.63 61.77 13.6 
OE 87 317 324 
  11.95 43.54 44.51 
    
Transition: 2007-2014 
  2014 
2007 UE M OE 
UE 330 181 30 
  61 33.46 5.55 
M 245 1,046 278 
  15.62 66.67 17.72 
OE 60 313 343 
  8.38 43.72 47.91 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
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Main Variables Description 
The main variables of the present study are wage and mismatch. Firstly, wage refers to 
the log of hourly wage. The advantage of using hourly wage is to eliminate unobserved 
heterogeneity caused by the omitted working hours (Li and Urmanbetova, 2007). Hourly 
wages are equal to last year wages (in real term) divided by the total number of hours per 
week times the total number of weeks per year, as explained in Section 3.3.   
The second variable is mismatch, which is divided into three categories, i.e. workers with 
years of required schooling (similar to match category in Chapter 4), workers with surplus 
years of schooling and workers with deficit years of schooling71. Before discussing the 
mismatch, Table 5.4 shows the sample distribution based on the actual years of schooling. 
Most of the respondents have 12 years of actual schooling (36.7 per cent) or equal to 
senior high school level; followed by 6 and 9 years of schooling. This indicates that most 
individuals still have low education attainment. Only around 22 per cent of the sample 
have more than 12 years of actual schooling. There were also 2 observations with 21 years 
of schooling in 2007, but the sample size was very small, and the proportion was nearly 
zero per cent.  
 
Table 5.4: Sample Distribution Based on the Actual Years of Schooling, in per cent 
Years of 
Schooling 2000 2007 2014 Total 
6 36.9 21.1 17.2 24.3 
9 18.5 15.6 16.5 16.8 
12 31.5 38.1 39.4 36.7 
15 6.0 8.8 5.9 6.8 
16 7.0 15.5 19.2 14.4 
18 0.2 0.8 1.7 1.0 
21 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
22 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Total Sample 6,385 6,300 8,489 21,174 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
 
 
71 Individuals are considered to have deficit year of schooling if they have actual years of schooling below 
their occupation’s mode. Workers have surplus year of schooling if they have actual year of schooling 
above their occupation’s mode. Required year of schooling is equal to the mode of each occupation 
category. The difference between mismatch variables in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 are: Chapter 4 uses 
education level to estimate the mismatch (for example: 1 for primary school and 2 for junior high school), 
while Chapter 5 uses year of schooling (primary school represents 6 year of schooling and junior high 
school represents 9 year of schooling).  
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Table 5.5 shows the sample distribution based on years of required schooling, which is 
equal to the mode of each occupation. Thus, the sample proportion of years of actual 
schooling is different from that of years of required schooling. Most individuals have 12 
years of required schooling (around 51 per cent of the total sample), followed by those 
with 6 years of schooling. Meanwhile, only 1.1 per cent of the sample has a mode of 9 
years of schooling. Table 5.5 also indicates the decreasing trend of 6 years of required 
schooling (low education qualifications) and the increasing trend of 16 years of required 
schooling or equivalent to university qualifications. Workers with low educational 
qualifications are needed as production workers in the manufacturing sector (Suryahadi 
et al., 2003). Meanwhile, higher education qualifications are required considering the 
rapid technological changes.  
Table 5.5: Sample Distribution Based on Years of Required Schooling, in per cent 
Years of 
Required 
Schooling 2000 2007 2014 Total 
6 56.1 27.7 22.4 34.1 
9 0.9 2.9 0.0 1.1 
12 35.9 54.5 60.2 51.2 
15 7.1 2.1 2.5 3.8 
16 0.0 12.8 14.8 9.8 
Total Sample 6,385 6,300 8,489 21,174 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
 
For mismatched workers, most individuals have years of surplus of schooling around 3 
to 6 years from the years of required schooling. 74.6 per cent of the sample who has zero 
years of surplus schooling is either in the required or deficit years of schooling (Table 
5.6). In terms of the trend, around 11.2 per cent of the sample in 2000 had 3 years of 
surplus schooling. The percentage decreased to 6 per cent in 2014. Similarly, the sample 
with 6 years of surplus schooling decreased from 11.7 per cent in 2000 to 6.8 per cent in 
2014. In contrast, the sample proportion with 2, 4 and 9 years of surplus schooling 
increased between 2000 and 2014. The majority of the individuals experienced a 
decreasing trend of years of surplus schooling or overeducation, confirming the finding 
in Chapter 4 that overeducation proportion decreased between 2000 and 2014.   
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Table 5.6: Sample Distribution Based on Years of Surplus Schooling, in per cent 
Years of 
Surplus 
Schooling 2000 2007 2014 Total 
0 71.5 75.0 76.6 74.6 
2 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.4 
3 11.2 7.2 6.1 8.0 
4 3.5 5.9 6.8 5.5 
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
6 11.7 8.1 6.8 8.7 
7 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 
10 1.1 2.3 1.9 1.8 
12 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 
16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total Sample 6,385 6,300 8,489 21,174 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: If the years of surplus schooling equals to zero, it means that the individuals are 
either matched or undereducated.  
 
For years of deficit schooling, most individuals have a deficit schooling of around 3 to 6 
years from the years of required schooling (Table 5.7), which is similar to the proportion 
of years of surplus schooling. The sample proportion with 3 years of deficit schooling 
increases from 7.2 per cent in 2000 to 10 per cent in 2014. The proportion of workers 
with 6 years of deficit schooling also slightly increases from 6.3 per cent to 9 per cent in 
the same period. A similar trend occurs for the other categories of years of deficit 
schooling as well. This also confirms the findings in Chapter 4 that there is an increase in 
undereducation.  
 
Table 5.7: Sample Distribution Based on Years of Deficit Schooling, in per cent 
Years of 
Deficit 
Schooling 2000 2007 2014 Total 
0 86.4 79.4 77.9 80.9 
3 7.2 8.7 10.0 8.8 
4 0.0 2.0 2.3 1.5 
6 6.3 9.2 9.0 8.3 
7 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.3 
9 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 
10 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Total Sample 6,385 6,300 8,489 21,174 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: If the years of deficit schooling equals to zero, it means that the individuals are 
either matched or overeducated. 
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By gender, the same trend also occurs for both males and females, as most individuals 
had either 3 or 6 years of deficit schooling compared to required schooling, or around 8 
per cent of the total sample (see Appendix XVI). With regards to years of surplus 
schooling by gender, most males had 3 or 6 years of surplus schooling. Slightly different 
to males, most females had around 3-5 years of surplus schooling. The trends were similar 
for all individuals, for both males, and females, i.e.: there were a decrease in the sample 
proportion with years of surplus schooling (overeducation) and an increase in the sample 
proportion with years of deficit schooling (undereducation).  
In terms of sector, the private sector had a similar trend with all individuals: most of the 
years of deficit and surplus schooling were either 6 or 3 years (see Appendix XVI). 
However, the public sector had a different pattern: the highest proportion of years of 
deficit schooling was three years. This is possibly because the public sector workers are 
expected to have university degree or at least three-years diploma qualifications. 
Moreover, the highest proportion of surplus schooling was 4 years. In terms of trend, the 
pattern was different between both sectors. In the private sector, the sample proportion 
with 3 years of deficit schooling (undereducation) increased from 6.3 per cent in 2000 to 
11.2 per cent in 2014. In contrast, the sample proportion of with 6 years of deficit 
schooling in the public sector decreased from 12 per cent to 4.2 per cent in the same 
period of time. For overeducation, the sample proportion with 3 years of surplus schooling 
decreased in the same period of time. However, the sample size in the public sector was 
smaller than the sample size in the private sector. The overall trend reflects the change in 
the private sector rather than the public sector. This finding is also consistent with Chapter 
4.  
 
Summary Statistics 
Turning to the summary statistics (Table 5.8), the mean of log of hourly wage is 8.29, 
with the minimum 0 and the maximum 16.94. Years of required schooling has a mean 
value of 10.42 years (equal to senior high school level). The mean of years of surplus of 
schooling is 1.27 years from the required schooling and the mean of years of deficit 
schooling (undereducation) is 0.86 years (less than 1 year of schooling). It is worth noting 
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that the other workers are assumed to spend zero year of schooling; thus, the minimum is 
0 in the table.  
With regards to experience as the first control variable, the present study uses potential 
experience with a similar formula as in Chapter 3. As a result, 221 observations have 
negative or zero value of experience; this negative value could arise because the potential 
experience is formulated as: experience of workers with primary school degree or below 
is age (in years) – 12 years; experience of workers with junior high school degree is age 
– 15 years; experience of workers with senior high school degree is age – 18 years; and 
experience of university qualification is age – 22 years (Dong, 2016), and there is a 
deviation of school entering age, for example: workers aged 16 years old, he/she already 
graduated from senior high school, the potential experience is is -2. Then, the negative 
values are replaced by 0, following ACAPS (2016). This also implies the measurement 
error in experience could occur for example for individuals who graduate early. The mean 
of potential experience is 15.62 years. Another control variable is sex. Here, sex is a 
dummy variable with the mean of 0.37. This implies that the proportion of males is higher 
than the proportion of females in the present study.  
For ethnicity, there are some inconsistent data across the waves. Inconsistent data could 
result from inconsistent answers from the respondents or a careless error. The present 
study follows one of the solutions for inconsistent data from Merckle et al. (2015) by 
choosing responses from the 2000 survey wave, i.e. the earliest responses. This is based 
on the assumption that cultural experiences “sediment” as a person grows older, meaning 
that errors are due to respondents forgetting the answers they supplied in the previous 
surveys. Therefore, correcting them means accepting the initial response as accurate and 
the following ones as inaccurate. From the summary statistics, only around 16 per cent of 
observations are the majority ethnicity.   
For marital status, most individuals are married: the mean value of married and cohabitate 
status is 0.7, which is higher than the other marital statuses. In terms of employment 
status, most individuals work as full-time workers who work for more than 30 hours per 
week. Furthermore, some individuals have tenure higher than experience. Thus, tenure 
has higher maximum values than experience. This is because tenure uses actual value, as 
it is questioned in the survey, while experience is the potential one, as explained 
previously. As it is only a small proportion, the present study sets those negative values 
to zero.  
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Table 5.8: Summary Statistics of Main Variables and Selected Explanatory Variables  
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Wage (log of hourly wages) 21,174 8.29 1.79 0 16.94 
Years of required schooling  21,174 10.42 3.44 6 16.00 
Years of surplus schooling (OE) 21,174 1.27 2.42 0 16.00 
Years of deficit schooling (UE) 21,174 0.86 1.90 0 10.00 
Potential Experience 21,174 15.62 10.22 0 43.00 
Potential experience squared 21,174 348.56 391.07 0 1849.00 
Sex (1=female) 21,174 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Ethnicity (1=Javanese) 21,174 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Marital status: Single 21,174 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Marital status: Married and cohabitate 21,174 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Marital status: Other (Separated, divorced and 
widowed) 21,174 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Employment Status: full-time (30 hours a 
week or more) 21,174 0.84 0.36 0 1 
Tenure 21,174 6.49 7.34 0 52.00 
Tenure squared 21,174 96.00 196.32 0 2704.00 
Sector: private 21,174 0.83 0.38 0 1 
Industry1: agriculture 21,174 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Industry2: mining and quarrying 21,174 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Industry3: manufacturing 21,174 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Industry4: electricity, gas and water 21,174 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Industry5: construction 21,174 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and 
hotels 21,174 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Industry7: transportation, storage, and 
communications 21,174 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Industry8: Finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services 21,174 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Industry9: Social services 21,174 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Firm size1: 1-19 people 21,174 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Firm size2: 20-99 people 21,174 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Firm size3: >= 100 people 21,174 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Urban 21,174 0.68 0.46 0 1 
Capital region 21,174 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
 
In terms of sector, most individuals work in the private sector, similar to Chapter 3. 
Related to industry dummies, the three highest means are social services (0.37), 
manufacturing (0.22), and wholesale, retail, restaurants and hotels (0.15). Furthermore, 
there are three dummies for firm’s size, which represents small, medium and large firms 
(based on the number of workers). The sample is dominantly small firms with 1-19 
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workers. And finally, most sample resides in urban areas, around 68 per cent, though only 
11 per cent of them reside in the capital province (DKI Jakarta).  
Furthermore, Table 5.9 shows that females have slightly higher mean of years of required 
schooling than males, 10.96 and 10.11 years, respectively. Males seem to have higher 
years of surplus schooling, around 1.41 years higher than females. In contrast, females 
have higher years of deficit schooling than males. In terms of wages, males have a slightly 
higher mean of log of real hourly wages than females, 8.39 and 8.11, respectively. This 
is in line with Becker's employer taste model of discrimination (Becker, 1971), as 
explained in Chapter 3, and the statistical discrimination theory.  
The values of sector (Table 5.9), wage, years of required schooling, years of surplus 
schooling (overeducation), experience and tenure in the public sector are relatively higher 
than in the private sectors. In contrast, years of deficit schooling (undereducation) is 
relatively higher for the private sector than for the public sector: 0.94 and 0.47 years of 
undereducation, respectively. This is in line with Part 3.4.3; the public sector in Indonesia 
prefers workers with high education levels; and wages in the public sector are relatively 
higher than wages in the private sector. Full table of the summary statistics is presented 
in Appendix XVI.  
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Table 5.9: Summary Statistics of Main Variables, by Gender and Sector 
By Gender Male Female 
Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Wage (log of 
hourly wages) 13,312 8.39 1.76 0 16.94 7,862 8.11 1.84 0 14.20 
Years of 
required 
schooling  
13,312 10.11 3.33 6 16.00 7,862 10.96 3.54 6 16.00 
Years of surplus 
schooling (OE) 13,312 1.41 2.50 0 12.00 7,862 1.02 2.26 0 16.00 
Years of deficit 
schooling (UE) 13,312 0.82 1.87 0 10.00 7,862 0.93 1.96 0 10.00 
           
By Sector Private Public 
Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Wage (log of 
hourly wages) 17,512 8.12 1.80 0 16.94 3,662 9.08 1.55 0 13.88 
Years of 
required 
schooling  
17,512 9.99 3.24 6 16.00 3,662 12.48 3.58 6 16.00 
Years of surplus 
schooling (OE) 17,512 1.15 2.25 0 16.00 3,662 1.81 3.04 0 16.00 
Years of deficit 
schooling (UE) 17,512 0.94 1.99 0 10.00 3,662 0.47 1.38 0 10.00 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
 
 
5.4 Estimation Results  
The following parts will further discuss the estimation results of the ORU model in 
Indonesia for 2000, 2007 and 2014 periods. The analysis is conducted for the main model 
(all individuals), based on gender and sector; followed by a brief discussion on control 
variables’ findings and robustness tests.  
 
5.4.1 Wage Effect: All Individuals (The Main Model) 
Table 5.10 reports the estimated results of the ORU model in all individuals. The present 
study estimates the pooled OLS with the dummy of year, RE, and FE. In addition, pooled 
OLS model without the dummy of year is provided in Appendix XVII. The interpretation 
of the coefficient estimates of the control variables are ceteris paribus.  
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Based on pooled OLS, the wage return to an additional year of required schooling was 
around 10.6 per cent. The wage returns to one year of surplus schooling was around 10 
per cent, which was slightly lower than the wage returns to years of required schooling. 
Meanwhile, the wage returns to one year of deficit schooling was -8.7 per cent. All of the 
variables were significantly different from zero or statistically significant at 1 per cent. 
The surplus of schooling coefficient is positive, which implies that overeducated workers 
still have economic value and receive positive returns to each additional year of 
overeducation. But, the coefficient of the surplus of schooling was slightly lower than the 
coefficient of years of required schooling. Furthermore, the coefficient of deficit of 
schooling is negative, meaning that undereducated workers receive lower returns 
compared to the returns received by matched workers in the same occupation. Also, the 
absolute value of the coefficient of deficit schooling is lower than that of required 
schooling. This finding is consistent with Duncan and Hoffman’s (1981) and confirms 
that the highest return is received by workers with required schooling level relative to the 
other worker’s categories. A possible explanation from the demand side is that rapid 
technological changes affect more companies in Indonesia to prefer workers with higher 
educational qualifications (Allen, 2016). From the supply side, undereducated workers’ 
lack of education may restrict their productivities, given the complexity level of their jobs 
(Quintini, 2011). 
Furthermore, the R squared is around 16 per cent. Also, the coefficients of the dummy 
year of 2007 and 2014 are positive; both of which are higher relative to the dummy year 
of 2000. This indicates that wage return increases wave after wave (7-year period) along 
with the improvement of economic growth in Indonesia from 2000 to 2014 period. As 
Yin (2016) asserts, coefficients of year dummies can be treated as indicators of the 
deepening of economic reforms and market improvements. As the dummy of time effect 
influences the estimation, the panel data model will accommodate these dummies.  
Moreover, the present study also applies clustered standard errors in the OLS models; 
clustered by year and by individuals. The result is shown in Appendix XVII. The 
coefficient estimate results are similar with the pooled OLS results; the difference is in 
the values of the standard error. Thus, using the clustered standard errors would not 
influence the coefficient estimates but may affect the significance levels. It is worth 
noting that the standard errors in the pooled OLS are clustered by individuals. As a result, 
the results of the pooled OLS with dummy year and clustered standard errors by 
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individuals are exactly the same. Although the pooled OLS estimation is consistent with 
previous empirical findings, it has been criticised due to the unobserved heterogeneity 
problem. As such, FE and RE models can be used to deal with the problem, as explained 
in the methods used here (Section 5.3.2).  
Table 5.10: The ORU Model for All Individuals 
Variable 
Pooled OLS with 
dummies year RE FE 
Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t 
Years of required schooling  0.106 0.005 *** 0.101 0.006 *** 0.047 0.022 * 
Years of surplus schooling (OE) 0.100 0.006 *** 0.101 0.006 *** 0.060 0.022 ** 
Years of deficit schooling (UE) -0.087 0.007 *** -0.088 0.007 *** -0.058 0.024 * 
Experience 0.034 0.005 *** 0.032 0.005 *** 0.019 0.023   
Experience squared -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 * 
Sex (1=female) -0.310 0.025 *** -0.326 0.028 *** (omitted) 
Ethnicity (1=Javanese) 0.043 0.031  0.057 0.036   (omitted) 
Married and cohabitate 0.171 0.034 *** 0.173 0.035 *** 0.234 0.070 *** 
Other (Separated, divorced and 
widowed) 0.101 0.066  0.117 0.068   0.255 0.130 * 
Status: full-time (30 hours a week or 
more) -0.355 0.033 *** -0.366 0.033 *** -0.444 0.058 *** 
Tenure 0.073 0.005 *** 0.069 0.005 *** 0.036 0.008 *** 
Tenure squared -0.002 0.000 *** -0.002 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** 
Sector: private -0.327 0.038 *** -0.309 0.040 *** -0.213 0.087 * 
Industry2: mining and quarrying 0.490 0.110 *** 0.393 0.112 *** 0.094 0.206   
Industry3: manufacturing 0.153 0.047 ** 0.181 0.047 *** 0.149 0.091   
Industry4: electricity, gas and water -0.171 0.135  -0.169 0.137   -0.287 0.241   
Industry5: construction 0.166 0.060 ** 0.160 0.061 ** 0.073 0.119   
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants 
and hotels 0.008 0.051  0.036 0.052   0.036 0.101   
Industry7: transportation, storage, and 
communications 0.008 0.070  0.036 0.071   0.022 0.130   
Industry8: Finance, insurance, real estate 
and business services 0.391 0.074 *** 0.383 0.074 *** 0.186 0.142   
Industry9: Social services 0.057 0.046  0.087 0.047   0.033 0.091   
Firm size2: 20-99 people 0.219 0.028 *** 0.204 0.029 *** 0.072 0.050   
Firm size3: >= 100 people 0.422 0.035 *** 0.386 0.035 *** 0.137 0.063 * 
Urban 0.132 0.027 *** 0.146 0.028 *** 0.091 0.067   
Capital region 0.260 0.038 *** 0.255 0.043 *** 0.287 0.197   
2007 0.085 0.030 ** 0.095 0.028 *** 
0.264
3 0.159   
2014 0.292 0.030 *** 0.322 0.029 *** 
0.647
1 0.3 * 
Rho    0.438     0.630     
Constants 6.619 0.087 *** 6.645 0.090 *** 7.331 0.383 *** 
Number of observations 21,174   21174    21174    
Number of individuals      15440     15440     
The R-squared statistic 0.16            
Wald chi2(3)    3387.7  ***     
F Test              29.84   *** 
Post Estimation:                   
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects          
Var(u) = 0     31.270  ***     
Hausman Test              
Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic       102.4   *** 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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RE result shows that the wage return to an additional year of required and surplus 
schooling were the same (10.1 per cent). Meanwhile, the wage return to an additional year 
of deficit schooling was slightly different from the pooled OLS model. Yet, this result 
still has the same pattern as the previous models: workers with years of surplus schooling 
receive premium wages and workers with years of deficit schooling received penalty 
wages. The Rho (interclass correlation) was 43.8 per cent, indicating that 43.8 per cent of 
the variance is due to differences across cross-sections. The Wald test result was 3387.68 
with a p-value of less than 0.01, this indicates that the model is adequate and the 
coefficients in the model are different from zero. Also, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) result shows that chi2 was 31.3 with p-value = 0.00, meaning that the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and RE is appropriate or more favourable than the 
pooled OLS model in this case.  
Based on the FE result, the wage returns to additional year of surplus schooling were 
slightly higher than years of required schooling: 6 per cent and 4.7 per cent, respectively. 
Also, the coefficient of deficit of schooling was still negative at -5.8 per cent, which is 
higher than years of required schooling in absolute value. This is in contrast to Korpi and 
Tahlin (2007) and Dockery and Miller (2012) who find lower coefficients when applying 
FE, but it does not change the pattern of the coefficients. Some studies assert that the 
changes in the coefficient of schooling variables indicate that unobservable heterogeneity 
could affect the analysis substantially (Lindley and McIntosh, 2009 and Yin, 2013). 
However, explaining unobservable heterogeneity is not easy. Another possible reason is 
a collinearity with the fixed effect, for instance, several variables are constant over time 
for any given individuals, such as education (Wooldridge, 2009), so education may be 
collinear with the individual’s level of fixed effects, as well as UE/OU/REQ status 
remains constant, only few individuals change the status. Similarly, year dummies are 
indeed the time fixed effect. Alternatively, the significant change in those coefficients 
could occur since the model for Indonesia’s case is sensitive to the change in methods.  
Having said that, Hausman test result shows that the chi2 was 102.4, with p-value = 0.00, 
which indicates that the FE model is more favourable than the RE. Yet, Bell and Jones 
(2015) argue that FE in this context is possibly not appropriate because the data used are 
longitudinal, i.e. the data could have a hierarchical structure; and the FE result is 
substantially different from the RE and the pooled OLS models. The education 
coefficients in FE estimates in this chapter are largely statistically insignificant, due to 
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lack of variation over time in the education measure (this is time-invariant for most 
people). Thus, RE would be more appropriate and sensible, despite its more restrictive 
assumption that individual effect is uncorrelated with the exogenous variables. Bell and 
Jones also argue that the RE model is not simply technical solutions to endogeneity, but 
it is also the substantive importance of context/heterogeneity. In additions, Nielsen (2007) 
argues that only few individuals that change status for category of worker with required 
years of schooling to being surplus of years of schooling. Similarly, Wooldridge (2009) 
asserted some variables do not change over time such as education, as well as 
overeducated-required-undereducated statuses. Using fixed effect or first differencing, 
education variables cannot be included in the equation. Additionally, to test whether the 
return to education was constant over time, the interaction of education variable with year 
dummies can be used. Thus, based on those considerations, the present study prefers RE 
model for this case.  
Based on the analysis, all models indicate that workers with years of surplus schooling 
receive premium wages. There are some explanations for this: Wye and Ismail (2018) 
assert that premium wage could be paid to overeducated workers because they are 
healthier, have stronger work and career aspiration, are more acceptable to on-the-job 
training, and have longer job tenure than perfectly matched workers in the same 
occupation (Büchel, 2002). These explain the persistent motive of employers to hire 
overqualified/overeducated workers with wage rewards without causing much wage 
inequality in the labour market (Rodriguez, 2011). Also, education in Indonesia might be 
used as a signal for ability rather than as a source of skill supply; and there is an increase 
in the demand for workers with higher levels of education in the country (Allen, 2016). 
There are also empirical data showing that there is a positive relationship between the 
education required and wages, and this will be elaborated in the sectoral analysis.  
Furthermore, the present study performs the equality test for two coefficients as explained 
in the post-estimation test result: all models indicate that there was no statistical difference 
between coefficients of surplus and required years of education, including the FE model. 
RE model could provide clearer explanation that coefficients of surplus and required 
years of education are not statistical difference; since in terms of value, both coefficients 
have exactly the same value of 0.101, which implies workers with years of surplus may 
not receive lower wages than workers with required schooling. Meanwhile, the difference 
between coefficient of years of required schooling and deficit schooling was significant. 
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Also, penalty wages received by workers with years of deficit schooling is significantly 
different (Table 5.11). 
Table 5.11: Testing the Equality of Two Coefficients 
  
Coefficient test  
F-test (p-value) 
Pooled OLS + 
dummies year RE FE 
H0: years of required = years of OE 1.11 (0.29) 0.01 (0.93) 2.13 (0.14) 
H0: years of required = years of UE 384.10 (0.00) 317.55 (0.00) 5.68 (0.02) 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: p value is in brackets.  
 
In short, all models have the same implications; undereducated workers receive negative 
or lower wages whereas overeducated workers still receive positive wage returns. This is 
also in line with Duncan and Hoffman’s (1981) finding. The present study could suggest 
that overeducated workers still obtain higher or at least the same return as workers with 
required schooling. Thus, this promotes the education sector to expand rapidly. Though 
the RE result shows that the returns for workers with required and surplus schooling are 
the same, pursuing higher education requires more investment in education. Thus, from 
the workers’ perspective, the highest return is still obtained by workers with required 
schooling.  
 
 
5.4.2 Control Variables 
The present study uses similar control variables as in Chapter 3, including some 
adjustments to the control variables such as: ethnicity (majority/non-majority), firm size 
(only 3 categories in this chapter), and capital region (adjusted from province dummies).   
In terms of control variables, it seems that the result of the RE model (see Table 5.10) is 
similar to Chapter 3 (see Table 3.20). Firstly, for personal characteristic variables, sex is 
negative and significant at 1 per cent, implying that males receive higher hourly wages 
compared to females. This is in line with Becker's employer taste model of discrimination 
(Becker, 1971) and the statistical discrimination theory. Meanwhile, married and 
cohabitate status has a positive and significant effect on wages, as one of the wage 
elements of white-collar workers is family allowances (includes spouse and children 
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according to the law number 8/1974) for married workers which inevitably increases the 
overall wage. In contrast, ethnicity has insignificant effects on wage. All these findings 
are similar to the arguments explained in Section 3.5.6. 
Turning to work-related and firm size variables, experience and tenure variables have a 
positive impact on wage in any specifications, and the effects of the square of experience 
and tenure are negative, which is consistent with the hypotheses in the labour market (as 
explained in Part 3.2.2). Furthermore, for the full-time dummy variable, the result shows 
that all coefficients are negative and significant, which is still similar to Chapter 3 
findings. The next control variable is sector; the private sector yields a negative and 
significant coefficient in any specifications, which also implies that an average 
government worker earns more, not less, than his/her private sector counterpart (World 
Bank, 2000). For the dummy of industries, only a few industries have a significant effect 
on wage, such as: mining and quarrying; manufacturing; construction; and finance, 
insurance, real estate and business services. Adding more data in the analysis strengthens 
the argument that Indonesia has a comparative advantage in labour-intensive 
manufacturing and that the service sector still dominates the economy (as explained in 
Chapter 2). The last variable in this category is firm size. The bigger the firms are, the 
higher the wages that the workers can earn, as is in line with Dhanani and Islam (2004).  
With regards to residence, both urban/rural and capital/non-capital province dummies 
show positive and significant results. Thus, working in urban areas and/or in the capital 
province (DKI Jakarta) affects higher hourly wages, as is in line with Comola and de 
Mello (2011). 
The additional dummy variables are year dummies. In both 2007 and 2014, these 
dummies are positive and significant relative to the dummy in 2000, which could imply 
that there is a deepening of economic reform and economic growth, as Yin (2016) asserts. 
  
 
5.4.3 Wage Effects by Gender 
In general, coefficients of years of required schooling, years of surplus schooling (OE), 
and years of deficit schooling (UE) of females are slightly higher than the coefficients of 
males (Table 5.12). This suggests that females have a higher return to required schooling, 
surplus schooling, as well as deficit schooling compared to males. It is worth noting that 
the interpretation of the coefficient estimates of the control variables are ceteris paribus. 
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Higher return for females also occurs in the Mincer wage equation (Chapter 3). Similar 
to the argument in Chapter 3 finding, a possible explanation for the higher return of 
females is the low probability or short duration of employment which requires a higher 
apparent rate of return compared to males (Abbas and Foreman-Peck, 2008). The 
empirical data on the average working week in Indonesia (Table 2.4) also support this 
argument; females tend to have shorter average working hours than males.  
Based on the pooled OLS model for males, the wage return to additional years of required 
schooling was 10.2 per cent; the wage returns to one year of surplus schooling was 9.2 
per cent; and the wage return to one year of deficit schooling was -8.2 per cent. 
Meanwhile, the RE model result for males indicates that the wage return to additional 
years of required schooling was 9.7 per cent; the wage return to one year of surplus 
schooling was 9.2 per cent; and the wage return to one year of deficit schooling was -8.1 
per cent. The pattern of coefficients between the pooled OLS and RE was relatively 
similar. These results are consistent with Duncan and Hoffman’s finding in 1981.  
For females, the pooled OLS result shows that the wage returns to additional years of 
required schooling was 10.3 per cent; the wage returns to one year of surplus schooling 
was 10.7 per cent; and the wage returns to one year of deficit schooling was -9 per cent. 
Meanwhile, based on the RE model, the wage returns to additional years of required 
schooling, the wage returns to one year of surplus schooling, and the wage returns to one 
year of deficit schooling were 9.9 per cent, 10.7 per cent and -9.2 per cent, respectively. 
These results are slightly different from Duncan and Hoffman’s (1981) finding, since the 
coefficients of years of surplus schooling are slightly higher than the coefficients of years 
of required schooling.  
However, the coefficient’s test result (Appendix XVIII) indicates the difference between 
coefficients of years of required schooling and surplus schooling was insignificant for 
both males and females in the pooled OLS and RE models. Meanwhile, the difference 
between coefficients of years of required schooling and deficit schooling was significant. 
The implication is similar to all sample results: workers with years of surplus schooling 
receive premium wages, which could be similar to premium wages received by workers 
with required schooling. Also, the penalty wages received by workers with years of deficit 
schooling was significantly different. 
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Using the FE approach, there are also some substantial changes in both the coefficient 
value as well as the patterns and significance of the variables: most mismatch coefficients 
were insignificant, except for years of surplus schooling of males (positive and significant 
at 10 per cent). Similar to all individuals, this could indicate that the model is very 
sensitive to the methods used. In particular, the female’s FE result indicates that the 
coefficient of years of deficit schooling is far higher in absolute value than the coefficient 
of years of required schooling, though remains insignificant.  
Females in Indonesia tend to take any jobs they can find, despite the low wages offered. 
As Alisjahbana and Manning (2006) find, better-off women are more likely to be 
unemployed and poorer women are more likely to be underemployed (working but 
wanting to work more). This shows that better-off women can afford to stay unemployed 
for longer periods while poorer women will take whatever work they can find, often in 
the agricultural and/or informal sectors. Moreover, poorer married women are more likely 
to participate in the labour market than married women in non-poor households. Thus, an 
unobserved heterogeneity factor for females is family background, and it may 
substantially affect the wage and mismatch relationship.  
In short, the patterns of those coefficients of the pooled OLS and the RE model are 
relatively similar with all individuals estimation results. The implications are also the 
same for both males and females; overeducated workers receive wage premium and their 
over-qualification still have some economic values, or at least the wage could be similar 
to the premium wages received by workers with required schooling. In contrast, 
undereducated workers receive a wage penalty (lower wages) compared to the matched 
workers. Thus, increasing education attainment is necessary for both male and female 
workers. Comparing those three models, the RE model is preferred since it deals with 
heterogeneity and only few individuals that change status for those worker categories. 
similar reason with the main model.  In additions, the present study conducted additional 
estimation with the interaction between sex and OE/REQ/UE/years of schooling. The 
interaction variables are significant affect the wages, with the exception Model 4, the 
interaction between sex and REQ is insignificant. Thus, the effect of years of deficit and 
surplus schooling on wages would be different at different gender. The estimations are 
provided in Appendix XVI Table XVI.4.       
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Table 5.12: The ORU Model by Gender 
Variable 
Male Female 
Pooled OLS with 
dummies year RE FE 
Pooled OLS with 
dummies year RE FE 
Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t 
Years of required schooling  0.102 0.007 *** 0.097 0.007 *** 0.049 0.027   0.103 0.008 *** 0.099 0.009 *** 0.041 0.038   
Years of surplus schooling (OE) 0.092 0.007 *** 0.092 0.008 *** 0.064 0.027 * 0.107 0.010 *** 0.107 0.011 *** 0.049 0.039   
Years of deficit schooling (UE) -0.082 0.009 *** -0.081 0.009 *** -0.047 0.029   -0.090 0.011 *** -0.092 0.012 *** -0.073 0.041   
Experience 0.039 0.006 *** 0.040 0.006 *** 0.044 0.028   0.026 0.008 *** 0.021 0.008 ** -0.035 0.040   
Experience squared -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 ** -0.001 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 * 0.000 0.000   
Ethnicity (1=Javanese) 0.057 0.040  0.064 0.046   (omitted) 0.023 0.051  0.053 0.059   (omitted) 
Married and cohabitate 0.240 0.044 *** 0.234 0.045 *** 0.207 0.088 * 0.098 0.056  0.110 0.057   0.353 0.117 ** 
Other (Separated, divorced and widowed) 0.208 0.112  0.241 0.112 * 0.295 0.189   0.053 0.087  0.064 0.090   0.276 0.183   
Status: full-time (30 hours a week or more) -0.493 0.045 *** -0.494 0.045 *** -0.530 0.079 *** -0.239 0.048 *** -0.263 0.048 *** -0.349 0.084 *** 
Tenure 0.056 0.006 *** 0.052 0.006 *** 0.023 0.009 * 0.099 0.008 *** 0.095 0.008 *** 0.061 0.013 *** 
Tenure squared -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000   -0.002 0.000 *** -0.002 0.000 *** -0.002 0.000 *** 
Sector: private -0.292 0.048 *** -0.269 0.051 *** -0.040 0.112   -0.372 0.062 *** -0.366 0.066 *** -0.483 0.137 *** 
Industry2: mining and quarrying 0.493 0.114 *** 0.398 0.117 *** 0.111 0.216   0.795 0.483  0.764 0.487   0.568 1.179   
Industry3: manufacturing 0.202 0.057 *** 0.227 0.057 *** 0.180 0.109   0.115 0.084  0.134 0.084   0.039 0.166   
Industry4: electricity, gas and water -0.211 0.142  -0.195 0.145   -0.271 0.266   0.592 0.465  0.303 0.439   -0.532 0.618   
Industry5: construction 0.137 0.065 * 0.129 0.066   0.057 0.132   0.335 0.199  0.353 0.198   0.146 0.334   
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and 
hotels 0.071 0.063  0.090 0.064   0.031 0.123   -0.023 0.090  -0.002 0.090   0.025 0.179   
Industry7: transportation, storage, and 
communications -0.020 0.075  0.018 0.076   0.029 0.143   0.340 0.234  0.252 0.231   -0.216 0.424   
Industry8: Finance, insurance, real estate 
and business services 0.393 0.087 *** 0.378 0.088 *** 0.091 0.165   0.456 0.137 *** 0.465 0.140 *** 0.539 0.284   
Industry9: Social services 0.064 0.056  0.097 0.057   0.011 0.109   0.106 0.082  0.116 0.083   0.087 0.169   
Firm size2: 20-99 people 0.165 0.035 *** 0.160 0.036 *** 0.076 0.062   0.319 0.047 *** 0.286 0.048 *** 0.081 0.087   
Firm size3: >= 100 people 0.364 0.044 *** 0.317 0.044 *** 0.062 0.077   0.547 0.057 *** 0.531 0.058 *** 0.321 0.112 ** 
Urban 0.131 0.033 *** 0.131 0.035 *** -0.021 0.082   0.151 0.045 *** 0.196 0.048 *** 0.351 0.117 ** 
Capital region 0.180 0.049 *** 0.170 0.054 ** 0.101 0.221   0.395 0.063 *** 0.392 0.070 *** 1.144 0.445 * 
2007 0.070 0.038  0.076 0.034 * 0.158 0.193   0.123 0.052 * 0.135 0.046 ** 0.482 0.284   
2014 0.251 0.037 *** 0.282 0.036 *** 0.448 0.364   0.382 0.050 *** 0.398 0.048 *** 1.044 0.532 * 
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Constants 6.758 0.107 *** 6.765 0.111 *** 7.316 0.486 *** 6.164 0.146 *** 6.204 0.151 *** 7.236 0.634 *** 
Rho       0.415     0.616           0.478     0.665     
Number of observations 13,312   13312    13312    7,862   7862    7862    
Number of individuals       9539     9539           5901     5901     
The R-squared statistic 0.14            0.19            
Wald chi2(3)    1796.90  ***        1570.60  ***     
F Test              17.83   ***             14.06   *** 
Post Estimation:                                     
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for RE                       
Var(u) = 0     17.320  ***         12.450  ***     
Hausman Test                           
Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic       66.17   ***             65.12   *** 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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5.4.4 Wage Effects by Sector 
Turning to wage effects by sector, the conclusion is still the same with the main model 
(Table 5.13). The interpretation of the coefficient estimates of the control variables are 
ceteris paribus. Meanwhile, the FE result shows that most of the coefficients are 
insignificant with the exception of years of surplus schooling of the private sector. This 
is possibly due to collinearity with the fixed effect, as explained in Section 5.4.1.  
In terms of the coefficients in RE model, it seems that the coefficients of years of surplus 
schooling are slightly higher than the coefficients of years of required schooling. But the 
equality of two coefficient test results show that those are insignificant (Appendix XVIII).  
Moreover, there are some empirical data in relation to wages and education in both 
sectors. In the public sector, entry ranks are mainly determined by education level, and 
increases in rank are largely driven by seniority, with a maximum rank depending on the 
entry level of the civil servant (World Bank, 2002). For instance, an undergraduate entry 
level is IIIA and master’s degree is IIIB. In terms of wages, IIIB with 0-year experience 
receives a slightly higher wage (around GBP 7 per month) compared to IIIA with 0-year 
experience (Government Regulation 30/2015). Similarly, most private companies apply 
different wage rates based on educational qualifications. This indicates that there is a 
positive relationship between years of schooling and wage in general, for both the public 
and the private sectors.  
Comparing the coefficients of the mismatch, most of the coefficients are higher in the 
public sector than in private sector. However, noncompeting groups model is suitable for 
Indonesia as one of developing countries, in which individuals belong to one labour 
market segment or another, and they cannot or will not switch from one to another (Fields, 
2010). This finding is consistent with Chapter 3 finding that the return to education in the 
public sector is higher than in the private sector. The distribution of earnings across the 
public sector suggests that government wage-setting institutions are very different from 
those in the private economy. The lack of competition in the public sector also allows 
higher returns to education in the sector (Psacharopolous, 1979).  
The public sector also has higher coefficient of years of surplus schooling. This is in line 
with Allen et al. (2013) who find that overeducated workers in the public sector are likely 
to be paid higher wages than one would expect based on their productivity, based on wage 
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setting institution theory (as explained in Section 5.2.5). When applying FE, the result 
shows some substantial changes in both the coefficient value and patterns and 
significance of variables. Most mismatch coefficients were insignificant, except for years 
of surplus schooling of the private sector (positive and significant at 10 per cent). These 
findings may indicate that the ORU model in this study is relatively sensitive to the panel 
data method used. 
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Table 5.13: The ORU Model by Sector 
Variable 
Private Public 
Pooled OLS with 
dummies year RE FE 
Pooled OLS with 
dummies year RE FE 
Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t 
Years of required schooling  0.091 0.006 *** 0.090 0.006 *** 0.049 0.027   0.145 0.012 *** 0.127 0.013 *** -0.018 0.041   
Years of surplus schooling (OE) 0.091 0.007 *** 0.091 0.007 *** 0.054 0.027 * 0.141 0.013 *** 0.132 0.013 *** 0.004 0.041   
Years of deficit schooling (UE) -0.075 0.008 *** -0.076 0.008 *** -0.052 0.028   -0.123 0.019 *** -0.127 0.019 *** -0.010 0.048   
Experience 0.025 0.005 *** 0.025 0.005 *** 0.038 0.028   0.047 0.011 *** 0.045 0.011 *** 0.001 0.043   
Experience squared -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 * -0.001 0.000 * 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.001   
Sex (1=female) -0.355 0.028 *** -0.360 0.031 *** (omitted) -0.115 0.051 * -0.133 0.061 * (omitted) 
Ethnicity (1=Javanese) 0.045 0.035  0.060 0.039   (omitted) 0.066 0.071  0.092 0.086   (omitted) 
Married and cohabitate 0.192 0.038 *** 0.192 0.038 *** 0.232 0.081 ** 0.267 0.087 ** 0.230 0.090 * 0.188 0.176   
Other (Separated, divorced and 
widowed) 0.137 0.073  0.147 0.075 * 0.286 0.152   0.130 0.156  0.141 0.160   0.156 0.271   
Status: full-time (30 hours a week or 
more) -0.382 0.038 *** -0.403 0.038 *** -0.517 0.076 *** -0.305 0.060 *** -0.295 0.059 *** -0.429 0.091 *** 
Tenure 0.086 0.006 *** 0.080 0.005 *** 0.037 0.009 *** 0.052 0.010 *** 0.049 0.010 *** 0.032 0.015 * 
Tenure squared -0.002 0.000 *** -0.002 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 ** -0.001 0.000 ** -0.001 0.000 ** -0.001 0.000 * 
Industry2: mining and quarrying 0.449 0.119 *** 0.357 0.120 ** -0.044 0.239   0.619 0.298 * 0.533 0.305   0.087 0.527   
Industry3: manufacturing 0.168 0.050 *** 0.191 0.050 *** 0.189 0.101   -0.377 0.187 * -0.297 0.186   -0.302 0.325   
Industry4: electricity, gas and water -0.152 0.157  -0.147 0.157   -0.152 0.290   -0.288 0.259  -0.442 0.267   -1.328 0.477 ** 
Industry5: construction 0.208 0.063 *** 0.207 0.064 ** 0.131 0.130   -0.858 0.240 *** -0.824 0.243 *** -0.341 0.417   
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants 
and hotels 0.032 0.054  0.050 0.055   0.074 0.112   -0.590 0.259 * -0.427 0.261   0.048 0.511   
Industry7: transportation, storage, and 
communications 0.042 0.074  0.066 0.075   0.091 0.144   -0.351 0.214  -0.168 0.216   0.000 0.385   
Industry8: Finance, insurance, real 
estate and business services 0.422 0.080 *** 0.410 0.080 *** 0.305 0.160   0.154 0.206  0.219 0.211   -0.010 0.404   
Industry9: Social services 0.063 0.050  0.082 0.051   0.042 0.105   -0.088 0.125  0.005 0.125   0.138 0.205   
Firm size2: 20-99 people 0.256 0.033 *** 0.231 0.033 *** 0.060 0.061   0.099 0.052  0.124 0.055 * 0.134 0.092   
Firm size3: >= 100 people 0.471 0.039 *** 0.433 0.039 *** 0.199 0.075 ** 0.346 0.075 *** 0.315 0.076 *** 0.006 0.132   
Urban 0.147 0.031 *** 0.160 0.032 *** 0.141 0.081   0.148 0.052 ** 0.152 0.057 ** -0.034 0.126   
Capital region 0.287 0.041 *** 0.278 0.045 *** 0.324 0.218   -0.028 0.110  -0.004 0.126   -0.042 0.548   
2007 0.088 0.035 * 0.085 0.032 ** 0.090 0.197   0.058 0.062  0.084 0.055   0.582 0.281 * 
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2014 0.327 0.034 *** 0.336 0.033 *** 0.335 0.375   0.130 0.064 * 0.205 0.060 *** 1.206 0.516 * 
Constants 6.479 0.079 *** 6.507 0.081 *** 6.959 0.426 *** 5.962 0.200 *** 6.069 0.207 *** 8.630 0.910 *** 
Rho       0.423     0.625           0.496     0.702     
Number of observations 17,512   17,512    17,512    3,662   3662    3662    
Number of individuals       13417     13417           2429     2429     
The R-squared statistic 0.12            0.18            
Wald chi2(3)    2171.14  ***        723.86  ***     
F Test              18.24   ***             12.86   *** 
Post Estimation:                                     
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for RE                       
Var(u) = 0     16.200  ***         14.970  ***     
Hausman Test                           
Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic       73.84   ***             82.91   *** 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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5.4.5 Robustness Test  
The present study uses three approaches as the robustness test, i.e. replacing mode in the 
main model by mean, using balanced panel data, and applying an alternative model from 
Verdugo and Verdugo (1989). Those tests confirm that overeducated workers receive 
wage premium for each year of surplus of schooling, while undereducated workers 
receive wage penalty for each year of deficit schooling. The coefficients of deficit 
schooling are negative but insignificant in affecting the wages. Meanwhile, using 
Verdugo and Verdugo’s model, the present study finds a different conclusion compared 
to Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) results. Previous empirical studies find that overeducated 
workers will receive penalty wage and undereducated workers will receive premium 
wage, such as: Iriondo and Perez-Amaral (2013) and Alisjahbana et al. (2017). The 
present study finds that overeducated workers may receive wages higher than the matched 
workers. Also, undereducation incidences may not have any effect on wage. However, 
this is not the main focus of the analysis here and this issue can be explored in future 
research.  
 
Realised Method by Mean 
When comparing the RE models between mode (Table 5.10) and mean (Table 5.14), the 
results still show a similar pattern in coefficients of the main variables and thus suggest 
the same implications; the surplus of schooling coefficient is positive and significant and 
the deficit of schooling coefficient is negative and significant on wage. This implies that 
one extra year of surplus schooling (overeducation) still gains premium wages, whereas 
one extra year of deficit schooling (undereducation) will receive penalty wages. When 
comparing premium wages between required schooling and surplus schooling, the result 
shows that workers with required schooling receive higher wages than workers with 
surplus schooling. Similarly, the return to workers with required schooling is still higher 
than the absolute value of the return to undereducated workers. This agrees with Duncan 
and Hoffman’s (1981) finding. The complete results and sample distribution are provided 
in Appendix XIX.  
The RE model also shows a similar pattern with the pooled OLS model. There is a slight 
difference between the mode (main model) and the mean results: the coefficients of years 
of required schooling and surplus schooling are the same in the model. The t-test also 
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indicates an insignificant difference between those coefficients. In the mean model, those 
coefficient values are different: the coefficient of required schooling is 12.1 per cent while 
the coefficient of surplus schooling is 9 per cent.   
Controlling unobservable heterogeneity, the FE model shows some substantial changes. 
All mismatch coefficients are insignificant and the absolute value of years of deficit 
schooling is slightly higher than the coefficient of years of required schooling. Using 
mean also confirms that the model is sensitive to the method of panel data used, as 
explained in Section 5.3.2.  
Table 5.14: Estimation Result Based on Mean 
Variable 
Pooled OLS with 
dummies year RE FE 
Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t 
Years of required schooling  0.133 0.007 *** 0.121 0.008 *** 0.012 0.019   
Years of surplus schooling (OE) 0.096 0.007 *** 0.090 0.007 *** -0.002 0.018   
Years of deficit schooling (UE) -0.076 0.008 *** -0.073 0.009 *** -0.019 0.019   
 … …  … …  … …   
Constants 6.372 0.100 *** 6.484 0.104 *** 8.035 0.309 *** 
Rho       0.438     0.652     
Number of observations 21,174    21,174    21,174    
Number of individuals       15,440     15,440     
The R-squared statistic 0.1557            
Wald chi2(3)     3298.850  ***     
F Test          29.49  *** 
Post Estimation:                   
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for RE          
Var(u) = 0    29.840  ***     
Hausman Test             
Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic       140.9   *** 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent. 
 
 
 
Balanced Panel Data 
 
The other approach of robustness test is using balanced panel data. The main aim of this 
approach is to compare the result of balance data with non-random attrition and the 
unbalance panel data with random attrition, whether the results still indicates similar 
pattern.  
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This approach is shrinking the sample to only individuals who appear in all three waves 
of the survey, which means the later waves are skewed towards older age groups. As 
indicated in Table 5.15, there pattern of the mean of year of surplus schooling in balance 
and unbalance panel data is not significantly different based on t-test result (Table 5.15). 
On the other side, the trend of years of deficit of balanced panel data is significantly higher 
than the trend in unbalance panel data, which may indicate older generation has a 
significant contribution on the increase of undereducation (workers with deficit years of 
schooling).  
Table 5.15: Comparison of the Mean of Years of Surplus Schooling and Years of Deficit 
Schooling, Balanced and Unbalanced Panel Data 
  2000 2007 2014 
Years of Surplus Schooling 
Balanced panel 29.43 20.92 20.3 
Unbalanced panel 28.5 24.9 23.4 
Two tails t-test (P-
Value) 0.3078 
Years of Deficit Schooling 
Balanced panel 14.27 25.35 28.01 
Unbalanced panel 13.6 20.6 22 
Two tails t-test (P-
Value) 0.1418 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: T-test hypothesis is mean of balanced panel data is equal to mean of unbalanced 
panel data.  
 
Although the attritions between this robustness test and the main model are different; and 
there is skewed towards older age groups in the robustness test, this approach also does 
not change the key findings of the present study. Overeducated workers and workers with 
required years of schooling still receive premium wages and undereducated workers still 
receive penalty wages. The pattern of coefficients is similar to the main model (all 
individuals). The pooled OLS and RE results are more consistent to Duncan and 
Hoffman’s (1981) finding that the wage return to one-year surplus schooling is lower than 
the wage returns to one-year required schooling. Meanwhile, the wage return to one-year 
deficit schooling is less than the wage returns to required schooling in absolute value. 
Controlling unobservable heterogeneity, the FE result significantly changes: the wage 
return to years of surplus schooling is higher than the wage returns to years of required 
schooling; and the absolute value of years of deficit schooling is higher than the wage 
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returns of required schooling. Again, this finding confirms that the model is sensitive to 
the method of panel data used. This finding may also imply that unobservable 
heterogeneity (such as ability) affects the model. Thus, there is no significant difference 
in pattern of variables between unbalanced and balanced panel data. The complete result, 
summary statistics and sample distribution are provided in Appendix XX.  
 
Table 5.16: Estimation Result, Balanced Panel 
Variable 
Pooled OLS with 
dummies year RE FE 
Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t 
Years of required schooling  0.119 0.010 *** 0.119 0.010 *** 0.080 0.032 * 
Years of surplus schooling (OE) 0.105 0.011 *** 0.107 0.012 *** 0.084 0.032 ** 
Years of deficit schooling (UE) -0.113 0.012 *** -0.116 0.013 *** -0.092 0.034 ** 
… … …  … …  … …   
Constants 7.172 0.187 *** 7.148 0.194 *** 7.673 0.705 *** 
Rho       0.084     0.352     
Number of observations 3,384    3,384    3,384    
Number of individuals       1,128     1,128     
The R-squared statistic 0.2681            
Wald chi2(3)     1122.92  ***     
F Test          15.01  *** 
Post Estimation:                   
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for RE          
Var(u) = 0    21.690  ***     
Hausman Test             
Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic       71.3   *** 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent. 
 
 
Alternative model: Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) 
In Chapter 4, the present research finds that there were the increase in undereducation and 
the decrease in overeducation during 2000-2014 period. Table 5.16 also confirms these 
findings: there was an increase in sample proportion for dummy undereducation equal to 
one, from 13 per cent in 2000 to 20.9 per cent in 2007 and to 22.7 per cent in 2014. There 
was also a decrease in sample proportion of dummy overeducation equal to one, from 
28.5 per cent in 2000 to 24.9 per cent in 2007 and to 23.3 per cent in 2014.  
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Table 5.17: Sample Distribution for Overeducation and Undereducation Dummies 
  
Years 
2000 2007 2014 
Dummy of undereducation 0 86.4 79.1 77.3 
1 13.6 20.9 22.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
          
Dummy of overeducation 0 71.5 75.1 76.7 
1 28.5 24.9 23.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
 
By applying the Verdugo and Verdugo model (as explained in the literature review); the 
present study finds that the coefficients of dummy of overeducation are positive and 
significant at 1 per cent for the pooled OLS model; positive and significant at 5 per cent 
for the RE model, and insignificant in the FE model. Positive and significant coefficient 
implies that overeducated workers receive premium wages relative to workers with actual 
years of schooling. In terms of the dummy of overeducation, the coefficient is 11.8 per 
cent for the pooled OLS model. When applying the RE model, the coefficient decreases 
slightly to 10.9 per cent. This implies that overeducated workers may receive 11.8 per 
cent higher wage compared to matched workers. Meanwhile, the coefficient of 
undereducation dummy is negative but insignificant in all specifications, which implies 
that undereducation incidences may not have any effects on wage. The complete 
estimation results of this model are provided in Appendix XXI.  
This finding is inconsistent with Verdugo and Verdugo’s (1989) findings and previous 
empirical studies which use this model: the coefficient of overeducation is negative and 
significant, whereas the coefficient of undereducation is positive and significant. This 
implies that overeducated workers receive wage penalty, relative to matched workers. 
Finally, this finding also confirms that the model is relatively sensitive to the panel data 
method used since the result of the RE and FE model are significantly different.   
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Table 5.18: Estimation Result Based on Verdugo and Verdugo’s Model 
Variable 
Pooled OLS with 
dummies year RE FE 
Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t 
Years of actual schooling 0.112 0.005 *** 0.109 0.006 *** 0.059 0.033   
Dummy of Overeducation 0.118 0.034 *** 0.094 0.033 ** -0.041 0.055   
Dummy of Undereducation -0.034 0.030   -0.016 0.030   0.026 0.051   
… … …   … …   … …   
Constants 6.548 0.088 *** 6.564 0.092 *** 7.177 0.556 *** 
Rho       0.437     0.628     
Number of observations 21,174    21,174    21,174    
Number of individuals       15,440     15,440     
The R-squared statistic 0.159            
Wald chi2(3)     3406.81  ***     
F Test          29.64  *** 
Post Estimation:                   
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for RE          
Var(u) = 0    30.860  ***     
Hausman Test             
Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic       98.73   *** 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
Throughout the literature on education mismatch and wage in Indonesia, most studies 
have focused on analysing the relationship between wage and education mismatch by 
using cross-sectional data. The present study contributes to the discussion on education 
mismatch by using the ORU model which is relatively more systematic and more 
comprehensive than previous empirical studies (Table 5.1), since the model 
accommodates many variables that are grouped by personal characteristics, job related, 
firm size and region categories. In terms of education level, the present study covers from 
6 years of schooling (primary school) to the highest level, since the challenge of the 
Indonesian labour market is the domination of workers with lower level of education in 
the labour market, and the increase of mismatch which is driven by the increase of 
undereducation (Chapter 4 finding). Thus, undereducation should be a deeper concern 
here than in developed countries since there is a risk of weaker productivity growth and 
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a slower structural transition to higher value-added activities with undereducated 
workforce (ILO, 2015). This study also attempts to address the unobserved heterogeneity 
issue. Gender and sectoral differences are also considered to provide a more 
comprehensive and detailed analysis of the labour market.  
This chapter has focused on answering three research questions: (5.1) does education 
mismatch (undereducation and/or overeducation) contribute to determine wage in 
Indonesia? (5.2) considering the unobserved heterogeneity, does education mismatch still 
contribute to determine wage, and (5.3) do returns associated with education mismatch 
differ by gender and by sector? Three waves of IFLS data (2000, 2007 and 2014) are used 
in the analysis. The present study employs the ORU model adapted from Duncan and 
Hoffman (1981) with panel analysis. The model offers a better interpretation of mismatch 
and wage relationship, in terms of each additional deficit or surplus of education. 
Meanwhile, panel data are used to deal with unobserved heterogeneity problem.  
Answering the first research question, the results reported here indicate that both 
overeducation and undereducation incidences affect the labour wages in Indonesia. Based 
on the pooled OLS model, the present study finds that the wage returns to additional years 
of required schooling was around 10.6 per cent. The wage returns to one year of surplus 
schooling was around 10 per cent and the wage return to one year of deficit schooling 
was -8.7 per cent. This finding is consistent with Duncan and Hoffman’s (1981) finding 
that: the wage return to one year of surplus schooling is positive and significant but lower 
than the wage return to additional years of required schooling; and the wage return to one 
year of deficit schooling is negative and significant with the absolute value lower than the 
wage return to an additional year of required schooling, However, the test of equality of 
two coefficients shows that the difference between the coefficients of years of required 
schooling and surplus schooling is insignificant. Also, the penalty wages received by 
workers with years of deficit schooling is significantly different from the wage return to 
additional years of required schooling.  
The panel data model is used to deal with unobserved heterogeneity; this part also answers 
the second research question. When applying the RE, the result becomes similar to the 
pooled OLS findings. The results suggest that workers with years of surplus schooling 
receive premium wages and workers with years of deficit schooling receive penalty 
wages, which is consistent with Duncan and Hoffman’s (1981) findings. Meanwhile, the 
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FE method’s result indicates a substantial change in the coefficients value, pattern and 
significance level.  
Furthermore, the post-estimation test indicates that FE is favourable. On the other hand, 
Bell and Jones (2015) argue that RE is more favourable in the context of longitudinal data 
and when hierarchies occur in the data. Considering the sensitive estimation results when 
using panel data methods, a cautious interpretation is needed in this case. Significantly 
different results of the RE and FE may indicate that the ORU model in this study is 
relatively sensitive to the panel data methods used. Another possible explanation is a 
collinearity with the fixed effect; both the individual’s level fixed effects and the time 
fixed effects. Alternatively, the unobserved heterogeneity may affect the wages. Yet, 
obtaining the proof is not straightforward. Hartog (2000) asserts that the omission of 
unobserved heterogeneity may lead to an underestimation/overestimation of the rate of 
return to education mismatch. Meanwhile, Wen and Maani’s (2017) argue that applying 
panel data techniques to the study of overeducation may lead to the controversial results 
on whether or not education and occupational mismatch with earning penalty effects are 
verified once individual heterogeneity is taken into account. 
Answering the third research question, the coefficients of years of required schooling, 
years of surplus schooling (OE), and years of deficit schooling (UE) of females are 
slightly higher than those coefficients of males, which implies that females have a higher 
return to required schooling, surplus schooling, as well as deficit schooling than males 
do. This could be due to the short duration of females’ employment (Abbas and Foreman-
Peck, 2008). Similar to all individuals, the panel data method may result in a very 
sensitive result of estimation of both the RE and FE models. The implication of the gender 
analysis is similar to all sample results: both male and female workers with years of 
surplus schooling receive premium wages. The premium could be similar to premium 
wages received by workers with required schooling. Meanwhile, penalty wages received 
by workers with years of deficit schooling are significantly different.  
By sector, the same key finding is also found within the general (all individuals) results. 
Workers in the public sector receive slightly higher wages than those in the private sector 
for workers with required and surplus years of schooling, as is in line with Allen et al. 
(2013). Also, overeducated workers in the public sector are likely to be paid higher wages 
than one would expect based on their productivity based on wage setting institution 
theory, and higher returns in the public sector support some signalling value of education 
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(Chevalier et al., 2004). Applying the panel data method, the RE result is relatively 
similar to the pooled OLS result, meanwhile the FE result shows some substantial changes 
in both the coefficient value as well as patterns and significance of variables. Again, the 
models are relatively sensitive to the panel data method used.  
This finding has several implications: education mismatch, which has negative effects on 
both the individual and the macro levels such as lower productivity. In this case, the 
workers acquire knowledge that is not subsequently transferred into skills that are needed 
for a certain job. This also highlights some inefficiency in the country’s educational 
system and labour market. The policy makers can provide labour market information 
including job vacancies. Moreover, the government should focus on increasing education 
attainment, in particular senior high school and university levels to meet the growing 
demand for skills/education in the labour force. Equal access to senior high schools and 
universities is necessary in terms of physical infrastructure (higher education building 
construction) as well as funding mechanisms (such as scholarship and student loan). The 
other important aspect is that the proliferation of education in Indonesia should be 
accompanied by progress in the quality of schooling, such as: strengthening vocational 
education and skill training that can help prepare the youth for a smooth transition to 
employment; and promoting the integration of internship programs and other practical 
learning experience in the curriculums.  
Owing to the limitations of the dataset, the present study is unable to elaborate the aspects 
of skill, subject of study and job characteristics. These data would allow the analysis to 
be more comprehensive for both the vertical and horizontal mismatches and to elaborate 
the job characteristics and skills required from the demand side. In the absence of other 
measures of skills competencies, the results from this analysis should not be treated as 
conclusive, but rather as indicative. The resulting skill gap is worrying as it will affect 
Indonesia’s competitiveness in the world economy, which is becoming more and more 
knowledge-based and technologically intensive. Moreover, adding interaction variables 
such as gender and OE/REQ/UE variables will be more interesting and enrich the analysis 
of gender different. Finally, the assessment of the changes in the consequences of 
education mismatch in the labour market over time is an interesting area to be explored 
in future research. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion and Implications  
 
This chapter comprises three parts: (6.1) an overview of the key findings from each 
chapter; (6.2) the implications of the research and the policy recommendations related to 
return to education and education mismatch in Indonesia; and finally, (6.3) the research 
limitations and extensions as well as some points which may be worth further 
investigation in future research.   
 
6.1 An Overview of Key Findings 
This thesis focuses on exploring education and the labour market outcomes in Indonesia. 
It provides an overview of the education system and development as well as the 
background of the data used in Chapter 2. Meanwhile, the main discussion analyses three 
aspects, i.e.: the return to education (Chapter 3); the determinants of education mismatch 
(Chapter 4); and the relationship between education mismatch and wage (Chapter 5). This 
overview is drawn from the Indonesia Family Life Survey’s (IFLS) data of 2000 and 2014 
periods. Those waves are chosen to analyse the return to education and the education 
mismatch determinants in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Those waves represent the conditions 
before and after the education expansion period; hence the immediate and longer effects 
of those policies can be addressed. The IFLS of 2007 data are also added to increase the 
number of individuals and to narrow the gap between the periods of the analysis in 
Chapter 5 (education mismatch and wage). Compared to other data such as SAKERNAS 
(Labour Force Survey), IFLS data are more comprehensive since they can accommodate 
all variables that are needed in the present study, especially the data on the public and 
private workers. 
Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous country in the world and one of the largest 
economies in Southeast Asia. As such, human capital is supposed to be one of the primary 
focuses in developing the country. However, the number of people with junior high school 
or lower qualifications in the country is around 64 per cent of the total population in 2017, 
which is still far higher than the number of those with senior high school or higher 
qualifications (Statistics Indonesia, 2019). 
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Education becomes one of the most important factors in career progression, as well as in 
increasing wage and productivity at both the individual and aggregate levels. The 
education sector then expands as many individuals become aware of the importance of 
education and decide to pursue higher education qualifications. In the US, such expansion 
is followed by the rise of overeducation incidences, since the supply of university 
graduates increases more rapidly than its demand (Freeman, 1976). This begs the 
question: does this also apply in developing countries? 
In detail, Chapter 3 highlights several key points: the return to education varies and 
increases in line with education level, as predicted by the human capital theory (Schultz, 
1961; Mincer, 1974; and Becker, 1994). Based on the Mincer wage equation, the return 
to junior high school in 2000 was 28.5 per cent, senior high school was 63.7 per cent and 
university was 119.3 per cent (relative to primary school and below). In 2014, the return 
to junior high school was 22.1 per cent and to senior high school and university were 48 
per cent and 95.8 per cent, respectively. In terms of years of schooling, the result shows 
that one additional year of schooling increased the wage by 12.4 per cent in 2000 and by 
9.9 per cent in 2014. In comparison, the return to junior high school in China in 2005 was 
15.9 per cent; the return to senior high school was 46.6 per cent and the return to 
university was 95.8 per cent - relative to primary school (Gropello and Sakellariou, 2010). 
Indonesia’s return to education in both periods was slightly higher, but the growth of the 
return was negative or declining. In contrast, China still had a positive growth of return 
to schooling for all education levels, as indicated in Table 3.5 (Gropello and Sakellariou, 
2010). 
The present study also finds a gender disparity in wage; the return to education for females 
is higher than for males. This trend also occurred in 139 other countries between the 
period of 1950 and 2014 (Psacharopoulos, 2018). Some possible explanations are the 
more limited supply of skilled female workers, the different technological requirements 
in female-dominated and male-dominated jobs (Ren and Miller, 2012), and shorter 
duration of females employment. A similar trend also occurs in other developing 
countries such as Pakistan (Abbas and Foreman-Peck, 2008).  
In terms of sector, the return to education was generally higher in the public sector than 
in the private sector for both periods. Thus, the public sector in Indonesia continues to 
attract more job seekers. Some possible reasons for the premium in the public sector are: 
the increase of wage in public sector is higher and faster (The World Bank, 2000); there 
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is a lack of competition in the public sector (Psacharopolous, 1979); the private sector is 
more efficient than the public sector (Rao, 2015); and wage rigidity may occur more in 
the public sector.  
For trend over time, based on the equality of coefficients across two Mincer wage 
equations, the present study finds that the return to education tends to decrease for most 
education levels from 2000 to 2014. This decline could be attributed to the education 
expansion. This is consistent with the increase in the supply of educated workers (Section 
3.2.4). This is also similar to Freeman’s finding that there is a fall in the return to 
education in the US, which is attributed to the expansion of the country’s education sector 
(Freeman, 1976). The same pattern also occurred in the UK between 1994 and 2006 as 
Walker and Zhu (2008) find. Furthermore, the decline in the return to higher education 
was because the higher education participation rate increased dramatically while the 
growth in relative labour demand suggests that the supply of graduates considerably 
outstripped the demand, which ought to imply a fall in the wage premium. Dumauli 
(2015) adds that one of the possible reasons for the decrease in the return to education in 
Indonesia is the low quality of the education system. 
By gender, the highest decrease in the return to education is the return for males with 
junior high school qualifications (relative to primary school or below), one of possible 
explanations is more males having higher education attainment due to the 9-year (primary 
and junior high schools) compulsory education program. On the demand side, the 
economy transforms to service and manufacturing and increases the demand for female 
workers; for instance, garment companies hardly recruit men because the job needs 
sewing; moreover, an increase in retail sector causes supermarkets and mega-malls 
(which requires at least senior high school qualification) to replace the traditional markets. 
Thus, males with lower education attainment are more affected.  
By sector, the private sector experienced a significant decline in the return to education 
between the year 2000 and 2014. Meanwhile, according to the test of coefficients of the 
two models, the result indicates that the changes are insignificant for the public sector. 
This is possibly due to the wage rigidity in the public sector as the sector has a wage 
mechanism that is not based on the market’s mechanism.  
Anticipating endogeneity problems and selection bias, the Instrumental Variable (IV) and 
Heckman model are used by incorporating conventional, policy and alternative 
 302 
instruments. The IV is used to gauge the role of the omitted variables (ability bias) in the 
OLS estimates of the return to schooling in the Indonesian labour market. The selection 
bias, in this case, is the bias that arose from non-random sampling for employment. The 
OLS with years of schooling is used to simplify the analysis. The OLS result shows that 
the coefficient of years of schooling in 2000 was 12.4 per cent; and decreased to 9.9 per 
cent in 2014. The IV results show that endogeneity problems may occur. In spite of the 
instruments’ weaknesses, the IV result confirms that there is a decline in year schooling 
coefficient from 0.108 in 2000 to 0.066 (Model 1) and 0.088 (Model 2) in 2014. While 
the Heckman model confirms that selection bias could occur in the OLS model. But the 
conclusion remains the same: there is a decline in return to education, from 11.8 per cent 
in 2000 to 9.8 per cent in 2014. 
In Chapter 4, another consequence of education expansion is overeducation, as has 
happened in the US. In developing countries such as Indonesia, education mismatch 
increases but is driven by the increase of undereducation. In contrast, the trend of 
overeducation decreased between 2000 and 2014 periods. The analysis is based on RM 
(Mode), by calculating the mode education level for a range of occupations with an 
individual defined as being overeducated if their qualifications are more than one standard 
deviation above their occupation’s mode education level, and being undereducated if their 
qualifications are less than the standard deviation. In addition to the estimation 
techniques, the present study also develops a hybrid of occupation classifications to 
provide a good balance between a strong sample size and reducing the level of 
heterogeneity in roles within the occupational grouping and to provide a more accurate 
measurement of overeducated, undereducated and matched categories. 
The result shows that the proportion of undereducated workers was 13.6 per cent in 2000, 
which then increased to 22.8 per cent in 2014. The overeducation proportions in 2000 and 
2014 were around 28.5 per cent and 23.4 per cent, respectively. That conclusion is drawn 
based on both mode and mean methods. Thus, there is an increase of undereducation and 
a decrease of overeducation. Compared to OECD countries, undereducation and 
overeducation incidences in Indonesia are relatively higher. The average undereducation 
and overeducation incidences in OECD were 19 per cent and 15 per cent in 2015, 
respectively (World Bank, 2018).  
One possible explanation for this trend is as explained by technological change theory 
(Oliveira et al., 2000); rapid technological change may require school-provided 
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skills/education higher than those possessed by the currently employed workers. Even in 
the presence of positive adjustment costs, better-educated workers cannot be made 
instantaneously. The employers and the employees could be locked into a situation of 
disequilibrium (at least in the short run) and hence pockets of undereducation would arise. 
Prospera and AlphaBeta Advisors (2019) find that rapid technological growth is 
occurring in Indonesia and transforming the nature of works in the country. Machines 
have eliminated around 5.5 hours of repetitive and menial tasks from the average 
Indonesian working week since 2000 and workers who were able to adapt to a higher 
value, more complex tasks saw their incomes grow almost twice as quickly over the 
period as those whose work did not automate. However, Indonesian firms have been 
slower to automate than their global peers; almost three out of ten are now investing in 
technology like car-assembly robots, agricultural tractors, and advanced point-of-sale 
systems. Another aspect that may attribute to the conclusion is related to the estimation 
techniques: the weakness of the RM is that it only considers the supply side, so the 
changes in the mode only reflect the changes in average workers’ education. The 
measurement cannot represent the changes because the jobs demanded higher education 
qualifications or the change in education required by the firms. 
In terms of the determinants of education mismatch, the present study develops a model 
of mismatch determinant using Multinomial Logit Model (MNL), since there is no 
standard model of mismatch determinants. Thus, most variables used by previous 
empirical studies (both internationally and specifically on Indonesia) are sorted, selected 
and adjusted based on the Indonesia context. The result shows that undereducation in 
Indonesia is determined by gender; there are some advantages for female workers 
compared to males, considering safety and respectability for example. The private sector 
experiences a higher relative probability of undereducation incident. This confirms the 
finding that the increase of undereducation incident is partly driven by the private sector. 
Moreover, undereducation is more likely to occur in non-agriculture sectors. Those 
working in medium and large firms are less likely to be undereducated, possibly because 
several large companies in the private sector have also developed their own training 
centres.  
For overeducation, there is a negative relationship between tenure and the probability of 
being overeducated. The coefficient of the private variable is negative and significant, 
possibly because the Indonesian bureaucracy has a very rigid organisational structure in 
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which the number of positions at each level in the hierarchy is fixed mechanically by a 
formula. Moreover, the probability of being overeducated is lower in manufacturing 
industries relative to the agriculture industry. Thus, the mismatch is determined by 
workers’ and job’s characteristics as the Assignment Model asserted.  
Chapter 4 also analyses sector and gender differences with similar method (Multinomial 
Logit Model/MNL). Different trends of mismatch are found in the public sector; there is 
an increase in overeducation and a decrease in undereducation between 2000 and 2014. 
One of the possible reasons is the regulations. For instance, according to Government 
Regulation 30/2015, entry ranks are mainly determined by education level, and increases 
in rank are largely driven by seniority, with the maximum rank depending on the entry-
level of the civil servant. More specifically, an undergraduate entry-level is IIIA and a 
master’s is IIIB. In terms of wages, IIIB with 0-year experience receives a slightly higher 
wage (around GBP 7 per month) compared to IIIA with 0-year experience. Thus, workers 
with master’s degrees still have an incentive (higher wages) to apply for the same position 
compared to those with undergraduate degree. Furthermore, the public sector recently 
prefers to hire workers with high education levels; those with at least senior high school 
qualifications. For unskilled jobs such as cleaning, however, the public sector prefers 
outsourcing or using private firms’ services rather than hiring directly, as explained in 
Chapter 3. Nevertheless, there is no substantial difference between trends and the 
determinants of mismatch between males and females.  
Several sensitivity tests are also performed to test the model, such as MNL with mean, 
Multinomial Probit (MNP) Model and by adding casual workers into the sample. The 
present study finds that the variables that determine educational mismatch are slightly 
sensitive to different methods, sets of variables, sector/gender and periods. Yet, the result 
still implies that educational mismatch in Indonesia is determined by personal and 
household characteristics, work-related and firm size and area of residency variables 
which are all observed in this research. 
The last chapter, Chapter 5 finds, based on the Pooled OLS model, the wage return to an 
additional year of required schooling is 10.6 per cent, which is consistent with Duncan 
and Hoffman’s (1981) finding. The wage returns to one year of surplus schooling is 10 
per cent and the wage return to one year of deficit schooling is -8.7 per cent. The analysis 
employs Overeducation-Required-Undereducation (ORU) model, developed by Duncan 
and Hoffman (1981), to analyse the relationship between wage and education mismatch. 
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The model in the present study is relatively more systematic and comprehensive than the 
ones used in previous empirical studies since the model accommodates many variables 
that are grouped by personal characteristics, work-related, firm size and region categories. 
Meanwhile, panel data are used to deal with unobserved heterogeneity.  
The test of equality of two coefficients shows that there is no significant difference 
between the wage of years of required schooling and years of surplus schooling. The 
implication here is still similar; the return to overeducation is positive and significant and 
the return to undereducation is negative and significant, both of which affect the wage. 
This finding is slightly different from previous empirical studies, such as Korpi and 
Tahlin (2007) and Tsai (2010). This could be related to Chapter 4’s finding that 
overeducation trend decreases, implying that Indonesia needs more workers with higher 
education and better skill to meet the labour demand (Allen, 2016); as a result, 
overeducated workers will have at least the same wage as matched workers.  
In comparison, the wage return to additional years of required schooling in the EU 
between 2006 and 2009 was 14 per cent; the wage return to one year of surplus schooling 
was 4 per cent; and the wage return to one year of deficit schooling was -3 per cent 
(Iriondo and Perez-Amaral, 2013). Meanwhile, the wage returns to additional years of 
required schooling in China between 1989 and 2009 was 23 per cent; the wage return to 
one year of surplus schooling was 3 per cent; and the wage return to one year of deficit 
schooling was -4 per cent. In other words, the wage return to an additional year of required 
schooling in Indonesia is relatively lower than in other countries. Also, the wage return 
to one year of surplus schooling is significantly higher and the wage return to one year of 
deficit schooling is significantly lower.  
The panel data model is used to deal with unobserved heterogeneity. There are two 
methods of panel data: FE and RE. The crucial distinction between FE and RE is whether 
the unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are correlated with the regressors 
in the model, not whether these effects are stochastic or not. The main assumptions of RE 
model are random and uncorrelated with the independent variable included in the model. 
The advantage of FE model is that it can be used to analyse the impact of variables that 
vary over time, so the estimated coefficients of FE models cannot be biased because of 
the omitted time-invariant characteristics, such as culture, religion, gender, race, etc.  
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Turning to the results, RE result shows a conclusion similar to the pooled OLS model. 
Yet, applying FE substantially changes the coefficients value, pattern and significance 
level. The result is slightly different from previous empirical studies (Korpi and Tahlin, 
2007; Tsai, 2010; Dockery and Miller, 2012) which find similar patterns between both 
models, although with lower coefficient values when using FE. The marked difference 
between the results of RE and FE may indicate that the ORU model in this study is 
relatively sensitive to the panel data methods used. Thus, a cautious interpretation is 
required. Another possible explanation is collinearity with the fixed effects, since the 
model accommodates several personal characteristic variables and year dummies which 
may be similar to individual level’s fixed effects and the time’s fixed effects. This is also 
in contrast to previous empirical studies which use fewer control variables. Alternatively, 
it could be argued that unobserved heterogeneity may affect the wage, though it is hard 
to prove.  
From those three chapters’ findings, there are some possible explanations for the 
inconsistent evidence with the previous empirical studies in the US and EU countries 
(Freeman, 1987; and McGuinness et al., 2017). In the US, expansion in education is 
followed by the rise of overeducation incidences, since the supply of university graduates 
increases more rapidly than its demand (Freeman, 1976). The present study finds that 
Indonesia, as a developing country, has a different effect; the return to education tends to 
decline for most education levels between 2000 and 2014, and followed by the increase 
of undereducation. Some possible reasons are the different characteristics between the 
supply of and demand for labour. On the supply of labour, the proportion of labour force 
with higher education qualifications increases. However, some empirical studies find that 
the increase in education qualification is not followed by skill upgrading as low-quality 
education may occur (World Bank, 2018). This low quality is proven by the country’s 
PISA score; Indonesia performs below the 25th percentile of OECD countries. Moreover, 
despite the education expansion, the proportion of population which have junior high 
school or lower qualifications is still relatively high (around 60 per cent of the total 
population) and the non-schooling population persists, accounting for around 4.5 per cent 
of the national population (aged 15 years or older) in 2016 (World Development 
Indicators, 2016). On the other hand, the demand for labour requires workers with high 
education qualifications as well as highly skilled workers; this is consistent with the 
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economic transformation towards the service sector and the rapid technological change 
in the industries.  
 
6.2 Implications  
Several key findings from the present study are the returns to schooling in Indonesia tend 
to increase as the level of education increases; for trend overtime, the return to education 
declines while the education sector expands. By gender, the return to education is 
relatively higher for females than for males, and there is a combination effects of gender 
– years of schooling and the wages. By sector, the return to education in public sector is 
relatively higher than in private sector. The wage determination in public and private 
sector is different. Wages in private sector in Indonesia are largely determined by the 
market. On the other hand, the determination of public service’s wage is more 
complicated, involving seniority, position, rank, and political approach. In addition, 
endogeneity problems do not occur, but there is a selection bias. This conclusion subject 
to an instruments’ limitation problem in the present study. 
In terms of trend in education mismatch and its determinants, the present study finds 
education mismatch increases between 2000 and 2014, as a consequence of the rise in 
under-education. The trend is similar when the sample is distinguished by gender. By 
sector, the private sector has a similar pattern with the main model. Meanwhile, the public 
sector has a contrary result; there is an increase in overeducation and a decrease in 
undereducation. In terms of determinants, the variables are slightly sensitive to the 
different methods used, the set of variables, the sector/gender and the periods. The results 
show that education mismatch in Indonesia is determined by personal and household 
characteristics, work related and firm size as well as area of residency variables which 
are all observed in this research and which is in line with the Assignment Models 
(mismatch is determined by workers’ and job’s characteristics). 
In relations to the wages, both overeducation and undereducation incidences affect the 
labour wages in Indonesia. This finding is consistent with Duncan and Hoffman’s (1981) 
finding, However, the test of equality of two coefficients shows that the difference 
between the coefficients of years of required schooling and surplus schooling is 
insignificant. Also, the penalty wages received by workers with years of deficit schooling 
is significantly different from the wage return to additional years of required schooling. 
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Thus, investing in higher education and improving the quality of the educational 
institutions are necessary for the government. There is an argument that a university 
qualification does not necessarily guarantee that individuals will fit the needs of the 
industries or workplaces, strengthening vocational education and skill training that can 
help prepare the youth for a smooth transition to employment; and promoting the 
integration of internship programs and other practical learning experience in the 
curriculums. Moreover, equal access to senior high schools and universities is necessary 
in terms of physical infrastructure (higher education building construction) as well as 
funding mechanisms (such as scholarship and student loan). 
Those key findings contribute to the existing literature and future policies. For the 
literature, education expansion may affect the decline in the return to education which is 
consistent with an increase in the supply of educated labour (Walker and Zhu, 2008), but 
it is not always followed by an increase in overeducation incidences, as previous 
empirical literature commonly found (Freeman, 1987; and McGuinness et al., 2017), or 
education expansion is followed by the decrease of both undereducation and 
overeducation (Yano, 2012). Furthermore, Indonesia has a different pattern, education 
expansion affects the decline in the return to education and is followed by the increase in 
undereducation incidences; possibly because labour demand lags behind labour supply. 
Increasing education attainment, particularly senior high school and university levels, is 
required to meet the growing demand for workers with high skills/education in the labour 
force through 12-year compulsory programme, free education (like Germany or the UK), 
higher education scholarship, especially for students from low-income families. As Allen 
(2016) emphasises, Indonesia needs more educated and skilled workers to meet the labour 
demand. Yet, another possible consequence is more declining in the return to education. A 
similar situation happened in the US in 1970s (Freeman, 1977). Further demand-side 
adjustments could enhance the profitability of the investment in education and so 
increases the returns to their former levels. In the short run, the policymakers need to 
boost the labour demand through improving the investment climate, easing the starting of 
a business, and providing incentives for labour-intensive firms, particularly the low 
educated (as well as unskilled and low skilled) labours. It is also necessary to ensure that 
the speed of labour supply adjustment is as fast as the speed of labour demand and 
technology adjustment. When both the labour supply and demand are adjusted; reaching 
a better match between the labour supply and demand as well as a new equilibrium with 
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higher wages. Another important implication is that information asymmetries should be 
minimised to enable a smoother matching process between job seekers and employers. 
Another key finding of Chapter 3 is that the return to education in the public sector in 
Indonesia is much higher than in the private sector. The public sector continues to attract 
job seekers due to the appeals in the sector. This could create a crowding-out in the 
economy through many channels, such as the labour market where higher wages, more 
job security, or a higher probability of finding a public-sector job can make an individual 
more likely to seek or wait for a public-sector employment rather than searching for or 
accepting a job in the private sector. Also, individuals will only seek qualifications 
appropriate for entering the public sector through the education market rather than 
seeking the skills needed for productive employment in the private sector (Behar and 
Mok, 2013). 
Education mismatch in Indonesia is determined by personal and household 
characteristics, work related and firm size as well as area of residency variables which 
are all observed in this research and which is in line with the Assignment Models 
(mismatch is determined by workers’ and job’s characteristics). The main role of the 
Ministry of Manpower is to minimise informational asymmetry. The Ministry of 
Manpower actually has a programme to facilitate matching of job seekers and job 
vacancies. The employment service gathers information on both vacancies and job 
seekers. It directs job seekers to employment which best suits their skills, ability and 
competencies. Any person has equal rights and opportunity to have access to labour 
market information, choose a job and earn a decent income to sustain decent living. But 
the government role is still not optimal since there is regional autonomy; thus, the job 
vacancy information and job seeker registration are conducted across the provinces and 
district level. Coordination, harmonisation and synchronisation rules and regulations are 
required. And the government must provide information on job opportunities through 
offline and online platforms.    
Arguably, overeducation and undereducation may be related to job polarisation72 in 
various ways. Job polarisation is closely linked to the shift from manufacturing to service 
sector, as a consequence of economic structural change; this also can occur due to rapid 
 
72 Job polarisation means that the share of high- and low-skill jobs grows at the expense 
of medium-skill jobs, and such trends have been linked to the decline in the demand for 
routine or codifiable tasks, including both manual and cognitive tasks.  
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technological change ILO (2017b). This leads to a change in the occupational structure 
and in skill/education-demand across jobs. For instance, if the growth of high-skill 
(education) occupations outpaces the supply of workers at this level of skills (education), 
undereducation can be expected to rise. On the other hand, overeducation may rise if high-
skilled (educated) workers cannot find appropriate jobs and increasingly compete for jobs 
usually taken by those with a lower level of education (Sparreboom and Tarvid, 2016). 
ILO (2017) finds that the growth of the service industry in Indonesia was 7 per cent and 
the manufacturing industry was 4.4 per cent in 2016. Given that the largest industries are 
mining, construction and manufacturing, those industries require highly educated as well 
as skilled workers. Thus, the growth of high-skill (education) occupations may outpace 
the supply of workers at this level of skills or education in Indonesia; while the growth of 
low skill/education occupation may lag behind its supply, or abundant labour with lower 
education qualification (60 per cent of total labour) cannot be accommodated by the 
demand.  
Furthermore, McGuinness et al. (2017) identify two types of undereducation. 
Firstly, undereducation and skill obsolescence; these are more likely to affect older 
workers and have similar drivers, such as technological change. And secondly, 
undereducation and skill gaps; these represent two approaches to describing the problem 
of deficit human capital among the workforce. Indonesia could have both types, 
undereducation associated with skill obstacle and skill gaps. Policies related to providing 
incentives to invest in training and to increase the number of training centres are required 
to be developed. Non formal education such as training and lifelong learning programme 
should be optimised and adjusted with labour market development, in particular for older 
generations, that experienced higher level of undereducation. 
The declining return to education and increasing undereducation may highlight some 
inefficiencies in a country’s educational system and labour market. Undereducation could 
affect weaker productivity growth and a slower structural transition to higher value-added 
activities with undereducated workforce (ILO, 2015). Communication between education 
providers and businesses is therefore essential to discover what is required by the 
businesses and how education providers can equip students with the necessary skills and 
knowledge. This can achieve a better alignment between educational/training supply and 
the labour demand. There should also be a strengthening of vocational education and skill 
training which can help to prepare the youth for a smooth transition to employment; and 
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promoting of the integration between internship programs and other practical learning 
experiences in the education curriculum.  
In terms of education mismatch and wage, the results indicate that workers with surplus 
year of education will have at least the same return with workers with required years of 
education, ceteris paribus. In the literature, overeducated workers will receive higher 
wages if they get a matching job. This may imply that one of the policies that can 
minimise education mismatch is unemployment insurance. Despite the existence of 
employment social security and health insurance programs, Indonesia still does not have 
an insurance scheme protecting the unemployed against poverty and assisting them before 
reemployment. World Economic Forum (2015) shows that there is evidence for positive 
effects of unemployment insurance on job quality; unemployment benefits can help 
workers to avoid large wage drops and even help them to join better firms. Meanwhile, 
Bosch (2016) finds that unemployment insurance can increase the formalisation of jobs; 
in turn, formal jobs may become more valued by workers, and it enables a more efficient 
job search. Thus, developing employment insurance scheme is urgently needed recently. 
In addition, the establishment of employment service centres also important, the main 
objectives are to provide training, vacancy information, and counselling for the 
unemployed as well as designing a system to monitor job search and participation in 
training activities. 
 
6.3 Research Limitations and Extensions  
Inevitably, there are limitations in this thesis. However, these limitations can be explored 
for better estimations in further research and used as a basis for the right policies.  
Firstly, the interaction variables (between year dummies/gender and years of schooling) 
and wages significant affect the wages. Thus, it is worth to explore any interaction 
variables in the future research since the presence of interactions can have important 
implications for the interpretation of both Mincer wage equation and ORU model. If two 
variables of interest interact, the relationship between each of the interacting variables 
and a third "dependent variable" depends on the value of the other interacting variable. 
Related to the issue of controlling for potential ability bias, the IV model could deal with 
this issue, if the instruments are appropriate. But IV is subject to an often-overlooked 
limitation as well. Many researchers intend to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) 
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for the entire population interest, but IV estimation only covers the local average 
treatment effect (LATE) or the ATE for the subpopulation that is influenced by the IV. 
When treatment effect are heterogenous across units, the LATE and the ATE may take 
on different values, this potentially causing complication in the interpretation, as well as 
makes comparison difficult, as explained in Chapter 3. Studies of the impact of over/under 
education on wages typically do not address this issue, because unobserved heterogeneity 
may influence education mismatch and its returns. The present study also finds that the 
result’s interpretation is complicated since it is inconsistent with the idea of policy 
instruments and with the aim of the policies to increase the school participation rate, as 
explained in Section 3.4.7. 
The present study does not consider school quality in the Mincer wage equation. 
Empirically, education differs between countries as it differs within countries, in terms of 
quality; for instance, individuals with the UK’s university degree may receive higher 
wages than individuals with Indonesia’s university degree, because education in the UK 
has better quality than education in Indonesia. As Card and Krueger (1992) find, men in 
the US in 1980 who were educated in states with higher-quality schools have a higher 
return to additional years of schooling. Thus, it is extremely necessary to measure the 
return to education by considering school quality, teacher’s competence and other 
important factors to better understand how investment in education should be made. 
Purnastusti et al. (2015) also further that an analysis which considers education quality 
can give a clear understanding of factors affecting the return to education and can serve 
as an effective tool in the hands of organisations and institutions dealing with transition 
from school to work.   
Furthermore, according to International Labour Organisation (2014), 53.6 per cent of the 
Indonesian labour force worked in informal employment. Rothenberg et al. (2015) 
emphasise that most of Indonesia's informal firms are very small, micro firms that pay 
low wages and are relatively unproductive. Thus, the return to education between the 
formal and informal employments will be different, as well as for waged and casual 
workers. However, the present study does not consider casual workers in the analysis 
since the wage data are only available for recent years. Further research on the return to 
education in casual workers or a comparison between the waged workers and casual 
workers would enrich the labour market analysis in Indonesia.     
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Related to job polarisation argument, the literature requires further analysis on the 
demand of labour based on occupations and skill levels. A more detailed analysis can 
map which different types of job (graduate/non-graduate jobs) and/or skilled/unskilled 
labours may have a substantial contribution to education mismatch. Meanwhile, the 
demand for labour can be analysed further using firm-level data or meta-analysis.    
The present study also does not consider skill or at least subject study requirements since 
the data are not available in IFLS. Also, most companies will post job vacancies based on 
education and skill (or at least subject study), for instance: an automotive company 
requires workers with undergraduate degree in engineering for production staffs. 
Moreover, Badillo-Amador and Vila (2013) find that education and skill mismatches are 
two different phenomena of the labour market, although simultaneous. Specifically, for 
skill measurements, unfortunately the data are not available in IFLS and Indonesia Labour 
Force Survey (SAKERNAS). In the absence of skill and competence measurements, the 
results from this analysis should not be treated as conclusive, but rather as indicative that 
skill gap may affect the labour market productivity. There are some alternative 
measurements that can accommodate skill information, such as: (1) normative or 
professional job analysis (JA) - the method compares job titles with actual skill/education 
attainments based on information provided by professional job analysts; (2) subjective 
measures, including asking respondents directly or indirectly information on minimum 
job or skill requirements and their acquired education; or (3) mixed/alternative methods 
(EMX) or a combination between objective and subjective measures. Those measures can 
be elaborated in future research. Moreover, it is possible to combine the IFLS data with 
other data sources such as Village Potential Survey and National Socio-Economic 
Household Survey; that may provide data which is unavailable in the IFLS. There are 
some studies combines those data such as Wicaksono et al, (2018), the study examines 
the impact of parents’ education and attending vocational high school to the probability 
of children attending tertiary education. Wicaksono et al, combined the IFLS and Village 
Potential Survey. Village Potential Survey provides the data about the education facility 
in location where children live, the data is in village level; while, the IFLS provides the 
data of the individual characteristics and household characteristics. One of advantages 
using PODES is more detail variable, such as: PODES provides data on school by 
institutions (public and private school), while IFLS only provide the number of schools 
in the villages.   
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The analysis can also be extended by taking into account skill mismatch and job 
satisfaction, as some studies (e.g. Badillo-Amador and Vila, 2013) argue that the 
consequences of education and skill mismatch is not only on wage, but also on job 
satisfaction. Badillo-Amador and Vila find that skill mismatches are perceived by 
workers as a much more relevant problem than education mismatches. The wage and job 
satisfaction consequences of skill mismatches are strongly negative; to the contrary, 
education mismatches show much weaker effects. Yet, Allen et al. (2001) argue that 
education mismatch and skill mismatch have their own advantages and disadvantages. 
Education mismatch affects wages strongly. Contrary to the assumption of assignment 
theory, this effect is not explained by skill mismatch. Conversely, skill mismatch is a 
much better predictor of job satisfaction and on-the-job search than education mismatch. 
Thus, extending the analysis could shed light on the mechanism of labour market 
adjustment or the dynamic of mismatch, since skill mismatch is an important cause of job 
dissatisfaction, and this provide an incentive for workers to look for other works, 
presumably one which is better suited to their abilities.  
And finally, the IFLS data is longitudinal data that allows more deep analysis, beyond 
allowing for the modelling of unobserved heterogeneity, by looking at labour market 
dynamics such as: the dynamic of wages, in the sense that the analysis considers the 
persistency of wages: how long the employers and the employees could be locked into a 
situation of disequilibrium and whether education mismatch is temporary or a persistent 
phenomenon; overeducation or undereducation results in subsequent labour market 
transitioning behaviour. Thus, a clear understanding on education mismatch and wage 
relationship can inform the right policies, for example: unemployment benefits, since 
Indonesia has not had any policies on unemployment insurance yet. This is essential as 
such insurance can increase the formalisation of jobs; in turn, formal jobs may become 
more valued by workers, and it enables a more efficient job search (Bosch, 2016).  
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Appendices  
Appendix I: IFLS Survey 
 
 
Figure I.1: IFLS1 Sampling 
Source: IFLS1 User Guide. 
Note: IFLS1 was conducted in grey areas. 
 
 
Table I.1: 1993 Dynasty Re-Contact Rates 
Source: IFLS5 User Guide. 
 
 
Figure I.2: Households Re-Contact Rates IFLS1-IFLS5 
Source: IFLS5 User Guide. 
  
 333 
Table I.3: Households Sample and Completion Rate, IFLS1-IFLS5  
Source: IFLS5 User Guide 
  
 334 
Appendix II: Log Linear Relationship between Wages (w) and Education (X) 
 
W(X, t) is defined as the wages at time t of an individual with X years of schooling. Thus, 
the present value of wages of an individual who enters the labour market after X years of 
schooling is represented by the integral of wages with respect to time (t):  !"($) = ∫ (($, *)!" +#$%,*, 
where:  
PV(X): present value of an individual wages; X: years of schooling; T: retirement time, 
and e: exponential value (approximately 2.718).  
Based on assumption 1, W(X, t) does not depend on t, and we can write just W(X) and 
take it out the integral, thus we have PV(X) now: !($) = ∫ (($)!" +#$%,*, !"($) = (($) ∫ +#$%!" ,*, !"($) = (($) -− &$/ [+#$! − +#$"], !"($) = (($) '(!"##(!"$)$ ; 
Meanwhile, according to assumption 2 of Mincer wage equation that present value of 
lifetime incomes are the same across individuals regardless of schooling, PV(X) should 
not depend on X, thus PV(X)=PV. Assumption 3 also states that the number of years 
spent at work are independent of the number of years schooling, thus the number of year 
in workforce is equal to retirement time – years of schooling WF=T-X; or we can write 
as: T=X+WF. Using both assumptions, now we have: !"($) = !" = (($) '(!"##(!"$)$ , 2!" = (($)[+#$" − +#$+#$*+], 
And the number of schooling should be the same regardless of the years of schooling: 2!" = ((0)[1 − +#$*+] = (($)[+#$" − +#$"+#$*+], 2!" = (($)+#$"[1 − +#$*+], thus: ((0) = (($)+#$" , and finally, 56($) = 56((0) + 2$, 
The equation above proves that there is a log-linear relationship between wages and 
schooling73. As Byron and Takahashi (1989) assert that there is a strong theoretical 
 
73 The linear specification could be not accurate, particularly if there is an assumption that individuals are 
heterogeneous in their preferences and wage opportunities. Thus, log wages may either be a convex or a 
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rationale for using log wages in a human capital wages regression, since investments in 
human capital, like other investments, are only undertaken as long as the rate of return 
(not the absolute return) on the investment exceeds the discount rate. Log-linearity of 
wages as a function of years of schooling is in fact a key empirical implication of the 
human capital model with identical individuals.  
 
 
  
 
concave function of years of schooling. Another cause of this case is the presence of ‘‘credential’’ or 
‘‘sheepskin’’ effects. 
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Appendix III: Experience and Wage Relationship 
 
For post-schooling investment model or experience variable, the other assumptions is 
needed: (4) the return to post-schooling investment in a constant δ, and (5) an employee 
devotes a fraction H of time to investment in the human capital, and a fraction (1-H) to 
actual work. This implies that growth in wages is determined by: 8(($, *)8* = δ:(*)(($, *), 
By solving the differential equation and we will have: 1(($, *) 8(($, *)8* = δ:(*), 856(($, *)8* = δ:(*), ∫ ,-.*(",%),% = ∫δ:(*), and 56(($, *) = δ∫:(*).  
For specific solution, now we have: 56(($, *) = γ + δ∫ :(<),<%2 , 
where: γ is constant, 
to find the value of γ, form the assumption that there is no post-schooling investment in 
human capital, so: 56(($) = 56((0) + 2$	or equation that we obtain in Appendices I,  
if H(u)=0 and put into differential equation: 56(($, *) = >, this implies that > = 56((0) + 2$, and 
the solution is: 56(($, *) = 56((0) + 2$ + δ∫ :(<),<%2 .  
It starts from time 0 because the growth does not start till after school is over. To solve 
the model, we assumed that the frequency of investment in human capital is as follow: :(*) = :∗ -1 − %!/ = :∗ − 4∗%! , 
this is consistent with t running from the time an individual finishes school. Afterwards, 
we can figure out the relationship between potential earning and schooling variable; back 
again to the solution:  56(($, *) = 56((0) + 2$ + δ∫ :(<),<%2 , 56(($, *) = 56((0) + 2$ + δ:∗ ?< − 5&6!@2% , 
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and finally the relationship between potential earning and schooling variable is: 56(($, *) = 56((0) + 2$ + δ:∗* − δ:∗ %&6!. 
Since an individual only works part time now, so: (78$%#%9:(($, *) = A1 − :(*)B(($, *), (78$%#%9:(($, *) = 56(($, *) + 56A1 − :(*)B,	and 56A1 − :(*)B = ln -1 − :∗ + :∗ %!/,  
Using Taylor expansion around t=T to solve the model: ln E1 − :∗ + :∗ *FG = ln(1) + :∗ F⁄1 (* − F) − 12 (:∗ F⁄ )6(* − F)6 = 4∗! * − :∗ − &6 (:∗ F⁄ )6*6 − &6 (:∗ F⁄ )6F6 + (:∗ F⁄ )6F*, = :∗F * − :∗ − 12 (:∗ F⁄ )6*6 − 12 (:∗)6 + (:∗)6F *, = −:∗ − 12 (:∗)6 − 12 (:∗ F⁄ )6*6 + * J:∗F + (:∗)6F K, 
the error is highest when −:∗ + :∗ %! is big and t=0. So, in total, wage (w) would be: 56L($, *) = 56(($, *) + ln	(1 − :(*)) = "#$(0) + )* + δ,∗- − δ,∗ -"20 − ,∗ +,∗ -0 − 12 (,∗)" − 12 (,∗ 0⁄ )"-" + - 3,∗0 + (,∗)"0 4, = M56((0) − :∗ − &6 (:∗)6N + 2$ + * ?4∗! + (4∗)&! + O:∗@ + *6 M&6 (:∗ F⁄ )6 − 74∗6! N,  
so we can prove that standard Mincer wage equation is a linear function, because of the 
homogeneous individuals. Meanwhile, the quadratic function of experience variable 
could capture the fact that on-the-job training investments decline over time in a standard 
lifecycle of the human capital model; thus, more consistent with the theory and much 
easier for the regression model to be estimated. 
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Appendix IV: Endogeneity Problem in Mincer Wage Equation 
 
This part will prove the endogeneity by mathematical equation based on Card (2001). 
Suppose the model of the observed and wage outcome is the semi-logarithmic functional 
form, as adopted from Mincer Equation (1974), the model is as follow: log(.,% = R2,% + R&,%$.,% − &6R6,%$.,%6 + S.,%,    
or it can be written as: log(.,% = T2,% + R&,%UUUUU$.,% − &6R6$.,%6 + T.,% + AR& − R&UUUB$.,% + S.,%,  
where: R2,%: a person-specific constant of integration, and T.,% ≡	R2,% − T2,%, S.,%: error term, we can ignore it in this case. 
If the model assumed heterogeneity of individuals, it would allow to affect the intercept 
of the wage equation (via R2,%) and the slope of the wage-schooling relation (via R&,%), and 
both equations are in terms of underlying random variables R2,% , R&,% and XY; (the 
marginal cost of schooling). In estimating the OLS, the model ignores other covariates. 
Considering the linear projection of R2,% and	-R&,% − R&,%/ on observed schooling:  Z&,% = [2A$.,% − $B + <.,%, thus, R&,% − R&,% = \2A$.,% − $B + ].,%,  
where: $: the mean of schooling, and if expected correlation between $.,% and <.,% or ].,% (error 
term) is zero or:  ^_$.,%<.,%` = ^_$.,%].,%` = 0, 
then, substituting these expressions to the wage function: 5ab 5ab	(	.,% = Ya6c*d6* + -	R& + [2 − \2$/$.,% + -\2 − &6/ 	$.,%6 + <.,% + ].$.,%. 
From the equation above, the orthogonality of ].,% and $.,% (the last term) does not imply 
that ^_].,%$.,%6 ` = 0; as a result, the residual component ].,%$.,% may be correlated with 
schooling ($.,%). Yet, if the third central moments of the joint distribution of R& and XY;(.,%) are equal to zero, then	].,%$.,%will be uncorrelated with the education variable 
($.,%).    
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Furthermore, if ^ ?A$.,% − $B<@ = 0 implies that the linear projection of 	$.,%6  on $.,% has 
slope 2$. Under this assumption, the probability limit of the ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression coefficient Z=-> from a regression of log wages on schooling is: O5ef	R&,=-> = -	R& + [2 − \2$/ + 2$ -\2 − &6R6/,  O5ef	R&,=-> = R& + [2 − \2$ + 2\2$ − $R6 O5ef	R&,=-> = R& − R6$ + [2 + \2$, O5ef	R&,=-> = R& + [2 + \2$, 
the equation above generalises the conventional analysis of ability bias in the relationship 
between schooling and wage.  
Suppose that there is no heterogeneity in the marginal benefits of schooling or R& = R&; 
and the log wages are linear in schooling R6 = 0, then: O5ef	R&,=-> − R& = [2, 
this is the standard expression for the asymptotic bias in the estimated return to schooling. 
This arises by applying the omitted variables formula to the wage model with a constant 
schooling coefficient R&. Based on the model, the bias occurs through the correlation 
between the ability component Z.,% and the marginal cost of schooling XY"(.,%). If the 
marginal costs are lower for individuals who would tend to receive more at any level of 
schooling, then the standard deviation is less then zero (g; < 0), which implies that [2 >0.  
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Appendix V: Education Attainment Based on Gender 
 
Table V.1: Education Attainment Based on Gender, 2000 and 2014 
 
Source: The author’s calculation.  
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Appendix VI: Mincer Wage Equation, OLS 
 
Table VI. 1: Estimations: All Individuals (2000) 
2000 
All Individuals 
Basic + Personal 
Basic + personal + work 
related + firm size 
Log of real hourly wage Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t 
Junior High School 0.365  0.034  ***  0.293  0.034  *** 
Senior High School 0.825  0.030  *** 0.659  0.033  *** 
University 1.549  0.038  *** 1.210  0.044  *** 
Experience  0.048  0.005  *** 0.031  0.005  *** 
Experience squared -0.001  0.000  *** -0.001  0.000  *** 
Sex (1=female) -0.304  0.025  *** -0.351  0.025  *** 
Married and cohabitate 0.105  0.035  *** 0.087  0.034  *** 
Other (Separated, divorced 
and widowed) -0.089  0.068   -0.064  0.065   
Religion1: Islam 0.003  0.062   0.012  0.060   
Religion2: 
Christian/Protestant 0.066  0.090   0.089  0.086   
Religion3: Catholic 0.031  0.104   0.046  0.099   
Religion5: Buddhist -0.307  0.186  *  -0.168  0.178   
Ethnicity1: Jawa -0.002  0.032   0.021  0.031   
Ethnicity2: Sunda 0.172  0.040  *** 0.175  0.039  *** 
Ethnicity3: Batak 0.282  0.081  *** 0.314  0.078  *** 
Ethnicity4: Betawi 0.311  0.051  *** 0.343  0.050  *** 
Ethnicity5: Minang 0.200  0.056  *** 0.208  0.054  *** 
Ethnicity6: Tiong Hoa 0.266  0.162   0.328  0.156  **  
Status: fulltime (30 hours a week or 
more)     -0.621  0.032  *** 
Tenure    0.019  0.005  *** 
Tenure squared    -0.000  0.000   
Sector: private    -0.268  0.038  *** 
Industry2: mining and 
quarrying    0.406  0.121  *** 
Industry3: manufacturing    0.140  0.039  *** 
Industry4: electricity, gas 
and water    0.116  0.144   
Industry5: construction    0.309  0.048  *** 
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and 
hotels  0.096  0.045  **  
Industry7: transportation, storage, and communications 0.179  0.057  *** 
Industry8: Finance, insurance, real estate and business 
services 0.450  0.093  *** 
Industry9: Social services    0.127  0.037  *** 
Firm size2: 5-19 people       0.179  0.027  *** 
Firm size3: 20-99 people    0.254  0.032  *** 
Firm size4: >= 100 people       0.400  0.043  *** 
Constants 6.484 0.069 0.000 7.160 0.087 *** 
Observation 6386 6386 
The R-squared statistic 0.290  0.354  
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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Table VI.2: Estimations: All Individuals (2014) 
2014 
All Individuals 
Basic + Personal 
Basic + personal +  
work related + firm size 
  
Log of real hourly wage Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t Coef. Std. Err. P>t 
Junior High School 0.298  0.039  *** 0.241  0.038  *** 
Senior High School 0.694  0.035  *** 0.525  0.035  *** 
University 1.251  0.038  *** 0.972  0.043  *** 
Experience  0.037  0.004  ***  0.025  0.004  *** 
Experience squared -0.000  0.000  *** -0.000  0.000  *** 
Sex (1=female) -0.299  0.023  *** -0.281  0.023  *** 
Married and cohabitate 0.054  0.035   0.012  0.033   
Other (Separated, divorced 
and widowed) 0.039  0.064   0.084  0.061   
Religion1: Islam -0.144  0.052  *** -0.187  0.049  *** 
Religion2: 
Christian/Protestant -0.011  0.107   -0.028  0.102   
Religion3: Catholic 0.002  0.089   -0.046  0.084   
Religion5: Buddhist -0.059  0.314   -0.107  0.299   
Ethnicity1: Jawa 0.046  0.028   0.052  0.027  *  
Ethnicity2: Sunda 0.193  0.038  ***  0.169  0.036  *** 
Ethnicity3: Batak 0.143  0.069  ** 0.132  0.065  **  
Ethnicity4: Betawi 0.201  0.166   0.156  0.158   
Ethnicity5: Minang 0.239  0.044  *** 0.263  0.042  *** 
Ethnicity6: Tiong Hoa 0.406  0.176  **  0.531  0.168  *** 
Status: fulltime (30 hours a week or more)   -0.423  0.030  *** 
Tenure    0.019  0.005  *** 
Tenure squared    0.000  0.000   
Sector: private    -0.247  0.035  *** 
Industry2: mining and quarrying   0.412  0.088  *** 
Industry3: manufacturing    0.055  0.045    
Industry4: electricity, gas and water   0.200  0.114  *  
Industry5: construction    0.266  0.063  *** 
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and hotels 0.006  0.046   
Industry7: transportation, storage, and communications 0.118  0.073   
Industry8: Finance, insurance, real estate and business 
services 0.305  0.057  *** 
Industry9: Social services    -0.136  0.044  *** 
Firm size2: 5-19 people       0.065  0.030  **  
Firm size3: 20-99 people    0.270  0.032  *** 
Firm size4: >= 100 people       0.578  0.035  *** 
Constants 7.884 0.064 *** 8.962 0.132 *** 
Observation 8119   8119   
The R-squared statistic 0.178      0.260      
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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Table VI.3: Estimation Results: By Gender (2000) 
2000 
By Gender 
Male Female Male Female 
 Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>t 
Junior High School 0.336 0.040 *** 0.393 0.066 *** 0.291 0.040 *** 0.243 0.064 *** 
Senior High School 0.710 0.036 *** 1.063 0.056 *** 0.593 0.039 *** 0.790 0.060 *** 
University 1.399 0.048 *** 1.796 0.063 *** 1.130 0.054 *** 1.312 0.077 *** 
Experience  0.052 0.006 *** 0.044 0.008 *** 0.042 0.006 *** 0.018 0.008 ** 
Experience squared -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000   
Sex (1=female) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
Married and cohabitate 0.086 0.043 * 0.150 0.059 *** 0.117 0.042 *** 0.055 0.056   
Other (Separated, divorced and 
widowed) -0.003 0.126  -0.004 0.089  0.033 0.121  -0.011 0.084   
Religion1: Islam 0.042 0.074  -0.085 0.112  0.056 0.072  -0.088 0.106   
Religion2: Christian/Protestant 0.038 0.111  0.057 0.154  0.048 0.106  0.086 0.145   
Religion3: Catholic 0.025 0.129  -0.046 0.176  0.042 0.124  -0.046 0.166   
Religion5: Buddhist -0.221 0.220  -0.428 0.342  -0.069 0.211  -0.330 0.321   
Ethnicity1: Jawa 0.020 0.038  -0.034 0.058  0.045 0.037  -0.014 0.056   
Ethnicity2: Sunda 0.136 0.047 *** 0.223 0.073 *** 0.131 0.046 *** 0.242 0.070 *** 
Ethnicity3: Batak 0.287 0.097 *** 0.253 0.143 * 0.349 0.094 *** 0.258 0.135 * 
Ethnicity4: Betawi 0.214 0.062 *** 0.471 0.090 *** 0.228 0.061 *** 0.518 0.086 *** 
Ethnicity5: Minang 0.242 0.068 *** 0.082 0.099  0.237 0.066 *** 0.097 0.094   
Ethnicity6: Tiong Hoa 0.318 0.199   0.178 0.280   0.375 0.192 ** 0.292 0.264   
Status: fulltime (30 hours a week or more)           -0.717 0.042 *** -0.551 0.050 *** 
Tenure       0.011 0.006 ** 0.025 0.008 *** 
Tenure squared       0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000   
Sector: private       -0.198 0.045 *** -0.399 0.068 *** 
Industry2: mining and quarrying       0.372 0.124 *** 1.127 0.510 ** 
Industry3: manufacturing       0.170 0.048 *** 0.141 0.068 ** 
Industry4: electricity, gas and water       0.127 0.155  0.160 0.365   
Industry5: construction       0.297 0.052 *** 0.045 0.167   
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and hotels     0.100 0.056 * 0.129 0.075 * 
Industry7: transportation, storage, and communications     0.184 0.060 *** -0.213 0.224   
Industry8: Finance, insurance, real estate and business services    0.396 0.115 *** 0.547 0.158 *** 
Industry9: Social services       0.168 0.045 *** 0.137 0.067 ** 
Firm size2: 5-19 people             0.108 0.033 *** 0.321 0.050 *** 
 344 
Firm size3: 20-99 people       0.154 0.039 *** 0.440 0.056 *** 
Firm size4: >= 100 people             0.282 0.054 *** 0.643 0.070 *** 
Constants 6.484 0.083 *** 6.153 0.118 *** 7.130 0.102 *** 6.880 0.158 *** 
Observation 4216 2170 4216 2170 
The R-squared statistic 0.231  0.361  0.297  0.443  
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  *** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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Table VI.4: Estimation Results: By Gender (2014) 
2014 
By Gender 
Basic + Personal Basic + Personal Basic + personal + work related + firm size 
Basic + personal + work 
related + firm size 
Male Female Male Female 
Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>t 
Junior High School 0.259 0.048 *** 0.359 0.068 *** 0.197 0.046 *** 0.308 0.065 *** 
Senior High School 0.635 0.042 *** 0.784 0.062 *** 0.464 0.043 *** 0.622 0.062 *** 
University 1.181 0.048 *** 1.336 0.063 *** 0.913 0.053 *** 1.02 0.075 *** 
Experience  0.033 0.006 *** 0.044 0.007 *** 0.027 0.005 *** 0.026 0.007 *** 
Experience squared 0 0 *** -0.001 0 *** 0 0 *** 0 0 ** 
Sex (1=female) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
Married and cohabitate 0.147 0.043 *** -0.102 0.059 * 0.098 0.041 ** -0.114 0.056 ** 
Other (Separated, 
divorced and widowed) 0.164 0.098 * -0.114 0.091  0.166 0.094 * -0.024 0.086   
Religion1: Islam -0.079 0.063  -0.261 0.088 *** -0.118 0.06 ** -0.289 0.084 *** 
Religion2: 
Christian/Protestant 0.014 0.136  -0.05 0.173  0.001 0.13  -0.045 0.164   
Religion3: Catholic -0.024 0.111  0.014 0.148  -0.074 0.106  -0.017 0.14   
Religion5: Buddhist -0.003 0.371  -0.088 0.577  0.09 0.352  -0.395 0.546   
Ethnicity1: Jawa 0.043 0.035  0.06 0.049  0.05 0.033  0.06 0.047   
Ethnicity2: Sunda 0.143 0.045 *** 0.291 0.067 *** 0.133 0.043 *** 0.232 0.064 *** 
Ethnicity3: Batak 0.146 0.085 * 0.134 0.115  0.136 0.081 * 0.111 0.109   
Ethnicity4: Betawi 0.26 0.22  0.124 0.254  0.282 0.209  -0.042 0.242   
Ethnicity5: Minang 0.177 0.055 *** 0.336 0.075 *** 0.191 0.052 *** 0.362 0.071 *** 
Ethnicity6: Tiong Hoa 0.344 0.209 *** 0.518 0.319   0.437 0.199 ** 0.652 0.304 ** 
Status: fulltime (30 hours a week or more)     -0.595 0.041 *** -0.294 0.044 *** 
Tenure       0.016 0.006 *** 0.021 0.008 *** 
Tenure squared       0 0 *** 0 0   
Sector: private       -0.236 0.044 *** -0.244 0.057 *** 
Industry2: mining and quarrying      0.472 0.089 *** 0.584 0.38   
Industry3: manufacturing      0.156 0.052 *** -0.131 0.086   
Industry4: electricity, gas and water      0.298 0.115 *** -0.24 0.502   
Industry5: construction      0.266 0.066 *** 0.623 0.232 *** 
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and hotels    0.106 0.054 ** -0.167 0.087 ** 
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Industry7: transportation, storage, and communications    0.158 0.076 ** 0.299 0.238   
Industry8: Finance, insurance, real estate and business services   0.358 0.064 *** 0.216 0.115 * 
Industry9: Social services      -0.076 0.051  -0.219 0.083 *** 
Firm size2: 5-19 people           0.087 0.037 ** 0.012 0.05   
Firm size3: 20-99 people      0.223 0.039 *** 0.333 0.055 *** 
Firm size4: >= 100 people           0.519 0.043 *** 0.673 0.062 *** 
Constants 7.852 0.079 *** 7.655 0.105 *** 8.974 0.165 *** 8.749 0.221 *** 
Observation 4946   3173   4946   3173    
The R-squared statistic 0.157     0.183     0.245     0.276     
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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Table VI.5: Estimation Results with Interaction Variables between Gender and Years of 
Schooling  
Log of real hourly wage 
2000 2014 
Coef. Std. Err. P>t Coef. Std. Err. P>t 
Years of Schooling 0.103 0.005 *** 0.090 0.005 *** 
Experience  0.036 0.005 *** 0.022 0.004 *** 
Experience squared -0.001 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 
Sex (1=female) -0.907 0.073 *** -0.518 0.075 *** 
Married and cohabitate 0.107 0.033 *** 0.058 0.033 * 
Other (Separated, divorced and widowed) 0.008 0.065   0.123 0.059 ** 
.          
.          
Urban -0.004 0.026   0.140 0.024 *** 
Sex* Years of schooling 0.058 0.007 *** 0.022 0.006 *** 
Constants 6.476 0.141 *** 8.236 0.162 *** 
Observation 6,386    8,119    
R-squared 0.376     0.301     
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** 
significance level at 1 per cent. 
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Table VI.5: Estimation Results: By Sector 2000 
2000 
By Sector 
Public  Private Public  Private 
Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>t 
Junior High School 0.417 0.126 *** 0.295 0.037 *** 0.331 0.127 *** 0.270 0.036 *** 
Senior High School 0.950 0.099 *** 0.683 0.035 *** 0.825 0.105 *** 0.607 0.035 *** 
University 1.496 0.103 *** 1.366 0.052 *** 1.285 0.111 *** 1.207 0.053 *** 
Experience  0.032 0.012 *** 0.038 0.005 *** 0.005 0.013  0.031 0.005 *** 
Experience squared 0.000 0.000   -0.001 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000   -0.001 0.000 *** 
Sex (1=female) -0.017 0.054   -0.367 0.028 *** -0.058 0.053   -0.414 0.028 *** 
Married and cohabitate 0.324 0.097 *** 0.112 0.037 *** 0.239 0.095 *** 0.083 0.036 ** 
Other (Separated, 
divorced and widowed) 0.138 0.175  -0.055 0.073  0.180 0.170  -0.074 0.070   
Religion1: Islam -0.072 0.103  0.040 0.074  -0.014 0.100  0.000 0.071   
Religion2: 
Christian/Protestant -0.201 0.158  0.179 0.105 * -0.128 0.153  0.139 0.101   
Religion3: Catholic -0.245 0.181  0.135 0.122  -0.296 0.175 * 0.116 0.117   
Religion5: Buddhist 0.443 0.800  -0.244 0.193  -0.007 0.773  -0.159 0.185   
Ethnicity1: Jawa 0.035 0.062  0.038 0.036  0.033 0.061  0.034 0.035   
Ethnicity2: Sunda -0.046 0.082  0.247 0.045 *** -0.050 0.079  0.221 0.043 *** 
Ethnicity3: Batak 0.188 0.147  0.345 0.094 *** 0.178 0.143  0.371 0.090 *** 
Ethnicity4: Betawi -0.125 0.150  0.423 0.056 *** -0.117 0.145  0.393 0.054 *** 
Ethnicity5: Minang 0.296 0.104 *** 0.187 0.065 *** 0.204 0.101 ** 0.191 0.062 *** 
Ethnicity6: Tiong Hoa 0.000 (omitted)   0.346 0.166 ** 0.000 (omitted)   0.334 0.160 ** 
Status: fulltime (30 hours a week or more)         -0.459 0.067 *** -0.665 0.036 *** 
Tenure       0.043 0.011 *** 0.017 0.005 *** 
Tenure squared       -0.001 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000   
Sector: private      (omitted) 
(omitted) 
  
Industry2: mining and quarrying     0.853 0.547  0.370 0.125 *** 
Industry3: manufacturing      0.062 0.148  0.133 0.041 *** 
Industry4: electricity, gas and water     0.006 0.220  0.144 0.185   
Industry5: construction      0.149 0.185  0.312 0.051 *** 
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and hotels   -0.171 0.205  0.102 0.047 ** 
Industry7: transportation, storage, and communications   0.220 0.154  0.173 0.061 *** 
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Industry8: Finance, insurance, real estate and business services  0.286 0.200  0.503 0.105 *** 
Industry9: Social services      0.135 0.100  0.101 0.041 ** 
Firm size2: 5-19 people           0.172 0.071 ** 0.166 0.030 *** 
Firm size3: 20-99 people     0.207 0.076 *** 0.268 0.036 *** 
Firm size4: >= 100 people         0.151 0.104   0.467 0.047 *** 
Constant 6.47 0.16 *** 6.58 0.08 *** 6.77 0.18 *** 7.00 0.09 *** 
Observation 1060 5326 1060 5326 
The R-squared statistic 0.28 0.21 0.34 0.28 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** significance level at 1 per cent. 
 
 
  
 350 
Table VI.6: Estimation Results: By Sector 2014 
2014 
By Sector 
Basic + Personal Basic + Personal 
Basic + personal + work 
related + firm size 
Basic + personal + work 
related + firm size 
Public  Private Public  Private 
Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>t 
Junior High 
School 0.111 0.275   0.175 0.043 *** -0.002 0.272   0.154 0.041 *** 
Senior High 
School 0.927 0.234 *** 0.538 0.039 *** 0.681 0.238 *** 0.439 0.039 *** 
University 1.542 0.233 *** 0.971 0.047 *** 1.271 0.241 *** 0.821 0.049 *** 
Experience  0.056 0.014 *** 0.023 0.005 *** 0.066 0.014 *** 0.009 0.005 * 
Experience 
squared 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 * 0.000 0.000   
Sex (1=female) -0.205 0.064 *** -0.321 0.026 *** -0.178 0.063 *** -0.290 0.026 *** 
Married and 
cohabitate 0.244 0.113 ** 0.094 0.039 ** 0.180 0.112  0.041 0.037   
Other (Separated, 
divorced and 
widowed) 0.447 0.208 ** 0.072 0.072  0.388 0.203 * 0.100 0.068   
Religion1: Islam -0.293 0.121 ** -0.177 0.063 *** -0.282 0.118 ** -0.220 0.060 *** 
Religion2: 
Christian/Protest
ant -0.428 0.248 * 0.091 0.123  -0.388 0.241  0.058 0.117   
Religion3: 
Catholic -0.326 0.203  0.061 0.101  -0.358 0.198 * 0.014 0.095   
Religion5: 
Buddhist 1.341 1.045  -0.193 0.373  1.415 1.011  -0.304 0.353   
Ethnicity1: Jawa 0.322 0.077 *** 0.079 0.036 ** 0.351 0.076 *** 0.040 0.035   
Ethnicity2: 
Sunda 0.281 0.109 *** 0.269 0.046 *** 0.304 0.106 *** 0.196 0.044 *** 
Ethnicity3: Batak 0.404 0.160 ** 0.109 0.080  0.412 0.157 *** 0.092 0.075   
Ethnicity4: 
Betawi 0.272 0.295  0.463 0.062 *** 0.212 0.287  0.385 0.059 *** 
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Ethnicity5: 
Minang 0.486 0.099 *** 0.224 0.057 *** 0.575 0.098 *** 0.206 0.054 *** 
Ethnicity6: Tiong 
Hoa 0.000 (omitted)   0.432 0.186 ** 0.000 (omitted)   0.496 0.176 *** 
Status: fulltime (30 hours a week or more)         -0.302 0.069 *** -0.504 0.036 *** 
Tenure       -0.007 0.013  0.039 0.006 *** 
Tenure squared       0.001 0.000 * -0.001 0.000 *** 
Sector: private       0.000 (omitted)  0.000 (omitted)   
Industry2: mining and quarrying     0.490 0.284 * 0.339 0.099 *** 
Industry3: manufacturing      -0.402 0.289  0.019 0.049   
Industry4: electricity, gas and water     -0.356 0.338  0.206 0.131   
Industry5: construction      -0.116 0.598  0.259 0.067 *** 
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and hotels   -0.449 0.440  -0.054 0.049   
Industry7: transportation, storage, and communications   0.656 0.410  0.049 0.079   
Industry8: Finance, insurance, real estate and business services  0.326 0.216  0.242 0.062 *** 
Industry9: Social services      -0.203 0.149  -0.196 0.049 *** 
Firm size2: 5-19 
people             0.180 0.113   0.063 0.033 * 
Firm size3: 20-99 people      0.403 0.113 *** 0.262 0.036 *** 
Firm size4: >= 100 people           0.724 0.126 *** 0.584 0.040 *** 
Constants 7.102 0.269 *** 8.136 0.074 *** 7.368 0.302 *** 8.539 0.084 *** 
Observation 1220 5942 1220 5942 
The R-squared 
statistic 0.251  0.131  0.309  0.225  
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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Appendix VII: Robustness Test 
 
Table VII.1: Natural and Conventional Instruments 
Variable 
2000 2014 
    
Number 
of Obs Question Book 
Number of 
Obs Question Book 
Total observation 6386 8119 
Endogeneity problem 
Conventional Instruments          
Total: National exam score 933 DL16e BIIIA 630 DL16e BIIIA 
Siblings or twin data 3888 BA28  BIIIB 7021    
Do you have siblings out of 
hh? (YES?NO) 2043 BA29a BIIIB 6331  
  
# of siblings away who died 
lst/12 months 4538 BA30 BIIIB   
  
Total # of siblings non-
HHM          
Siblings' education 4251 BA36 BIIIB     
Distance to school(in hour 
and minutes) 2031 DL16j  BIIIA 2267 DL16j  BIIIA 
  2031 dl16jx       
Spouse education 3062 KW02n BIIIA 2 KW02n BIIIA 
Parent's highest education          
Mother's education 2857 BA08M  BIIIB 4063 BA08M BIIIB 
Father's education 3769 BA08P BIIIB 4842 BA08P BIIIB 
Preschool attendance      7067 dl05b BIIIA 
Delayed enrolment in 
primary school (age of 
primary school enrolment) 
6371 dl05a BIIIA 7058 dl05a BIIIA 
In what age did you enter 
school (DL05A)    
  
  
  
Smoking 6383 KM01a BIIIB 7036 KM01a BIIIB 
Policy instruments (Purnastuti et al (2015) 
INPRES Program (Dummy for INPRES program) 1 if individual was born in 1967 and later; 0 otherwise 
The first compulsory school attendance law (CSAL-1), 1 if individual was born in 1977 and later 
The second compulsory school attendance law (CSAL-2). 1 if individual was born in 1987 and later 
Selection problem 
Heckman sample selection 
model       
  
Number of children  AR02b 
Book 
K     
Dumauli (2015) Household size 
Source: The author’s compilation. 
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Appendix VIII: IV Model of Mincer Wage Equation 
Table VIII.1: Age Distribution and Year of Schooling (in per cent) 
Age in 
2000 
Year of Schooling 
Total 
 Age in 
2014 
Year of Schooling 
Total 6 9 12 15  6 9 12 15 
16 2.17 3.70 0.00 0.00 1.46  16 1.00 1.10 0.00 0.00 0.36 
17 2.74 7.23 0.00 0.00 2.30  17 1.21 2.57 0.00 0.00 0.64 
18 2.61 7.06 1.92 0.00 2.82  18 0.85 2.28 2.34 0.00 1.45 
19 2.74 5.59 4.15 0.00 3.29  19 0.93 3.31 4.33 0.00 2.43 
20 3.91 4.04 4.90 0.00 3.66  20 1.21 2.57 3.58 0.00 2.06 
21 3.13 4.13 5.16 0.00 3.48  21 1.14 2.13 3.93 0.00 2.11 
22 4.13 4.99 4.85 2.75 4.31  22 1.71 3.68 4.27 2.89 3.36 
23 3.04 4.48 4.04 4.33 3.81  23 1.78 2.43 3.77 3.08 3.02 
24 3.09 3.44 4.50 2.96 3.57  24 1.92 3.16 3.77 3.82 3.36 
25 3.87 3.27 4.30 3.80 3.88  25 2.21 3.75 3.93 4.76 3.82 
26 2.57 3.87 3.84 3.70 3.37  26 2.14 2.87 3.49 4.01 3.29 
27 2.87 5.77 3.54 4.65 3.87  27 1.78 3.38 4.30 4.52 3.77 
28 3.13 2.84 4.90 3.59 3.70  28 2.21 2.72 3.77 4.66 3.56 
29 2.44 2.93 4.70 4.22 3.49  29 2.92 5.00 3.89 4.34 4.03 
30 3.13 3.10 4.60 4.12 3.73  30 3.06 4.04 4.08 5.08 4.16 
31 2.44 1.98 3.94 5.70 3.30  31 2.92 6.18 3.86 4.06 4.14 
32 2.74 2.84 3.99 4.22 3.37  32 3.28 4.93 4.36 4.71 4.36 
33 2.57 1.89 3.64 3.80 2.96  33 3.77 3.24 3.86 4.99 4.04 
34 2.17 1.98 3.44 4.33 2.85  34 3.85 4.19 3.49 3.78 3.74 
35 3.13 1.81 2.98 4.01 2.98  35 3.21 4.19 2.74 3.92 3.37 
36 2.26 2.41 2.53 3.70 2.58  36 3.92 3.01 3.05 3.68 3.36 
37 3.61 1.98 1.82 3.70 2.77  37 3.85 3.38 2.65 3.26 3.14 
38 2.91 1.12 2.38 3.70 2.54  38 3.92 2.57 2.46 2.38 2.71 
39 3.04 1.20 2.02 2.96 2.38  39 4.84 2.13 2.55 2.80 2.94 
40 2.87 1.46 1.97 3.48 2.43  40 3.06 3.01 2.49 1.59 2.44 
41 2.83 1.64 2.12 2.85 2.40  41 2.99 2.35 1.96 2.28 2.29 
42 3.52 1.29 1.97 3.27 2.60  42 2.92 2.21 2.52 1.63 2.30 
43 2.22 1.29 1.11 3.27 1.86  43 2.35 1.69 1.56 2.24 1.90 
44 2.17 1.20 0.76 2.01 1.53  44 2.49 1.47 2.46 2.38 2.28 
45 1.87 0.95 1.01 2.53 1.53  45 2.85 1.47 1.96 2.28 2.12 
46 1.78 1.20 1.06 1.90 1.47  46 2.78 1.40 1.15 2.00 1.70 
47 2.22 1.29 1.26 2.32 1.77  47 2.85 1.10 1.25 2.10 1.72 
48 1.70 1.12 1.26 1.37 1.41  48 1.42 0.88 1.09 2.10 1.38 
49 1.91 1.03 0.71 0.74 1.21  49 2.99 1.10 1.31 1.63 1.65 
50 1.30 1.20 0.71 1.90 1.19  50 2.21 0.96 0.93 1.77 1.38 
51 0.83 0.60 1.01 0.95 0.86  51 2.78 0.44 0.90 1.54 1.32 
52 1.44 0.69 0.76 0.53 0.96  52 2.14 0.96 0.56 1.77 1.22 
53 1.17 0.69 0.81 0.95 0.94  53 2.14 0.59 0.50 1.35 1.02 
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54 0.52 0.52 0.91 0.95 0.70  54 2.49 0.88 0.44 1.31 1.10 
55 1.17 0.17 0.40 0.74 0.69  55 1.92 0.66 0.44 1.31 0.96 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Note:  The birth cohorts are in the grey area, or the age range that covered in the present 
study were from 16-41 years old in 2000 and from 30-55 years old in 2014. While, 
workers aged 42-55 were too old or entered pension age in the later period, and aged 16-
29 were too young in 2014, they have not yet entered labour market in 2000. 
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Table VIII.2: Summary Statistics of IV Instruments 
Education Level 2000: INPRES 2014: CSAL1 2014: CSAL2 
Percentage of 
distribution 0 1 Total 0 1 Total 0 1 Total 
Primary School 1,073 1,226 2,299 690 714 1,404 1,153 251 1,404 
  42.4% 31.8% 36.0% 26.2% 13.0% 17.3% 20.2% 10.4% 17.3% 
Junior High School 312 850 1,162 352 1,008 1,360 908 452 1,360 
  12.3% 22.1% 18.2% 13.4% 18.4% 16.8% 15.9% 18.8% 16.8% 
Senior High School 653 1,325 1,978 852 2,358 3,210 2,000 1,210 3,210 
  25.8% 34.4% 31.0% 32.4% 43.0% 39.5% 35.0% 50.3% 39.5% 
University 494 453 947 739 1,406 2,145 1,650 495 2,145 
  19.5% 11.8% 14.8% 28.1% 25.6% 26.4% 28.9% 20.6% 26.4% 
Total 2,532 3,854 6,386 2,633 5,486 8,119 5,711 2,408 8,119 
  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
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Table VIII.3: Age Distribution of IV Instruments 
Age 
2000 2014 
INPRES CSAL1 CSAL2 INPRES CSAL1 CSAL2 
0 1 Total 0 1 Total 0 Total 0 1 Total 0 1 Total 0 1 Total 
16 0 93 93 0 93 93 93 93 0 29 29 0 29 29 0 29 29 
17 0 147 147 0 147 147 147 147 0 52 52 0 52 52 0 52 52 
18 0 180 180 0 180 180 180 180 0 118 118 0 118 118 0 118 118 
19 0 210 210 0 210 210 210 210 0 197 197 0 197 197 0 197 197 
20 0 234 234 0 234 234 234 234 0 167 167 0 167 167 0 167 167 
21 0 222 222 0 222 222 222 222 0 171 171 0 171 171 0 171 171 
22 0 275 275 0 275 275 275 275 0 273 273 0 273 273 0 273 273 
23 0 243 243 0 243 243 243 243 0 245 245 0 245 245 0 245 245 
24 0 228 228 228 0 228 228 228 0 273 273 0 273 273 0 273 273 
25 0 248 248 248 0 248 248 248 0 310 310 0 310 310 0 310 310 
26 0 215 215 215 0 215 215 215 0 267 267 0 267 267 0 267 267 
27 0 247 247 247 0 247 247 247 0 306 306 0 306 306 0 306 306 
28 0 236 236 236 0 236 236 236 0 289 289 0 289 289 289 0 289 
29 0 223 223 223 0 223 223 223 0 327 327 0 327 327 327 0 327 
30 0 238 238 238 0 238 238 238 0 338 338 0 338 338 338 0 338 
31 0 211 211 211 0 211 211 211 0 336 336 0 336 336 336 0 336 
32 0 215 215 215 0 215 215 215 0 354 354 0 354 354 354 0 354 
33 0 189 189 189 0 189 189 189 0 328 328 0 328 328 328 0 328 
34 182 0 182 182 0 182 182 182 0 304 304 0 304 304 304 0 304 
35 190 0 190 190 0 190 190 190 0 274 274 0 274 274 274 0 274 
36 165 0 165 165 0 165 165 165 0 273 273 0 273 273 273 0 273 
37 177 0 177 177 0 177 177 177 0 255 255 0 255 255 255 0 255 
38 162 0 162 162 0 162 162 162 0 220 220 220 0 220 220 0 220 
39 151 0 151 151 0 151 151 151 0 239 239 239 0 239 239 0 239 
40 155 0 155 155 0 155 155 155 0 198 198 198 0 198 198 0 198 
41 153 0 153 153 0 153 153 153 0 186 186 186 0 186 186 0 186 
42 166 0 166 166 0 166 166 166 0 187 187 187 0 187 187 0 187 
43 119 0 119 119 0 119 119 119 0 154 154 154 0 154 154 0 154 
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44 98 0 98 98 0 98 98 98 0 185 185 185 0 185 185 0 185 
45 98 0 98 98 0 98 98 98 0 172 172 172 0 172 172 0 172 
46 94 0 94 94 0 94 94 94 0 138 138 138 0 138 138 0 138 
47 113 0 113 113 0 113 113 113 0 140 140 140 0 140 140 0 140 
48 90 0 90 90 0 90 90 90 112 0 112 112 0 112 112 0 112 
49 77 0 77 77 0 77 77 77 134 0 134 134 0 134 134 0 134 
50 76 0 76 76 0 76 76 76 112 0 112 112 0 112 112 0 112 
51 55 0 55 55 0 55 55 55 107 0 107 107 0 107 107 0 107 
52 61 0 61 61 0 61 61 61 99 0 99 99 0 99 99 0 99 
53 60 0 60 60 0 60 60 60 83 0 83 83 0 83 83 0 83 
54 45 0 45 45 0 45 45 45 89 0 89 89 0 89 89 0 89 
55 44 0 44 44 0 44 44 44 78 0 78 78 0 78 78 0 78 
Total 2,531 3,854 6,385 4,781 1,604 6,385 6,385 6,385 814 7,305 8,119 2,633 5,486 8,119 5,711 2,408 8,119 
Source: The author’s calculation 
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Table VIII.4: OLS and IV Specifications without Experience, All Individuals 
 
OLS IV: First Stage IV: Second Stage 
Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>z 
Years of schooling 0.111 0.004 ***      -0.004 0.038   
Sex (1=female) -0.344 0.025 *** -0.269 0.074 *** -0.374 0.028 *** 
Married and cohabitate 0.245 0.027 *** -0.301 0.087 *** 0.180 0.036 *** 
Other (Separated, divorced and 
widowed) 0.114 0.060 * -1.381 0.186 *** -0.085 0.091   
Religion1: Islam -0.009 0.107   -0.463 0.325   -0.066 0.114   
Religion2: Christian/Protestant 0.112 0.122   0.782 0.369 ** 0.192 0.131   
Religion3: Catholic 0.075 0.128   1.020 0.390 *** 0.182 0.140   
Religion5: Buddhist -0.144 0.199   -0.522 0.606   -0.219 0.212   
Ethnicity1: Jawa -0.045 0.047   0.056 0.144   -0.041 0.050   
Ethnicity2: Sunda -0.060 0.058   -0.340 0.175 * -0.101 0.062   
Ethnicity3: Batak 0.062 0.094   0.620 0.287 ** 0.133 0.102   
Ethnicity4: Betawi 0.005 0.067   0.241 0.203   0.032 0.071   
Ethnicity5: Minang 0.048 0.094   1.106 0.285 *** 0.174 0.107   
Ethnicity6: Tiong Hoa 0.114 0.158   0.346 0.480   0.146 0.167   
Status: fulltime (30 hours a week or 
more) -0.646 0.032 *** -0.087 0.097   -0.654 0.034 *** 
Tenure 0.032 0.004 *** 0.037 0.014 *** 0.034 0.005 *** 
Tenure squared -0.001 0.000 *** -0.002 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** 
Sector: private -0.348 0.037 *** -2.891 0.109 *** -0.668 0.112 *** 
Industry2: mining and quarrying 0.352 0.121 *** 0.836 0.368 ** 0.441 0.131 *** 
Industry3: manufacturing 0.117 0.040 *** 1.081 0.121 *** 0.247 0.060 *** 
Industry4: electricity, gas and water 0.133 0.144   2.069 0.436 *** 0.377 0.171 ** 
Industry5: construction 0.346 0.049 *** 0.309 0.148 ** 0.379 0.053 *** 
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants 
and hotels 0.066 0.046   1.609 0.137 *** 0.253 0.078 *** 
Industry7: transportation, storage, and 
communications 0.181 0.057 *** 1.412 0.173 *** 0.343 0.080 *** 
Industr8: Finance, insurance, real estate 
and business services 0.448 0.094 *** 3.684 0.282 *** 0.881 0.173 *** 
Industry9: Social services 0.130 0.038 *** 2.097 0.114 *** 0.370 0.088 *** 
Firm size2: 5-19 people 0.185 0.027 *** 0.893 0.082 *** 0.290 0.045 *** 
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Firm size3: 20-99 people 0.253 0.032 *** 1.383 0.095 *** 0.415 0.063 *** 
Firm size4: >= 100 people 0.335 0.043 *** 1.526 0.128 *** 0.517 0.075 *** 
Province 2: Sumatera Utara (12) 0.383 0.086 *** -0.525 0.261 ** 0.308 0.094 *** 
Province 3: Sumatera Barat (13) 0.286 0.111 *** -0.678 0.337 ** 0.196 0.121   
Province 4: Riau (14) 1.036 0.157 *** -0.279 0.476   1.001 0.166 *** 
Province 5: Jambi (15) 0.231 0.080 *** 0.504 0.244 ** 0.275 0.086 *** 
Province 7: Lampung (18) 0.154 0.093 * -0.153 0.282   0.133 0.098   
Province 8: Kepulauan Bangka 
Belitung (19) 0.564 0.077 *** 0.059 0.233   0.562 0.081 *** 
Province 9: Kepulauan Riau (21) 0.432 0.074 *** 0.015 0.225   0.428 0.078 *** 
Province 10: DKI Jakarta (31) 0.181 0.075 ** -0.756 0.227 *** 0.090 0.084   
Province 11: Jawa Barat (32) 0.052 0.081   0.252 0.247   0.071 0.086   
Province 12: Jawa Tengah (33) 0.204 0.070 *** -0.212 0.214   0.170 0.075 ** 
Province 13: D I Yogyakarta (34) 0.144 0.111   -0.384 0.339   0.093 0.119   
Province 15: Banten (36) 0.788 0.333 ** 1.029 1.014   0.876 0.353 ** 
Province 16: Bali (51) 0.339 0.076 *** -0.224 0.231   0.309 0.081 *** 
Province 17: Kalimantan Timur 0.919 0.440 ** -0.863 1.337   0.816 0.466 * 
Province 18: Kalimantan Barat (61) 0.026 0.078   -0.618 0.236 *** -0.052 0.086   
Urban 0.009 0.026   0.946 0.078 *** 0.114 0.044 *** 
INPRES      0.808 0.088 ***     
Constant 6.569 0.135 *** 9.829 0.399 *** 7.794 0.425 *** 
Observation 6386    6386    6386    
R Squared 0.36    0.36    0.28    
Instruments:       
F-Test  84.5 *** 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):  83.991 *** 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): (equation exactly identified) 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:   10.55 *** 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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Table VIII.5: OLS and IV Specifications without Experience and Experience Squared in 2004, All Individuals 
  
OLS 
IV Model 1 IV Model 2 
IV: First Stage IV: Second Stage IV: First Stage IV: Second Stage 
Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>z Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>z 
Years of schooling 0.087 0.004 ***      -0.033 0.034      -0.034 0.034   
Sex (1=female) -0.283 0.022 *** 0.124 0.066 * -0.262 0.024 *** 0.130 0.066 ** -0.262 0.024 *** 
Married and cohabitate 0.169 0.027 *** -0.473 0.093 *** 0.084 0.038 *** -0.541 0.083 *** 0.083 0.038 ** 
Other (Separated, divorced 
and widowed) 0.246 0.056 *** -1.167 0.175 *** 0.059 0.079   -1.240 0.169 *** 0.057 0.080   
Religion1: Islam 0.058 0.091   -1.521 0.272 *** -0.123 0.109   -1.523 0.272 *** -0.125 0.109   
Religion2: 
Christian/Protestant 0.278 0.123 ** -0.047 0.369   0.265 0.130 ** -0.055 0.369  0.265 0.130 ** 
Religion3: Catholic 0.223 0.111 ** -0.688 0.333 ** 0.139 0.120   -0.695 0.333 ** 0.139 0.120   
Religion5: Buddhist 0.125 0.302   -0.771 0.906   0.026 0.321   -0.775 0.906  0.025 0.322   
Ethnicity1: Jawa 0.133 0.036 *** 0.460 0.109 *** 0.187 0.042 *** 0.463 0.109 *** 0.187 0.042 *** 
Ethnicity2: Sunda 0.030 0.046   0.124 0.139   0.041 0.049   0.130 0.139  0.042 0.049   
Ethnicity3: Batak 0.027 0.076   1.043 0.228 *** 0.150 0.088 * 1.041 0.228 *** 0.151 0.088 * 
Ethnicity4: Betawi -0.081 0.165   0.596 0.494   -0.016 0.175   0.600 0.494  -0.015 0.176   
Ethnicity5: Minang 0.158 0.072 ** 0.871 0.216 *** 0.264 0.082 *** 0.866 0.216 *** 0.265 0.082 *** 
Ethnicity6: Tiong Hoa 0.364 0.167 ** 0.841 0.501 * 0.467 0.179 *** 0.850 0.501 * 0.468 0.180 *** 
Status: fulltime (30 hours a 
week or more) -0.467 0.029 *** -0.347 0.087 *** -0.507 0.033 *** -0.346 0.087 *** -0.507 0.033 *** 
Tenure 0.026 0.004 *** 0.085 0.013 *** 0.034 0.005 *** 0.080 0.013 *** 0.034 0.005 *** 
Tenure squared 0.000 0.000   -0.003 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 ** -0.003 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 ** 
Sector: private -0.310 0.034 *** -2.297 0.099 *** -0.580 0.084 *** -2.294 0.099 *** -0.583 0.085 *** 
Industry2: mining and 
quarrying 0.372 0.087 *** 0.945 0.261 *** 0.483 0.097 *** 0.948 0.261 *** 0.484 0.098 *** 
Industry3: manufacturing 0.035 0.045 *** 0.501 0.136 *** 0.100 0.051 * 0.502 0.136 *** 0.101 0.052 * 
Industry4: electricity, gas and 
water 0.144 0.112   1.601 0.337 *** 0.340 0.131 *** 1.588 0.337 *** 0.342 0.132 *** 
Industry5: construction 0.316 0.062 *** 0.188 0.188   0.332 0.066 *** 0.182 0.188  0.332 0.066 *** 
Industry6: wholesale, retail, 
restaurants and hotels -0.051 0.046   1.422 0.137 *** 0.126 0.070 * 1.429 0.137 *** 0.128 0.070 * 
Industry7: transportation, 
storage, and communications 0.112 0.072   1.517 0.216 *** 0.292 0.092 *** 1.505 0.216 *** 0.293 0.092 *** 
Industr8: Finance, insurance, 
real estate and business 
services 0.221 0.057 *** 2.793 0.167 *** 0.561 0.113 *** 2.794 0.167 *** 0.565 0.114 *** 
Industry9: Social services -0.138 0.044 *** 2.828 0.128 *** 0.205 0.107 * 2.828 0.128 *** 0.208 0.108 * 
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Firm size2: 5-19 people 0.058 0.029 ** 1.248 0.086 *** 0.215 0.054 *** 1.251 0.086 *** 0.216 0.054 *** 
Firm size3: 20-99 people 0.233 0.031 *** 1.753 0.092 *** 0.452 0.070 *** 1.757 0.092 *** 0.454 0.071 *** 
Firm size4: >= 100 people 0.496 0.035 *** 2.121 0.102 *** 0.763 0.084 *** 2.127 0.102 *** 0.765 0.085 *** 
Province 1: Aceh  1.227 0.919   3.014 2.758   1.615 0.980 * 3.119 2.758  1.619 0.981 * 
Province 2: Sumatera Utara  0.389 0.072 *** -1.105 0.215 *** 0.253 0.085 *** -1.106 0.215 *** 0.252 0.085 *** 
Province 3: Sumatera Barat  0.369 0.090 *** -0.705 0.271 *** 0.276 0.099 *** -0.708 0.271 *** 0.275 0.099 *** 
Province 4: Riau  0.724 0.131 *** -0.300 0.392   0.684 0.139 *** -0.302 0.392  0.684 0.139 *** 
Province 5: Jambi  0.565 0.269 ** -1.167 0.806   0.410 0.288   -1.171 0.806  0.409 0.288   
Province 6: Sumatera Selatan  0.363 0.068 *** -0.249 0.205   0.326 0.073 *** -0.256 0.205  0.326 0.073 *** 
Province 7: Lampung  0.151 0.077 ** -0.916 0.230 *** 0.039 0.087   -0.918 0.230 *** 0.038 0.087   
Province 8: Kepulauan 
Bangka Belitung  0.579 0.110 *** 0.270 0.330   0.603 0.117 *** 0.266 0.330  0.603 0.117 *** 
Province 9: Kepulauan Riau  0.866 0.184 *** -0.766 0.553   0.791 0.196 *** -0.775 0.553  0.791 0.197 *** 
Province 10: DKI Jakarta  0.679 0.058 *** -0.871 0.174 *** 0.567 0.069 *** -0.874 0.174 *** 0.566 0.070 *** 
Province 11: Jawa Barat  0.421 0.061 *** -0.840 0.184 *** 0.313 0.072 *** -0.848 0.184 *** 0.312 0.072 *** 
Province 12: Jawa Tengah  0.101 0.061 * -1.141 0.183 *** -0.044 0.077   -1.149 0.183 *** -0.045 0.077   
Province 13: D I Yogyakarta  0.059 0.069   -0.213 0.206   0.019 0.074   -0.219 0.206  0.019 0.074   
Province 14: Jawa Timur  0.125 0.058 ** -0.933 0.175 *** 0.005 0.070   -0.936 0.175 *** 0.004 0.071   
Province 15: Banten  0.614 0.068 *** -1.340 0.204 *** 0.454 0.085 *** -1.341 0.204 *** 0.452 0.086 *** 
Province 16: Bali  0.596 0.095 *** -1.623 0.283 *** 0.400 0.115 *** -1.623 0.283 *** 0.398 0.115 *** 
Province 18: Kalimantan 
Barat  1.423 0.461 *** -3.749 1.382 *** 0.937 0.507 * -3.792 1.382 *** 0.932 0.508 * 
Province 19: Kalimantan 
Tengah  1.275 0.243 *** -0.875 0.728   1.178 0.259 *** -0.882 0.728  1.177 0.259 *** 
Province 20: Kalimantan 
Selatan  0.400 0.084 *** -0.640 0.251 ** 0.321 0.092 *** -0.636 0.251 ** 0.320 0.092 *** 
Province 21: Kalimantan 
Timur  0.912 0.143 *** -0.417 0.430   0.871 0.152 *** -0.438 0.430  0.871 0.152 *** 
Province 22: Sulawesi 
Selatan  0.327 0.065 *** -0.614 0.196 *** 0.249 0.073 *** -0.622 0.196 *** 0.249 0.073 *** 
Province 23: Sulawesi 
Tenggara  0.213 0.266   -1.094 0.800   0.068 0.285   -1.103 0.800  0.066 0.286   
Urban 0.154 0.024 *** 0.764 0.073 *** 0.242 0.036 *** 0.757 0.073 *** 0.242 0.036 *** 
CSAL1      0.747 0.079 ***     0.783 0.076 ***      
CSAL2       0.144 0.089                     
Constant 8.139 0.158 *** 16.199 0.444 *** 10.169 0.596 *** 16.285 0.441 *** 10.188 0.603 *** 
Observation   8119   8119    8119    8119   8119    
The R-squared statistic   0.2995   0.3679     0.2074     0.3677     0.2056     
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Test Results on Instruments             
F-Test  53.9 ***      105.16 *** 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):  107.1 ***      104.487 *** 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):  0.046      (equation exactly identified) 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:   14.268 ***         14.183 *** 
Hausman Test (Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic)  14.17 ***     14.09 *** 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** significance level at 1 per cent.  
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Table VIII.6: Mincer Wage Equation: IV Model by Gender, 2000 
2000: Gender 
Female Male 
IV: First Stage IV: Second Stage IV: First Stage IV: Second Stage 
Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>z Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>z 
Years of School     0.045 0.048      -0.081 0.062   
Married and cohabitate -0.762 0.144 *** 0.089 0.070   -0.047 0.108  0.265 0.041 *** 
Other (Separated, divorced and widowed) -1.823 0.226 *** -0.060 0.133   -0.440 0.362  0.123 0.140   
Religion1: Islam 0.271 0.517  0.188 0.178   -0.776 0.411 * -0.248 0.161   
Religion2: Christian/Protestant 1.458 0.577 ** 0.509 0.208 ** 0.413 0.473  0.002 0.177   
Religion3: Catholic 1.799 0.636 *** 0.427 0.233 * 0.493 0.484  0.018 0.181   
Religion5: Buddhist 0.381 1.032  -0.062 0.354   -0.866 0.739  -0.343 0.281   
Ethnicity1: Jawa -0.057 0.252  -0.080 0.087   0.103 0.173  -0.019 0.064   
Ethnicity2: Sunda -0.048 0.304  0.005 0.104   -0.516 0.211 ** -0.212 0.085 ** 
Ethnicity3: Batak 0.796 0.490  -0.025 0.173   0.434 0.350  0.211 0.132   
Ethnicity4: Betawi 0.596 0.340 * 0.179 0.120   -0.060 0.250  -0.095 0.093   
Ethnicity5: Minang 1.876 0.477 *** 0.229 0.187   0.524 0.349  0.085 0.133   
Ethnicity6: Tiong Hoa 0.228 0.791  0.086 0.271   0.373 0.595  0.233 0.222   
Status: fulltime (30 hours a week or more) -0.120 0.147  -0.603 0.050 *** -0.137 0.129  -0.748 0.048 *** 
Tenure 0.078 0.023 *** 0.040 0.008 *** 0.000 0.017  0.023 0.006 *** 
Tenure squared -0.002 0.001 ** -0.001 0.000 ** -0.001 0.001 * -0.001 0.000 ** 
Sector: private -3.415 0.188 *** -0.763 0.168 *** -2.560 0.132 *** -0.720 0.161 *** 
Industry2: mining and quarrying 1.878 1.496  1.381 0.520 *** 0.615 0.382  0.404 0.146 *** 
Industry3: manufacturing 0.871 0.209 *** 0.214 0.085 ** 1.324 0.147 *** 0.386 0.100 *** 
Industry4: electricity, gas and water 4.964 1.068 *** 0.700 0.440   1.519 0.474 *** 0.413 0.200 ** 
Industry5: construction 2.081 0.494 *** 0.255 0.197   0.129 0.161  0.348 0.060 *** 
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and 
hotels 1.948 0.227 *** 0.288 0.125 ** 1.531 0.174 *** 0.336 0.115 *** 
Industry7: transportation, storage, and 
communications 3.630 0.658 *** 0.121 0.289   1.203 0.185 *** 0.401 0.100 *** 
Industr8: Finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services 4.251 0.460 *** 0.925 0.266 *** 3.436 0.350 *** 1.015 0.251 *** 
Industry9: Social services 2.476 0.202 *** 0.349 0.141 ** 1.939 0.139 *** 0.525 0.129 *** 
Firm size2: 5-19 people 1.131 0.145 *** 0.436 0.077 *** 0.785 0.099 *** 0.252 0.061 *** 
Firm size3: 20-99 people 1.586 0.162 *** 0.567 0.097 *** 1.305 0.118 *** 0.390 0.092 *** 
 364 
Firm size4: >= 100 people 1.205 0.206 *** 0.687 0.096 *** 1.901 0.164 *** 0.562 0.134 *** 
Province 2: Sumatera Utara (12) -0.805 0.444 * 0.561 0.160 *** -0.360 0.317  0.217 0.121 * 
Province 3: Sumatera Barat (13) -0.878 0.575  0.140 0.204   -0.561 0.409  0.244 0.156   
Province 4: Riau (14) 0.025 0.925  1.262 0.317 *** -0.310 0.549  0.885 0.205 *** 
Province 5: Jambi (15) 0.533 0.439  0.295 0.151 * 0.464 0.288  0.296 0.110 *** 
Province 7: Lampung (18) -0.375 0.527  0.038 0.182   -0.058 0.331  0.157 0.123   
Province 8: Kepulauan Bangka Belitung (19) -0.055 0.397  0.754 0.136 *** 0.193 0.284  0.507 0.106 *** 
Province 9: Kepulauan Riau (21) 0.077 0.392  0.545 0.134 *** -0.025 0.270  0.392 0.100 *** 
Province 10: DKI Jakarta (31) -0.295 0.393  0.204 0.136   -0.924 0.274 *** 0.001 0.117   
Province 11: Jawa Barat (32) 0.384 0.419  0.159 0.144   0.192 0.303  0.078 0.113   
Province 12: Jawa Tengah (33) -0.210 0.377  0.338 0.130 *** -0.164 0.256  0.108 0.096   
Province 13: D I Yogyakarta (34) -0.151 0.552  0.568 0.190 *** -0.440 0.423  -0.140 0.160   
Province 15: Banten (36) 3.159 1.844 * 1.706 0.649 *** 0.241 1.196  0.650 0.444   
Province 16: Bali (51) -0.689 0.423  0.600 0.150 *** -0.030 0.271  0.220 0.101 ** 
Province 17: Kalimantan Timur -1.175 2.626  0.366 0.902   -1.015 1.536  0.895 0.574   
Province 18: Kalimantan Barat (61) -0.430 0.403  0.180 0.141   -0.712 0.286 ** -0.201 0.115 * 
Urban 0.869 0.138 *** 0.044 0.061   0.932 0.094 *** 0.198 0.066 *** 
INPRES 1.066 0.150 ***     0.644 0.107 ***     
Constant 8.875 0.660 *** 6.550 0.521 *** 10.135 0.494 *** 8.788 0.692 *** 
Observation 2170   2170    4216   4216    
R squared (Partial R squared) 0.02     0.43     0.01     0.09     
Test Results on Instruments                       
F-Test    50.75 ***      36.08 ***   
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic): 50.62 ***      36.16 ***   
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 
(equation exactly 
identified)    
(equation exactly 
identified) 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:   3.52 *         10.90 ***   
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** significance level at 1 per cent.  
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 Table VIII.7: Mincer Wage Equation: IV Model by Gender, 2014 
2014: Gender 
Female Male 
IV: First Stage IV: Second Stage IV: First Stage IV: Second Stage 
Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>z Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>z 
Years of School     -0.020 0.035      -0.058 0.076   
Married and cohabitate -1.009 0.132 *** -0.106 0.064 * -0.221 0.106 ** 0.220 0.044 *** 
Other (Separated, divorced and widowed) -1.709 0.218 *** -0.104 0.110   -0.704 0.274 *** 0.193 0.116 * 
Religion1: Islam -0.794 0.415 * 0.038 0.156   -1.867 0.353 *** -0.252 0.187   
Religion2: Christian/Protestant 0.598 0.554  0.462 0.205 ** -0.252 0.483  0.138 0.171   
Religion3: Catholic -0.370 0.507  0.386 0.188 ** -0.833 0.434 * -0.054 0.165   
Religion5: Buddhist 1.201 1.536  0.267 0.568   -1.285 1.109  -0.085 0.402   
Ethnicity1: Jawa 0.672 0.177 *** 0.234 0.069 *** 0.346 0.137 ** 0.169 0.055 *** 
Ethnicity2: Sunda 0.677 0.228 *** 0.098 0.087   -0.142 0.174  0.012 0.062   
Ethnicity3: Batak 1.547 0.359 *** 0.182 0.142   0.657 0.291 ** 0.111 0.114   
Ethnicity4: Betawi 1.672 0.747 ** -0.070 0.281   0.018 0.661  0.015 0.232   
Ethnicity5: Minang 1.375 0.343 *** 0.321 0.135 ** 0.579 0.276 ** 0.166 0.107   
Ethnicity6: Tiong Hoa 2.046 0.841 ** 0.572 0.320 * 0.235 0.620  0.368 0.218 * 
Status: fulltime (30 hours a week or more) -0.260 0.121 ** -0.390 0.045 *** -0.443 0.124 *** -0.687 0.055 *** 
Tenure 0.145 0.020 *** 0.048 0.009 *** 0.020 0.016  0.022 0.006 *** 
Tenure squared -0.004 0.001 *** -0.001 0.000 * -0.001 0.001 ** 0.000 0.000   
Sector: private -2.354 0.151 *** -0.609 0.098 *** -2.233 0.131 *** -0.588 0.175 *** 
Industry2: mining and quarrying 3.378 1.035 *** 0.856 0.402 ** 0.704 0.276 *** 0.528 0.110 *** 
Industry3: manufacturing 0.261 0.240  -0.166 0.090 * 0.747 0.164 *** 0.260 0.082 *** 
Industry4: electricity, gas and water 3.007 1.370 ** 0.074 0.516   1.382 0.351 *** 0.454 0.163 *** 
Industry5: construction 2.850 0.636 *** 0.765 0.256 *** -0.196 0.204  0.298 0.074 *** 
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and 
hotels 1.664 0.238 *** -0.064 0.110   1.395 0.168 *** 0.269 0.122 ** 
Industry7: transportation, storage, and 
communications 1.153 0.651 * 0.289 0.245   1.368 0.233 *** 0.359 0.131 *** 
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Industr8: Finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services 3.243 0.313 *** 0.501 0.168 *** 2.537 0.196 *** 0.635 0.206 *** 
Industry9: Social services 3.458 0.225 *** 0.098 0.153   2.388 0.157 *** 0.286 0.190   
Firm size2: 5-19 people 1.483 0.133 *** 0.183 0.075 ** 1.012 0.111 *** 0.220 0.088 ** 
Firm size3: 20-99 people 2.030 0.146 *** 0.506 0.093 *** 1.567 0.116 *** 0.420 0.129 *** 
Firm size4: >= 100 people 2.007 0.166 ***     2.165 0.128 *** 0.741 0.174 *** 
Province 1: Aceh      0.848 0.100 *** 2.869 2.744  1.631 0.988 *** 
Province 2: Sumatera Utara  -1.195 0.345 *** 0.274 0.134 ** -1.073 0.270 *** 0.246 0.126 * 
Province 3: Sumatera Barat  -0.836 0.427 ** 0.484 0.161 *** -0.754 0.346 ** 0.181 0.136   
Province 4: Riau  -1.569 0.794 ** 0.721 0.298 ** -0.075 0.451  0.708 0.158 *** 
Province 5: Jambi  2.207 1.565  0.942 0.582   -2.402 0.928 *** 0.084 0.376   
Province 6: Sumatera Selatan  -0.128 0.349  0.484 0.129 *** -0.462 0.250 * 0.229 0.096 ** 
Province 7: Lampung  -1.012 0.389 *** -0.020 0.148   -0.973 0.281 *** 0.028 0.124   
Province 8: Kepulauan Bangka Belitung  1.090 0.522 ** 0.802 0.195 *** -0.205 0.418  0.480 0.148 *** 
Province 9: Kepulauan Riau  -0.837 1.133  1.036 0.419 ** -0.748 0.629  0.744 0.226 *** 
Province 10: DKI Jakarta  -0.694 0.286 ** 0.695 0.109 *** -1.031 0.216 *** 0.478 0.111 *** 
Province 11: Jawa Barat  -0.906 0.296 *** 0.412 0.114 *** -0.826 0.230 *** 0.252 0.104 ** 
Province 12: Jawa Tengah  -0.688 0.289 ** 0.015 0.110   -1.440 0.233 *** -0.089 0.139   
Province 13: D I Yogyakarta  0.061 0.325  0.157 0.120   -0.282 0.263  -0.043 0.096   
Province 14: Jawa Timur  -0.765 0.279 *** 0.063 0.107   -0.981 0.220 *** -0.018 0.110   
Province 15: Banten  -1.231 0.319 *** 0.738 0.125 *** -1.355 0.261 *** 0.249 0.138 * 
Province 16: Bali  -1.043 0.437 ** 0.729 0.166 *** -1.850 0.365 *** 0.189 0.190   
Province 18: Kalimantan Barat  -2.962 1.912  1.308 0.715 * -4.448 1.937 ** 0.538 0.765   
Province 19: Kalimantan Tengah  -1.328 1.232  0.737 0.456   -0.900 0.887  1.354 0.319 *** 
Province 20: Kalimantan Selatan  -0.517 0.397  0.265 0.147 ** -0.752 0.320 ** 0.373 0.127 *** 
Province 21: Kalimantan Timur  -0.870 0.752  0.805 0.278 *** -0.299 0.517  0.941 0.182 *** 
Province 22: Sulawesi Selatan  -0.519 0.303 * 0.137 0.113   -0.683 0.251 *** 0.345 0.103 *** 
Province 23: Sulawesi Tenggara  1.199 1.553  -0.195 0.574   -1.638 0.921 * 0.098 0.347   
Urban 0.728 0.113 *** 0.272 0.048 *** 0.783 0.093 *** 0.242 0.067 *** 
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CSAL1 1.294 0.123 ***     0.441 0.096 ***     
Constant 14.765 0.672 *** 9.661 0.604 *** 17.203 0.575 *** 10.706 1.355 *** 
Observation 3173   3173    4946   4946    
The R-squared statistic (Partial R-squared) 0.0343     0.263     0.0043   0.146    
Test Results on Instruments                         
F-Test    110.81 ***      21.12 ***   
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic): 108.763 ***      21.257 ***   
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):  
(equation exactly 
identified)     
(equation exactly 
identified) 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:     11.846 ***         3.995 **   
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** significance level at 1 per cent.  
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Table VIII.8: Mincer Wage Equation: IV Model by Sector, 2000 
2000: Sector 
Private Public 
IV: First Stage IV: Second Stage IV: First Stage  IV: Second Stage   
Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>z Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>z 
Years of School     0.024 0.035      -0.176 0.224   
Female -0.533 0.082 *** -0.453 0.034 *** 0.885 0.168 *** 0.185 0.213   
Married and cohabitate -0.266 0.091 *** 0.187 0.035 *** -0.239 0.294  0.236 0.150   
Other (Separated, divorced and widowed) -1.202 0.197 *** -0.035 0.087   -1.523 0.537 *** -0.178 0.446   
Religion1: Islam -0.367 0.382  -0.072 0.132   -0.628 0.578  -0.130 0.289   
Religion2: Christian/Protestant 1.101 0.435 ** 0.213 0.153   -0.050 0.658  -0.037 0.280   
Religion3: Catholic 1.789 0.454 *** 0.287 0.167 * -1.604 0.709 ** -0.703 0.472   
Religion5: Buddhist -0.464 0.639  -0.209 0.220   3.118 2.606  0.984 1.303   
Ethnicity1: Jawa 0.114 0.160  -0.050 0.055   0.052 0.306  0.055 0.130   
Ethnicity2: Sunda -0.321 0.194 * -0.087 0.067   -0.181 0.393  -0.152 0.172   
Ethnicity3: Batak 0.836 0.318 *** 0.147 0.113   1.539 0.695 ** 0.586 0.451   
Ethnicity4: Betawi 0.305 0.218  0.041 0.075   0.223 0.579  -0.245 0.252   
Ethnicity5: Minang 1.318 0.318 *** 0.115 0.119   0.277 0.593  0.238 0.256   
Ethnicity6: Tiong Hoa 0.182 0.483  0.092 0.165          
Status: fulltime (30 hours a week or more) -0.124 0.107  -0.703 0.037 *** -0.103 0.219  -0.495 0.096 *** 
Tenure 0.016 0.015  0.029 0.005 *** 0.123 0.033 *** 0.072 0.026 *** 
Tenure squared -0.001 0.001 ** -0.001 0.000 *** -0.004 0.001 *** -0.001 0.001 * 
Industry2: mining and quarrying 0.676 0.374 * 0.358 0.130 *** 2.861 1.785  1.744 0.976 * 
Industry3: manufacturing 1.032 0.126 *** 0.194 0.057 *** 0.324 0.482  0.171 0.219   
Industry4: electricity, gas and water 2.870 0.547 *** 0.441 0.213 ** 0.531 0.721  0.128 0.335   
Industry5: construction 0.250 0.153  0.367 0.053 *** 0.259 0.606  0.201 0.263   
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and hotels 1.513 0.142 *** 0.189 0.073 *** 1.079 0.664  0.151 0.371   
Industry7: transportation, storage, and 
communications 1.324 0.183 *** 0.287 0.078 *** 1.138 0.501 ** 0.523 0.334   
Industr8: Finance, insurance, real estate and business 
services 3.843 0.309 *** 0.815 0.173 *** 2.693 0.650 *** 1.105 0.683   
Industry9: Social services 1.932 0.123 *** 0.257 0.080 *** 1.925 0.318 *** 0.726 0.451   
Firm size2: 5-19 people 0.826 0.088 *** 0.244 0.043 *** 0.913 0.230 *** 0.451 0.221 ** 
Firm size3: 20-99 people 1.411 0.104 *** 0.384 0.062 *** 1.355 0.247 *** 0.599 0.315 * 
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Firm size4: >= 100 people 1.729 0.138 *** 0.548 0.079 *** 0.794 0.347 ** 0.339 0.229   
Province 2: Sumatera Utara (12) -0.192 0.288  0.462 0.099 *** -2.975 0.653 *** -0.868 0.723   
Province 3: Sumatera Barat (13) -0.616 0.379  0.292 0.133 ** -0.892 0.681  -0.216 0.351   
Province 4: Riau (14) -0.273 0.503  1.161 0.173 *** -1.255 1.520  -0.430 0.701   
Province 5: Jambi (15) 0.759 0.272 *** 0.347 0.095 *** -0.409 0.513  -0.097 0.238   
Province 7: Lampung (18) 0.027 0.309  0.208 0.106 ** -0.756 0.689  -0.125 0.335   
Province 8: Kepulauan Bangka Belitung (19) 0.131 0.261  0.661 0.089 *** -0.441 0.508  0.095 0.235   
Province 9: Kepulauan Riau (21) 0.062 0.255  0.540 0.087 *** 0.012 0.456  0.054 0.193   
Province 10: DKI Jakarta (31) -0.721 0.256 *** 0.208 0.092 ** -0.641 0.473  -0.323 0.242   
Province 11: Jawa Barat (32) 0.260 0.281  0.095 0.096   0.251 0.490  0.070 0.214   
Province 12: Jawa Tengah (33) -0.160 0.243  0.256 0.084 *** 0.029 0.433  0.004 0.184   
Province 13: D I Yogyakarta (34) -0.032 0.396  0.178 0.136   -1.154 0.609 * -0.286 0.373   
Province 15: Banten (36) 3.238 1.190 *** 1.267 0.420 *** -3.496 1.807 * -0.664 1.096   
Province 16: Bali (51) 0.056 0.270  0.408 0.093 *** -0.936 0.412 ** -0.134 0.273   
Province 17: Kalimantan Timur -0.941 1.332  0.882 0.458 *        
Province 18: Kalimantan Barat (61) -0.384 0.282  0.087 0.098   -0.953 0.404 ** -0.470 0.278 * 
Urban 1.151 0.086 *** 0.112 0.049 ** 0.116 0.172  0.046 0.076   
Inpres 0.917 0.094 ***     0.431 0.228 * 9.332 2.434 *** 
Constant 6.723 0.448 *** 6.942 0.311 *** 
10.25
1 0.791 ***     
Observation 5326       1060   1060    
R squared (Partial R squared) 
0.017
6           
0.003
5   
-
0.2718    
Test Results on Instruments                     
F-Test    94.7 ***     3.59 *   
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic): 93.821 ***     3.724 *   
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): (equation exactly identified)    (equation exactly identified) 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors: 5.242 **         3.469 *   
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** Significance level at 1 per cent. 
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 Table VIII.9: Mincer Wage Equation: IV Model by Sector, 2014 
2014 
Private Public 
IV: First Stage IV: Second Stage IV: First Stage IV: Second Stage 
Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>z Coef. SE P>t Coef. SE P>z 
Years of School     0.067 0.031 **    -1.599 0.980   
Female -0.028 0.075  -0.299 0.024 *** 0.825 0.132 *** 1.262 0.868   
Married and cohabitate -0.533 0.090 *** 0.102 0.036 *** -0.075 0.225  0.383 0.407   
Other (Separated, divorced and 
widowed) -1.270 0.185 *** 0.133 0.076 * -0.546 0.407  -0.171 0.944   
Religion1: Islam -1.541 0.309 *** -0.009 0.108   -1.377 0.532 *** -2.021 1.661   
Religion2: Christian/Protestant 0.318 0.422  0.329 0.134 ** -1.142 0.697  -1.670 1.706   
Religion3: Catholic -0.455 0.379  0.256 0.120 ** -1.356 0.649 ** -2.179 1.774   
Religion5: Buddhist -0.753 0.960  0.028 0.304   0.967 2.374  3.525 4.243   
Ethnicity1: Jawa 0.523 0.122 *** 0.107 0.041 *** 0.079 0.240  0.376 0.424   
Ethnicity2: Sunda 0.098 0.152  -0.002 0.048   -0.037 0.344  0.027 0.602   
Ethnicity3: Batak 1.089 0.257 *** -0.012 0.088   0.965 0.463 ** 1.848 1.233   
Ethnicity4: Betawi 1.054 0.586 * -0.191 0.187   -0.104 0.836  0.049 1.460   
Ethnicity5: Minang 1.071 0.251 *** 0.142 0.086 * 0.183 0.393  0.592 0.706   
Ethnicity6: Tiong Hoa 0.684 0.519  0.302 0.165 *        
Status: fulltime (30 hours a week or 
more) -0.312 0.102 *** -0.523 0.034 *** -0.405 0.151 *** -1.032 0.476 ** 
Tenure 0.097 0.015 *** 0.041 0.005 *** 0.068 0.026 *** 0.123 0.074 * 
Tenure squared -0.004 0.001 *** -0.001 0.000 *** -0.002 0.001 ** -0.003 0.002   
Industry2: mining and quarrying 0.954 0.285 *** 0.380 0.094 *** 0.274 0.663  0.881 1.177   
Industry3: manufacturing 0.468 0.146 *** 0.064 0.049   -0.506 0.657  -1.288 1.255   
Industry4: electricity, gas and water 1.451 0.371 *** 0.255 0.125 ** 1.434 0.767 * 1.998 1.996   
Industry5: construction 0.216 0.196  0.334 0.062 *** -2.542 1.190 ** -4.286 3.203   
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants 
and hotels 1.440 0.146 *** -0.008 0.065   -1.271 0.948  -2.562 2.035   
Industry7: transportation, storage, and 
communications 1.429 0.227 *** 0.129 0.084   1.638 0.883 * 3.503 2.248   
Industr8: Finance, insurance, real estate 
and business services 2.707 0.180 *** 0.288 0.101 *** 2.610 0.478 *** 4.606 2.714 * 
Industry9: Social services 2.857 0.140 *** -0.090 0.099   2.098 0.331 *** 3.440 2.130   
Firm size2: 5-19 people 1.169 0.094 *** 0.072 0.048   0.998 0.244 *** 1.837 1.068 * 
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Firm size3: 20-99 people 1.772 0.101 *** 0.253 0.065 *** 1.169 0.243 *** 2.306 1.233 * 
Firm size4: >= 100 people 2.333 0.111 *** 0.552 0.083 *** 0.906 0.272 *** 2.088 1.031 ** 
Province 1: Aceh  2.838 2.819  1.183 0.894          
Province 2: Sumatera Utara  -0.974 0.251 *** 0.349 0.085 *** -1.350 0.398 *** -1.762 1.475   
Province 3: Sumatera Barat  -0.913 0.324 *** 0.282 0.107 *** -0.265 0.456  -0.042 0.829   
Province 4: Riau  -0.381 0.442  0.590 0.140 *** -0.177 0.807  0.928 1.412   
Province 5: Jambi  -1.218 0.828  0.473 0.264 *    -0.084 0.668   
Province 6: Sumatera Selatan  -0.214 0.243  0.313 0.077 *** -0.249 0.360  -0.399 0.881   
Province 7: Lampung  -1.005 0.264 *** 0.075 0.089   -0.343 0.464  1.500 1.030   
Province 8: Kepulauan Bangka Belitung  0.324 0.407  0.596 0.128 *** 0.517 0.495  -1.846 2.452   
Province 9: Kepulauan Riau  -0.405 0.627  0.847 0.198 *** -1.754 1.076  -0.385 0.951   
Province 10: DKI Jakarta  -0.926 0.201 *** 0.619 0.071 *** -0.651 0.415  -0.089 0.718   
Province 11: Jawa Barat  -0.913 0.214 *** 0.362 0.074 *** -0.309 0.372  0.265 0.620   
Province 12: Jawa Tengah  -1.308 0.214 *** 0.011 0.080   0.001 0.356  0.653 0.720   
Province 13: D I Yogyakarta  -0.299 0.240  -0.033 0.077   0.258 0.396  -1.101 0.881   
Province 14: Jawa Timur  -0.945 0.206 *** 0.087 0.072   -0.712 0.320 ** -2.472 1.847   
Province 15: Banten  -1.441 0.230 *** 0.553 0.085 *** -1.488 0.627 ** -2.031 2.027   
Province 16: Bali  -1.603 0.324 *** 0.454 0.113 *** -1.775 0.558 ***     
Province 18: Kalimantan Barat  -3.781 1.415 *** 1.299 0.463 ***        
Province 19: Kalimantan Tengah  -0.750 0.870  1.396 0.275 *** -0.477 1.199  -0.113 2.131   
Province 20: Kalimantan Selatan  -0.933 0.299 *** 0.297 0.099 *** -0.043 0.428  0.458 0.747   
Province 21: Kalimantan Timur  -0.684 0.478  0.922 0.152 *** -0.667 1.058  -0.526 1.921   
Province 22: Sulawesi Selatan  -0.658 0.244 *** 0.358 0.080 *** -0.438 0.285  -0.497 0.664   
Province 23: Sulawesi Tenggara  0.169 1.067  0.026 0.336   -2.044 1.047 * -2.824 2.681   
Urban 0.887 0.083 *** 0.132 0.037 *** 0.381 0.140 *** 0.936 0.431 ** 
CSAL1 0.882 0.086 ***     0.282 0.159 *     
Constant 9.269 0.380 *** 7.628 0.331 *** 12.588 0.712 *** 28.089 12.695 ** 
Observation 6728   6728    1391   1391    
The R-squared stat. (Partial R-squared) 0.0157     0.2622     0.0023   -10.2838    
Test Results on Instruments                     
F-Test    106.2 ***     3.16 *   
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic): 105.35 ***     3.267 *   
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): (equation exactly identified) (equation exactly identified) 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors: 0.181           51.609 ***   
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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Appendix IX: IV with Smoking as the Instrument 
 
Table IX.1: IV with Smoking as Instrument, 2000 
  
2000: All Individuals 
OLS: Wages IV: First Stage IV: Wage equation 
Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t 
Years of Schooling 0.120 0.004 ***      0.102 0.059 * 
Experience  0.033 0.005 *** -0.294 0.014 *** 0.028 0.018   
Experience squared -0.001 0.000 *** 0.003 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 ** 
Sex (1=female) -0.328 0.024 *** -0.776 0.090 *** -0.336 0.036 *** 
Married and 
cohabitate 0.099 0.033 *** 1.416 0.095 *** 0.124 0.089   
Other (Separated, 
divorced and 
widowed) -0.052 0.064   0.898 0.185 *** -0.036 0.083   
Religion1: Islam -0.009 0.106   -0.340 0.306   -0.015 0.108   
Religion2: 
Christian/Protestant 0.083 0.121   0.993 0.348 *** 0.101 0.134   
Religion3: Catholic 0.052 0.127   1.127 0.367 *** 0.072 0.144   
Religion5: Buddhist -0.186 0.199   0.110 0.573   -0.181 0.199   
Ethnicity1: Jawa -0.043 0.047   0.048 0.135   -0.042 0.047   
Ethnicity2: Sunda -0.061 0.057   -0.165 0.165   -0.064 0.058   
Ethnicity3: Batak 0.064 0.094   0.626 0.271 ** 0.074 0.100   
Ethnicity4: Betawi 0.010 0.066   0.221 0.191   0.013 0.067   
Ethnicity5: Minang 0.052 0.093   1.012 0.268 *** 0.070 0.110   
Ethnicity6: Tiong 
Hoa 0.124 0.157   0.394 0.453   0.130 0.158   
Status: fulltime (30 
hours a week or 
more) -0.640 0.032 *** -0.186 0.092 ** -0.643 0.034 *** 
Tenure 0.022 0.005 *** 0.115 0.013 *** 0.024 0.008 *** 
Tenure squared 0.000 0.000   -0.002 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000   
Sector: private -0.303 0.038 *** -2.839 0.102 *** -0.354 0.171 ** 
Industry2: mining 
and quarrying 0.363 0.120 *** 0.635 0.347 * 0.374 0.125 *** 
Industry3: 
manufacturing 0.126 0.040 *** 0.736 0.114 *** 0.139 0.060 ** 
Industry4: 
electricity, gas and 
water 0.139 0.144   1.767 0.415 *** 0.171 0.178   
Industry5: 
construction 0.337 0.049 *** 0.363 0.140 *** 0.343 0.053 *** 
Industry6: 
wholesale, retail, 
restaurants and 
hotels 0.079 0.045 * 1.170 0.130 *** 0.100 0.084   
Industry7: 
transportation, 
storage, and 
communications 0.173 0.057 *** 1.234 0.163 *** 0.194 0.091 ** 
Industry8: Finance, 
insurance, real 
estate and business 
services 0.418 0.093 *** 3.288 0.266 *** 0.476 0.214 ** 
Industry9: Social 
services 0.113 0.038 *** 1.865 0.108 *** 0.146 0.118   
Firm size2: 5-19 
people 0.183 0.027 *** 0.734 0.077 *** 0.195 0.051 *** 
Firm size3: 20-99 
people 0.242 0.032 *** 1.200 0.090 *** 0.264 0.078 *** 
Firm size4: >= 100 
people 0.338 0.042 *** 1.139 0.122 *** 0.359 0.080 *** 
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Province2: 
Sumatera Utara 
(12) 0.368 0.085 *** -0.128 0.246   0.365 0.086 *** 
Province3: 
Sumatera Barat (13) 0.253 0.110 ** -0.122 0.318   0.250 0.111 ** 
Province4: Riau 
(14) 1.054 0.156 *** -0.331 0.448   1.047 0.157 *** 
Province5: 
Sumatera Selatan 
(16) 0.202 0.080 ** 0.817 0.229 *** 0.216 0.092 ** 
Province7: 
Lampung (18) 0.153 0.092 * -0.024 0.265   0.152 0.092 * 
Province8: DKI 
Jakarta (31) 0.542 0.076 *** 0.399 0.219 * 0.549 0.079 *** 
Province9: Jawa 
Barat (32) 0.419 0.074 *** 0.178 0.212   0.422 0.074 *** 
Province10: Jawa 
Tengah (33) 0.167 0.074 ** -0.386 0.214 * 0.160 0.078 ** 
Province11: D I 
Yogyakarta (34) 0.023 0.081   0.631 0.233 *** 0.033 0.088   
Province12: Jawa 
Timur (35) 0.180 0.070 *** 0.146 0.202   0.183 0.070 *** 
Province13: Bali 
(51) 0.150 0.111   -0.325 0.319   0.145 0.112   
Province15: 
Kalimantan Tengah 
(62) 0.753 0.332 ** 1.385 0.954   0.776 0.339 ** 
Province16: 
Kalimantan Selatan 
(63) 0.336 0.075 *** -0.044 0.217   0.335 0.075 *** 
Province17: 
Kalimantan Timur 
(64) 0.911 0.437 ** -0.720 1.258   0.900 0.437 ** 
Province18: 
Sulawesi Selatan 
(73) 0.010 0.077   -0.223 0.222   0.006 0.078   
Urban -0.007 0.026   1.014 0.073 *** 0.011 0.065   
Smoke       -0.501 0.085 ***       
Constants 6.294 0.139 *** 12.546 0.375 *** 6.509 0.727 *** 
Observation 6383    6383    6383    
R Squared 0.371    0.006    0.370    
Test Results on Instruments       
Quality (F Test) 35.02 ***   
Validity (Sargan Test) exactly identified   
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic): 35.09 0.00   
Endogeneity test (years of schooling) 0.09 0.7627   
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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Table IX.2: IV with Smoking as Instrument, 2014 
Log of real hourly 
wage  
2014: All Individuals 
OLS: Wages IV: First Stage IV: Wage equation 
Coef. Std. Err. P>t Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t 
Years of schooling 0.099 0.004 ***    0.088 0.044 ** 
Experience  0.020 0.004 *** -0.147 0.011 *** 0.018 0.008 ** 
Experience squared 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 *** 
Sex (1=female) -0.268 0.022 *** -0.524 0.081 *** -0.269 0.022 *** 
Married and 
cohabitate 0.055 0.033 * 0.807 0.087 *** 0.063 0.048   
Other (Separated, 
divorced and 
widowed) 
0.109 0.059 * 0.843 0.160 *** 0.117 0.069 * 
Religion1: Islam 0.056 0.091   -1.234 0.243 *** 0.043 0.105   
Religion2: 
Christian/Protestant 0.250 0.123 ** 0.332 0.330  0.254 0.123 ** 
Religion3: Catholic 0.211 0.111 * -0.472 0.298  0.207 0.112 * 
Religion5: Buddhist 0.102 0.301   -0.090 0.810  0.100 0.300   
Ethnicity1: Jawa 0.129 0.036 *** 0.407 0.098 *** 0.134 0.041 *** 
Ethnicity2: Sunda 0.024 0.046   0.168 0.125  0.025 0.047   
Ethnicity3: Batak 0.021 0.076   0.956 0.204 *** 0.031 0.086   
Ethnicity4: Betawi -0.086 0.164   0.694 0.441  -0.079 0.167   
Ethnicity5: Minang 0.152 0.072 ** 0.770 0.193 *** 0.160 0.079 ** 
Ethnicity6: Tiong 
Hoa 0.366 0.167 ** 0.544 0.448   0.373 0.169 ** 
Status: fulltime (30 
hours a week or 
more) 
-0.461 0.029 *** -0.375 0.078 *** -0.465 0.033 *** 
Tenure 0.019 0.004 *** 0.115 0.012 *** 0.021 0.007 *** 
Tenure squared 0.000 0.000   -0.001 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000   
Sector: private -0.288 0.034 *** -2.106 0.089 *** -0.310 0.099 *** 
Industry2: mining 
and quarrying 0.372 0.087 *** 0.776 0.233 *** 0.381 0.093 *** 
Industry3: 
manufacturing 0.041 0.045   0.217 0.122 * 0.044 0.047   
Industry4: 
electricity, gas and 
water 
0.139 0.112   1.291 0.301 *** 0.152 0.125   
Industry5: 
construction 0.306 0.062 *** 0.295 0.168 * 0.309 0.064 *** 
Industry6: 
wholesale, retail, 
restaurants and 
hotels 
-0.037 0.046   0.886 0.123 *** -0.027 0.061   
Industry7: 
transportation, 
storage, and 
communications 
0.102 0.072   1.304 0.193 *** 0.115 0.092   
Industr8: Finance, 
insurance, real estate 
and business 
services 
0.229 0.057 *** 2.144 0.150 *** 0.252 0.111 ** 
Industry9: Social 
services -0.137 0.044 *** 2.238 0.115 *** -0.113 0.109   
Firm size2: 5-19 
people 0.064 0.029 ** 0.894 0.078 *** 0.074 0.049   
Firm size3: 20-99 
people 0.240 0.031 *** 1.269 0.083 *** 0.253 0.065 *** 
Firm size4: >= 100 
people 0.514 0.035 *** 1.438 0.092 *** 0.529 0.073 *** 
Province 1: Aceh  1.318 0.917   2.043 2.465  1.337 0.918   
Province 2: 
Sumatera Utara  0.384 0.072 *** -0.773 0.192 *** 0.376 0.080 *** 
Province 3: 
Sumatera Barat  0.355 0.090 *** -0.378 0.242  0.351 0.092 *** 
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Province 4: Riau  0.722 0.130 *** -0.318 0.351  0.719 0.131 *** 
Province 5: Jambi  0.545 0.268 ** -0.783 0.720  0.537 0.269 ** 
Province 6: 
Sumatera Selatan  0.349 0.068 *** 0.014 0.183  0.350 0.068 *** 
Province 7: 
Lampung  0.149 0.077 * -0.698 0.206 *** 0.142 0.082 * 
Province 8: 
Kepulauan Bangka 
Belitung  
0.563 0.110 *** 0.530 0.297 * 0.568 0.113 *** 
Province 9: 
Kepulauan Riau  0.888 0.184 *** -0.785 0.494  0.880 0.186 *** 
Province 10: DKI 
Jakarta  0.670 0.058 *** -0.511 0.156 *** 0.665 0.062 *** 
Province 11: Jawa 
Barat  0.409 0.061 *** -0.539 0.165 *** 0.404 0.065 *** 
Province 12: Jawa 
Tengah  0.091 0.061   -0.805 0.164 *** 0.083 0.070   
Province 13: D I 
Yogyakarta  0.038 0.069   0.100 0.185  0.039 0.069   
Province 14: Jawa 
Timur  0.116 0.058 ** -0.588 0.156 *** 0.110 0.063 * 
Province 15: Banten  0.611 0.068 *** -1.102 0.183 *** 0.600 0.083 *** 
Province 16: Bali  0.592 0.094 *** -1.303 0.253 *** 0.579 0.109 *** 
Province 18: 
Kalimantan Barat  1.350 0.460 *** -2.168 1.236 * 1.327 0.468 *** 
Province 19: 
Kalimantan Tengah  1.267 0.242 *** -0.734 0.651  1.260 0.243 *** 
Province 20: 
Kalimantan Selatan  0.402 0.084 *** -0.570 0.225 ** 0.396 0.087 *** 
Province 21: 
Kalimantan Timur  0.911 0.143 *** -0.394 0.384  0.907 0.143 *** 
Province 22: 
Sulawesi Selatan  0.319 0.065 *** -0.432 0.175 ** 0.315 0.068 *** 
Province 23: 
Sulawesi Tenggara  -0.011 0.277   -0.968 0.746  -0.020 0.279   
Urban 0.137 0.024 *** 0.783 0.065 *** 0.145 0.042 *** 
Smoke       -0.662 0.078 ***       
Constant 7.857 0.163 *** 18.149 0.396 *** 8.043 0.790 *** 
Observation 8086    8086   8086    
The R-squared 
statistic 0.30    0.01   0.30    
Test Results on 
Instruments                   
Quality            
F test        71.41 ***   
Validity (Sargan 
Test)        71.26 ***   
Underidentification 
test (Anderson 
canon. corr. LM 
statistic): 
       exactly identified    
Endogeneity test 
(years of schooling)             0.06 0.8104   
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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Appendix X: Mincer Wage Equation: Two-Step Heckman by Gender 
Table X.1: Mincer Wage Equation: Two-Step Heckman by Gender, 2000 
2000: Gender 
Female Male 
Probit OLS Probit OLS 
Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>z Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>z Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>t 
HH Size -0.043  0.014  ***     -0.013  0.010        
Employment (omitted)     (omitted)     
Years of Schooling 0.142  0.015  *** 0.140  0.008  *** 0.097  0.011  *** 0.106  0.005  *** 
Experience  0.062  0.017  *** 0.020  0.008  ** 0.050  0.013  *** 0.042  0.006  *** 
Experience squared -0.001  0.000  *** -0.000  0.000    -0.001  0.000  *** -0.001  0.000  *** 
Sex (1=female) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
Married and cohabitate -0.092  0.128    0.091  0.055  * -0.023  0.096    0.121  0.042  *** 
Other (Separated, divorced and widowed) 0.047  0.174    0.020  0.083    -0.092  0.225    0.048  0.120    
Religion1: Islam -0.161  0.344    0.157  0.173    0.050  0.222    -0.096  0.133    
Religion2: Christian/Protestant -0.139  0.389    0.359  0.193  * 0.240  0.274    -0.085  0.153    
Religion3: Catholic -0.825  0.426  * 0.249  0.213    -0.049  0.292    -0.071  0.157    
Religion5: Buddhist 0.555  0.636    -0.103  0.346    0.776  0.447  * -0.247  0.240    
Ethnicity1: Jawa -0.124  0.164    -0.069  0.085    0.092  0.115    -0.044  0.056    
Ethnicity2: Sunda 0.264  0.217    0.013  0.102    0.207  0.153    -0.134  0.069  * 
Ethnicity3: Batak -0.177  0.314    -0.108  0.164    -0.293  0.236    0.134  0.113    
Ethnicity4: Betawi 0.223  0.275    0.142  0.114    -0.093  0.193    -0.093  0.081    
Ethnicity5: Minang 0.083  0.345    0.052  0.160    -0.170  0.239    0.005  0.113    
Ethnicity6: Tiong Hoa -1.060  0.455  ** 0.063  0.266    -1.797  0.353  *** 0.227  0.194    
Status: fulltime (30 hours a week or more) 0.572  0.087  *** -0.575  0.050  *** 0.340  0.073  *** -0.744  0.042  *** 
Tenure 0.079  0.015  *** 0.028  0.008  *** 0.070  0.011  *** 0.011  0.006  ** 
Tenure squared -0.002  0.001  *** -0.000  0.000    -0.002  0.000  *** -0.000  0.000    
Sector: private 3.734  0.109  *** -0.410  0.104  *** 3.728  0.080  *** -0.363  0.070  *** 
Industry2: mining and quarrying -0.547  0.928    1.204  0.499  ** 0.407  0.323    0.301  0.124  ** 
Industry3: manufacturing 0.201  0.139    0.155  0.071  ** 0.275  0.108  ** 0.135  0.048  *** 
Industry4: electricity, gas and water (omitted) (omitted) 1.185  0.328  *** 0.110  0.154    
Industry5: construction 0.671  0.429    0.063  0.166    0.193  0.118    0.301  0.053  *** 
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and 
hotels -0.087  0.131    0.139  0.077  * -0.052  0.102    0.064  0.057    
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Industry7: transportation, storage, and 
communications 0.887  0.439  ** -0.163  0.222    0.379  0.111  *** 0.156  0.060  *** 
Industry8: Finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services 0.661  0.489    0.528  0.157  *** 2.229  0.517  *** 0.328  0.115  *** 
Industry9: Social services 1.195  0.123  *** 0.138  0.075  * 1.327  0.085  *** 0.121  0.048  ** 
Firm size2: 5-19 people 1.045  0.094  *** 0.345  0.053  *** 0.960  0.068  *** 0.079  0.034  ** 
Firm size3: 20-99 people 1.387  0.142  *** 0.431  0.060  *** 1.485  0.100  *** 0.108  0.041  *** 
Firm size4: >= 100 people 1.554  0.255  *** 0.590  0.072  *** 1.543  0.172  *** 0.184  0.055  *** 
Province1: Aceh  (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
Province2: Sumatera Utara 0.776  5.356    0.119  0.866    -3.722  260.959    -0.727  0.502    
Province3: Sumatera Barat 0.581  5.366    -0.295  0.882    -3.604  260.959    -0.705  0.509    
Province4: Riau  -0.027  5.436    0.796  0.908    -2.811  260.959    -0.087  0.522    
Province5: Sumatera Selatan  0.355  5.359    -0.281  0.877    -3.985  260.959    -0.799  0.499    
Province6: Bengkulu  (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
Province7: Lampung  0.507  5.360    -0.399  0.880    -3.864  260.959    -0.840  0.503  * 
Province8: DKI Jakarta  0.377  5.357    0.230  0.870    -3.915  260.959    -0.541  0.499    
Province9: Jawa Barat  0.453  5.357    0.012  0.871    -3.752  260.959    -0.616  0.499    
Province10: Jawa Tengah  0.727  5.357    -0.291  0.871    -3.818  260.959    -0.860  0.499  * 
Province11: D I Yogyakarta  0.782  5.358    -0.401  0.872    -3.898  260.959    -0.990  0.501  ** 
Province12: Jawa Timur  0.763  5.357    -0.174  0.871    -3.869  260.959    -0.887  0.498  * 
Province13: Bali  0.702  5.365    0.070  0.884    -3.414  260.959    -1.066  0.510  ** 
Province15: Kalimantan Tengah  0.820  5.358    -0.512  0.876    -3.459  260.959    -1.022  0.498  ** 
Province16: Kalimantan Selatan  (omitted) (omitted) -1.730  260.962    -0.462  0.625    
Province17: Kalimantan Timur  1.295  5.358    0.142  0.877    -3.258  260.959    -0.806  0.498    
Province18: Sulawesi Selatan  0.381  5.357    -0.302  0.877    -3.437  260.959    -1.112  0.499  ** 
Province19: Sulawesi Tenggara  (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
Urban 0.017  0.092    -0.050  0.047    0.022  0.065    0.020  0.031    
IMR     0.046  0.102         -0.180  0.070  *** 
Constants -5.099  5.369    5.952  0.912  *** -0.511  260.959    7.769  0.527  *** 
Number of jobs (Uncensored jobs) 5438    2162    7861    4216    
The R-squared statistic    0.47       0.32    
LR chi2(47) 6038.04 ***         8444.78 ***         
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** significance level at 1 per cent.  
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Table X.2: Mincer Wage Equation: Two-Step Heckman by Gender, 2014 
2014: Gender 
Female Male 
Probit OLS Probit OLS 
Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>t Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>t 
HH Size -0.009  0.006        -0.025  0.006  ***      
Employment 0.000  (omitted)      0.000  (omitted)      
Years of Schooling 0.000  0.008   0.103  0.007  *** 0.012  0.008   0.091  0.005  *** 
Experience  0.021  0.008  *** 0.024  0.007  *** 0.026  0.008  *** 0.019  0.005  *** 
Experience squared -0.000  0.000  ** -0.000  0.000  ** -0.000  0.000  ** -0.000  0.000  ** 
Married and cohabitate -0.406  0.079  *** -0.114  0.056  ** 0.290  0.061  *** 0.098  0.042  ** 
Other (Separated, divorced and widowed) 0.042  0.108   0.020  0.083    0.132  0.132   0.152  0.092  * 
Religion1: Islam -0.017  0.168   0.108  0.147    -0.135  0.184   0.028  0.114    
Religion2: Christian/Protestant 0.172  0.256   0.368  0.196  * -0.296  0.259   0.198  0.156    
Religion3: Catholic -0.003  0.208   0.393  0.179  ** -0.371  0.219  * 0.102  0.141    
Religion5: Buddhist -0.019  0.804   0.119  0.542    0.433  0.628   0.037  0.358    
Ethnicity1: Jawa -0.032  0.076   0.160  0.063  ** 0.106  0.069   0.107  0.045  ** 
Ethnicity2: Sunda -0.055  0.103    0.030  0.081    0.243  0.096  ** 0.008  0.056    
Ethnicity3: Batak -0.497  0.147  *** -0.044  0.128    -0.082  0.139   0.020  0.094    
Ethnicity4: Betawi 0.149  0.427   -0.243  0.264    0.015  0.306   -0.000  0.213    
Ethnicity5: Minang 0.025  0.134    0.158  0.121    -0.183  0.133    0.112  0.089    
Ethnicity6: Tiong Hoa -0.591  0.338  * 0.281  0.298    -0.358  0.310   0.372  0.200  * 
Status: fulltime (30 hours a week or more) 0.271  0.044  *** -0.320  0.045  *** 0.401  0.049  *** -0.699  0.045  *** 
Tenure -0.047  0.007  *** 0.020  0.008  *** -0.006  0.007   0.015  0.005  *** 
Tenure squared 0.001  0.000  *** 0.000  0.000    -0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000    
Sector: private 0.571  0.021  *** -0.274  0.059  *** 1.101  0.022  *** -0.394  0.058  *** 
Industry2: mining and quarrying 0.196  0.487   0.599  0.369    0.586  0.157  *** 0.310  0.095  *** 
Industry3: manufacturing 1.011  0.080  *** -0.020  0.110    0.843  0.076  *** 0.007  0.068    
Industry4: electricity, gas and water 0.751  0.531   -0.137  0.488    0.872  0.222  *** 0.101  0.121    
Industry5: construction 1.442  0.309  *** 0.653  0.241  *** 0.417  0.076  *** 0.218  0.071  *** 
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and hotels 0.466  0.066  *** -0.139  0.096    0.348  0.064  *** -0.007  0.060    
Industry7: transportation, storage, and 
communications 0.831  0.319  *** 0.328  0.240    0.650  0.105  *** 0.023  0.084    
Industry8: Finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services 1.321  0.160  *** 0.336  0.139  ** 1.026  0.120  *** 0.116  0.079    
Industry9: Social services 1.882  0.070  *** -0.020  0.138    1.216  0.064  *** -0.249  0.077  *** 
Firm size2: 5-19 people 1.406  0.051  *** 0.226  0.096  ** 0.956  0.048  *** -0.094  0.063    
Firm size3: 20-99 people 1.899  0.079  *** 0.526  0.112  *** 1.499  0.067  *** -0.025  0.077    
Firm size4: >= 100 people 2.349  0.116  *** 0.902  0.125  *** 1.443  0.082  *** 0.224  0.077  *** 
Province 1: Aceh (11) 0.000  (omitted) 0.000  (omitted)   0.402  4.196   1.334  0.885    
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Province 2: Sumatera Utara (12) 0.214  0.134   0.440  0.122  *** 0.136  0.126   0.392  0.087  *** 
Province 3: Sumatera Barat (13) 0.346  0.169  ** 0.624  0.152  *** 0.459  0.165  *** 0.221  0.113  ** 
Province 4: Riau (14) -0.000  0.299   0.904  0.280  *** 1.029  0.251  *** 0.588  0.150  *** 
Province 5: Jambi (15) -0.191  0.628   0.668  0.553    0.014  0.393   0.400  0.300    
Province 6: Sumatera Selatan (16) 0.170  0.124   0.491  0.123  *** 0.379  0.112  *** 0.248  0.081  *** 
Province 7: Lampung (18) 0.251  0.130  * 0.105  0.138    0.058  0.125   0.171  0.091  * 
Province 8: Kepulauan Bangka Belitung (19) 0.573  0.281  ** 0.746  0.186  *** -0.032  0.203   0.507  0.135  *** 
Province 9: Kepulauan Riau (21) 0.167  0.542   1.115  0.400  *** 0.490  0.447   0.808  0.203  *** 
Province 10: DKI Jakarta (31) 0.493  0.126  *** 0.829  0.103  *** 0.022  0.113   0.615  0.070  *** 
Province 11: Jawa Barat (32) 0.246  0.123  ** 0.531  0.105  *** -0.045  0.115   0.369  0.074  *** 
Province 12: Jawa Tengah (33) 0.351  0.118  *** 0.124  0.103    -0.025  0.111   0.113  0.075    
Province 13: D I Yogyakarta (34) 0.132  0.138   0.158  0.115    0.011  0.136   -0.013  0.085    
Province 14: Jawa Timur (35) 0.107  0.110   0.166  0.099  * -0.243  0.102  ** 0.155  0.072  ** 
Province 15: Banten (36) 0.166  0.156   0.891  0.113  *** -0.045  0.140   0.454  0.084  *** 
Province 16: Bali (51) 0.339  0.179  * 0.872  0.155  *** 0.142  0.193   0.433  0.118  *** 
Province 19: Kalimantan Tengah (62) -0.223  0.510   0.865  0.435  ** 0.103  0.497   1.419  0.286  *** 
Province 20: Kalimantan Selatan (63) 0.231  0.145   0.352  0.140  ** 0.488  0.153  *** 0.413  0.105  *** 
Province 21: Kalimantan Timur (64) 0.655  0.358  * 0.976  0.267  *** 0.216  0.318   0.927  0.167  *** 
Province 22: Sulawesi Selatan (73) 0.050  0.120   0.192  0.107  * -0.036  0.117   0.459  0.081  *** 
Province 23: Sulawesi Tenggara (74) 0.007  0.446   -0.265  0.548    0.363  0.444   0.256  0.298    
Urban 0.285  0.049  *** 0.205  0.042  *** 0.273  0.045  *** 0.084  0.032  *** 
Mills     0.321  0.126  **     -0.465  0.134  *** 
Constants -3.184  0.241  *** 6.944  0.370  *** -4.501  0.245  *** 8.925  0.344  *** 
Number of obs (Uncensored obs) 8170     3171      10623     4944     
The R-squared statistic     0.338         0.287    
LR chi2(50) 6396.32 ***         9279.12 ***         
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** significance level at 1 per cent.  
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Appendix XI: Determinants of Education Mismatch in Selected Previous Empirical Studies  
 
Table XI.1: Determinants of Education Mismatch        
No Author (s) Countries Study  Data Education level Method Personal characteristics   Household Characteristics 
       Sex Marital 
Status 
Ethnicit
y 
Country 
of Birth 
Year 
(cohort) 
Young 
Children 
Parent 
education 
1 Battu and 
Sloane (2002) 
UK Determinants the Fourth 
National Survey of 
Ethnic Minorities 
(FNSEM) 
conducted in 
1993/94 
Various education 
levels 
Multinomia
l logit 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔    
2 Battu and 
Zakariya 
(2015) 
Malaysia Determinants 
and wage 
the 2007 
Productivity 
Investment 
Climate Survey 
Various education 
levels 
Multinomia
l logit 
✔ ✔    ✔  
3 Boll et al 
(2016) 
EU Determinants the European 
Labour Force 
Survey (EU-LFS 
2013) 
High school and 
university 
Probit ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔  
4 Caroleo and 
Pastore (2013) 
Italy Determinants 
and wage 
Alma Laurea 
university 
graduates, 2005 
University Logit ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔  
5 Clark et al 
(2012) 
US Determinants 
and dynamic 
the National Lon- 
gitudinal Survey of 
Youth 1979 
(NLSY79) and 
CPS 
Various education 
levels 
Probit ✔  ✔ ✔   ✔ 
6 Chevalier and 
Lindley (2007) 
UK Determinants 
and wage 
UN Higher 
Education 
Institutions in 
1995, primary 
survey 
University Multinomia
l logit 
✔  ✔     
7 Flisi et al 
(2014) 
EU Determinants 
and wage 
PIAAC data Various education 
levels 
Multinomia
l logit 
✔       
8 Green et all 
(1999) 
UK Determinants 
and wage 
the National Child 
Development 
Study 
Various education 
levels 
Probit ✔    ✔   
9 Linsley (2005) Australia Determinants the Negotiating the 
Life Course 
survey, 1997 
Various education 
levels 
Probit  ✔  ✔  ✔  
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10 Linsley (2005) Swiss Determinants 
and wage 
the Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office’s 
(BFS) graduate 
survey, 2004-2011 
University Multinomia
l logit 
✔      ✔ 
11 McGuinness 
(2006) 
Northern 
Ireland 
Determinants 
and wage 
Northern Ireland 
University 
graduates collected 
in 1999 
University Cohort  ✔      
12 McGuinness et 
al (2017) 
EU Trends, 
convergence 
and drivers 
the European 
Union Labour 
Force Study (EU-
LFS) for the period 
Q1 1998 up to Q4 
2012 
Various education 
levels 
Logit with 
Mundlak 
Correction 
✔       
13 Meroni 
and Vera-
Toscano 
(2017) 
EU Determinant 
and 
persistence 
the 2005 REFLEX 
data (research into 
employment and 
professional 
flexibility) 
Various education 
levels 
 ✔      ✔ 
14 Morano (2014) Italy Determinants the National 
Labour Force 
Survey during the 
2006-2011 
Various education 
levels 
Probit ✔ ✔      
15 Kiker et al 
(1997) 
Portugal Determinants and wage Years of 
education 
Multinomia
l logit 
✔       
16 Kiersztyn 
(2013) 
Poland Determinants and wage High school and 
university 
Logit ✔    ✔   
17 Leuven 
and Oosterbee
k (2011) 
 Literature review Probit ✔  ✔     
18 Raita (2005) Dutch Determinants 
and wage 
NLSY 1979-2000 University Probit  ✔     ✔  
19 Silles and 
Dolton (2002) 
UK Determinants Newcastle alumni 
survey, 1998 
University Probit ✔ ✔    ✔  
20 Verhaest and 
Omey (2010) 
Belgium Determinants 
and wage 
SONAR database, 
1999 
Various education 
levels 
Probit ✔ ✔ ✔     
21 Yin (2016) China Determinants 
and wage 
CHNS data from 
1989 to 2009 
Various education 
levels 
Probit ✔    ✔   
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(cont’d) 
No Author (s) A level 
score or 
other 
score 
Education 
Level 
Foreign 
Qualification 
University 
Performance/degree 
Education 
required 
Subject Study 
Grant  
Skills/Ability Age Agesq 
1 Battu and Sloane (2002) ✔     ✔ ✔ ✔ 
2 Battu and Zakariya (2015) ✔         
3 Boll et al (2016)     ✔   ✔  
4 Caroleo and Pastore (2013) ✔  ✔  ✔     
5 Clark et al (2012) ✔        ✔  
6 Chevalier and Lindley (2007) ✔ ✔    ✔  ✔ ✔  
7 Filsi et al (2014) ✔      ✔ ✔  
8 Green et all (1999)   ✔    ✔  
9 Linsley (2005) ✔       ✔  
10 Diem (2015)  ✔ ✔     ✔  
11 McGuinness (2006) ✔    ✔ ✔     
12 McGuinness et al (2017)         
13 Meroni and Vera-Toscano (2017) ✔    ✔   ✔  
14 Morano (2014)     ✔   ✔  
15 Kiker et al (1997)          
16 Kiersztyn (2013) ✔         
17 Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011)     ✔ ✔  
18 Raita (2005) ✔         
19 Silles and Dolton (2002) ✔  ✔  ✔   ✔  
20 Verhaest and Omey (2010)  ✔   ✔ ✔   
21 Yin (2016) ✔         
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(cont’d) 
No Author (s) Experience Experiecesq Tenure Tenuresq Unemployment 
Experience 
Other 
experience 
Occupation Status Sector Industry 
1 Battu and Sloane (2002)     ✔  ✔  
2 Battu and Zakariya (2015) ✔          
3 Boll et al (2016)  ✔ ✔    ✔   
4 Caroleo and Pastore (2013)         
5 Clark et al (2012) ✔  ✔  ✔   ✔   
6 Chevalier and Lindley (2007)        
7 Filsi et al (2014)          
8 Green et all (1999)        ✔ 
9 Linsley (2005)  ✔     ✔   
10 Diem (2015)          
11 McGuinness (2006) ✔ ✔       ✔  
12 McGuinness et al (2017)      ✔   
13 Meroni and Vera-Toscano (2017)        
14 Morano (2014)      ✔ ✔  ✔ 
15 Kiker et al (1997) ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔       
16 Kiersztyn (2013)  ✔    ✔    
17 Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011)        
18 Raita (2005) ✔      ✔ ✔  ✔ 
19 Silles and Dolton (2002) ✔ ✔   ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  
20 Verhaest and Omey (2010)    ✔     
21 Yin (2016) ✔        ✔  
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(cont’d) 
No Author (s) Firm 
Size 
Immigration Other Residence Regional Unemployment 
1 Battu and Sloane (2002) ✔  Trade Union  
2 Battu and Zakariya (2015) Training   
3 Boll et al (2016) ✔  marginal employment, second job, participation in LL 
4 Caroleo and Pastore (2013) ✔    
5 Clark et al (2012)  Number of job ✔ ✔ 
6 Chevalier and Lindley (2007)   
7 Filsi et al (2014)     
8 Green et all (1999)    
9 Linsley (2005)     
10 Diem (2015)  Working before/while studying 
11 McGuinness (2006) Work location  
12 McGuinness et al (2017) ✔   ✔ 
13 Meroni and Vera-Toscano (2017) ✔  ✔  
14 Morano (2014)     
15 Kiker et al (1997)     
16 Kiersztyn (2013)    ✔ 
17 Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011)   
18 Raita (2005) ✔  Number of job   
19 Silles and Dolton (2002) ✔ ✔    
20 Verhaest and Omey (2010)   ✔ 
21 Yin (2016) ✔   ✔  
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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Table XI.2: Summary of Determinants of Education Mismatch        
No Variable Number of studies 
  Personal characteristic variables    
1 Sex 19 out of 21 studies in Table XI.1 
2 Marital status  50 per cent of the studies in Table XI.1 
3 Ethnicity 30 per cent of the studies in Table XI.1 
4 Age and the square of age More than 50 per cent of the studies in Table XI.1 
  Household characteristics   
5 The presence of young children Around 30 per cent of studies in Table XI.1 
  Work related and firm size   
6 Tenure and tenure squared  5 out of 21 studies in Table XI.1 
7 Working status Around 30 per cent of the studies in Table XI.1 
8 Sector (private/public) 4 studies in Table XI.1 
9 Industries 3 studies in Table XI.1 
10 Firm size  5 out of 21 studies in Table XI.1 
  Region or area   
11 Capital province  Harris Todaro model  
12 Urban 3 studies in Table XI.1 
Source: Author’s compilation, based on Table XI.1. 
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Appendix XII: Sample Distribution based on Occupation, Category and Sub-
category, 2000 and 2014 
 
Table XII.1: Sample Distribution Based on Occupation Category, 2000 and 2014 
Occupation (1 digit) 
2000 2014 
N mean mode SD min max N mean mode SD min max 
1 Professional/Technical 151 12.29 12 2.65 6 18 328 13.85 12 2.46 6 22 
2 The other professionals  568 13.86 12 2.42 6 18 1001 15.39 16 2 6 22 
3 Administrative/managerial  25 14.08 12 2.16 12 18 57 13.61 16 3.1 6 18 
4 Clerical and related workers 575 12.38 12 2.61 6 18 1072 12.91 12 2.78 6 18 
5 Sales workers 575 10.38 12 3.09 6 18 922 11.72 12 3 6 22 
6 Services workers 1040 9.31 6 3.05 6 16 1516 10.99 12 3.1 6 22 
7 Agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry workers, fisherman and hunters 970 7.33 6 2.32 6 18 715 9.08 6 3.16 6 18 
8 Craft and related trade workers 742 9.03 6 3 6 16 949 10.09 12 2.98 6 22 
9 Plant and machine operators and assemblers 351 9.28 12 2.76 6 16 514 10.72 12 2.63 6 18 
1
0 Elementary occupation 1331 8.56 6 2.84 6 16 1394 10.03 12 3.12 6 22 
1
1 Armed forces occupation 57 11.18 12 2.21 6 18 21 13.29 12 1.87 12 16 
  Number of observations 6385           8489           
Source: The author’s calculation. 
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Table XII.2: Sample Distribution Based on Occupation Sub-Category, 2000 and 2014 
Code Occupation 2000 2014 
    N Mean Mode SD Min Max N Mean Mode SD Min Max 
  Professional/Technical                         
1 Physical scientists and related technicians 2 11 12 7.07 6 16 2 9 12 4.24 6 12 
2 Architects, engineers, technologists 8 12.13 12 3.72 6 18 11 14.55 12 2.88 9 18 
3 Surveyors, draftsmen, engineering assistants 40 11.5 12 2.48 6 16 59 12.49 12 2.6 6 18 
4 Aircraft and ship's officer 3 15.67 12 0.58 15 16             
5 Life scientists and related technicians 2 12 12 0 12 12 3 14 12 1.73 12 15 
6 Physicians, medical assistants, dentists, dental assistants, pharmacists, nutritionists 16 12.75 12 2.72 6 16 33 13.85 12 2.27 9 16 
7 Nurses, midwives, x-ray technicians, traditional medicine practitioners 69 12.13 12 2.31 6 16 216 14.21 12 2.27 6 22 
8 Statisticians, mathematicians, system analysts and related   technicians 11 15 12 2.05 12 18 4 15.25 12 2.5 12 18 
                                
  The other professionals                          
11 Accountants and auditors 10 14.8 12 1.93 12 16 8 15.38 16 2.33 12 18 
12 Jurists 7 14.86 12 1.95 12 16 15 13.8 16 2.57 9 18 
13 Teacher 451 14.25 12 2.1 6 18 878 15.68 16 1.54 6 22 
14 Workers in religion 26 12.62 12 2.55 6 16 41 13.44 16 3.71 6 18 
15 Authors, critics, journalists, editors and related writers 7 11.86 12 3.58 6 16 6 13.83 16 2.04 12 16 
16 Sculptors, painters, photographers and related creative artists 12 11.42 12 3.15 6 16 19 11.05 16 3.84 6 16 
17 Composers, performing artists 29 11.21 12 3 6 16 13 12 16 2.12 9 15 
18 Athletes, sportsmen and related workers 5 13.6 12 3.05 9 16 6 14 16 2.19 12 16 
19 Professional and technical workers not elsewhere classified assigned 21 12.19 12 2.6 6 16 15 14.87 16 2.23 12 18 
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  Administrative/managerial                          
20 Legislative officials and government administrators 6 15.5 12 1.97 12 18 6 14.67 16 2.07 12 16 
21 Managers 17 13.82 12 2.1 12 18 42 13.5 16 3.33 6 18 
22 Managers             1 12 16   12 12 
29 Manager not elsewhere classified (mostly school principals) 2 12 12 0 12 12 8 13.63 16 2.72 9 16 
                            
  Clerical and related workers                         
30 Clerical supervisors 78 11.96 12 3.01 6 16 70 13.26 12 2.69 6 18 
31 Government executive of officials 126 12.66 12 2.56 6 16 199 14.09 12 2.75 6 18 
32 Stenographers, typists and card tape-punching machine operators 14 13.57 12 2.24 9 16 39 13.33 12 2.49 6 18 
33 Bookkeepers, cashiers, and related workers 122 12.51 12 2.47 6 18 305 12.87 12 2.52 6 18 
34 Computing machine operators 8 12.88 12 2.3 9 16 18 13.78 12 2.51 9 16 
35 Transport and communications supervisors 1 12 12   12 12             
36 Transport conductors 11 9.55 12 2.62 6 12 21 10.14 12 2.92 6 15 
37 Mail distributors and related workers 22 11.23 12 3.02 6 16 46 10.96 12 2.67 6 16 
38 Telephone and telegraph operators 33 11.91 12 2.01 6 16 20 11.6 12 2.11 6 16 
39 Clerical and related workers not elsewhere classified 160 12.59 12 2.49 6 16 354 12.62 12 2.77 6 18 
                            
  Sales workers                         
40 Managers (wholesale and retail trades) 1 15 12   15 15             
41 Working proprietors (wholesale and retail trades) 2 12 12 0 12 12 32 13.59 12 2.88 6 16 
42 Sales supervisors and buyers 6 11 12 2.45 6 12 39 12.44 12 3.43 6 22 
43 Technical salesman, commercial travellers, manufacturer's agents 30 13.07 12 2.39 9 16 56 12.88 12 2.12 6 16 
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44 Insurance, real estate, securities and business services salesman and auctioneers 69 13.51 12 2.32 6 18 147 13.97 12 2.11 9 18 
45 Salesmen, shop assistants and related workers 459 9.72 12 2.85 6 16 624 10.89 12 2.85 6 18 
49 Sales workers not elsewhere classified 8 9.75 12 3.49 6 15 24 13.08 12 2.87 6 16 
                            
  Services workers                         
50 Managers (catering and lodging services)             1 9 12   9 9 
51 Working proprietors (catering and lodging services) 167 9.84 6 2.98 6 16 266 11.48 12 2.7 6 16 
52 Housekeeping and related service supervisors             5 12 12 0 12 12 
53 Cooks, waiters, bartenders and related workers 43 8.44 6 2.72 6 15 179 10.03 12 3 6 16 
54 Maids and related housekeeping service workers NEC 451 8.58 6 3.03 6 16 424 10.47 12 3.72 6 22 
55 Building caretakers, char workers, cleaners and related workers 75 9.08 6 2.86 6 16 158 10.54 12 2.77 6 18 
56 Launderers, dry-cleaners and pressers 1 6 6   6 6 4 9 12 2.45 6 12 
57 Hairdressers, barbers, beauticians and related workers 15 9.27 6 3.03 6 16 25 10.24 12 2.82 6 16 
58 Protective service workers 121 10.23 6 2.56 6 16 216 11.46 12 2.3 6 16 
59 Service workers not elsewhere classified 167 10.44 6 3.08 6 16 238 12.04 12 2.85 6 18 
                            
  Agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry workers, fisherman and hunters                         
60 Plantation managers and supervisors 5 13.2 6 4.55 6 18 8 13.88 6 2.03 12 16 
61 Planters and farmers 1 6 6   6 6 3 8 6 3.46 6 12 
62 Agricultural and animal husbandry workers 654 6.98 6 2.06 6 16 462 8.8 6 3.05 6 18 
63 Forestry workers 175 8.31 6 2.72 6 16 99 9.25 6 2.79 6 18 
64 Fishermen, hunters, and related workers 135 7.53 6 2.26 6 15 142 9.66 6 3.53 6 18 
69 Agricultural worker not elsewhere classified             1 6 6   6 6 
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  Craft and related trade workers                         
70 Production supervisors and general foremen 77 11.6 6 2.52 6 16 100 11.9 12 2.78 6 18 
71 Miners, quarrymen, well drillers and related workers 42 8.6 6 2.84 6 16 36 10.22 12 3.83 6 18 
72 Metal processers 13 8.77 6 2.86 6 12 17 10.82 12 2.72 6 16 
73 Wood preparation workers and paper makers 22 7.64 6 2.57 6 12 47 9.21 12 2.87 6 16 
74 Chemical processers and related workers 43 8.95 6 3.13 6 16 65 9.94 12 2.88 6 18 
75 Spinners, weavers, knitters, dyers, and related workers 115 8.57 6 2.67 6 16 80 9.31 12 2.88 6 16 
76 Tanners, fellmongers and pelt dressers             6 10.67 12 2.88 9 16 
77 Food and beverage processors 232 9.15 6 3.17 6 16 328 10.43 12 3.1 6 22 
78 Tobacco preparers and tobacco product makers 9 7 6 2.12 6 12 13 7.62 12 2.33 6 12 
79 Tailors, dressmakers, sewer, upholsterers and related workers 189 8.5 6 2.68 6 16 257 9.44 12 2.49 6 16 
                            
  Plant and machine operators and assemblers                         
80 Shoemakers and leather good makers 34 8.82 12 2.66 6 15 59 10.34 12 2.54 6 16 
81 Cabinet makers and related wood makers 99 8.46 12 2.65 6 16 92 10.53 12 2.84 6 16 
82 Stone cutters and carvers 4 7.5 12 3 6 12 34 11.15 12 2.22 6 16 
83 Blacksmith, tool makers and machine tool operators 34 9.44 12 2.57 6 12 28 11.04 12 2.01 6 15 
84 
Machinery fitters, assemblers, repairers and 
precision  instrument makers (except 
electrical) 
78 10.09 12 2.58 6 16 164 11.12 12 2.31 6 16 
85 Electrical fitters and related electrical and electronics workers 42 11.05 12 2.54 6 16 60 10.78 12 2.73 6 18 
86 Broadcasting station, sound equipment operators and cinema projectionists 1 12 12   12 12 3 11.33 12 5.03 6 16 
87 Plumbers, welders, sheet-metal and structural metal preparers and erectors 32 8.53 12 2.65 6 12 42 9.55 12 2.91 6 16 
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88 Jewellery and precious metal workers 4 11.25 12 1.5 9 12 10 12.3 12 3.5 6 16 
89 Glass formers, potters and related workers 23 8.22 12 2.75 6 12 22 9.73 12 3.01 6 16 
                            
  Elementary occupation                         
90 Rubber and plastics product makers 27 8.67 6 2.09 6 12 37 9.46 12 2.87 6 16 
91 Paper board products makers 9 9.67 6 2.5 6 12 23 10.39 12 3 6 16 
92 Printers and related workers 73 9.71 6 3.03 6 16 101 10.41 12 2.76 6 16 
93 Painters 24 8.13 6 2.25 6 12 35 9.43 12 2.32 6 12 
94 Production and related workers not elsewhere classified 48 8.31 6 2.64 6 15 62 9.69 12 3.11 6 16 
95 Bricklayers, carpenters and other construction workers 519 7.99 6 2.69 6 16 425 9.49 12 3.06 6 18 
97 Material handling and related equipment, operators dockers and freight handlers 137 8.86 6 3.14 6 16 249 10.39 12 3.19 6 18 
98 Transport equipment operators 339 8.81 6 2.66 6 16 304 10.19 12 2.77 6 18 
99 Laborers not elsewhere classified 155 9.13 6 3.25 6 16 158 10.68 12 3.9 6 22 
                            
  Armed forces occupation                         
M1 Military and Police 18 10.83 12 2.33 6 15 9 12.78 12 1.56 12 16 
M2 Military and Police 22 11.77 12 2.33 6 18 12 13.67 12 2.06 12 16 
MM Military and Police 17 10.76 12 1.86 6 12             
    6385           8489           
Source: The author’s calculation.  
Note: N is number of observations, SD: standard deviations.  
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Table XII.3: The List of Occupations That Merge and The Same as The Original Sub-
Category 
The new occupation category, 
merging some occupation 
code/categories 
Occupation Code with 
remain same sub-category  
OX, comprises of occupation 
codes: 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 3,7 
1X, comprises of occupation 
codes: 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 
19 13 
2X, comprises of occupation 
codes: 20, 21, 22, 23, 29 None 
3X, comprises of occupation 
codes: 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 30, 31, 33, 39 
4X, comprises of occupation 
codes: 40, 41, 42, 43, 49 44, 45 
5X, comprises of occupation 
codes: 50, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57 51, 54, 55, 58, 59 
6X, comprises of occupation 
codes: 60, 61, 64, 69 62, 63 
7X, comprises of occupation 
codes: 72, 73, 76, 78 70, 71, 74, 75, 77, 79 
8X, comprises of occupation 
codes: 82, 83, 86, 88, 89 80, 81, 84, 85, 87 
9X, comprises of occupation 
codes: 90, 91, 93, 96 92, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99 
M, comprises of occupation 
codes: M1, M2, MM None 
Source: The author’s compilation. 
Note: the occupation name sub-category is indicated in previous table (Table XII.2) 
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Table XII.4: Mismatch Distribution (1 Digit Occupation Category) 
Year 
Match (Mean) Match (Mode) 
UE M OE Total UE M OE Total 
All Sample 
2000 
Number of obs. 1,127 4,347 911 6,385 519 3,424 2,442 6,385 
Proportion 17.65 68.08 14.27 100.00 8.13 53.63 38.25 100.00 
2014 
Number of obs. 1,399 5,724 1,366 8,489 1,537 5,407 1,545 8,489 
Proportion 16.48 67.43 16.09 100.00 18.11 63.69 18.20 100.00 
Male 
2000 
Number of obs. 551 2,978 675 4,204 370 2,097 1,737 4,204 
Proportion 13.11 70.84 16.06   8.8 49.88 41.32   
2014 
Number of obs. 795 3,494 866 5,155 899 3,315 941 5,155 
Proportion 15.42 67.78 16.8   17.44 64.31 18.25   
Female 
2000 
Number of obs. 576 1,369 236 2,181 149 1,327 705 2,181 
Proportion 26.41 62.77 10.82   6.83 60.84 32.32   
2014 
Number of obs. 604 2,230 500 3,334 638 2,092 604 3,334 
Proportion 18.12 66.89 15   19.14 62.75 18.12   
Public 
2000 
Number of obs. 78 713 215 1,006 59 392 555 1,006 
Proportion 7.75 70.87 21.37   5.86 38.97 55.17   
2014 
Number of obs. 67 882 456 1,405 73 829 503 1,405 
Proportion 4.77 62.78 32.46   5.2 59 35.8   
Private 
2000 
Number of obs. 1,049 3,634 696 5,379 460 3,032 1,887 5,379 
Proportion 19.5 67.56 12.94   8.55 56.37 35.08   
2014 
Number of obs. 1,332 4,842 910 7,084 1,464 4,578 1,042 7,084 
Proportion 18.8 68.35 12.85   20.67 64.62 14.71   
Source: The author’s calculation.  
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Appendix XIII: Sample Distributions: Age, Years of Schooling and Sex 
 
Figure XIII.1: Age and Overeducation, 2000  
 
 
Source: The author’s calculation.  
 
 
Figure XIII.2: Age and Overeducation, 2014 
 
 
Source: The author’s calculation.  
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Figure XIII.3: Years of Schooling and Sex 
 
Years of 
schooling 
Sex 
2000 2014 
Male Female Total Male Female Total 
0-6 1,485 871 2,356 878 579 1,457 
  35.32 39.94 36.9 17.03 17.37 17.16 
7-9 851 328 1,179 880 524 1,404 
  20.24 15.04 18.47 17.07 15.72 16.54 
10-12 1,394 618 2,012 2,269 1,079 3,348 
  33.16 28.34 31.51 44.02 32.36 39.44 
13-15 186 194 380 224 275 499 
  4.42 8.9 5.95 4.35 8.25 5.88 
13-16 275 169 444 820 807 1,627 
  6.54 7.75 6.95 15.91 24.21 19.17 
17-18 13 1 14 81 67 148 
  0.31 0.05 0.22 1.57 2.01 1.74 
19-22       3 3 6 
        0.06 0.09 0.07 
Total 4,204 2,181 6,385 5,155 3,334 8,489 
  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: The author’s calculation.  
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Appendix XIV: T-Test of Mismatch (Mode) 
 
Figure XIV.1: T-Test of Mismatch  
Mismatch 
(Mode) 
Mean Diff  T-Statistic 
Degree of 
Freedom P-value 
2000 2014         
Male             
UE 0.13 0.22 0.08 10.63 9357 *** 
M 0.55 0.53 -0.02 -2.05 9357 ** 
OE 0.32 0.26 -0.06 -6.76 9357 *** 
Female             
UE 0.14 0.24 0.10 9.25 5513 *** 
M 0.64 0.56 -0.08 -6.00 5513 *** 
OE 0.22 0.20 -0.02 -1.82 5513 * 
Public             
UE 0.16 0.11 -0.05 -3.41 2409 *** 
M 0.55 0.57 0.02 1.07 2409   
OE 0.29 0.32 0.02 1.31 2409   
Private             
UE 0.13 0.25 0.12 16.57 12461 *** 
M 0.58 0.53 -0.05 -5.79 12461 *** 
OE 0.28 0.22 -0.07 -8.59 12461 *** 
Source: The author’s calculation.  
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Appendix XV: Summary Statistics with Casual Workers, 2014 
 
Table XV.1: Summary Statistics of Sample with Casual Workers, 2014 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Match (Mode) 10594 2.03 0.68 1 3 
Sex (1=Female) 10594 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Marital Status 10594 1.83 0.48 1 3 
Ethnicity (1=Javanese) 10594 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Age 10594 33.71 9.78 16 55 
Age squared 10594 1232.30 694.08 256 3025 
Young children (0-5 years 
old) 10594 0.36 0.57 0 3 
Tenure 10594 6.39 7.56 0 50 
Tenure squared 10594 98.07 211.07 0 2500 
Status: part time 10594 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Sector: private 10594 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Industry 10594 5.94 2.88 1 10 
Firm Size 10594 1.57 0.77 1 3 
Urban 10594 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Capital 10594 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Source: The author’s calculation.  
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Appendix XVI: Sample Distribution and Summary Statistics of Education 
Mismatch by Gender and Sector  
 
Table XVI.1: Sample Distribution Based on Years of Deficit Schooling and Gender (in 
per cent)  
Years of 
Deficit 
Schooling 
Male Female 
2000 2007 2014 Total 2000 2007 2014 Total 
0 86.6 80.1 78.9 81.7 86.0 78.3 76.4 79.6 
3 7.2 8.6 10.1 8.7 7.3 8.9 9.9 8.9 
4 0.0 1.6 1.9 1.2 0.0 2.6 3.0 2.0 
6 6.1 9.1 8.4 7.9 6.7 9.4 10.1 8.9 
7 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.3 
9 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
10 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Total 4,204 3,953 5,155 13,312 2,181 2,347 3,334 7,862 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
 
Table XVI.2: Sample Distribution Based on Years of Surplus Schooling and Gender 
Years of 
Surplus 
Schooling 
Male Female 
2000 2007 2014 Total 2000 2007 2014 Total 
0 68.1 72.3 74.4 71.8 78.0 79.6 80.0 79.3 
2 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.3 1.1 0.6 
3 12.4 7.5 6.8 8.8 8.8 6.6 5.0 6.6 
4 3.4 6.4 7.1 5.7 3.7 5.1 6.4 5.2 
5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 7.6 4.9 4.4 5.4 
6 13.7 10.1 8.4 10.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
7 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 
9 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.6 2.2 1.7 1.5 
10 1.4 2.4 2.0 1.9 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 
12 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Total 4,204 3,953 5,155 13,312 2,181 2,347 3,334 7,862 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
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Table XVI.3: Summary Statistics of Main and Control Variables by Gender 
Variable Male Female 
Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Wage (log of hourly 
wages) 13,312 8.39 1.76 0 16.94 7,862 8.11 1.84 0 14.20 
Years of required 
schooling  13,312 10.11 3.33 6 16.00 7,862 10.96 3.54 6 16.00 
Years of surplus 
schooling (OE) 13,312 1.41 2.50 0 12.00 7,862 1.02 2.26 0 16.00 
Years of deficit 
schooling (UE) 13,312 0.82 1.87 0 10.00 7,862 0.93 1.96 0 10.00 
Potential Experience 13,312 16.36 10.07 0 43.00 7,862 14.37 10.36 0 43.00 
Experience squared 13,312 368.99 395.5 0 1849 7,862 314 380.9 0 1849 
Sex (1=female) 13,312 0.00 0.00 0 0 7,862 1.00 0.00 1 1 
Ethnicity 
(1=Javanese) 13,312 0.15 0.36 0 1 7,862 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Marital status: Single 13,312 0.25 0.43 0 1 7,862 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Marital status: 
Married and 
cohabitate 
13,312 0.74 0.44 0 1 7,862 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Marital status: Other 
(Separated, divorced 
and widowed) 
13,312 0.02 0.14 0 1 7,862 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Employment Status: 
full-time (30 hours a 
week or more) 
13,312 0.88 0.32 0 1 7,862 0.78 0.42 0 1 
Tenure 13,312 6.72 7.42 0 51.83 7,862 6.10 7.19 0 52.00 
Tenure squared 13,312 100.22 198.3 0 2686.7 7,862 88.84 192.8 0 2704.0 
Sector: private 13,312 0.84 0.37 0 1 7,862 0.81 0.39 0 1 
Industry1: agriculture 13,312 0.11 0.32 0 1 7,862 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Industry2: mining 
and quarrying 13,312 0.02 0.13 0 1 7,862 0.00 0.04 0 1 
Industry3: 
manufacturing 13,312 0.20 0.40 0 1 7,862 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Industry4: electricity, 
gas and water 13,312 0.01 0.11 0 1 7,862 0.00 0.04 0 1 
Industry5: 
construction 13,312 0.09 0.28 0 1 7,862 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Industry6: wholesale, 
retail, restaurants and 
hotels 
13,312 0.14 0.34 0 1 7,862 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Industry7: 
transportation, 
storage, and 
communications 
13,312 0.06 0.23 0 1 7,862 0.01 0.08 0 1 
Industry8: finance, 
insurance, real estate 
and business services 
13,312 0.04 0.20 0 1 7,862 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Industry9: social 
services 13,312 0.33 0.47 0 1 7,862 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Firm size1: 1-19 
people 13,312 0.60 0.49 0 1 7,862 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Firm size2: 20-99 
people 13,312 0.24 0.43 0 1 7,862 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Firm size3: >= 100 
people 13,312 0.16 0.36 0 1 7,862 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Urban 13,312 0.67 0.47 0 1 7,862 0.71 0.45 0 1 
Capital region 13,312 0.10 0.31 0 1 7,862 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
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Table XVI.4: RE Model with the Interaction Variables Between Sex and Education Mismatches   
Wage 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
Years of required schooling  0.097 0.008 *** 0.109 0.007 *** 0.109 0.007 *** 0.111 0.008 *** 
Years of surplus schooling (OE) 0.092 0.008 *** 0.094 0.009 *** 0.104 0.008 *** 0.103 0.008 *** 
Years of deficit schooling (UE) -0.076 0.009 *** -0.089 0.008 *** -0.072 0.010 *** -0.089 0.008 *** 
Experience 0.036 0.006 *** 0.034 0.006 *** 0.035 0.006 *** 0.034 0.006 *** 
Experience squared -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** 
Sex (1=Female) -0.634 0.108 *** -0.308 0.036 *** -0.238 0.036 *** -0.243 0.109 ** 
Married and cohabitate 0.177 0.043 *** 0.177 0.043 *** 0.176 0.043 *** 0.176 0.043 *** 
Other (Separated, divorced and widowed) 0.219 0.084 *** 0.207 0.084 ** 0.210 0.084 ** 0.204 0.084 ** 
Ethnicity (1=Javanese) -0.023 0.031   -0.022 0.031   -0.023 0.031   -0.023 0.031   
Status: full-time (30 hours a week or more) -0.390 0.040 *** -0.391 0.040 *** -0.392 0.040 *** -0.389 0.040 *** 
Tenure 0.073 0.006 *** 0.074 0.006 *** 0.074 0.006 *** 0.075 0.006 *** 
Tenure squared -0.002 0.000 *** -0.002 0.000 *** -0.002 0.000 *** -0.002 0.000 *** 
Sector: private -0.275 0.048 *** -0.282 0.048 *** -0.279 0.048 *** -0.282 0.048 *** 
Industry2: mining and quarrying 0.359 0.133 *** 0.361 0.133 *** 0.359 0.133 *** 0.360 0.133 *** 
Industry3: manufacturing 0.112 0.062 * 0.096 0.062   0.098 0.062   0.094 0.062   
Industry4: electricity, gas and water -0.329 0.162 ** -0.346 0.162 ** -0.344 0.162 ** -0.344 0.162 ** 
Industry5: construction 0.095 0.083   0.116 0.083   0.115 0.083   0.113 0.083   
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and hotels -0.026 0.065   -0.041 0.065   -0.041 0.065   -0.043 0.066   
Industry7: transportation, storage, and communications -0.177 0.095 * -0.182 0.095 * -0.188 0.095 ** -0.178 0.096 * 
Industry8: Finance, insurance, real estate and business services 0.380 0.087 *** 0.365 0.087 *** 0.368 0.087 *** 0.366 0.087 *** 
Industry9: Social services -0.034 0.061   -0.044 0.061   -0.046 0.061   -0.044 0.062   
Firm size2: 20-99 people 0.214 0.035 *** 0.212 0.035 *** 0.216 0.035 *** 0.213 0.035 *** 
Firm size3: >= 100 people 0.446 0.041 *** 0.438 0.041 *** 0.443 0.041 *** 0.438 0.041 *** 
Urban 0.204 0.034 *** 0.203 0.034 *** 0.203 0.034 *** 0.203 0.034 *** 
Capital region 0.233 0.053 *** 0.231 0.053 *** 0.230 0.053 *** 0.232 0.053 *** 
Sex*Years of Schooling 0.031 0.009 ***               
Sex*Years of Surplus Schooling      0.026 0.012 **          
Sex*Years of Deficit Schooling           -0.041 0.015 ***     
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Sex*Years of Required Schooling                -0.003 0.009   
Constants  6.872 0.121 *** 6.773 0.117 *** 6.744 0.117 *** 6.749 0.123 *** 
Sigma U 1.165    1.164    1.165    1.165    
Sigma E 1.308    1.309    1.308    1.309    
Rho 0.443    0.442    0.442    0.442    
                     
Wald chi2(26)     2121.73    2113.86    2117.49    2108.84    
Prob > chi2 0    0    0    0    
Number of obs 14,789    14,789    14,789    14,789    
Number of groups 11,963     11,963     11,963     11,963     
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; *** 
significance level at 1 per cent. 
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Table XVI.5: Sample Distribution Based on Years of Deficit Schooling and Sector (in 
per cent)   
Years of 
Deficit 
Schooling 
Private Public 
2000 2007 2014 Total 2000 2007 2014 Total 
0 86.7 76.8 75.7 79.4 84.5 90.2 89.3 88.3 
3 6.3 9.8 11.2 9.3 12.0 4.5 4.2 6.4 
4 0.0 1.7 1.9 1.3 0.0 3.0 4.4 2.7 
6 6.9 11.0 10.6 9.6 3.2 2.0 1.3 2.0 
7 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.2 
9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.2 
10 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 
Total 5,379 5,049 7,084 17,512 1,006 1,251 1,405 3,662 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
 
Table XVI.6: Sample Distribution Based on Years of Surplus Schooling and Sector   
Years of 
Surplus 
Schooling 
Private Public 
2000 2007 2014 Total 2000 2007 2014 Total 
0 71.7 77.2 78.3 75.9 70.7 66.3 68.0 68.2 
2 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.8 3.5 1.6 
3 12.1 8.1 6.7 8.8 6.3 3.6 3.2 4.2 
4 2.4 4.9 6.1 4.6 9.3 10.2 10.3 10.0 
6 12.0 7.7 6.9 8.7 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 
7 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 9.6 9.8 6.1 8.3 
9 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.0 
10 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.1 2.1 7.0 5.8 5.2 
12 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.4 
16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Total 5,379 5,049 7,084 17,512 1,006 1,251 1,405 3,662 
Source: The author’s calculation.
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Table XVI.7: Summary Statistics of Main Variables by Sector 
Variable Private Public 
Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Wage (log of hourly 
wages) 17,512 8.12 1.80 0 16.94 3,662 9.08 1.55 0 13.88 
Years of required 
schooling  17,512 9.99 3.24 6 16.00 3,662 12.48 3.58 6 16.00 
Years of surplus 
schooling (OE) 17,512 1.15 2.25 0 16.00 3,662 1.81 3.04 0 16.00 
Years of deficit 
schooling (UE) 17,512 0.94 1.99 0 10.00 3,662 0.47 1.38 0 10.00 
Potential Experience 17,512 15.01 10.17 0 43.00 3,662 18.53 9.98 0 43.00 
Experience squared 17,512 328.86 388.75 0 1849.00 3,662 442.79 388.41 0 1849.00 
Sex (1=female) 17,512 0.36 0.48 0 1 3,662 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Ethnicity 
(1=Javanese) 17,512 0.16 0.37 0 1 3,662 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Marital status: Single 17,512 0.29 0.45 0 1 3,662 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Marital status: 
Married and 
cohabitate 
17,512 0.67 0.47 0 1 3,662 0.85 0.36 0 1 
Marital status: Other 
(Separated, divorced 
and widowed) 
17,512 0.04 0.20 0 1 3,662 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Employment Status: 
full-time (30 hours a 
week or more) 
17,512 0.85 0.35 0 1 3,662 0.79 0.41 0 1 
Tenure 17,512 5.34 6.29 0 52.00 3,662 12.00 9.26 0 40.00 
Tenure squared 17,512 68.05 158.18 0 2704.00 3,662 229.64 285.70 0 1600.00 
Sector: private 17,512 1.00 0.00 1 1 3,662 0.00 0.00 0 0 
Industry1: agriculture 17,512 0.11 0.31 0 1 3,662 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Industry2: mining and 
quarrying 17,512 0.01 0.11 0 1 3,662 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Industry3: 
manufacturing 17,512 0.26 0.44 0 1 3,662 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Industry4: electricity, 
gas and water 17,512 0.01 0.08 0 1 3,662 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Industry5: 
construction 17,512 0.07 0.25 0 1 3,662 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Industry6: wholesale, 
retail, restaurants and 
hotels 
17,512 0.19 0.39 0 1 3,662 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Industry7: 
transportation, 
storage, and 
communications 
17,512 0.04 0.20 0 1 3,662 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Industry8: finance, 
insurance, real estate 
and business services 
17,512 0.04 0.20 0 1 3,662 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Industry9: social 
services 17,512 0.27 0.44 0 1 3,662 0.86 0.35 0 1 
Firm size1: 1-19 
people 17,512 0.62 0.49 0 1 3,662 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Firm size2: 20-99 
people 17,512 0.22 0.41 0 1 3,662 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Firm size3: >= 100 
people 17,512 0.16 0.37 0 1 3,662 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Urban 17,512 0.69 0.46 0 1 3,662 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Capital region 17,512 0.12 0.32 0 1 3,662 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
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Appendix XVII: Estimation Results: Basic Model of Pooled OLS and Cluster 
Standard Error 
 
Table XVII.1: Pooled OLS and Cluster Standard Error Results 
Variable 
Pool OLS  Cluster SE (Year) Cluster SE (individual) 
Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t 
Years of required schooling  0.120 0.005 *** 0.106 0.003 *** 0.106 0.005 *** 
Years of surplus schooling (OE) 0.108 0.006 *** 0.100 0.004 ** 0.100 0.006 *** 
Years of deficit schooling (UE) -0.090 0.007 *** -0.087 0.004 ** -0.087 0.007 *** 
Experience 0.034 0.005 *** 0.034 0.003 ** 0.034 0.005 *** 
Experience squared -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 * -0.001 0.000 *** 
Sex (1=female) -0.305 0.025 *** -0.310 0.032 * -0.310 0.025 *** 
Ethnicity (1=Javanese) 0.074 0.031 * 0.043 0.048   0.043 0.031   
Married and cohabitate 0.189 0.034 *** 0.171 0.014 ** 0.171 0.038 *** 
Other (Separated, divorced and 
widowed) 0.116 0.067   0.101 0.083   0.101 0.069   
Status: full-time (30 hours a week 
or more) -0.367 0.033 *** -0.355 0.047 * -0.355 0.040 *** 
Tenure 0.070 0.005 *** 0.073 0.005 ** 0.073 0.005 *** 
Tenure squared -0.002 0.000 *** -0.002 0.000 ** -0.002 0.000 *** 
Sector: private -0.296 0.038 *** -0.327 0.012 ** -0.327 0.038 *** 
Industry2: mining and quarrying 0.529 0.110 *** 0.490 0.095 * 0.490 0.120 *** 
Industry3: manufacturing 0.140 0.047 ** 0.153 0.061   0.153 0.048 ** 
Industry4: electricity, gas and 
water -0.168 0.135   -0.171 0.289   -0.171 0.193   
Industry5: construction 0.161 0.060 ** 0.166 0.029 * 0.166 0.068 * 
Industry6: wholesale, retail, 
restaurants and hotels 0.009 0.051   0.008 0.060   0.008 0.054   
Industry7: transportation, storage, 
and communications -0.020 0.070   0.008 0.166   0.008 0.078   
Industry8: finance, insurance, real 
estate and business services 0.440 0.074 *** 0.391 0.089 * 0.391 0.074 *** 
Industry9: social services 0.040 0.046   0.057 0.089   0.057 0.048   
Firm size2: 20-99 people 0.229 0.028 *** 0.219 0.026 * 0.219 0.027 *** 
Firm size3: >= 100 people 0.465 0.034 *** 0.422 0.036 ** 0.422 0.034 *** 
Urban 0.139 0.027 *** 0.132 0.067   0.132 0.027 *** 
Capital region 0.227 0.038 *** 0.260 0.022 ** 0.260 0.042 *** 
2007      0.0848 0.003 *** 0.085 0.029 ** 
2014      0.2923 0.005 *** 0.292 0.031 *** 
Constants 6.570 0.087 *** 6.619 0.050   6.619 0.097 *** 
Number of observations 21,174    21,174    21,174    
The R-squared statistic 0.15     0.15     0.16     
Coefficient test: F-test (p-value)           
H0: years of required = years of 
OE 5.36 (0.02)            
H0: years of required = years of 
UE 461.76 (0.00)               
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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Appendix XVIII: Coefficient Test by Gender and Sector 
 
Table XVIII.1: Coefficient Test by Gender 
  
Male 
F-test (p-value) 
Pooled OLS 
+ dummy 
year 
RE FE 
H0: years of required = years 
of surplus schooling 2.23 (0.13) 0.47 (0.49) 1.79 (0.18) 
H0: years of required = years 
of deficit schooling 209.80 (0.00) 171.41 (0.00) 3.17 (0.08) 
    
  
Female 
F-test (p-value) 
Pooled OLS 
+ dummy 
year 
RE FE 
H0: years of required = years 
of surplus schooling 0.25 (0.62) 0.82 (0.36) 0.25 (0.62) 
H0: years of required = years 
of deficit schooling 142.58 (0.00) 121.62 (0.00) 2.17 (0.14) 
Source: The author’s calculation.  
 
 
 
Table XVIII.1: Coefficient Test by Sector 
  
Private 
F-test (p-value) 
Pooled OLS + 
dummy year RE FE 
H0: years of required = years 
of surplus schooling 0.00 (0.97) 0.02 (0.87) 0.15 (0.70) 
H0: years of required = years 
of deficit schooling 219.82 (0.00) 193.10 (0.00) 3.61 (0.06) 
    
  
Public 
F-test (p-value) 
Pooled OLS + 
dummy year RE FE 
H0: years of required = years 
of surplus schooling 0.23 (0.63) 0.30 (0.58) 3.15 (0.07) 
H0: years of required = years 
of deficit schooling 129.29 (0.00) 102.27 (0.00) 0.01 (0.93) 
Source: The author’s calculation.  
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Appendix XIX: Robustness Test by Mean: Summary Statistics and Estimation 
Result 
 
Table XIX.1: Summary Statistics of Selected Variables Based on Mean  
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Years of 
required 21,174 10.72 2.20 6.98 15.64 
Years of 
over-
education 21,174 0.71 1.71 0.00 11.93 
Years of 
under-
education 21,174 0.62 1.50 0.00 9.64 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
 
 
Table XIX.2: Coefficient Test 
  
Coefficient test  
F-test (p-value) 
Pooled OLS RE FE 
H0: years of required = years of 
OE 17.03 (0.00) 12.67 (0.00) 0.92 (0.34) 
H0: years of required = years of 
UE  322.09 (0.00) 252.25 (0.00) 0.93 (0.34) 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; 
*** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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Table XIX.3: Estimation Results Based on Mean  
Variable 
Pooled OLS with 
dummy year RE FE 
Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t 
Years of required schooling  0.133 0.007 *** 0.121 0.008 *** 0.012 0.019   
Years of surplus schooling (OE) 0.096 0.007 *** 0.090 0.007 *** -0.002 0.018   
Years of deficit schooling (UE) -0.076 0.008 *** -0.073 0.009 *** -0.019 0.019   
Experience 0.029 0.005 *** 0.026 0.005 *** -0.018 0.020   
Experience squared -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000   
Sex (1=female) -0.340 0.025 *** -0.355 0.028 *** (omitted) 
Ethnicity (1=Javanese) 0.038 0.032   0.053 0.036   (omitted) 
Married and cohabitate 0.190 0.034 *** 0.194 0.035 *** 0.238 0.070 *** 
Other (Separated, divorced and 
widowed) 0.117 0.066   0.135 0.068 * 0.258 0.130 * 
Status: full-time (30 hours a week or 
more) -0.344 0.033 *** -0.359 0.033 *** -0.440 0.058 *** 
Tenure 0.074 0.005 *** 0.070 0.005 *** 0.035 0.008 *** 
Tenure squared -0.002 0.000 *** -0.002 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** 
Sector: private -0.340 0.038 *** -0.331 0.040 *** -0.217 0.087 * 
Industry2: mining and quarrying 0.465 0.110 *** 0.372 0.113 *** 0.088 0.206   
Industry3: manufacturing 0.155 0.047 *** 0.181 0.047 *** 0.137 0.092   
Industry4: electricity, gas and water -0.187 0.135   -0.179 0.137   -0.303 0.241   
Industry5: construction 0.142 0.060 * 0.144 0.061 * 0.079 0.119   
Industry6: wholesale, retail, 
restaurants and hotels 0.030 0.050   0.051 0.051   0.015 0.101   
Industry7: transportation, storage, and 
communications 0.030 0.070   0.054 0.071   0.015 0.130   
Industry8: Finance, insurance, real 
estate and business services 0.361 0.075 *** 0.361 0.075 *** 0.161 0.143   
Industry9: Social services 0.012 0.048   0.050 0.048   0.009 0.093   
Firm size2: 20-99 people 0.229 0.028 *** 0.215 0.029 *** 0.069 0.050   
Firm size3: >= 100 people 0.454 0.035 *** 0.416 0.035 *** 0.133 0.063 * 
Urban 0.153 0.027 *** 0.168 0.028 *** 0.091 0.067   
Capital region 0.259 0.039 *** 0.256 0.043 *** 0.288 0.197   
2007 0.104 0.030 *** 0.115 0.028 *** 0.519 0.133 *** 
2014 0.299 0.030 *** 0.335 0.029 *** 1.138 0.251 *** 
Constants 6.372 0.100 *** 6.484 0.104 *** 8.035 0.309 *** 
Rho       0.438     0.652     
Number of observations 21,174    21,174    21,174    
Number of individuals       15,440     15,440     
The R-squared statistic 0.1557            
Wald chi2(3)     3298.850  ***     
F Test          29.49  *** 
Post Estimation:                   
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for RE          
Var(u) = 0    29.840  ***     
Hausman Test             
H0:  difference in coefficients not systematic       140.9   *** 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent; 
*** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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Appendix XX: Robustness test of the Balanced Panel Data: Sample Distribution, 
Summary Statistics and Estimation Result 
 
Table XX.1: Distribution of Years of Required Schooling, Years of Surplus Schooling 
and Years of Deficit Schooling for Balanced Panel Data 
Years of Required 
Schooling 2000 2007 2014 Total 
6 468 275 205 948 
9 13 29 0 42 
12 464 567 649 1,680 
15 183 42 26 251 
16 0 215 248 463 
Total 1,128 1,128 1,128 3,384 
     
Years of Surplus Schooling 2000 2007 2014 Total 
0 796 892 899 2,587 
2 0 6 17 23 
3 102 55 47 204 
4 46 48 63 157 
6 160 88 65 313 
9 11 10 6 27 
10 13 27 27 67 
12 0 2 4 6 
Total 1,128 1,128 1,128 3,384 
     
Years of Deficit Schooling 2000 2007 2014 Total 
0 967 842 812 2,621 
3 112 118 119 349 
4 0 36 38 74 
6 49 122 153 324 
7 0 6 5 11 
9 0 2 0 2 
10 0 2 1 3 
Total 1,128 1,128 1,128 3,384 
Source: The author’s calculation.  
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Table XX.2: Summary Statistics of the Balanced Panel 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Wage (log of hourly wages) 3,384 8.69 1.41 0 13.42 
Years of required schooling  3,384 11.05 3.49 6 16 
Years of surplus schooling (OE) 3,384 1.23 2.45 0 12 
Years of deficit schooling (UE) 3,384 1.01 2.00 0 10 
Experience 3,384 19.46 8.68 0 43 
Experience squared 3,384 453.98 357.14 0 1849 
Sex (1=female) 3,384 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Marital status: Single 3,384 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Marital status: Married and cohabitate 3,384 0.84 0.37 0 1 
Marital status: Other (Separated, 
divorced and widowed) 3,384 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Status: full-time (30 hours a week or 
more) 3,384 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Tenure 3,384 0.86 0.34 0 1 
Tenure squared 3,384 10.21 8.41 0 51.83333 
Sector: private 3,384 174.85 240.48 0 2686.694 
Industry1: agriculture 3,384 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Industry2: mining and quarrying 3,384 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Industry3: manufacturing 3,384 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Industry4: electricity, gas and water 3,384 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Industry5: construction 3,384 0.04 0.21 0 1 
Industry6: wholesale, retail, 
restaurants and hotels 3,384 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Industry7: transportation, storage, and 
communications 3,384 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Industry8: finance, insurance, real 
estate and business services 3,384 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Industry9: Social services 3,384 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Firm size1: 1-19 people 3,384 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Firm size2: 20-99 people 3,384 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Firm size3: >= 100 people 3,384 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Urban 3,384 0.71 0.45 0 1 
Capital region 3,384 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Source: The author’s calculation.  
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Table XX.3: Estimation Results of the Balanced Panel Data 
Variable 
Pooled OLS with 
dummy year RE FE 
Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t 
Years of required schooling  0.119 0.010 *** 0.119 0.010 *** 0.080 0.032 * 
Years of surplus schooling (OE) 0.105 0.011 *** 0.107 0.012 *** 0.084 0.032 ** 
Years of deficit schooling (UE) -0.113 0.012 *** -0.116 0.013 *** -0.092 0.034 ** 
Experience 0.013 0.012   0.013 0.012   -0.012 0.034   
Experience squared 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   
Sex (1=female) -0.194 0.047 *** -0.194 0.050 *** (omitted) 
Ethnicity (1=Javanese) -0.071 0.052   -0.070 0.056   (omitted) 
Married and cohabitate 0.265 0.081 ** 0.260 0.083 ** 0.198 0.110   
Other (Separated, divorced and widowed) 0.173 0.132   0.197 0.134   0.375 0.190 * 
Status: full-time (30 hours a week or more) -0.333 0.065 *** -0.341 0.065 *** -0.399 0.086 *** 
Tenure 0.029 0.008 *** 0.030 0.008 *** 0.030 0.010 ** 
Tenure squared 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   -0.001 0.000 * 
Sector: private -0.512 0.063 *** -0.491 0.066 *** -0.181 0.119   
Industry2: mining and quarrying 0.753 0.218 *** 0.695 0.223 ** 0.162 0.314   
Industry3: manufacturing 0.146 0.096   0.156 0.098   0.189 0.134   
Industry4: electricity, gas and water -0.572 0.239 * -0.573 0.244 * -0.667 0.341   
Industry5: construction 0.086 0.130   0.104 0.132   0.287 0.187   
Industry6: wholesale, retail, restaurants and 
hotels -0.102 0.109   -0.084 0.110   0.041 0.153   
Industry7: transportation, storage, and 
communications -0.009 0.136   0.035 0.139   0.404 0.192 * 
Industry8: finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services 0.175 0.156   0.158 0.159   -0.002 0.220   
Industry9: Social services -0.117 0.098   -0.087 0.099   0.075 0.134   
Firm size2: 20-99 people 0.110 0.049 * 0.103 0.051 * 0.001 0.074   
Firm size3: >= 100 people 0.146 0.062 * 0.136 0.064 * -0.004 0.091   
Urban 0.010 0.049   0.009 0.052   -0.021 0.098   
Capital region 0.325 0.075 *** 0.318 0.080 *** -0.105 0.344   
2007 0.106 0.059   0.109 0.058   0.401 0.233   
2014 0.321 0.072 *** 0.326 0.073 *** 0.856 0.439   
Constants 7.172 0.187 *** 7.148 0.194 *** 7.673 0.705 *** 
Rho       0.084     0.352     
Number of observations 3,384    3,384    3,384    
Number of individuals       1,128     1,128     
The R-squared statistic 0.2681            
Wald chi2(3)     1122.9  ***     
F Test          15.01  *** 
Post Estimation:                   
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for RE          
Var(u) = 0    21.690  ***     
Hausman Test             
Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic       71.3   *** 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent. 
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Appendix XXI: Estimation Results Based on Verdugo and Verdugo’s Model 
Table XXI.1: Verdugo and Verdugo’s Estimation Results 
Variable 
Pooled OLS with 
dummy year RE RE 
Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t Coef SD P>t 
Years of actual schooling 0.112 0.005 *** 0.109 0.006 *** 0.059 0.033   
Dummy of Overeducation 0.118 0.034 *** 0.094 0.033 ** -0.041 0.055   
Dummy of Undereducation -0.034 0.030   -0.016 0.030   0.026 0.051   
Experience 0.035 0.005 *** 0.033 0.005 *** 0.025 0.029   
Experience squared -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 * 
Sex (1=female) -0.313 0.025 *** -0.329 0.028 *** (omitted)  
Ethnicity (1=Javanese) 0.042 0.031   0.056 0.036   (omitted)  
Married and cohabitate 0.169 0.034 *** 0.170 0.035 *** 0.236 0.070 *** 
Other (Separated, divorced and 
widowed) 0.100 0.066   0.116 0.068   0.253 0.130   
Status: full-time (30 hours a week or 
more) -0.356 0.033 *** -0.367 0.033 *** -0.441 0.058 *** 
Tenure 0.073 0.005 *** 0.068 0.005 *** 0.035 0.008 *** 
Tenure squared -0.002 0.000 *** -0.002 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** 
Sector: private -0.318 0.038 *** -0.300 0.040 *** -0.216 0.087 * 
Industry2: mining and quarrying 0.477 0.110 *** 0.379 0.112 *** 0.086 0.206   
Industry3: manufacturing 0.145 0.047 ** 0.172 0.047 *** 0.144 0.091   
Industry4: electricity, gas and water -0.182 0.135   -0.177 0.137   -0.286 0.241   
Industry5: construction 0.168 0.060 ** 0.162 0.061 ** 0.075 0.119   
Industry6: wholesale, retail, 
restaurants and hotels -0.003 0.051   0.022 0.052   0.027 0.101   
Industry7: transportation, storage, 
and communications 0.001 0.070   0.028 0.070   0.019 0.129   
Industry8: finance, insurance, real 
estate and business services 0.373 0.074 *** 0.363 0.074 *** 0.176 0.142   
Industry9: Social services 0.027 0.046   0.056 0.047   0.022 0.091   
Firm size2: 20-99 people 0.217 0.028 *** 0.202 0.029 *** 0.071 0.050   
Firm size3: >= 100 people 0.421 0.035 *** 0.385 0.035 *** 0.135 0.063 * 
Urban 0.123 0.027 *** 0.138 0.028 *** 0.089 0.067   
Capital region 0.258 0.038 *** 0.254 0.043 *** 0.291 0.197   
2007 0.085 0.030 ** 0.093 0.028 *** 0.222 0.204   
2014 0.289 0.030 *** 0.315 0.029 *** 0.563 0.388   
Constants 6.548 0.088 *** 6.564 0.092 *** 7.177 0.556 *** 
Rho       0.437     0.628     
Number of observations 21,174    21,174    21,174    
Number of individuals       15,440     15,440     
The R-squared statistic 0.159            
Wald chi2(3)     3406.81  ***     
F Test          29.64  *** 
Post Estimation:                   
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test RE          
Var(u) = 0    30.860  ***     
Hausman Test             
Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic       98.73   *** 
Source: The author’s calculation. 
Notes: * significance level at 10 per cent; ** significance level at 5 per cent;  
*** significance level at 1 per cent.  
